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ABSTRACT
Many people know that English law has Been received 
in the four countries of West Africa, namely, The Gambia, 
Sierra Leone, Ghana and Nigeria^ but few people realise 
that English law applies in West Africa ^so far only as 
the limits of the local jurisdiction and local circumstances 
permit and subject to any existing or future local 
Ordinance1*« The object of this thesis, therefore, is to 
show the limits placed on the application of English law 
in West Africa® It is divided into four main parts®
Part One deals with the evolution of the judicial 
systems which are modelled on the English pattern. A 
separate chapter gives a synopsis of the present judicial 
systems*
Part Two is devoted to the general principles governing 
the reception of English law in the former British colonies 
with special reference to West Africa*
English law comprises the common law, the doctrines of 
Equity and statutes® Succeeding chapters deal with the 
reception of each of the three elements of English law in 
West Africa«
Part Three relates to the application of the common law 
of England in West Africa and the condition of Its 
applicability. Some distinctive features of the common law,
for example, judicial precedents, the jury system, 
prerogative writs, the independence of the judges, contract, 
tort and criminal law are discussed®
Part Four deals with the influence of equity both on 
the general law and on the application of customary laws in 
West Africa*
Part Five relates to the application of English statutes 
of general application, some of which are deemed to be in 
force in West Africa depending on the date of the reception 
of English law*
The common law of West Africa can, therefore, be defined 
as embracing the three elements of English law and the 
local modifications made on their application*
T A B L E  OF C O N T E N T S  
PART I 
THE JUDICIAL SYSTEMS
Chapter One 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEMS
A. THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO 1821
B« WEST AFRICAN SETTLEMENTS (1821 AND AFTER)
C. DR. MADDEN*S REPORTS AND THEIR REPERCUSSIONS 1841-1862
D. THE SEJECT COMMITTEE REPORT, 1865
E. THE H CHARTER” OF JULY 24 th, 1874
F. CONSULAR JURISDICTION
Ct. THE SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TERRITORIES
(1) Gold Coast
(2) Nigeria
(3) Sierra Leone
(4) The Gaiabia
II. WEST AFRICAN COURT OF APPEAL II.
Chapter Two 
SYNOPSIS OF PRESENT JUDICIAL SYSTEMS 
Ghana
The Federation of Nigeria 
Sierra Leone 
The Gambia
VPART II
INTRODUCTION AND RECEPTION OF ENGLISH IAW
Chapter Three
INTRODUCTION
A. SETTLEMENT
B. CESSION
C. CONQUEST
D. PROTECTORATES AND PROTECTED STATES
E. TRUST TERRITORIES
THE RECEPTION
P. TilE IAW IN SETTLED COLONIES
(1) Type I
(2) Type II
Gr« THE IAW IN CONQUERED AND CEDED COLONIES
H. OTHER MODES OF RECEPTION
1. Acts of U.K. Parliament declared to extend to all 
overseas territories.
2. Acts extended to particular territories.
3. Acts adopted hy local legislatures.
4. Powers and enactments of colonial legislatures.
5. Powers and enactments of independent Commonwealth 
legislatures.
6. Application of current English law.
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PART III
THE COMMON IAW
Chapter Four
A« NATURE AND CONTENT
1 „ Common lav; and statute law
2» Common law and equity
3* Common law and special law
Bo MIGRATION AND CONDITION OF APPLICABILITY
Ce SOME DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THE COMMON IAW OF ENGLAND
I THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT
(a) Judicial Precedent in West Africa 
(h) The Authority of Decisions of English Courts 
over West African Courts 
(c) Conclusion
II JURX TRIAL
(a) Number of a Jury
(b) The Unanimity Rule
(c) Trial with Assessors
III PREROGATIVE WRITS
(a) Habeas Corpus
(b) Certiorari
(c) Prohibition 
(d)Mandamus
IV thE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDGES
vii
Chapter Five 
A« ASPECTS OF CIVIL (COMMON)IAW IN TOST AFRICA 
1* Contracts
<ia-ww w rr« aggnimifnniiii j twnmo Mn*w
2 * Commercial and related laws 
S a Ib^oF^Ooo d s
(b) C ompany Laws
(c) Miscellaneous 
3® Torts
(aj~ Negligence
(b) Occupier1s Liability
(c) Defamation
(d) Miscellaneous 
4• Evidence
5* Practice and Procedure 
6• The Common Law and the Common Market
B. ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL 3AW* EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE
1« The Criminal Law 
2 o Evidence 
3® Criminal Procedure
viii
PART IV
THE INFLUENCE OP EQUITY IN 
WEST AFRICAN LAW
A « INTRODUCTION
B. NATURAL JUSTICE, EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE
1. The e
(h) Natural justice In its broad sense 
(c) Good conscience
3• Interpretation of Expression as a whole
(a) Repugnancy clause with x^ egard to natural justice
(b) Repugnancy clause with regard to equ11y
(c) Repugnancy clause with regard to public policy
4« By what criteria is it decided 3 and who decides that 
a customary law is repugnant?
Ta) What should the role of the judge be?
(b) Negative aspects, of the judge1 s role
(c) Positive aspects of the judge1s role
0, THE RESIDUAL CLAUSE
1* Origin of the expression
2 e Meaning and application of clause
(a) The Indian example
(b) The Sudan example
(c) The West African example
2 ®
and/or morality
Chapter Seven 
THE DOCTRINES OP EQUITY 
A« INTRODUCTION
ix
Chapter Seven 
THE '.DOCTRINES OF EQUITY (cont.)
B. MAXIMS OF EQUITY
1 prior est tempore potior eat .jure
2* One cannot approbate and reprobate
 ^.1 m .III y1*1 ,l" 1 • 1 1 11     I 1 1 1 I 'I ■> -■ 1- mA ■ I ■1   IM'I* '■ n I n
3* Eq,uity looks on that as done which ought to be done 
4* belay defeats equities
C, EQUITABLE RELIEF AND REMEDIES
XFART V 
Chapter Eight
I STATUTES OP GENERAL APPLICATION
A. THE MEANING- AND SCOPE
B. THE DEC TARING AUTHORITY
C. CONDITIONS OP APPLICABILITY
D. SOME PARTICULAR EXAMPLES
1* Statutes of Limitation 
2• The Statute cf Frauds
5 • Statutes relating "to Fraudulent Deeds and
Conveyances
4* Other statutes declared to he of general
>*>»»* »»*« l,i ■ iijn i >n i Wina► nro»tan*
application 
5• Statutes not of genera1 application
* ^ » = — * f  ■ I I I  I I  I ■  II t m o i » |» » « )  V n t ^ M  ■
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Partnership Act
(53 and 54 Viet* C•39) *•*«*••*••*«••* 324j 494
Settled Land Act
(53 and 54 Vxct* C*69) 196  ^494
Slander of Women Act
(54 and 55 Viet* C.5l)....    347
Coinage Act
(54 and 55 Viet* C * 72 ) »••**»»«»«*»•»»» 189
Colonial Probates Act
(55 and 56 Viet* C«6) «e*o**®*»**«**«** 189
The Conveyancing and Lew of Property Act
(55 and 56 Viet* 0*13) ......    196
The Voluntary Conveyances Act
(56 and 57 Vxct® C*13) 196
The Trustee Act
(56 and 57 Viet* C#53) ******......   196
1893
1894
1894
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1900
x x x
Sale of Goods Act
(56 and 57 Viet® C.7l) 316, 324j 385
320? 327, 329, 467
The Trustee Act, 1893, Amendment Act
(57 and 58 Viet® C.10) ••»*.•«...»•*•• 196
Finance Act
(57 and 58 Viet. C• 30) .««•*»*.«.*«*«*«
Merchant Shipping Act
(57 and 58 Viet. C.60) .........  206, 207
Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act
(53 and 59 Vxct. C.39) «»«.«*.«....«««*. 209, 212
The Judicial Trustees Act
(59 and 60 Viet. C.35) 196
hand Transfer Act
(60 and 61 Viet. C.65)..............    460 , 494
Criminal Evidence Act
(61 and 62 Vxct. C.36) ...««.««.«.«..... 369
Colonial Loans Act
6^2 and 63 Vict. C•36) ................ 190
Colonial Solicitors Act
(63 and 64 Viet. C.14) ..............  188
Merchant Shipping (Liability of Shipoimers and 
Others) Act
(63 and 64 Viet. C-32)  ........   207
1900 Money-lenders Act
(63 and 64 Vxct® C ® 51) ..o.o.......... 335
1900 Colonial Stock Act
(63 and 64 Viet. C.62)  ..... 188
1907 Evidence (Colonial Statutes) Act
(7 Edw. 7 C.16)   ....   188
1907 Criminal Appeal Act
(7 Edw. 7 C.23 )««*«.....e**.©.....*... 82, 119
1908 Companies (Consolidation) Act
(8 Edw. 7 C.69) 188, 330
1911 Perjury Act
(1 and 2 Geo. 5, C.6) ........s....... 197, 874
1911 The Conveyancing Act
(1 and 2 Geo. 5, C.37) ..............o 196
1911 Copyright Act
(1 and 2 Geo 5, C.46) ................ 190
1913 Foreign Jurisdiction Act
(3 and 4 Geo 5, C*16) « 170—172, 188
1913 Forgery Act
(3 and 4 Geo® 5, C.27).....«......... 197
1915 Indictment Act
(5 and 6 Geo* 5, C.90) 373
1916 Larceny Act
(6 and 7 Geo * 5, C.50) ............... 197 , 27 4
1919
1920
1925
1925
1925
1925
1925
1927
1928
1929
1931
1932
XXX//’
Trade Marks Act
(9 and 10 Geo* 5, C#10) ••*•»*••**•**•* 201
Administration of Justice Act
(10 and 11 Geo« 5^  C«Sl) »*«•»•««•«•»«» 190
Law of Property Act
(15 and 16 Geo * 5 , C * 20) ***®**«»*o*»®© 195 , 27 4j 450 , 471,
482
Administration of Estates Act
(15 and 16 Geo• 5, C•23) **oo*©#o®*©®* 494
Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 
(15 and 16 Geo * 5 y C *49) ©***•©©••»*••* 302
Summary Jurisdiction, (Separation and Maintenance) Act 
(15 and 16 Geo• 5, C»51) 209
Workmens1 Compensation Act
(15 and 16 Geo * 5, C * 84 ) 339
Money-lenders Act
(17 and 18 Geo« 5, C•21) ****0000®**®**® 335
Companies Act
(lS and 19 Geo» 5, C©45) «»o®***oe****»« 330
Companies Act
(19 and 20 Geo• 5, C•23) **»***oo***o*«* 33Q
Statute of Westminster
(22 and 23 Geo® 5, C®4)  ..........  205, 213
Carriage by Air Act
(22 and 23 Geo« 5, C*36) ao*®***®*©*©*®* 349
XXX//J
1932
1938
1940
1943
1945
1945
1945
1947
1948 
1948 
1950 
1952
Extradition Act
(22 and 23 Geo * 5, C»39 ) • • • o a o e o * © * ®  136, 186
Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act
(l and 2 Geo® 6, C«63) ••****»*«©®*«® 293, 294, 302
xA"U- ' <~-x f V d r . 2 - ^ 3  G,"'^  « ^  - £  * '*2..il - _ „  ^
Evidence and Powers of Attorney Act
(3 and 4 Geo® 6, C«28) 190
Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act
(6 and 7 Geo * 6, C•40) »«»«•««>>»*»•* 320, 322
British Settlements Act
(9 and 10 Geoo 6, C « 7 ) ©*«©ee®o0»«e* 187
Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act
(8 and 9 Geo® 6 C#2S)  ......  342, 343, 344
Workmens * Compensation (pneumoconiosis) Act 
(9 and 10 Geo » 6, C ® 16 ) 339
Mandated and Trust Territories Act
(ll and 12 Ge0* 6, CJoS)®©©«o®««oo*«>* 173
Companies Act
(ll and 12 Geo® 6, C ® 38 ) e * o e ® « # « a o « © »  320, 330
Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act, 1948 
(ll and 12 Geo © 6, C © 41) 339, 340
Matrimonial Causes Act
(l4 Geo0 6 ,  C 9 25) o © o « < ? © f .  c © © < > < J u < t c © o e o ©  208
Defamation Act
(15 and 16 Geo 6 and 1 Elis© 2« C066) ©©©©© 346
1954
1956
1956
1957
1957
1957
1958
1958
1960
1960
1960
1960
Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act
(2 and 3 Eliz« 2, C «34) 316, 321
Administration of Justice Act
(4- and 5 Eliz. 2, Co46)  .....................352
Restrictive Trade Practices Act
(4 and 5 Elia* 2 3 C*68) .......    318
Ghana Independence Act
(5 and 6 Elia* 2, C.6) ................ * 187, 206, 213
Homicide Act
(5 and 6 Eliz* 2, C.ll) ......... *.....  365
Occupiers1 Liability Act
(5 and 6 Eliz 2, C»31) ....e..*..»••••*•«• 344, 345
Matrimonial Causes (Property and Maintenance) Act
(6 and 7 Eliz. 2, C*35).................  208
Divorce (insanity and Desertion) Act
(6 and 7Eliz* 2, C*54) ••«*•*•*•••*••••« 209
Marriage (Enabling) Act
(8 and 9 Eliz. 2, C»29) .........   209
Ghana (Consequential Provision) Act
(8 and 9 Eliz* 2, C*41) •***«*•••***••••• 207
Corporate Bodies Contracts Act
(8 and 9 Eliz 2, C*46)  ....   321
Matrimonial Proceedings (Magistrates* Courts) Act 
(8 and 9 Eliz* 2, C.48) • 209
X x x v '
1960 Nigeria Independence Act
(8 and 9 Eliz. 2, C.55)  ..........  X87, 206, 2X3
1960 Charities Act
(8 and 9 Eliz« 2, C<*50) »»*»»««»»»»«» 61, 194
1960 Administration of Justice Act
(8 and 9 Eliz. 2, C.65) ...........  298, 300, 302, 304
1961 Sierra Leone Independence Act
(9 and 10 Elxz• 2, C * 6 ) ••»•»»•«*«•*» 187, 806, 213
X x x v /
B. AFRICAN LEGISLATION
(Where possible, reference is 
made to the appropriate chapter 
number of the laws#)
BRITISH CAMEROONS
192k British Cameroons (Administration)
Ordinance, ^o#3 of 1 9 2 k ...............  98
GAMBIA
18U5 Juries urdinance  ............... ♦.. o 35
1831 Supreme Court and Court of Appeal
Ordinance, No#2 of 1 8 5 1 .............. 3k9 36
1851 "Sierra Leone Ordinances” Ord*
No#6 of 1851 ..........................  202
1855 Criminal Law Ordinance No#3 of 1851 • 191
1866 Administration of Justice Ordinance
N o.8 of 1866  ..................  282
186? Juries Ordinance No.6 of 1 8 6 ? ... 280
1867 Juries Ordinance N0.£ ©f 1867 ....... J>k9
1867 Evidence Ordinance No. 3 of I867 *... 191
1872 Adopting English Criminal Acts
Ordinance No.3 of 1872..........  192
1889 Supreme Court Ordinance, N0.I4 of
1889     U 3 ,  179,
183
1889 Mohammedans and Criminal Law
(Amendment) Oi*dinance No.12 of I889 Ilk
XXXV//
1889 Perjury °rcLlnance No. 13 of
lS89.......... .......... H U
1893 Libel Ordinance ^0.3 of 1893 H U
I89U Protectorate Ordinance No.11
of 189U ........ .............  116
1899 Imperial Acts (Adoption)
Ordinance, N 0e 1I4 0f 1899 • •• 192
1902 The Protectorate Ordinance
No.7 of 1902 ................  116, 117
1905 Mohammedan Law Rcognition
Ordinance No. 10 of 1905 11U* 117
1913 The Protectorate Ordinance
No.30 of 1 9 1 3 ............... 118
1915 The Protectorate Ordinance
No. 10 of 1 9 1 5 ...............  116
1915 Supreme Court (Amendment)
Ordinance, No.16 of 1915 ••• 118
1916 Maintenance of Deserted 
Wives (Amendment) Ordinance
No. 11 of 1916 ............... 211
1916 Statute Law Revision Ordi­
nance No. 20 of 1916 ...... 202
1929 Supreme Court Appeals
Ordinance No.9 of 1929 •••• 118
XXXV///
1930
1931 
1933 
1935 
19UU 
1954 
LAWS
Supreme Court Appeals 
(Amendment) Ordinance, No. 4
of 1930 ...................... 119
Imperial Acts Adoption
Ordinance, No* 2 of 1 9 3 1 ..... 192
Subordinate Courts Ordinance,
No.5 of 1933 ................  119
Provincial 0'ourts Ordinance,
No. 5 of 1 9 3 5 ............... 119
Protectorate Courts Ordinance,
No. 13 of 1 9 4 4 .............. 120
Moneylenders Ordinance, No.
25 of 1 9 5 4 ..................  355
OP GAMBIA. 1955 REVISION
Law of England (Application)
Ordinance, Cap. 3   153, 156, 179?
230, 232, 375,
376, 455, 473
Supreme Court Ordinance,
Cap. 5 .......................  154, 157, 208,
285, 288, 310
Protectorate Courts Ordinance,
Cap. 7 .....................   155
Bathurst Magistrates’ Courts
Ordinance, Cap. 8  ........   154
Court of Requests Ordinance,
Cap. 9 ......................   154
Xxx/X
Maintenance of Deserted 
Wives Ordinance (No.8 of
1887) Cap. 11 ...........   211
Children and Young Persons
Ordinance Cap. 2 0 .....    154
Criminal Codes, Cap. 21 .... 193, 348,
357, 362
Criminal Procedure Code
Cap 23   193, 285,
286, 371
Criminal Evidence Ordinance,
Cap 26   193, 369
Mohammedan Law Recognition 
Ordinance, (No.10 of 1905)
Cap 31 ..................  155
Protectorate Ordinance Cap 41/ 376
District Tribunals Ordinance,
Cap 49 • • •.........  156
Workmen’s Compensation Ordi­
nance, Cap 93 ...............  339
Kombo St. Mary’s District
Court Ordinance, Cap 103 ... 154
Land (Registration of Deeds)
Ordinance, Cap 126 ........   430
Stamp Ordinance, (No.14 of
1937) Cap. 167 .............. 325
x*_
Pawnborkers Ordinance, Cap
177 .............. *........... 335
1955 Sale of Goods Ordinance, No.
J+ of 1955 ...............  326, 328
1955 Companies Ordinance, No.9
of 1955 ...................... 330
m
1956 Worl^ns Compensation An^idment
Ordinance No. 9 ©f.1956-**** 339
1957 Protectorate Courts (Amend­
ment) Ordinance No. 7 of 1957 155
1957 Paw of England (Application)
(Amendment) Ordinance, No.11
of 1957 ...................... 29h 9 302, 340
1958 District Tribunals (Amend­
ment) Ordinance, No.13 of
1958 .........................  156
1938 Protectorate Courts (Amend­
ment) Ordinance 1958   155
1961 Court of Appeal Ordinance,
No.5 of 1 9 6 1   15b, 155
GHANA (Gold Coast)
1853 Supreme Court Ordinance of
1853, No.l of 1853  37, 280
1854 Supreme Court Amendment Or­
dinance, No. 1 of 1854 ••••• 37
X L  I
1856 Supreme Court Amendment
Ordinance, No*5 of 1856 #••• 37
1856 Probate and Administration
No#6 of 1856 ......     38
1857 Supreme Court Equity juris­
diction No# 1 of 1857 ......  38
1859 Divorce and matrimonial
Causes Ordinance, No#l of
1859 .........................  38
1864 Supreme Court Amendment Ordi­
nance, No# 5 of 1 8 6 4 . 37
1866 Supreme Court Ordinance,
No# 7 of 1866 ................  282
1874 Slave-dealing Abol&tion
Ordinance No.l of 1 7 8 4 . 391
1874 Emancipation Ordinance,
No# 2 of 1874 ...............  391
1876 Supreme Court Ordinance,
No.4 of 1876 ................  57, et seq,
179, 1827 426, 
458, 469, 475, 
484
1876 Criminal Law and Procedure
Ordinance, No.5 of I876 •••• 82
1877 Statute Law Revision Ordi­
nance, No#13 of 1877 #•#.*•# 37
1878 Gold Coast Native Jurisdic­
tion Ordinance, No. 8 of 
1878 ........................  73
1883 The Gold Coast Native Juris­
diction Ordinance, No. 5 of
1883 ............*............ 73
1884 Marriage Ordinance, 1884,
No. 14 of 1884 ...................   459
1892 Criminal Code Ora.inance
No. 12 of 1 8 9 2 .............. 356
1893 Statute Law Revision Cr£i-
nance, No.l of 1893  ...... 469
1902 Ashanti Administration
Ordinance, No.l of 1902 .... 74, 76, 80
1906 Companies Or&inance No. 14
of 1906   330
1907 Criminal Evidence Ordinance,
No. 13 of 1907 .............. 369
1918 Ashanti Administration Or­
dinance, 1902 (6th further 
Amendment) Ordinance No. 8 of
1918      77
1919 Ashanti Judicature Ordinance,
No. 9 of 1 9 1 9 ...............  77
X&L.///
1923 Supreme Court Amendment
Ordinance, No.6 of 1923 •••• 79
1927 Native Administration Ordi­
nance, No. 18 of 1927 ♦••••• 31
1928 Laws of the Gold Coast,
1928 Rev.
Native Administration Ordi­
nance , Cap 111     8 1
1929 West African Court of Appeal 
Northern Territories Ordi­
nance, No. 1& of 1929 .......  82
1929 West African Court of Appeal 
Ashanti Ordinance No.17 of
1929   82
1929 Supreme Court Amendment Or­
dinance, No.29 of 1929 ..... 82
1930 Togoland Administration Amend­
ment Ordinance, ^o.l of 1930 82
1932 Northern Territories Native 
Tribunal Op&inance No.l of
1932 ........     81
1932 British Mandate Native Admi­
nistration (Southern Section 
of Togoland) Ordinance, No.l
of 1932 .....................   81
1932 Ashanti - Native Jurisdiction 
Amendment Ordinance, No.3 of
1932    81
1935 Courts Cr&inance No.7 of 1935 81, 1+05, 1+06,
1+07.
1935 Criminal Procedure Code Or­
dinance No.10, of 1935 .....  85
1935 Assessors in Criminal Trials 
(Ashanti) Ordinance, No.37
of 1935 ........   85
1935 Assessors in Criminal Trials 
(Northern Territories) Or­
dinance, No.38 of 1935 ..... 85
Laws of the Gold Coast.
1936 Revision 
Criminal Code, Cap 9 359, 366 et seq.
1951 Laws of the Gold Coast.
1951 Revision
Interpretation Ordinance,
Cap 1 ........................  273
Courts Ordinance, Cap 1+
(same as No.7 of 1935)   137, 211+, 215,
375, 1+06, 1+27, 
1+76, ij.81+
Workmen’s Compensation Or­
dinance, Cap 9 4 ..........  339
X  t-v
Copyright Ordinance, Cap.126 190
Moneylenders Ordinance, (No.
21 of 19U0) Cap 176 ........ 335
Pawnbrokers Ordinance, Cap
189.............. -............ 335
1952 Public Trustee Ordinance,
No. 21+ of 1952 .............. 203
1957 Courts (Amendment) Ordinance
No. 17 of 1957 .............. 87, 121+
1957 Statute Law (Amendment) (No.2)
Act, No.30 1957 ............. 205
1957 Courts of Appeal Act No. 35
of 1957 ...................... 87
1958 Commissioners of Assize and 
Civil Pleas Act, No.12 of
1958   88
1958 Local Courts Act, No.23 of
1958 .........................  86
1959 Courts (Amendment) Act, No. 8
of 1959  ..................  121+
1960 The Republic Constitution •• 265
art. 1 +......     128
art• 1+0 •••••...........   135
art. 1+0 (f) ......    136
art. 1+1  ...... ••••  128, 130
art. 1+2 (2) .................  129
art. 1+2 (1+) .................  266
art. 1+1+ .........    128
art. 1+1+ (l) .................  311
art. b 5 (1) .................  312
(3) .................  312, 31U
I960 Interpetation Act, 1960,C.A.i+ 136, 273, 302,
1+27, 1+97
i960 Courts .Act C.A. 9 ........... /!+, 128 81 s e q . ,
179, 208, 211+',
215, 302, 375,
380, 1+27, 1+73,
1+81+, 1+98
i960 Judicial Service Act, i960
C.A.1 0 .......................  130
i960 Cohtracts Act, i960, Act 25 317, et sea..
1+89
i960 Criminal Code i960, Act 29 31+8, 357, 363,
et sea.
1960 Criminal Procedure Code,
1960, Act 30   132, 286, 288,
365, 369, 370, 
382.
1961 Merchant Shipping Act 
(Liability of Shipowners
and others) Act, 1961,
Act 57 ...................... 266, 207
1961 Administration of Estates Act,
1961, Act 63 ................  271+
X L v
1961 Chieftaincy Act, 1961,
Act 81   130, 136, 307
1961 Copyright Act, 1961, Act 85 190
1962 Farm Lands (Protection) Act
1962, Act 1 0 7 ...............  kk5
1962 Criminal Procedure Code (Amen­
dment) (No, 2) Act, 1962, Act
116    132
1962 Land Registry Act, 1962,
Act 1 2 2 ...................... k30
1962 Courts (Amendment) Act, 1962,
Act 130 ...................... 130, 131, 132
1962 Sale of Goods Act, 1962, Act
No* 137 .............    327
NIGERIA
I863 Application of English Laws
to the Settlement of Lagos
Ordinance No*3 of I863 ..... 180
1863 Supreme Court Ordinance No,
11 of 1863 (Lagos) .........  39
(2o\Jis-C 6
186^ Supreme/_0rdinanee No* 1 of
1861+ (Lagos1)  .......  39
1861}- Supreme Court Ordinance No# 9
of 1861+ (Lagos) .....    39
X L ,  V f n
1865 Supreme Court Ordinance No.5
of 1865 (Lagos) ..........  39
1866 Supreme Court Ordinance
(Lagos) No.7 o f 1866 ....   48, 282
1874 Supreme Court Ordinance No.14- 
of 1876 (Gold Coast Colony
including Lagos ) ..........  180
1886 Extension of the laws of the 
Gold Coast Colony to the Co­
lony of Lagos Ordinance No.l
of 1886 (Lagos) ............. 89
1886 Supreme Court Ordinance N o #8
of 1886 (ILagos) ............. 89
1888 Supreme Court Ordinance No.l
of 1888 (Lagos) ............. 89
1894 Niger Coast Customs Ordinance
1894....................  70
1894 Niger C0ast Post Office Or­
dinance 1894  ............... 70
1894 Niger Coast Constabulary
Ordinance 1894 .............   70
1894 Niger Coast Fire Arms Ordi­
nance 1894  .........  70
X-L/X
1900 Protectorate Court Proclama­
tion No*4 of 1900 (Northern
N i g e r i a ....................... 91
1900 Native Courts Proclamation No.
5 of 19OO (Northern Nigeria) 91
1900 Supreme Court Proclamation
N o.6 of 1900 (Southern Nige­
ria) .................   92
1900 Commissioners1 Proclamation 
No.8 of 1900 (Southern Ni­
geria) .................•••••• 92
1900 Native Courts Proclamation 
No.9 of 1900 (Southern Ni­
geria) .......     92
1906 Native Courts Proclamation 
(Northern Nigeria) No.l of
1906 .........................  93
1912 Companies Ordinance, No. 8
of 1912 (Southern Nigeria) 330
1914 Supreme o0urt Ordinance,
1914* No.6 of 1914 (Colony
and Protect, of Nigeria) 94* 425* 477>
478, 487
1914 Provincial 0ourts Ordinance,
No. 7 of 1914 (Col. and Prot.
of Nigeria) ..............   96
L1911+ Native Courts Ordinance,
No #8 of 1914 (uolony and
Protect* of N i g e r i a )  96, 97
1917 Companies (Amendment and Kx- 
tension) Ordinance, No.66 of 
1917 (col. & Protect, of
Nigeria)......    330
1922 Companies Ordinance, No*54
of 1922 (Colony & Protectorate
of Nigeria) ••••••...............  330
1923 Laws of Nigeria. 1923 Revision 
Criminal -^ocedure Ordinance
Cap. 20  ......   •••• 371
1929 Companies Ordinance, No.20
of 1929 ..............................  330
1933 Protectorate Courts Ordinance,
No.45 of 1933  ...................  98
1933 Supreme ^ourt (Amendment) Or­
dinance No.46 of 1933 ...... 99
1933 West African Court of Appeal
Ordinance, No.47 of 1933 •* 100
1938 Moneylenders Ordinance, No.
45 of 1938 ..........................  333
1944 Coroners Ordinance, No.33 of
1944  ............................  1°°
Li
I9I+5 Magistrates1 Courts (Civil 
Procedure) Ordinance No#38
of 19*4-5  ....................  100
19*1-5 Magistrates* Courts (Appeals)
Ordinance No*1+1 of 19*4-3 .... 100
19*4-8 Laws of Nigeria 19U8 Revision
Native Authority Ordinance,
Cap. 1*4-0..................... 382
Native Courts Ordinance, Cap.
11+2   381, 1+01+
Supreme 0Ourt Ordinance, Cap.
211   1+80, 1+81
19*|8 Native Courts Ordinance, No.
36 of 19*+8 ..................  100
1955 Federal Supreme Court (Gene­
ral Provisions) Ordinance,
No. 27 of 1955 ............... 138
1955 Federal Supreme Court (Appeals)
(Amendment) Ordinance, No.28
of 1955  .................  139
Laws of the Federation of 
Nigeria And Lagos, 1958 
Bevision.
Criminal Code Ordinance No.
15 of 1916, Cap. *4-2 ........  356, 358, 360,
361, 362, 36k, 
366, 393
Ltl
Criminal Procedure Code
Cap. 43 ..............   288, 371, 372
Evidence Ordinance, Cap.62 • 351, 369
1955 High Court of Lagos Ordinance
(Cap. 80) (No.25 of 1955)... 138, 207, 294,
308, 376.
High Court of ^agos (Amend­
ment) Ordinance (No.36 of
1957) See Cap. 80  .......  138
Jury Ordinance Cap.90   279, 285, 286
Land Registration Ordinance
Cap. 9 9 ... 430
Magistrates Court (Lagos)
Ordinance, Cap. 113   139, 211
Pawnbrokers (Lagos) Ordinance
Cap • 146 .........  335
Regional Courts (Federal Ju­
risdiction) Ordinance, Cap.
177      . 208
Sheriffs and Civil process
Ordinance Cap. I89 ......... 352
Workmen1s Compensation Ordi­
nance, Cap. 222  .......   339
i960 Constitution of Federation of
Nigeria. Sched. II ........ 208
Un
1960 Federal Supreme Court Ordi­
nance No*12 of i960 ........ 138
1961 Nigerian Constitution.
First Amendment Act, 1961 •* 102
1961 Administration of Justice
(Habeas Corpus) Act, No.l).l of
1961     300
1961 Ins^^rance Companies Act, 1961
No. 33 of 1961 . 335
1961 Marine Insurance Act, no.5U
of 1961 ...................... 335
Federal Territory of ^agos*
1961 Civil liability (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act, No.33 of 1961 282, 3b3$ 350
1961 Fatal Accidents A.ct, 1961,
No. 3b of 1961 .............. 3k9f U83
1961 Sheriffs and Civil Process
(No.2) Act, No.62 of I96I •• 352
1961 Law Reform (Torts) Act, 1961,
No. 63 of 1 9 6 1 .............. 3b0, 3bk, 3k5
1961 Law Reform (Contracts) Act,
(Lagos) No.614- of I96I   322, b90
1961 Defamation Act, No.66 of
1961  ...................  3k6
Liv
Eastern Region.
1955 Magistrates Courts law, E.R.
No. 10 of 1955 ............... lUl
1955 High Court Law, 1955* E.R.
Ho.27 of 1955 ............... U+0, 11+1, 180
376, 380
1956 Fatal Accidents Law, E.R.
No. 16 of 1956 ..........  31+9
1956 Customary Courts Law, 1956,
E.R. No.21 of 1956    11+1, lh2
1957 Customary Courts (Amendment)
Law, E.R. No. 12 of 1957 ... Ikl, H+2
1938 Magistrates Courts (Amendment)
Law, E.R. No. 8 of 1958 •••• ll+l, 302
1958 Fatal Accidents Amendment law
E.R. No.20 of 1958 .........  31+9
1938 Customary Courts (Amendment)
Law, E.R. No.31 of 1958 (pu­
blished in Vol.l of 1959 An­
nual Volumes)   ll+l, 11+2
i960 Customary Courts (Amendment)
Law E.R. No. 12 of i960 .... Ikl
i960 High Court Amendment Law
E.R. No. ill- of I960 ....... 11+0
L.V
i960 Customary Courts (Amendment) Law
E.R. No. 17 of I960 .......  141
i960 Fatal Accidents Amendment Law
E.N. No.21 of I960 .........  349
Western Region 
Constitution Sched. IV.
art. 49 (2) .....    311
Sched. IV, art. 30 ( 2 ) ......  312
1953 High Court Law, 1953 (No.3
of 1955) now incorporated in 
Cap. 44 of 1959 Revision ... 146, 147
1955 Magistrates Courts Law, 1954*
W.R. No.5 of 1955 (Now incor­
porated in Cap. 74 of 1959
Revision ) ......    147* 148
1955 High Court Law W.R. N 0.7 of
1955* now incorporated in Cap.
44 of 1959 Revision......  146
1957 Customary Courts Law, 1957*
W.R. No. 26 of 1957* now in­
corporated in Cap. 31 of 1959
Revis i o n ......... •*•••  147 * 148
1958 Customary Courts (Amendment)
Law W.R. No.3 of 1958. Now 
incorporated in Cap.31 of
1959 Revision  ...........  148
L y i
1958 Customary Courts (Amendment)
Law W.R# No.11 of 1958. Now 
incorporated in 31 of 1959
R e v i s i o n ....................   1U8
1958 Torts Law, 1958. W.R. No.i+l
of 1958 , now Cap. 122 of 1959
r e v i s i o n .................  3k0, 3U3
1958 Defamation Law, W.R. No.U2 of
1958, Cap. 32 of 1959 Revision 3U6
1959 law of England (Application)
Law, W.R. No.9 of 1959. Now
Cap. 60 of 1959 Revision ... 1U9, 183
1959 High Court Law, W.R. No. 11
of 1959* now incorporated in 
Cap. kh of 1959 Revision ... 1^ -6
1959 Magistrates Courts (Amendment)
Law, W.R. No.12 of 1959, now 
incorporated in Cap. 7k of 1959
Sevision  .....•••••....  3.1+7
1959 Customary Courts (Amendment)
Law W.R. R o .3*4 of 1959 ..... 1U8
1959 Laws of Western Region. 1959
Revision.
Contracts Law, W.R. Cap.25 •• 321, 322, USO
Ls/n
Communal Land. Rights (Vest$S^ara°
Trustees) Law, Cap.2l+...... 1+51
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PART I 
THE JUDICIAL SYSTEMS
1.
Chapter One 
THE EVOLUTION OP THE JUDICIAL SfSTEM1
A. THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO 1821
Tlie British dependencies in West Africa began to be
treated with some seriousness towards the middle of May
1821* A long time before this date, however, considerable
activity both In the commercial and In the judicial field
had been going on*
The history of Sierra B&ne (formerly known as the
^peninsular of Sierra Leone**) dates from the year 1787,
when several Africans who had been released as a result of
2Lord Mansfield*s celebrated judgment in The Negro Case, 
were sent out from England to Sierra Leone as settlers, 
in 1788 a native chief, King Naimbara, and his subordinate 
chiefs stold and ceded certain portions of land to Captain 
John Taylor on behalf of the Hfree community of settlers,
their heirs and successors, lately arrived from England
— i — r . i n i - i r —,i-1 ri.f - ■ - — .. -   - . /and
1. A concise chart of the Important dates is given at p*Cb© 
Valuable cantx>ibutions have already been made on this
topic. On Ghana see SARBAH, J.M* Fanti national const it- 
ution (1906), **The rise of British juii sdictron1* , pp. 71- 
120. REDWAR, H.W.H*. Comments on some ordinances of the 
Gold Coast (1909), pp.TTI— SHIPFI'M'; ('glr'J' W.jj. A note 
on the history of the British courts in the Gold Coast 
Colony (1936). On""Nigeria, see ELIAS, T.O. Groundwork of 
Nigerian law (1953), pp. 37-109. On Sierra Leone, see 
CROOKS^J.j. A history of the Colony of Sierra Leone,
Western Africa (1903), passim; and FYFE, C. A history of 
Sierra Leone (1962) O.U.P.
2. Ipn-iVi 20 St. Tri. p. 1.
2.
and under the protection of the British Government*1 
The first settlement nearly failed Because of unfavourable 
conditions, and the promoters formed themselves into The 
Sierra Leone Company in order to trade with the penin­
sula ^  This was incorporated by an Act of Parliament in 
1791,^ whereby the Court of Directors, inter alia, were 
given powers to enact and declare laws. More settlers 
were brought in from time to time. As a result, the 
Company was granted a Charter of Justice in 1800, which 
authorised the appointment of a Governor, the establishment 
of a legislative council and the setting-up of a Mayor* a 
Court for the administi’ation of justice.^ However, the 
Sierra Leone Company did not remain a ”body politic” for
long. Seven years later an Act was passed 11 for transferr­
ing to His Majesty certain possessions and rights 
vested in the Sierra Leone Company, and for shortening 
the duration of the said Company, and for preventing 
any dealing or trafficking in the buying or selling 
of slaves within the Colony of Sierra Leone ...w7
By the same Act the Company was to cease functioning as a
body politic at the expiration of seven years, and the
T. Colonial Office List (i'957T~p. 185.
4. Burge's Commentaries on colonial and foreign laws (ed. 
by A.W. Renton and G.C. Fhillimore) 1907, Vol. 1, p. 272.
5. 31 Geo III. c. 55.
S. This Charter was subsequently revised in 1808 and 
finally in 1821.
7. 47 Geo III, c. 44, Repealed.
3.
Grown was authorised to resume the management of the settle­
ment. Such was the state of adminlstratIon of justice till 
1821 when fundamental changes were effected.
The sevex*al forts on the Gold Coast (Ghana) ® previous 
to 1821, formed part of the territories of the Corporation 
of the Company of Merchants trading to Africa which was 
created and subsidized annually by Parliament.9 There was 
no distinct judicial settlement then, and the administration 
of justice, as will he seen later, was far from satisfact­
ory.
It Is more accurate to state that the history of the
10British Gambia originates in 1816, when a new settlement 
was founded on the Island of Banjul by the British merch­
ants who had removed from the river Senegal and the Island 
of iSoree:', as a result of the restoration of those places
to the French (by the Treaty of Paris). Banjul was
_________________ /renamed
8. For an ear 11 erTiistory of Ghana, see LUCAS, C.P. 
Historical Geography of the British Colonies. Oxford, 1913, 
Vol. Ill, passim. Colonial Office List. 1862, s. V. ttGold 
Coast” , p. 60. SAHBAH, J.M* Fanti National Constitution. 
(1906) pp. 71-120.
9. 23 Geo. II. c. 31; 25 Geo II. c. 40.
10. For its earlier history, see Colonial Office List, 
s. V. uThe Gambia” , 1862, p. 59. Several different dates 
are given for the original settlement of the Gambia. In 
Parliamentary Papers, Session 1831, Vol. 17, p. 171, and in 
Session 1879, Vol. 34, p. 569, the date of occupation or 
settlement is 1631. In Par. Papers, Session 1845, Vol. 31 
at p. 32, the date Is 1618. Thus there is a divergence of 
opinion or inconsistency even in the most official source.
4L «
renamed St. Mary*s and its town named after Lord Bathurst 
who was at that time the Secretary of State. From the time 
the settlement was founded (i.e. 1816) to 1821 when it was 
annexed to the Colony of Sierra Leone by an Act of Parlia- 
ment, Gambia was governed by a military commandant, aided 
by a board of merchants called MThe Settlement Court*1 •
At this material moment Lagos had not come into the 
picture as far as the establishment of a settlement was 
concerned. But as early as the 17th century, British 
traders had mercantile depots on the mouths of the Niger 
and adjacent rivers and creeks, which dealt in the slave 
trade. Journeys into the hinterland were not undertaken 
until the era of exploration in the 19th century.*^
Since the administration of justice in West Africa at 
that time was far from satisfactory, the British Government 
did not fail to institute an investigation as soon as the 
occasion arrived. It occurred when the Committee of the 
Company of Merchants trading in Africa sent a petition to 
Parliament to ask for an increment of the annual parlia­
mentary grant towards the cost of running the West African 
settlements. Before considering the petition, the British 
Parliament sent out some commissioners to investigate the 
state of the settlements and forts on the West Coast of 
Africa. The main investigation was centred on the slave
n : — I Fid Oeo. IV."c. an.-----------------------------
12. Colonial Office List. S. V. "Nigeria", 1957, p. 148.
5*
trade and how test to deal with further trafficking in it.
But the administration of justice was also looked into.
The report of the Commissioners, which was laid before
the House on June 10th, 183.6,13 made very encouraging
comments on Sierra Leone *'from whence will probably emanate
any degree of civilization which may be attained by 
the adjacent parts of Africa in the south-east 
quarter** * 14
The Commissioners were of opinion that the best way to 
improve the administration of justice and the general 
conditions of the settlementsin West Africa lay in the est­
ablishment of a colony of some strength **from whence as a
focus, a H  efforts might be directed.*... The want of the 
strong control of law, and of a general system of 
jurisprudence, is so severely felt amongst the traders 
in Africa, that the foundation of a colony which may 
attain hereafter a sufficient magnitude to render it a 
suitable seat for courts, armed with full authority to 
repress and punish the enormities which so frequently 
happen on this coast, and pass without animadversion; 
the foundation of such a co3.ony must surely be con­
sidered as a matter worthy of very great attention; 
and there is no place on the whole coast which could 
in any degree be rendered so efficient for this most 
desirable purpose as Sierra Leone.w I3
In order to expedite the administration of law, the
Commissioners made certain suggestions concerning Sierra
Leone. The judgeTs duties as. outlined by them were, inter
alia, to preside at Quarter Sessions, to sit as a judge of
, - -  /the
13. Report of the Commissioners sent out by His Majesty* s 
Government to Investigate the state of the Settlements and 
Forts on the Coast of Africa. Par. Papers, Session 1816, 
Vol. 7fe*>. 121.
5^id, p. 124.
15. Ibid, p. 126.
6.
the admiralty, and to assist the Governor with legal advice 
on all points. Further, he was to sit as a Judge of the
v
Mayor's Court to decide all civil cases, and to have similaa 
powers and jurisdiction as a judge in the King's Bench.
It was also recommended that the Governor and his Coun­
cil should constitute a Court of Appeal, and that a Court 
of Quarter Sessions, or Gaol Delivery, was to he held four 
times a year. On the advisability or otherwise of trial by 
jury, the Commissioners said;
MThe Court of Quarter Sessions being a criminal court, 
it seems impossible to conduct trials without a Petty 
Jury; but if the Grand Jury could be legally dispensed 
with, It would be getting rid of a great nuisance, 
their mode of proceeding being in spite of all admon­
ition, very unsuitable to the spirit of their 
institution.1*
Adverting to the Gold Coast, the Commissioners reported 
very unfavourably on the great expense incurred in keeping 
the various forts, especially in view of the abolition of 
the slave trade in 1807, which formed nine-tenths of the 
settlements' trade. They recommended the dropping of seme 
of the forts. After the report of the Commiss si oners had 
been laid before the House in 1816, a Select Committee of 
the British House of Commons was appointed to examine the
1 Pimatters arising therefrom.
The Select Committee, in their report of the following 
-------«— —   ------ _ ...................     . /year.
16. Select Committee Report. Par. Papers. Session 1817. 
Vol. 6, pp. 403-9.
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year, declined to reconm^Bd.-that & parliamentary grant
should be made to the Company of Merchants trading in
Africa to enable them to establish regular contact with the
interior of the West African settlements. They recommended,
however, that the Government in Chief (Sierra Leone) should
be appointed with supreme authority **over the whole of the
British settlements on the Gold Coast11,
As a result of the recommendations embodied in the
report of 1816, and of other economic difficulties, an Act
was passed by the British Parliament in 1821 to dissolve
17the Africa Company, By a provision in the Act, the Comp­
any was to cease acting as a wbody politic**, A fewmonths 
later, the Company was stripped of all its possessions 
including the forts and castles,which were then vested in 
**His Majesty, his heirs and succes sors for ever**, By 
section 3 Sf the Act, all the possessions held by the Africa 
Company, and also any territories, islands, or possessions 
on the West Coast of Africa, between the 20th degree of 
North latitude and the 20th degree of South latitude, belong­
ing to the Crown, were annexed to or made dependencies of 
the Colony of Sierra Leone ..."and from the date of their
being so annexed or made dependencies on the said 
Golony, they shall be subject to all such laws,
_   _....  /statutes
17. 1 & 2 Geo IV, c. 28.
8,
statutes, and ordinances as shall he in force in the 
said Colony11. Thus, on the dissolution of the Company,
the settlements on the Gambia and the Gold Coast were 
joined to Sierra Leone to form a single 11 colony” under the 
name of the West African Settlements, with the seat of 
government at Sierra Leone.
On October 17th, 1821, a Royal Charter, which regulat­
ed the administration of the government and the dispen­
sation of justice, was granted to the Colony of Sierra 
18
Leone. By the provisions of the uCharter of Justice” , it 
was ordained that there should be 9 or more councillors, 
advising and assisting the Governor, and 5 of the councill-
t
ors could form a quorum* The Governor and Council were to 
have full power and authority to make laws, subject to 
certain limitations. Further, the Governor and Council were 
constituted as a court of record to receive, hear and deter­
mine appeals frcm the Court of the Recorder or other super­
ior courts of the Colony. When the debt, damages or matter
in dispute exceeded the value of M O O ,  and subject to the 
_____    /condition
18. The Constitution of the Colony of Sierra Leone and ita 
dependencies , London, 1835. William Clowes. A supplement­
ary charter was granted on February 17th, 1803S.
9.
condition of giving security, a further appeal could he made
19to the King in his Privy Council.
B. WEST AFRICAN SETTLEMENTS (1821 AND AFTER)
From this period onwards it may he said that the
recommendations of the Commissioners appointed in 1816 to
investigate the state of the West Africa settlements had
heen fully implemented. For, as it was suggested, almost
all the facilities for the administration of government
and for the dispensation of justice were centred on Sierra
Leone. Thus as early as 1825, Sierra Leone could
hoast of a strong legal establishment.20
In addition to the appellate Court of Record just
mentioned, the ^colonial*’ courts were as follows
1. The Court of Royal Commission. This consisted of
the G-overnor, Chief Justice, Commissary, Judge of the 
 _____    /Mixed
19. The full text of the provisions of the Charter can 
also he seen in official documents with reference to Sierra 
Leone, e.g. Sierra Leone Ordinances 1811-1857. compiled hy 
A. Montagu* It must he remembered that the composition of 
the Privy Council in 1821 was quite different from that of 
the body which has come to he known as the Judicial Comm­
ittee of the Privy Council, which dates from 1833.
20. Report of the Commissionerspf Inquiry into the State 
of the Cfelony of Sierra Leone. Par. Papers, Session 1826-7, 
Vol. 7, p. 359.
10.
Mixed Court, Kingi-s Advocate, Colonial Secretary, and 
others. The Court was established for the trial of 
offences committed on the high seas and for offences 
relating to the ®lave trade.'
21
2. The Court of Vice-Admiralty. This was presided 
over by the Chief Justice, but with the establishment of 
the Courts of Mixed Commissions, the business in this Court 
was much reduced.
3# The Court of Beeorder of Freetown. The Chief 
Justice, as Recorder, presided in the Court, aided by two 
assistant judges appointed by the G-overnor from among the 
Council. The Court was said to resemble most closely the
21. This Court was established under the Vice-Admiralty 
Courts, Act, 1863, and the Vice-Admiralty Courts Amendment 
Act, 1867. By these Acts, authority was given to estab­
lish these Vice-Admiralty courts in any ^British possession*! 
These Courts, being ”Imperial” , appeals were direct to the .j 
Privy Council. They did not, however, prove satisfactory, : 
owing to the judges presiding over them also being judges 
in the civil courts of the Colony, to which the rules of 
procedure were different. In 1890 the Colonial Courts of 
Admiralty Act was passed which abolished the Vice-Admiralty 
Court, and provided for the transfer of the admiralty juris­
diction of the High Court of Justice in England to the 
colonial courts, and also allowed inferior courts in the 
colonies to exercise partial and limited admiralty juris­
diction which the Gounty Courts exercised in England. See 
also TODD, A. Parliamentary Government in the Colonies . op 
cit. p. 239. See. e.g. The he hoi*ia(1817) 2 TJ5dsT~21Q. In 
which the Vice-Admiralty Court of Sierra Leone condemned a 
vessel for participating in the slave-trade, contrary to the 
law of nations. Their judgment was reversed on appeal.
Court of Common Pleas in England, and w&s also a Court of 
Equity.
4. The Courts of Quarter Sessions and Oyer and Term­
iner. The Chief Justice presided, With the assistance of 2 
members of the Council. These sessions were held in March, 
June, September and December, and generally completed their 
business within 3 to 5 days. The judges were directed to 
^proceed by indictment, or by such other ways and means as 
are used in England, as nearly as the condition and circum­
stances of the Colony and the inhabitants will admit” .
Apart from those already mentioned, the judicial personnel 
included:- The King's Advocate^ the Sherriff, the Clerk of
the Crown and of the Recorder's Court, the Coroner of Free-
23town, and 2 practising attornies, 7 justices in the Comm­
ission of the Peace, the Mayor of Freetown and 3 aldermen 
and 8 Commissioners of Requests, besides 8 district 
magistrates.
22. The office of Queen's Advocate was abolished in 1896. 
Ordinance No. 10 of 1896 created the offices of Attorney- 
General and Solicitor-General.
23. One of these was a ^person of colour” born and educ­
ated in England, and engaged in mercantile pursuits; see 
CLARK, C. A summary of colonial law, p. 498.
12.
The strong judicial establishment in Sierra Leone 
partly explains the lack of adequate judicial control in
OA
the Gambia. * The Commissioners appointed to inquire into 
the state of the Colony of Sierra Leone in 1826 reported 
that it was sufficient for Gambia to have a resident stipend
Otz
iary magistrate to preside over petty sessions. u It was 
also recommended that an assistant judge should go once a 
year there from Sierra Leone in order to hold a court of 
Oyer and Terminer, and also of Common Pleas. As things 
turned out, it was not possible for the assistant judge to 
travel to Gambia once a year, for in the first decade of 
the formation of the Settlements (1816-26) only two courts 
of Oyer and Terminer and Gaol Delivery were held.^®
The Report of Her Majesty's Commission of Inquiry on 
the Gambia in 1841 sheds a clear light on the administration 
of justice In Gambia in the 1820*s . D r .  Madden, the 
Commissioner, observed that the laws of the Gambia were 
enacted at Sierra Leone, and after obtaining the sanction 
of the Governor-in-Chief, were transmitted to the Gambia.
24. The other reason was the smallness of trade.
25. Report 1826. Op. cit. p. 394.
26. Ibid, p. 394.
27. Report of Her Majesty's Commissioner of Inquiry on the 
State of the British Settlements on the Gold Coast. at 
Sierra Leone and the Gambia ...184-1. Par. Papers. Session 
1842. Vol. 12, p. 9.
13.
Usually from 1 to 3 years elapsed before the laws were
returned. In one case, an Act called the nGrumetta Law**,
purporting to be applicable to the Gambia and passed in
P 8
Sierra Leone in 1825, only reached the Gambia in 1841.''
The Lieutenant Governor of Gambia recounted to Dr. Madden 
that in order to know what laws were applicable to the 
Gambia, an application was made to the Sierra Leone author­
ities for a copy of the laws; the reply they received was 
that no copy existed in that Colony except one which was 
the Sierra Leone Governments copy.
With respect to the admin is tx^ati on of justice, Ur. 
Madden found that the dependence of Gambia on Sierra Leone 
for its laws and judges was very inconvenient to the public 
and created cruel hardship to prisoners confined for crim­
inal offences. Those who were committed for trial had to 
stay in gaol till such time as the Chief Justice of Sierra 
Leone found It convenient to visit the territory, no matter 
how long he might be delayed by business or be detained by 
contrary winds; for the voyage from Sierra Leone, though 
only 500 miles, frequently occuoed 20 to 25 days to comolete
..............T fl"  . . .  - — . 1n ||g - T— t ~- II.. .  ' I Tr-Itwnf  imuiTrfrn r tfc tn u l  1 ndTmr.iH —  * - ^ tti. i i i ■ i     ■ i. i in       n -  m ■ m "  it -  i n     i n i mi  * him m i.
^8* Ibid. Information by one Huntley furnished by the 
Lieutenant-Governor to Ur. Madden. Report 1842, p. 215.
14.
And in the event of death (as in the lamentable case of
Chief Justice 0. Flintoff, who in 1840 was drowned In the
Gambia, where he touched on his way out to Sierra Leone)
a year might elapse before a Court of Oyer and Terminer
could be held.
As it will be recalled, there was no distinct judicial
establishment in the Gold Coast previous to 1821. The only
civil authority was that vested In individuals as justices
of the peace, who also acted as Commissioners of Requests
and decided In cases where thematter in dispute was upwards
of £30 in value. Prisoners under sentence of confinement
were detained In a dark close cell which harboured all
29classes of prisoners indiscriminately.
The poor judicial arrangements on the Gold Coast 
were not changed very much in 1821 when the several forts 
previously belonging to the late Royal Africa Company were 
transferred to the British Crown. In fact, the Crown 
would have done little to improve the forts if Sir Charles 
Wrearthy, then Governor of Sierra Leone (by whom the trans­
fer was effected) had not strongly recommended that 4 of 
the forts should be retained - namely Cape Coast Castle, 
Anomaboe. Uiapopve and Accra.
29. Report of the Comm, of Inquiry, 1826. p. 399.
15.
The wisdom of Sir Charles1 recommendation was to he 
realised later. But It would appear that there were two 
main reasons for the reluctance of the British Government 
to continue maintaining the forts in the Gold Coast.
Firstly, because of the great expense and defeat in the 
Ashanti War of 1824 and the death of Sir Charles in that 
war. (The cause of the defeat was not due to the paucity 
of the British forces - 1000 against 15,000 Ashanti-
wbut by the negligence of the Ordnance storekeeper In 
taking the ammunition out of store, and instead of 
sending the number of kegs of powder that were 
required, sending by mistake a corresponding number 
of casks of vermicelli...HI 30
Secondly, there was a decline in commerce on the Coast.31 
The British Government was, therefore, Inclined to abandon 
the forts on the Gold Coast and to relinquish their control 
over them. However, as a result of representationsmade by 
the local chiefs andmerchants, the forts were transferred tc 
the Company of African Merchants, inter alia, on the follow­
ing terms:- (a) that Cape Coast Castle and the fort at 
James Town, Accra, should remain the dependencies of Sierra' 
Leone, (b) That i&rA'tialh law should continue in force there;
30. Report of Her Majesty^ Commissioner of Inquiry on the 
state of the British Settlements on the Gold Coast, at 
Sierra Leone and the Gambia, 1841. Par. Papers, Session 
1842. Vol. 12, p. 13. !
31. WI should conceive that the slave trade was nine-ten 
ths of the whole trade11, per J. Swanzy, in Minutes of the 
Evidence before the Select Committee of the British House of 
Commons. June 14th, 1816. Pa!r• PapersSession" 1816^'*VolT™ 
7B, p. 24.
16.
and (c) that 5 of the merchants residing in the forts 
should form a council of magistrates for the regulation of 
the internal affairs of the forts, and exercising all such 
powers as might legally be ccnferred upon them for the pre­
servation of the peace, and the protection of the forts; 
provided, however, that themagistrates should not exercise 
authority or jurisdiction over the districts and natives 
under the immediate influence or protection of the forts, 
but solely in the fort*^
It was by virtue of the last provision that some 
form of justice was administered by the G-overnor and the 
Council of Magistrates* One of the reasons for their limi­
ted judicial power seems to be due to the fact that pris­
oners guilty of serious offences were to be sent to Sierra 
Leone for trial. However, on account of the length of 
time it too^ c to transport prisoners from the Gold Coast to 
Sierra Leone, the Governor and the magistrates exceeded 
their powers. They took cognizance of all classes of crimes 
tried them summarily and sentenced the guilty to long terms 
of imprisonment, or Imposed heavy fines and even the death 
sentence* For instance, for stealing a spoon, one Quaw 
Danq.ua, was detained for 5 months, and later sentenced to
1 year!s chain. In Cape Coast Castle, for example, nI was
______  ■.   /informed
32. From a copy of instructions addressed by Lord John 
Russell to Dr* Madden* Select Committee Report, Session 
1842. Vol. 12, p. 5.
17.
informed by the President of the Council of Government 
that he had to take cognizance of cases where applic­
ation fox'* divorce had been made to him; and once in 
the instance of a female, now mistress of the School 
at Cape Coast, married to a European, in which case he 
had pronounced a formal sentence of divorce, and had 
the sentence duly recorded in the archives of his 
office". 53
The inclusion of this quotation is not intended to create
the impression that the Governor favoured the idea of
exercising ultra vires jurisdiction. On the contrary, it
is intended to show that he and his Council found some
difficulty in administering justice. Thus in 1836,
Maclean, then President of the Gouncil of Government of
the Gold Coast, had sent a memorandum to the Committee of
African Merchants in London complaining of the difficulties
involved in the administration of justice. He said, inter 
34
alia? It may be said that Cape Coast Colony is In depend­
ency upon Sierra Leone, and that persons guilty of 
grave offences ought to be sent there (where there is 
a competent court(?)) for trial. But, practically 
speaking, this is impossible. We have no communic­
ation, or the means of communication with Sierra 
Leone; nor have we funds wherefrom the expenses of 
conveying prisoners and witnesses to Sierra Leone could 
be defrayed. Besides, witnesses neither would nor 
could absent themselves from their homes and businesses 
for many months whenever the ends of justice might 
require their presence at Sierra Leone, nor could 
such a sacrifice be required at their hands.
33. Ibid. Per Dr. Madden, The Commissioner. Report of Her 
Majesty1s Commissioner of Inquiry on the State of the 
British Settlements, etc. Par* Papers. Session 1842.
Vol. 12. p. 15*
34. GRIFFITH, W.B. op. cit. p. 9*
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I have thus, I trust, whown the necessity of providing 
for the due administration of existing magistrates to 
act judicially in all cases, or by the establishment 
of a separate and competent court."
C. DR* MADDEN1S REPORT AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS
Lack of proper jurisdiction in certain of the settle­
ments revived the s Have trade. In 1839^inf ormation 
reached the Marquis of Normandy (then Secretary of State 
for the Colonies) that a Spanish slaver,"Don Amigos" a 
short time previous to seizure, had been allowed to trade 
freely at Cape Coast, then a British Settlement on the Gold 
Coast, and "had been supplied there by a British merchant, 
a magistrate, with some of the goods requisite for her 
unlawful traffic". Captain Maclean, the "Governor", did 
not consider himself entitled to interfere with the traffic 
of any vessel of a friendly nation, whatever her purpose.
As a result, Lord John Russell (then Secretary of State for 
the Colonies) expressed the opinion that It was desirable 
that the Government of these settlements should be resumed 
by the Crown, and instructed a Dr. Richard Robert Madden, 
a gentleman who had formerly been employed as a stipendiary 
magistrate in the West Indies, and subsequently in the 
Mixed Commission at Havana, to proceed as Commissioner to
the Gold Coast, and the other British settlements on the 
 ____ _ ___ ___________________ _ ____   /West
35. S&lect Committee Report. Par. Papers. Session 1842. 
Vol.12, p. 9.
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West Coast of Africa, for the purpose of investigating these 
and other matters connected with the administration and con­
dition of these settlementsin 1840.
It was as a result of Dr. Madden1s inquiry laid before
36the British House of Commons in 1842 that the unsatis­
factory state of the judicial system in West Africa, which
has just been described earlier on, was fully reported to
Committee
the British Government. Consequently, a Select/of the
British House of Commons was appointed to inquire into the
state of the British possessions on the West Coast of Africa
more especially with reference to their present relations
with the native tribes, on March 22nd 1842, under the
37Chairmanship of Lord Sandon.
During the various sessions of the Select Committee
one question was uppermost in the minds of all concerned:
the question was whether in view of the unsatisfactory
state of the administration of justice in West Africa, it
would be expedient for each of the three dependencies (i.e.
Gambia, Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast) to be judicially 
 ____ _____ /independent
36* Sel. Cttee Hep. 1842, Vol. 12. An account of which has 
been given earlier. It must be pointed out that neither the 
British Parliament nor the local administrations concurneed 
3-n a3-3- Dr. Madden1 s conclusions. The local administrators 
were of opinion that Dr. Madden heard a great deal from 
irresponsible critics1*. This is a very questionable 
proposition.
37. Sel. Cttee Rep. 1842, Vol. 11.
independent of one another* During the proceedings of the 
Committee, it appeared that delayed justice was one of the 
main factors of maladministration* In a despatch to Lord 
Stanley in 1841, T.L. Ingram, Officer, who was administering 
the government of the Gambia, recounted the case of one
38prisoner, Thomas Lafeuillet, accused of murder and arson*
He was committed for trial by the magistrates * For 10 months 
he was confined and untried* There was no witness in the 
country then whose evidence would convict the accused* The 
only person whose testimony would be sufficient to prove his 
guilt was the accused1s employer, who had returned to Eng­
land In an almost hopeless state of Illness. It turned out 
that the employer had very patiently waited at Bathurst for 
17 months, in the hope that the Chief Justice would arrive 
at the Gambia to hold the general sessions* Ho Chief 
Justice arrived, and so he left for England* As it was 
unlikely that the employer would retiirn, the officer admini­
stering the government expressed the view that in such a 
case, the prisoner had to be acquitted for want of evidence* 
Apart from despatches such as Mr. Ingrams1, a number 
of people, including Dr. Madden, who, by virtue of their
trade or otherwise were qualified to speak on West Africa, 
 — — ________________________ /appeared
38. Sel. Cttee Rep. 1842. Vol. 12, p. 235.
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appeared before the Select Committee to give evidence*
Almost all of them were In favour of separation*
Dr. Madden, reporting on the Gambia, had recommended 
that its growing importance and the great increase in Its 
trade, would render it necessary for it to become independ­
ent of Sierra Leone as regards the framing of its laws and
their execution. This view was reiterated before the
39
Select Committees
Viscount Courtenays **13 it your opinion that it would be
well for the Gambia that the Colony there should have 
the power of making laws to themselves, without 
respect to Sierra Leone?u
Mr* John Hughes % uYes.u
Similar evidence was given by Messrs. Swanzy and Gedges
F. Swanzy; 677s t?I should say the government of the Gold
Coast ought to dej:>end entirely on the Colonial Office 
and not on Sierra Leone...w
Chairman; wWhat is the usual length of passage?n
Swanzy% uGoing up frcrn Gold Coast to Sierra Leone, from 3 
weeks to 8 weeks, sometimes longer, perhaps*
Mr* Forster; 8650s uDo you think the forts on the Gold
Coast should be rendered index^ endent of Sierra Leone?n
Mr* W.E* Gedges wMost decidedly*1
Judging by the trend of the evidence given, it was
therefore not surprising that the Select Committee reported
in favour of separation to the House of Commons, The
following extract relates to the Committee*s attitude to
,___     /the
39* Sel. Cttee Rep. 1842. Minutes of the Evidence, 1842. 
Vol* 11, p* 503, question 7975*
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the Gold Coast %^
nIn the first place, then, we recommend that the 
Government of the British forts upon the Gold Coast he 
resumed by the Crown, and that all dependence on the 
Government of Sierra Leone should cease...*
The Judicial authority at present existing in 
the forts isnot altogether in a satisfactory condition; 
it resides in the Governor and Council, who act as 
magistrates, and whose instructions limit them to the 
administration of British law, and that, as far as the 
natives are concerned, strictly and exclusively within 
the forts themselves; but practically, and necessarily, 
and usefully, these directions having been disregarded, 
a kiiid-g^  irregular jurisdiction has grown up extending 
itself^beyond the limits of the forts by the voluntary 
submission of the natives themselves, whether Chiefs 
or traders, to British \x\ equity ... Still, however, 
it is desirable that this jurisdiction should be 
better defined and understood, and that a judicial 
officer should be placed at the disposal of the Govern- 
or,to assist or super&ede, partially or entirely, his 
judicial functions, and those now exercised by the 
Council and the several Commandants in their magister­
ial capacity; but we would recommend, that while he 
follows in his decisions the general principles, he be 
not restricted to the technicalities of British law 
and that altogether he should be allowed a large 
discretion.•.
Adverting to the Gambia, the Committee made the 
following suggestions!^^
ttAs in the case of the Gold Coast, we recommend 
the entire separation of this Government from that of 
Sierra Leone. The dependence,which has hitherto 
existed, has been the cause of great inconvenience, 
and seems to possess no advantage. The laws of the 
Settlement have been enacted by those little acquainted 
with its concerns**, and we would recommend the 
........ ..- -..   /appointment
40. Sel. Gttee Rep. 1842. Vol. 11, pp. 4-9.
41. Sel. Cttee Rep. Ibid. p. 12.
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appointment of a distinct Judicial Officer in each 
settlement,who should have authority to act in case of 
vacancy in either/1
The recommendations of the Select Committee were accepted 
by the British Parliament, and as will be shown later,
Gambia and the Gold Coast were each in turn made independ­
ent of Sierra Leone.
The first reaction of the British Parliament was to 
pass ”an Act to enable Her Majesty to provide for the 
Government of Her Settlements on the Coast of Africa and in 
the Falkland Islands” on April 11th, 1843. ^  This Act had 
a two-fold purposes firstly, as far as the West African 
territories were concerned, it enabled Her Majesty to make 
such laws and to constitute such courts as might be 
necessary for the preservation of order and the administ­
ration of justice* Secondly, it made it fitozful for the 
Crown to delegate nt o  any three or more persons wthin any 
of the settlements, the powers and authorities so vested 
in Her Majesty in Council.. #n43
42. 6 & 7 Vic. c. 13. Hitherto the British Government had
been legislating for her dependencies in West Africa under 
the Boyal Prerogative. See Rex v. Thompson (1944) 10 WACA 
201 at 207.
43. Ibid. s. 2.
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In August of the same year, the first Foreign Juris­
diction A c t ^  was passed by the British Parliament ”to
remove doubts as to the exercise of power and juris­
diction by Her Majesty within divers countries and 
places out of Her Majesty1 s Dominions, and to render 
the same more effectual” .
By the provisions of this Act, Her Majesty was empowered to 
exercise jurisdiction on the same terms as her authority In 
the Crown Colonies. Any act done by her in order to exer­
cise this jurisdiction was to be deemed as valid and as 
effectual as though the same had been done according to the 
local law then in force within such country or area. The 
third section made it clear 'that, if any doubts arose as to 
the exercise of jurisdiction by Mer Majesty*s judges, the 
matter was to be referred to one of Her Majesty's principal 
Secretaries of State for determination.
By section 4, -persons charged with serious criminal
offences were to be 11 sent for trial to any British Colony... 
and upon the arrival of such person within such 
Colony, it shall and may be lawful for the Supreme
Court exercising criminal jurisdiction within the same
... to try and determine such crime...11
In West Africa at this time, Sierra Leone was the
only ter ritory which was in fact a Crown Colony, and In
which a Supreme Court had been established. It would appear
therefore, that the effect of section 4 was that criminal 
 -      /offenders
44. 6 8c 7 Viet c. 94.
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offenders in tlie Gambia had to be tried by a visiting 
Sierra Leone judge, and that criminals from the Gold Coast 
still had to be transported to Sierra Leone for trial. 
Fortunately this inconvenientce was remedied in good time.
For, even just before the passing of the Foreign Juris­
diction Act, a Commission dated June 24-th, 1843, at Ytfest- 
minster provided that the Gambia should sever its connections 
with the Colony of Sierra Leone. From then onwards she Was 
to be regarded as a separate Colony with her own Governor 
and Commander-in-Chief.
The Gold Coast was next on the list. Three measures
were taken to improve the government and the administration
45of justice there. Firstly, under the Act of 1843, a
British Order dated September 3rd, 1844, constituted the
Settlement of Cape Coast Castle and the Colony of Sierra
Leone as ^British Colonies to which it shall be lawful for
any person having authority derived from Majesty in that 
behalf ... to cause any person charged with the comm­
ission of any crime or offence ... to be sent for triaD 
or in order that sentences passed within such countries 
and places as aforesaid may be carried into effect with­
in such colonies.**
The Order stipulated also that the judges, magistrates,
assessors and other officers, duly appointed to exercise the
jurisdiction in the name <and on behalf of the British
Crown were to observe **until further Order, such of the ___
45. 6 & 7 Vicfc c. 94.
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local customs of* the said countries and places as 
may he compatible with the principles of the law of 
England, and in default of such customs*, such officers 
were to "proceed in all things as nearly as may be 
according to the law of England...'1
Secondly, partly in accordance with the recommendation 
of the Select Committee of 1842, and partly as a result &f 
the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1843, the office of Judicial 
Assessor was created in 'December 1843 and Mr. Maclean was
II Happointed (by warrant) "Government Assessor . This
office was established at the right moment. On March 6th,
1844, certain Fante chiefs inhabiting the area which was
then known as the British Protectorate assembled at Cape
Coast, and ''executed an agreement" which is often referred
47to by the name of the Bond.
By the provisions of the Bond, the chiefs acknowledged 
the power and jurisdiction of the British Queen; they 
renounced human sacrifices and other barbarous practices,
4-6. Bel. Cttee Rep. on Africa (Western Coast) 1865.
Minutes of Evidence. Session 1865. Vol. 5, pp. 22 and 58.
47. This document was not a treaty but a unilateral declar­
ation. Its historical title "The Bond" is the correct one. 
The British were not contracting parties; the Bond was 
executed by the Chiefs "before his Excellency the Lieu­
tenant Governor11 in the presence of Maclean, and the Chiefs 
of the British military and police forces, who signed in 
the capacity of witnesses. See FAGE, J.D. Ghana; a histor­
ical interpretation. 1959, p. 74-.
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and agreed that murder, robbery and other crimes should be
tried by the Queen1 s officers, "molding the customs of the 
country to the general principles of British law".
On November 22nd, 1844, Lord Derby, who was then Secretary 
of State for the Colonies, wrote a despatch to the Governor 
outlining the duties of the Judicial Assessor. He said that 
the system upon which Mr. Maclean had proceeded in the exer­
cise of judicial powers over the natives was to be taken as 
a guide for the future exercise of the powers of the 
Assessor. He was to combine with an impartial investi­
gation of the cases the mitigation of the severity of the 
sentences, which in such cases would be awarded by native 
judges* He was to aim at a lenient exercise of the discret­
ion entrusted to him, but in the event of his deeming 
capital punishment in any case inevitable, he was to take 
care that the capital execution should be carried into 
effect by the native authorities, and that it should 
take place in the country in which the offender was
/tried.
28 *
tried
In effect, the "business of the Judicial Assessor was
to superintend the magistracy in their jurisdiction over
the local inhabitants. He resided in Cape Coast, but also
went on a circuit* He had his own court called the Judicial
Assessors Court and sometimes sat with a jury.^ In his
appellate capacity, he heard and determined appeals from 
 ______   _ _ _ _______  /the
48. By Commissions dated October 1st, 1847 and December 
1847, Brodie Cruickshank and J.C. Fitzpatrick were appoint­
ed to the offices of Ag. Judicial Assessor and Judicial 
Assessor respectively. See Ordinances, etc. of the Gold 
Coast, 1852-70, compiled by A. MONTAGU.
In the words of Sir James Marshall (who was appointed 
Judicial Assessor in 1873 and later Chief Justice of the 
Gold Coast, uThe Judicial Assessor’s duty was to use all 
that was good and useful in native laws and customs, and 
as far as possible to preserve these for the natives, and. 
at the same time to introduce Christian justice among 
them.11 B H O W  LOW, W*R. s Memoir of Sir James Marshall, p. 13* 
See a Isos SARBAHJ J.M. Maclean and Gold Coast 
Judicial Assessors (1909-10) 9 J.A.S, 349; and ALLOTT, A.'N. 
Essays in African Law. 1961, pp. 99-116.
49* In the Judicial Assessor’s Court a special jury was 
empanelled to hear a c|se on slave-dealing - The West 
A frican Reporter, published In Freetown, 5th December,
1876.
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the British magistrates in cases Involving customary law.
In his official capacity of Judicial Assessor and assistant 
to native princes he was entitled to administer the estates 
of British subjects dying intestate in an area outside the 
British forts at Cape Coast Castle. Although authorised by 
the British Crown to advise or assist the Mnative princes1*, 
he exercised his authority within their dominions only with 
their consent.
In the exercise of his duties with regard to the admin­
istration of assets of British subjects dying intestate at 
Cape Castle Town, the Court of Chancery in England ruled 
that the Judicial Assessor would be recognized in the capa­
city of legal personnel representative only. This was so
50
held in Hervey v. Fitzpatrick. In that case James Hervey,
a British subject died Intestate In 1852, possessed of
personal property in Cape Coast and elsewhere on the Gold
Coast. The defendant, Fitzpatrick, in his capacity of
Judicial Assessor, took possession of this personal estate,
claiming to be the official administrator by usage. He
sent some of the assets to England to be sold. When the
defendants reached Ehgland, the Intestate’s father and sole
next-of-kin obtained letters of administration and
/instituted
50. (1854) 23 L.J.Ch. 564.
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instituted a suit against the defendant for the administ­
ration of the estate and a receiver. Despite the 
contention of the defendant that the English courts lacked 
jurisdiction, the English court he3_d that it had juris­
diction since the assets were in England. A receiver was 
also appointed, since the defendant’s presence was expected 
to return to Sierra Leone to resume his judicial.
The third measure taken to improve the system of 
government emanates from Letters Patent dated January 
24th, 1850, which provided that the Gold Coastt was to be 
separated from Sierra Leone, and that Sir William Winnett, 
Kt., Commander in the Royal Navy be appointed Governor and
Commander-in-Chief over the forts and settlements of the 
51
Gold Coast.
Lagos came into the picture on August 6th, 1861, when,
uIn order that the Queen of England may be the better
enabled to assist, defend and protect the inhabitants of
Lagos, and to put an end to the slave trade in this and
the neighbouring countries11, King Decemo of Lagos entered
Into a treay with the British, whereby the Port and Island
of Lagos were ceded to Great Britain.
As consideration for the cession, King Decemo
received from the representatives of the Queen an annual 
,____    /pension
51. London Gazette, January 25th, 1850.
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pension, which was calculated in 1862 to amount to 1200
52
bags of cowries. Owing to past experience, the settle­
ment of Lagos was not annexed to any other colony. By a 
Commission dated March 13th, 1862 under the Great Seal of 
the United Kingdom, provision was made for the separate 
administration of Lagos.
After reciting inter alia the Treaty of 1861, the 
Commission provided for the appointment of U.S. Freeman,
Esq., as Governor and Commander-in-Chief over the settle­
ment, of Lagos, and of all forts and garrisons established 
there. Provision was also made for the establishment of an 
Executive Council to advise the Governor; again, under the 
British Settlements Act of 1843, powers for the peace, 
order and good government of Lagos were delegated to the 
Legislative Council, which consisted of the Governor and 
not less than 2 persons, to establish such ordinances not 
being repugnant to the laws of England, and to constitute
courts and officers, and to make regulations, subject to
53certain limitations. _________________ _______
52. It was then worth £l,Q3o sterling; but note that 
before 1861, the British Government had established a con­
sulate in Lagos. See Sel. Cttee Hep. Par. Papers 1865,
Vol. 5, p. 23.
53. The provisions in this Commission were similar to those 
made for the Gold Coast and the Gambia.
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After the Settlements hitherto dependent on her had 
been separated from her, Sierra Leone was reconstituted as 
a separate Colony with her own Governor and Commander-in~ 
Chief, by a Commission dated May 27th, 1863
Before going any further, it may be useful to mention 
some of the Orders in Council and Acts of the British Parl­
iament passed between this period and 1865, which were of 
special importance to West Africa - they are namelys-
(a) Admiralty Offences (Golonial) Act, 1849.^
**An Act passed to provide for the prosecution and
trial in the British Colonies of offences committed 
within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty**. This 
Act applied to West Africa, for section 5 stated that 
ufor the purpose of this Act, the word **Colony** shall 
mean any island, plantation, colony, dominion, fort 
or factory of Her Majesty, except any island within 
the United Kingdom and the Islands of Man, etc.11
(b) British Order in Council, dated July 13th, 1850. 
Its purpose was to extend British jurisdiction over British 
subjects residing in countries under the dominion of
t!Native princes** adjacent to Ei&&rra Leone. It was extended 
on the basis of treaties of cession of jurisdiction by the 
chiefs or princes concerned.
(c) British Order in Council, dated April 4th, 1856, 
with reference to the jurisdiction in the protected terri­
tories of the Gold Coast. The main provisions of the 
Order were as follows ?
54. For further details of the 1863 Constitution, see 
CROOKS, J .J . A history of the Colony of Sierra Leone. 
P* 213> .g-?--g-g-fl• 55. 12 *• 13 V-lcfe c. 96.
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In respect of all civil and criminal matters and 
questions, which, arose within the Said ^protected terri­
tories11, and in regard to which Her Majesty was ”competent 
to exercise such jurisdiction as aforesaid without 
the co-operation of any native chief or authority, 
and especially in respect of all matters relating 
to the property of any "bankrupt or insolvent 
person, all magistrates and courts of justice auth­
orized to act within 'Her Majesty's Forts and Settle­
ments' on the Gold Coast were granted the same power 
and jurisdiction as if such matters or questions had 
arisen within the said Forts or Settlements•11
Again, in respect of civil and criminal matters, the person 
appointed to be the assessor to the native chiefs was 
given ttsuch powers and jurisdiction as might at any timie 
have been lawfully acquired by Her Majesty11. By section 3 
it was provided that in the determination of any matter or 
question which might concern or arise out of any dealings 
the inhabitants of the protected territories, equit­
able regard was to be paid to the local customs, in so far 
as they were not wrepugnant to Christianity or to natural 
justice*1.
To return to the provisions of the various commissions 
which provided for the separate administration of the West 
African territories, it will be remembered that under these 
Commissions powers were delegated to the Legislative 
Councils in each territory to enact laws and to constitute 
courts of justice.
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On June 11th, 1851, the Governor and the Legislative
Council of the Gambia passed an Ordinance providing for
the establishment of a Supreme Court; for “the separation 
of these settlements and their dependencies from the 
Colony of Sierra Leone; and divers other reasons ... 
rendered it necessary to establish in the said Settle­
ments a court of record, possessing supreme civil, 
criminal and equity jurisdiction, within the said 
Settlements and their dependencies ...“ 56
By section 2 a court of record styled the “Supreme Court of 
the British Settlements in the Gambia*1, possessing the 
power and authority of a superior court of civil and crim­
inal jurisdiction was established# Equity jurisdiction, 
for example over fraud, trusts, mortgates, etc#, similar 
to that possessed by the High Court of Chancery in England, 
was vested in the Court#
It was presided over by Her Majesty’s Chief Justice.
56. Repealed by No# 6 of 1867. The above Ordinance also 
repealed a former Ordinance passed at Sierra Leone 
establishing a Court of Common and a Court of Appeal 
“in the said settlements, and also an Ordinance enacted 
by the Governor and Council of these settlements estab­
lishing a Court of Queen’s Bench therein, and an 
Ordinance enacted by the said Governor and Council 
establishing a Supreme Court of civil, criminal and 
equity jurisdiction #..“ .
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Where a jury trial was necessary, seven jurymen whose ver­
dict had to be unanimous were empanelled.
During this period there were two classes of jurors :(a ) 
the Grand and Special Jurors.^ The men who qualified 
under this category had to be between 21 and 60 years of 
age. They must have been resident in the Gambia for six
calendar months previous to the making of the Juror’s book*
/They
57. Ordinance of the Gambia dated April 28th, 1845, rep­
ealed by No* 6 of 1867*
The Grand Jury or the jury of presentment originated 
from the Assize of Clarendon in 1166. In early days, the 
sheriff was directed to summon for the business either of 
the Assizes or of the Quarter Sessions 24 persons from the 
body of the county from which 23 were chosen.
They were instructed In the articles of their inquiry 
by a charge from the judge. They then withdrew to sit and 
receive indictments and to hear evidence on the part of the 
prosecution. They then had to decide whether to “find a 
true bill** or ignore the accusations preferred. In effect, 
they decided whether the prosecution had made a prima facie 
case against the accused or not. If a case had been made, 
it was tried before a judge and a petty jury. In the 13th 
century and during the early 14th century, alnost all the 
members of a grand jury were also members of the petty jury. 
Not unnaturally, the judges sometimes considered that when 
members of a petty jury, who had presented a person as sus­
pected, acquitted him, they contradicted themselves and 
deserved to be punished. (Holdsworth, Sir William: A Hist­
ory of English law, 7th ed, 1956, p. 321 et seq.) It is
difficult to understand why such a complicated system was 
imposed on West Africa.
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They had to be persons entitled to describe themselves as 
possessing the title of Esquire, or be persons of higher 
rank, who were bona fide property-tfowners to the value of 
£50 per annum, or were bona fide owners or occupiers of any 
house in the Settlement which contained not less than 15 
windows, or had to belong to some profession in any part of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.
(b) Petit and common .juries : here the jurymen had to be 
between the ages of 21 to 60 years, and inter alia had to be 
owners of property worth £10 per annum, or be engaged in a 
mechanical trade, or be clerks.
By section 14 of the Supreme Court Ordinance a Court 
of Appeal was constituted and It consisted of the Governor 
and any 3 members of the Legislative Council. It had powers 
to direct new trials of issues of fact in civil cases, which 
might have been tried in the Supreme Court. Appeals only 
lay when the matter in dispute exceeded £30 in value. A 
Supreme Court of civil and criminal jurisdiction within 
Her Majesty’s Forts and Settlements on the Gold Coast was
/constituted
37.
constituted by Ordinance No. d  of 18 5 3 * ^ a The Court, which 
was styled “the Supreme Court of Her Majesty’s Forts and 
Settlements on the Gold Coast*1, was also a court of record 
presided over by a Chief Justice having criminal and civil 
jurisdiction similar to that of the courts of Queen’s Bench, 
Common Pleas and Exchequer at Westminster. It also had 
jurisdiction in certain classes of offences committed on 
the high seas.
Trials were usually held at Cape Coast Castle before
C O
the Chief Justice and a jury00 of 6 men, whose unanimous 
verdict was considered valid and binding* The appointment 
of the first Chief Justice of the Court went to the Hon. 
J.C. Fitzpatrick, who, as will be remembered, had already 
been appointed as a Judicial Assessor. He was paid a salary 
of £300 per annum, In addition to his salary as a Judicial 
Assessor.
The Court of Appeal consisted of the Governor, the
Judicial Assessor and at least one other member of the 
, ...   .    /Legislative
57a , Amended by Ordinance of September 2lst, 1854, and 
further by Ordinance dated September 23rd 1856 in respect of 
section 5; amended further by No. 5 of 1864, and repealed 
by No. 13 of 1837.
58. J3y an Ordinance dated September 23rd, 1856, it became 
possible for the Court to try cases in Winneba and at other 
places appointed by the Governor.
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Legislative Council disinterested in the case. In the 
event of a number of voices being equal In the determin­
ation or judgment on appeal, the Governor was temporarily 
entitled to two voices.
The Supreme Court was also given probate jurisdiction 
by the provisions of Ordinance No. 3^4 of 1856, equity juris­
diction by an Ordinance dated February 3rd, 1857, and juris­
diction in divorce and matrimonial causes by an Ordinance 
dated January 19th, 1859.
In Sierra Leone the title of the Court of the Recorder 
of Freetown was changed to “The Supreme Court of the Colony 
of Sierra Leone“ by Ordinance No. 10 of 1858.^® This 
Court, which was presided over by the Chief Justice in 
Freetown, sat on the first Monday of January, March, May, 
July, September and November for both civil and criminal 
trials. The composition and jurisdiction of the Court 
were similar to those of the Gold Coast. Both civil and 
criminal causes were tried before the Chief Justice and 
12 Jurymen. In addition, It heard appeals from decisions 
of the police magistrates or justices of the peace, and 
from the courts for the recovery of small deb^bs.
59. Amended by an Ordinance dated May 4th, 1859. 
Repealed by No. 14 of 1904*
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The Supreme Court of Her Majesty's Settlement of
60Lagos was constituted by Ordinance No. 11 of 1863.
The Court, which was presided over by a Chief Magistrate, 
was invested with jurisdiction In civil and criminal cases 
similar to those of the oiher territories just described.
D. THE 3EIECT COMMITTEE REPORT, 1865
In 1863, the second Ashanti War broke out, caused by 
the refusal of the Governor of the Gold Coast to surrender
to the King of Ashanti 2 fugitives from his kingdom. In
revenge for this refusal, the Ashanti forces invaded the 
British Protectorate. More British soldiers were sent to 
the territory without delay, but because of lack of adeq­
uate facilities, most of them died from sickness. In fact
most of the soldiers did not agree with the British Govern­
ment’s main aim of taking Kumasi, the capital of Ashanti. 
The British troops were very bitter about the * 0 1 6  cam­
paign, which was later abandoned. One correspondent recall 
ed the declaration of the King of Ashanti to the effect
“That though the white man has sent plenty of guns to the
61
Bush, he knows the Bush will prove stronger than the guns“ .
60. Amended by Ho. 1 of 1864, Ho. B of 1864 and by No. 5 
of 1865.
61* The Times, May 16th, 1864.
40 *
This abortive and expensive expedition provoked so 
much discussion in England,62 that the British Government 
sent Colonel H. St .George Ord on a special mission to West 
Africa to inquire and report. On his return, he produced 
his report. As a result in 1865 a Select Committee of the 
British House of Commons was appointed to cons id er11 the State 
of the British Establishments on the Western Coast of Afr­
ica!!^ The K t . Hon* C.B. Adderley and 14 others were nomi­
nated to conduct the inquiry. In all 22 sessions were 
held from March 20th to June 22nd 1865, and among those who 
gave evidence before the Committee were Colonel Ord, R.E. 
and Dr. Livingstone. The recommendations made by the Comm­
ittee in their Draft Report are so informative that they
64
deserve quoting at length.
11 Your Committee recommend in consonance with almost 
unanimous evidence, that the four existing settle­
ments should be again concentrated under a Supreme 
Government at Sierra Leone.
The reasons which led to their separation, on the 
recommendation of the Committtee of 1842, no longer 
exist. Rapid communication by steam will enable 
military and judicial arrangements to be made now, 
which in 1842 were impossible.
62. See, e.g. The Tlines, May 12th, 16th and August 10th,
1864 .
63* Select Committee Report, 1865, Vol. 5,
64. Ibid. pp. 15-16.
4 1 *
wThe reasons for re~concentration are not only 
economical, but much more, the desirableness of 
uniform policy, and the hope of contracting our 
growing engagements and extricating ourselves as^much 
as possible from anything in the nature of colonizing 
Africa, and from a fatal service, or the possible imp­
lication in native wars .. •
The Government of Sierra Leone should be re-con- 
stituted Government over all the British Settlements 
in West Africa •.•
The Chief Justice will also be required to make 
an annual circuit of the other settlements ...
Gambia should have only a Lieutenant Governor 
with a small Executive and Legislative Council, local 
Ordinances being subject to the sanction of the 
Governor* * •
The judicial establishments may be reduced to 
magistrates only, the Sierra Leone Chief Justice undei 
taking the more serious cases on his circuit.
On the Gold Coast there is no possibility of 
reaising a sufficient revenue while the Butch remain, 
and thwart our policy ... The protectorate should 
only be retained while the Chiefs may be as speedily 
aspossible made to do without it. nothing should be 
done to encourage them to lean on British help, or 
trust to British administration of their affairs, 
whether military or judicial* The judicial assessor 
does not fulfil the first intention of the office 
assisting the chiefs in administering justice, but 
supersedes their authority by decisions according to 
his own sole judgment. The office, instituted with 
the best intentions, seems by the evidence of a Comm­
issioner from the native king of Cape Coast, to have 
led to the introduction of needless technicalities 
and expense, and the employment of attorneys when the 
natives had better speak for themselves. The Chiefs 
should rather be left to exercise their own juris­
diction, with only an appeal, when necessary, to the 
English magistracy. Queen1s advocates seem wholly 
unnecessary, and trials by jury inapplicable in 
many cases.
/The
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wThe forts on the Gold Coast should be under the 
command of a Lieutenant Governor at Gape Goast Castle* 
under the orders of the Governor of Sierra Leone* 
with a small council* legislative and executive* 
subject to his sanction of their proceedings; and 
the exercise of M s  government should be as much as 
possible confined to the forts actually occupied •
The judicial establishment should consist only 
of magistrates* important cases being reserved for 
the Chief Ju3ticefs circuit from Sierra Leone ...
Lagos will require an English Commandant until 
the native rule can be re-established, when he would 
resume the office of Consul* or rather confine 
himself to that office* which he now incongruously 
holds with the Government of Lagos as Consul of Benin*
The Houssa police should suffice for all 
military purposes.u
As a result of the recommendations of the Draft 
Report, and of the 7 Resolutions made by the Committee 
and ordered to be reported to the House of Commons on 
June 26th 1865, tremendous changes were made by the British 
Government in respect of the four Settlements.
By a Royal Commission dated February 19th* 1866, all 
the previous laws which provided for the separate admini­
stration of justice in each Colony or Settlement, were 
revoked* The main purpose of the Royal Commission despatch 
ed to the Governor and Commander-in-Chief ”in our West 
African Settlements” , was for the ^uniting the Colony of
Sierra Leone together wiith the forts and Settlements on the
/West
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\ 65West Coast of Africa (Gambia, Gold Coast and Lagos).
The boundaries wei*e defined to cover ”0ur Settlements 
of Sierra Leone, comprising all places, Settlements, and 
territories which may at any time belong to Us in Western 
Africa between the fifth and twelfth degrees north latitude 
and lying to the westward of the tenth degree of west longi­
tude; Our Settlements on the Gambia, ... between the twelfth 
and fifteenth degrees of north latitude, and lying to the 
westward of the tenth degree of West longitude; Our Settle­
ments on the Gold Coast ... between the fifth degree of 
West longitude and the second degree of east longitude;
Our Settlement of Lagos ... between the second and fifth 
degrees of east longitude” .
By the other provisions in the Royal Commissions
(a) A Legislative Council, consisting of the Governor.).and 
nor less than 2 nominated persons was to be established in 
each of the 4 Colonies.
(b) Each Legislative Council was given power and authority
subject to certain limitations to enact uOrdinances not
being repugnant to the law of England or to any Order 
made or to be made by us with the advice of Our Privy 
Council, and to constitute such courts and officers, 
and to make such provisions and regulations for the 
proceedings in such courts, and for the administration 
of justice” as and when such measures were required.
65. Hertsle^s Treaties. Vol. 13 p. 26.
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(c) The G-overnor wa s empowered to appoint judges and 
to veto unsuitable ordinances. In addition, he was to he 
advised by an Executive Council, which was to be estab­
lished in Sierra Leone.
7 months later, on the instructions of the (Governor 
at Sierra Leone, a series of ordinances were passed to pro­
vide for better administration of justice in the 4 terri­
tories concerned.
Thus, by an Ordinance dated November 16th, 1866,^ the 
title of the Supreme Court of the Colony of Sierra Leone 
established was once more changed to **The Supreme Court of 
the Settlement of Sierra Leone11 ♦ This time, the Court sat 
in Freetown each year on the second Monday of January,
M^rch and May, and on the third Monday in September and 
November. It had cognisance of pleas, civil and criminal, 
and jurisdiction in all cases just as fully and amply as 
that exercised by the courts at Westminster. Jurisdiction 
in equity, probate, divorce and matrimonial causes was 
also conferred on the Court. Criminal offences were to be 
tried before one or more of the judges and a jury of 12 *nen, 
sworn to give their verdict according to the evidence.
66. No. 4 of 1866. Repealed by No. 14 of 1904*
45.
Civil actions were triable before one or more of the judges
without a jury. Thus by this Ordinance trial by jury in
civil Cases was abolished.®^ In all civil causes evidence
had to be taken down in writing and kept as a record to be
used when necessary* such as in connection with an appeal.
Furthermore* ”The Court of summary jurisdiction of the
08Settlement of Sierra Leone” was established. It was a 
Court of Record and was presided over by the Assistant 
Judge of the Supreme Court without a jury. The Summary 
Court had jurisdiction in all pleas of personal actions 
within Sierra Leone* where the debt* damage or demand 
claimed did not exceed £100. Such cases were tried summ­
arily without a writ. It had no jurisdiction rtin any 
action of ejectment* or in which the title to any 
corporeal or incorporeal hereditaments* or to any 
tool, fair, market, or franchise shall be in 
question ... or in an action for any malicious 
prosecution* question under will* libel* slander* 
seduction* or breach of promise of marriage” .69
Dissatisfied litigants were entitled to appeal to the 
Supreme Court within 10 days after the date of the judgment 
by the Summary Court, provided that security was given.
67. For further details about the reaction of the 
inhabitants* see post p. *)S7f
68. No. 5 of 1866. Repealed by No. 14 of 1904.
69. No. 5 of 1866* 3. 6.
46.
As a result of the variety of cases triable by the Court of 
Summary Jurisdiction, the Court of Requests for Freetown 
was abolished and its jurisdiction transferred to the 
former#
From the rules framed for the Summary Court on March
25th, 1867, by H.J. Huggins Ag.C.J., and A. Montagu,
70Assistant Judge, we are tolds
(a) that the Court was held on the first and third 
Mondays of every month at such places appointed, and
(b) that it was held in Freetown only on every Satur­
day for the hearing, trial and determination of all cases, 
and proceedings hitherto triable in the Court of Requests,
The third Ordinance passed by the Government of Sierra 
Leone for the better administration of justice applied to 
the Gold Coast. It will be recalled that in 1853 a Supreme 
Court styled "the Supreme Court of Her Majesty’s Forts and 
Settlements on the Gold Coast15 had been established.*71 
By the provisions of Ordinance Ho. 7 of 1866 of the Gold 
Coast, a new supreme Court was established to replace the 
former. The new Court was styled "The Court of Civil and 
Criminal Justice of the Settlement on the Gold Coast".
70. Ordinances of the Colony of Sierra Leone (1868-1880), 
Vol. 4. 7
71. See ante p. 3?
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It was a court of record, and was presided over by a Chief 
Magistrate appointed by the Queen. It washeld at Cape Coast 
Castle and other appointed places on the first Monday of 
every month for the trial of both civil and criminal cases.
All civil cases were triable before the Chief Magi­
strate without a jury, but criminal cases were tried before 
the Chief Magistrate and a jury of 12 men or at least not 
less than 6 in those cases where the number was reduced by 
lawful challenges. Where a person charged with a criminal 
offence was found guilty and sentenced to death, or to 
transportation, banishment, penal servitude, or Imprisonment 
for more than 12 calendar months with hard labour, such pun­
ishment was not to be carried into execution until it had 
been approved by the Administrator of the Cold Coast.
The Court was given the care and custody of the 
persons and estates of idiots, lunatics, etc., and with 
powers to appoint guardians. It was empowered to appoint 
administrators of the estates and effects of persons dying 
intestate, or of those who In their last will and testament 
had failed to appoint executors, and finally, to grant 
probate in the case of persons dying testate. In actions 
where the matter in dispute was more than £50 in value, 
evidence had to be taken down in writing by the Clerk.
/The
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The Supreme Court of civil and criminal justice of the 
Settlements of the G-ambia was established on November 26th, 
1866.72 As a rule, the Court was held at Bathurst on the 
first Monday of every month in each year. It adjourned in 
the case of the indisposition of the Chief Magistrate. 
Otherwise the composition and jurisdiction of the Court 
were almost identical to those of the Gold Coast.
Finally, the Court of civil and criminal justice of 
the Settlement of Lagosu was set up on December 1st, 1866?^ 
This Court also had identical jurisdiction to that of the 
Gold Coast. According to the rules of the Court by the 
Chief Magistrate, Benjamin Way,7^ the officers of the Court 
were the Chief Magistrate himself, the Clerk of the Court 
and 2 bailiffs. The Court was held on the first Monday of
each month at 12p.m. All writs had to be signed by the
Chief Magistrate. All pleadings In the Court had to be 
verbal, but In civil cases where the claim exceeded £20, 
the evidence had to be taken down in writing by the Clerk.
72. Confirmed on February 23rd, 1867.
73. By virtue of Ordinance No. 7 of 1866, which was
confirmed on March 13th, 1867.
74• Ordinances of the Settlement of Lagos, 1862-70, 
compiled by A, Montagu, p. 239.
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A person was allowed to practise as a barrister,, solicitor, 
attorney or notary with the approval of the Chief Magistrate 
After the Courts of Civil and Criminal Justice had 
been established in the Cold Coast, the Gambia and Lagos, 
it soon became evident that a proper court of appeal had 
to be constituted a For as it will be remembered, the Courts 
of Appeal set up to serve the previous supreme courts of 
the settlements of West Africa, usually comprised the Gov­
ernor of the territory, and some members of the Legislative 
Council* Whenever there was any tie, the Governor had a 
casting vote* For obvious reasons, for example the lack of 
judicial training of the Governox's, the decisions of the
Courts of Appeal as they then existed, could not command 
75respect. It was with a view to remedying the legal
anomaly that a British Order in Council was issued on
February 26th, 1867, to constitute the Supreme Court of
Sierra Leone, a court of appellate jurisdiction from the
Courts of Civil and Criminal Justice on the Gambia, the
/Gold
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75. Certainly, the private/given by the Governor to an
appellant, a Gold Coast native, to declare himself an 
insolvent, was not looked on with favour by an English 
Court, when he appealed to the Court of Appeal, in the case 
of Smith v. Moffatt (1865-6) L.R. /£^ p. 397
50 *
Gold Coast and Lagos.76
By the provisions of this Order, the judges for the
time "being in the Supreme Court of the Settlement of Sierra
Leone were made judges of appeal to hear and determine
appeals from the Courts of Civil and Criminal Justice of
the Settlements of Gambia;, the Gold Coast and Lagos. This
Court of Appeal was styled 11 The West Africa Court of 
77Appeal *
Appeals were made to the Court of Appeal in respedt 
of judgments at the courts of first instance, where the 
matter in dispute was valued at more than £50. Notice of 
the appeal had to be given within 14 days from the date of 
judgment. Further, the appellant was enjoined to enter 
into sufficient security to "be approved "by the Chief Magi­
strate of the court of first judgment. Whenever, at the 
hearing of any such appeal, the judges were equally divided
in opinion, the judgment of the Court of civil and criminal
/ justice
76. The appellate jurisdiction of the Governor and the 
Legislative Council in Sierra Leone itself was abolished 
much later in 1869 by Ordinance No. 3 of 1869, which was 
repealed by ho. 14 of 1904. By virtue of No. 3 of 1869, 
all the powers and authorities granted to the Governor and 
Council to enable them to exercise their appellate juris­
diction were withdrawn.
77. Though the West Africa Court of Appeal established in 
1867 may be regarded as heralding the formation of the 2nd 
W.A.C.A* of 1928, yet it must be noted that they are two 
separate entities, and quite distinct in composition.
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justice from which such an appeal was brought stood con­
firmed, and was deemed to be the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal.
Further the judges of the Court of Appea.l were empow­
ered to make rules for the Court, provided that those rules 
when made were transmitted to the Govern or-in-Chief of the 
West African Settlements, to be sent to him to Her Majesty 
for approval or disallowance. According to the rules of 
the West Africa Court of Appeal, drafted by George Finch, 
C.J., and Horatio James, Assistant Judge, both of the 
Supreme Court of the Settlement of Sierra Leone
(a) the notice of appeal had to be in writing and sent
to the Registrar of the court whose sentence should be
appealed for;
(b) within 14 days, the appellant had to state in writ
ing his grounds of appeal and such statement was to be
transmitted to the Registrar of the West Africa Court of 
Appeal;
(c) The W.A.C.A. sat on the 4th Monday of January, 
March, and May, and on the 1st Monday of October and 
December annually.
78 • Ordinances of the Settlement of Lagos. 1862-70. 
compiled by A. Montagu, p. 279.
The scope of this Order«in~Council was not limited to the 
establishment of the West Africa Court of Appeal. By 
section 4, further appeals could be made by any persons 
dissatisfied with the judgment of the West Africa Court of 
Appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 
subject to certain regulations. These regulations regarding 
conditions of appeal were embodied in another Order-in- 
Council published on the same day with the Principal Order 
just mentioned.^
Diagramatically, the hierarchy of the courts was 
as follows
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
The West Africa Gourt of Appeal
(Appealable amount - any sum above £300; notice within 
14 days)
Ct. of Civ. &
Crim. Justice 
in 
GAMBIA
(Appealable amount 
14 days)
Ct. of Civ. & 
Grim. Justice 
in
GOLD COAST
Ct. of Civ. & 
Crim. Justice 
in 
1AG0S
any sum above £50; notice within
At this stage, mention must be made of nThe West
African Offences Act", passed by the British Parliament on
/■arch
79. The Order was published in Freetown on May 9th, 
1867.
54 *
March 31st, 1871.80 This was passed to extend the juris­
diction of the Courts of the West African Settlements to
certain offences; for it had been found that "the inhabi­
tants of cdrtain territories in Africa adjoining Her 
Majesty*s Settlements of Sierra Leone, Gambia, Gold 
Coast, and Lagos, and the adjacent protectorates, 
not being within the jurisdiction of any civilised 
government, and crimes and outrages having been 
and being likely to be committed within such
territories against Bx’itish subjects and persons 
resident within any of the said settlements, /and 
since_/ it is requisite to provide for the trial 
and punishment of such crimes and such outrages1*
it was enacted by section 1 that; wCrimes or offences
committed within twenty miles of the boundary of any 
of the said Settlements or of any adjacent protect­
orate by any of Her Majesty* s subjects, or by persons 
not subjects of any civilised power against the 
persons of British subjects, or of perstons resident 
within any of the said settlements, shall be cognis­
able in the superior courts exercising criminal juris­
diction within any of the said settlements, and shall 
be inquired of, tried, prosecuted, and upon conviction, 
punished in such and the same manner as if the crime 
or offence had been committed within such settlements*"
E • THE CHARTER OF JULY 24th 1874
It will be remembered that it was b;y virtue of the
Royal Commission dated February 19th, 1866, which provided
for the reuniting of the settlements on the Gambia, Gold
Coast and Lagos, together with Sierra Leone, under ore
Government in chief seated at Sierx^a Leone* However, on
July 24th 1874, a new British Charter was granted, the
effect of which was (a) to revoke so much of the provisions
/of
t f f r r - T * — "  1111,11111 - ‘■**’--*■■1 iij mpni^THf i^>whMOTWp ii i * i^ n l| i ia ^ i iw w ■ n iminnmimmii ,  r ...... .......n. unn ■ ji ju m i i w l — uinm_______,______ _________________________________ _____________________________________
80. 34 Vicfr c. 8.
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of the Royal Commission of 1866 as affected the settlements
of the Gold Coast and Lagos, and (b) to erect them into a
R1new Colony to be styled the Gold Coast Colony.
Although one Supreme Court was established for the new 
Gold Coast Colony, it must be noted that neither the Go3d 
Coast nor Lagos lost their identity under the Royal 
Charter. There was not a complete amalgamation in the 
strictest sense of the word. The Charter, after recifeing 
inter alia the provisions of the Royal Commission of 
February 19th, 1866, and the 1843 Act88 clearly defined the 
boundaries of each settlement.8^ One Governor was appoin­
ted for both settlements, and he resided in the Gold Coast; 
but a separate administrator, appointed under the Royal
Warrant and subordinate to the Governor of the Gold Coast
84
Colony, was stationed in Lagos.
81. Letters Patent dated July 24th, 1874.
82. 6 & 7 Vioir c. 13.
83. The Gold Coast comprised all places, etc, (in West 
Africa) between the 5th degree of west longitude and the 
2nd degree of east longitude. Lagos comprised all places, 
etc, of British West Africa between the 2nd and 5th degrees 
of east longitude.
84. Griffith, pp. cit. (1936) p. 19.
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Further, a Legislative Council was established, comp­
rising the Governor and not less than 2 other persons from 
each of the Settlements of the Gold Coast and Lagos. Each 
Legislative Council was empowered to enact such ordinances 
as were not repugnant to the law of England, and also to 
establish such courts and to appoint such officers j^ s would 
be required for the smooth administration of justice. The 
Governor load a negative voice in all these matters, but in 
making his decision he did so with the advice of the Exec­
utive Council, which was directed to be established under 
the provisions of the Charter. The appointment of judges 
and a Deputy Governor also vested in the Governor.
After the Charter was granted, there followed a series 
of Orders in Council consolidating the position of the new 
Gold Coast Colony. Particularly instructive was the Order 
issued to determine the mode of exercising the power and 
jurisdiction in those areas adjacent to the Gold Coast 
Colony on August 6th, 1874.®°
On December 17th, 1874,the anomalous position of 
86
Sierra Leone and the Gambia was rectified by a Koyal
/Charter
8 5. British Order-in-Council, dated August 6th 1874. 
Proclaimed at Cape Coast on September 12th, 1874.
8(a. Letters Patent dated December 17th, 1874. See 
Hertsle^s Treaties, Vol. 15, p. 525.
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Charter, whose provisions were very much similar to those 
granted to the Gold Coast Colony. It revoked so much of 
the provisions of the 1866 Charter as applied to Sierra 
Leone, and the Gambia, and provided that they he erected 
into one Government in Chief to he styled t4The West Africa 
Settlement .**87 Just as in the case of the Gold Coast Colony^ 
one Governor resident at Sierra Leone w&is appointed for 
hoth territories, hut each one had her own Legislative and 
Execut ive CounciIs *
In thh Gold Coast Colony on March 31st 1876, an imp­
ortant Ordinance for the constitution of a Supreme Court 
and for the purposes relating to the administration of 
justice was passed. This Ordinance Is still very important 
to every West African lawyer* f?en though it has heen 
repealed in parts and amended in others; yet it is well 
worth noting. The following is a summary of its provisions: 
Constitution of the Court
By section 3 the Court was constituted 11 the Supreme Court 
of Judicature for the Gold Coast Colony, and for the 
territories thereto near or adjacent. Wherein
  ______________________________________________  /Her
87. The Settlement of Sierra Leone was defined as a 11 
lands belonging to the British in West Africa between the 
5th and 12th degrees of North latitude and lying to the 
westward of the 10th degree of west longitude:Mand the 
Settlement of Gambia as Mall lands between the 12th and 15th 
degrees of North latitude and lying to the westward of the 
10th degree11.
Her Majesty may at any time, before or after the 
commencement of this Ordinance have acquired powers 
and jurisdiction11 •
It consisted of the Chief Justice and not more than 
4 puisne judges. The first Chief Justice was Sir D.P. 
Chalmers, appointed on December 2nd 1876.88 Further, a 
Full Court was established to serve as a Gourt of Appeal.
It was fully constituted when it consisted of not less 
than 2 and not more than 3 judges, one of whom must at all 
times be the Chief Justice. When matters were brought 
before the Full Court by way of appeal or otherwise, the 
decision of the majority was taken to be the judgment of 
the court. But in a case where the Full Court consisted
Q Q
of only 2 judges, the Chief Justice had a casting vote.
Jurisdiction and haw • .
The Supreme Court was^a superior court of record to possess
and exercise 11all the jurisdiction, powers and authorities, 
excepting the jurisdiction and powers of the High 
Court of Admiralty, which are vested In or capable of 
being exercised by Her Majesty*s High Court of Justice 
in England as constituted by thenSupreme Court of 
Judicature Acts 1873 and 18751,.yu
The jurisdiction and powers of the former Courts of Civil
and Criminal Justice In the Gold Coast and Lagos were
vested in the Court.^_____
88. No. 4 of 1876, section 4.
89* Ibid., section 7.
90. Ibid, section 11.
91. Ibid, section 12.
Further, it was given all the powers equal to those of
the Lord High Chancellor in England to appoint guardians of
infants and their estates, keepers of idiots, lunatics,
92
etc,  ^ Section 14? °The Common Law, the doctrines of 
Equity, and the statutes of general application* 
which were in force in England at the date when the 
Colony obtained a local legislature, that is to say, 
on the 24th day of July, 1874, shall be in force 
within the jurisdiction of the Court0 .
Section 16; °The jurisdiction hereby conferred upon the 
Coui^t in probate, divorce, and matrimonial causes 
and proceedings may, subject to this Ordinance and 
to rules of Court, be exercised by the Court in con­
formity with the law and practice for the time being 
in force in England0 .
Section 17? °A11 Imperial laws dedlared to extend or apply 
t'b the Colony or the jurisdiction of the Court shall 
be in force so far only as the limits of the local 
jurisdiction andlocal circumstances permit, and sub­
ject to any existing or future Ordinances of the 
Colonial Legislature ...u
Another section provided that law and equity were to be
administered concurrently ... uand in all matters in which 
there was any conflict or variance between the rules 
of Equity and the rules of the Common Law with refer­
ence to the same matter the rules of Equity should 
prevail0 . ^3
Section 19s ^Nothing in this Ordinance shall deprive the 
Supreme Court of the right to observe and. enforce the 
observance of, or shall deprive any person of the bene­
fit of any law or custom existing in the said Colony 
and territories subject to its jurisdiction, such .law 
or custom not being repugnant to natural justice,
/equity
92. Ho. 4 of 1876, section 13
93. Ibid, section 18.
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equity and good conscience, nor incompatible either 
directly or by necessary implication with any enact- 
ment of the Colonial Legislature existing at the comm­
encement of this Ordinance, or which may afterwards 
come into operation. Such laws and customs shall be 
deemed applicable in causes and matters where the 
parties thereto are natives of the said Colony or 
territories, and particularly, but v/ithout derogating 
from their application in other cases, in causes and 
matters relating to marriage and the tenure and trans­
fer of real and personal property, and to inheritance 
and testamentary dispositions, and also in causes and 
matters between natives and Europeans where it may 
appear to the Court that substantial injustice would be 
done to either party by a strict adherence to the rules 
of English law. ho party shall be entitled to claim 
the benefit of any local law or custom if it shall 
appealTeither from the express contract or from the 
nature of the transactions out of which any suit or 
question may have arisen, that such party agreed that 
his obligations in connection with such transactions 
should be regulated exclusively by English law; and 
in cases where no express rule is applicable to any 
matter in controversy, the Court shall be governed by 
the principles of justice, equity and good conscience.11
After the passing of this Ordinance for the Cold Coast
Colony, further attention was directed to Sierra Leone
and Gambia. First of all, the Supreme Court of Sierra
Leone, which was established in 1866,94 was reconstituted
by a further Ordinance enacted on December 26th 1 8 7 6 . ^
94. See, ante p. H-tf
95. No. 4 of 1876, repealed by 14 of 1904. Note % This 
Ordinance was enacted to be read and construed together 
with No. 4 of 1866, No. 10 of 1858, No. 8 of 1859 and 
No. 8 of 1864.
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The main purpose of the Ordinance (the nAdministration of 
Justice Ordinance*1) w&s to reduce the size of the judiciary* 
Thus the number of judges of the Supreme Court of Sierra 
Leone was cut down to 1 judge who was styled the Chief 
Justice of Sierra Leone* Further, the Court of Summary 
Jurisdiction was abolished, and Ordinance No* 5 of 1866 
and the rules of that Court were repealed. As a result, 
the summary jurisdiction of the previous court of the same 
name was conferred on the Supreme Court, with the powers, 
etc., vested in the Chief Justice* By section 10 the 
Supreme Court was empowered to exercise summary jurisdiction 
in equity in certain suits, for example suits for fore­
closure or redemption, or for enforcing any charge or lien 
where the mortgage, charge or lien did not exceed the sum 
of £200, and also in all proceedings for ordersin the 
nature of injunctions. Statutes in force in the County 
Courts in England applied to the Supreme Court when exer­
cising summary jurisdiction, except In matters relating to 
bankruptcy, or insolvency or under the Charitable Trusts 
Act
Further, Ordinance No. 4 of 1877 was enacted for faci­
litating appeals from magistrates1 decisions to the
/Supreme
96. No. 4 of 1876 (Sierra Leone)
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Supreme Court of Sierra Leone. Notice of an appeal could 
be given orally in open court or at any time within 8 days 
in writing. All appeals ready for hearing were heard summ­
arily by the Chief Justice at the first sitting of the Sup­
reme Court in its summary jurisdiction.
The date October 23rd 1877 deserves to be noted in our 
brief historical sketch* for as many as 3 Orders in Council 
were issued on that day. The first one referred to the 
Gambia. By that order, the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone 
was constituted a court of record to hear and determine 
appeals from the Court of Civil and Criminal Appeals from 
the Settlement of Gambia.
The second Order regulated the conditionsfor appeals 
from the Supreme Court of the Gold Goast Colony to the Jud­
icial Committee of the Privy Council*
The third Order abolished the West Africa Court of 
Appeal, which had been created 10 years previously.®^
The reasons for the abolition of the West Africa Court 
of Appeal were obvious. A Supreme Court of Judicature had 
been established for the Gold Coast Colony, comprising the 
Gold Coast and Lagos. Prom the judgmentsof the Supreme 
Court further appeals lay to the Full Court and thence to 
the Privy Council. Besides, Gambia had been united with
— .t i.... ...... .— . . . -,—  _^.r— ...., ,, .. i I, , e ?ra
9H* Hertslet’s Treaties, Vol. 14 p. 1000.
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Sierra Leone under the name of the West Africa Settlements, 
and appeals from the Court of Civil and Criminal juris­
diction in the Gambia lay to the Supreme Court of the Settle, 
mentsof Sierra Leone and thence to the Privy Council* In 
view of these circumstances, the only thing that remained to 
be done was the revocation of the West Africa Court of Appeal 
Order in Council* Dlagramatically, the following was the 
pattern of appeals
West Africa Settlements
Privy Council 
1
Supreme Court of the Settle­
ment of Sierra Leone
c „ rt „f c U  ^
Justice on the Gambia
F* CONSULAR JURISDICTION
A few words may be devoted to the powers of Consular 
Courts in relation to British officials and to the govern­
ment of the country in which the courts were established?8
Although all the powers which they held sprang remotely 
 , __________  . /from
98* Bee also HODGES^ F»E* Consular jurisdiction in Her 
Majesty* s Protectorate of the Niger Coast. etcT l l 8 9 5 T T
Gold
Privy Council
Full Court (Supreme Court 
of Judicature)
Divisional Courts of Gold 
Coast and Lagos
m .
from a delegation sent by the Sovereign of the territorial
state, their authority derived immediately from the British
Government, which had instituted them, not in the capacity
of an agent, but independently in virtue of the rights
acquired by treaty. They were British courts in effect,
and the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts were the foundations of
the Orders in Council issued to regulate the consular
jurisdiction." Thus, by Article 1 of the British Order in
Council dated February 21st^ 1872,-1* consuls were appointed
to Old Galabar, Bonny, Cameroons, New Calabar, Brass,
Qpobo, Nun and Benin Rivers. The consuls were enjoined 11 to 
make rules for the peace order, and good government of 
Her Majesty's subjects being within the said 
territories1* .2
By Article 5, the consuls were empowered to reorganize
within those territories the local courts termed Courts
/of
99. HALL, W.E. A treatise on the foreign powers and Juris-
*   — .n——— —^T,—wr>— , f i  ir w i r t m - i if n......... it i n  in  — iirrri-1— m.nwrn mi n^ m—Ti.m rm n rwi mp pun m  i'x  nat ra n rm i um m u.
diction of the British Crown, p. 191.
1* HERTSLET, E. A complete collection of the treaties & 
conventions etc. Vol. 13"Tl877?' pT~Bo7
2. By Article 1 of the rules & regulations framed under 
the 1872 Order in Council (Hertslet's Vol. 13, p. 63) it 
was stated that uNo British trader in any of the tex»ritor&s 
preferred tq_/ is permitted to take the law into his own 
hands or to seize and to put under restraint the person 
or property of any native or native chief under any pretext 
whatsoever .
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of Equity,3 appointed for the Sett lenient^by permission of 
the Consul, Of trading disputes between British subjects 
or between British traders and natives. Such Courts of 
Equity were to be composed of British agents and traders at 
the place where the Court was established, and out of their 
members the agents were to supply the assessors required to 
assist the consul in the trial of more important cases.
The Consul’s jurisdiction was as followsj-
1. To hear and determine breaches of rules and regulations, 
other than those relating to the observance of treaties, 
committed by a British subject.
2. To try all cases in which the penalty did not exceed 
40/- or banishment for 1 month or imprisonment for a period 
not exceeding 14 days. These cases were triable summarily 
without the aid of assessors.
3. Where the penalty exceeded 40/-, etc, the Consul, 
before trying the case, had to summon 2 impartial flBritish 
subjects of good repute being members of a Court of Equity1*, 
to sit with him as assessors. The Consul was not bound by 
the opinion of the assessors.
4. Civil disputes were to be heard and determined by the 
   /C onsul* * * *  .mi ■ n il— — —i t -  in i tin i ihm i^ >nin.i uni i wniM iiiinn i i t i  i Fi-^in^mrtin w t itb ii i 'i ih ii nun im ii .m i —hi p . m i m  i —  iwn i m U im . win i n in n r m n i  nuiwiinmiii 
3. The term 11 Court of Equity** shall be construed to include
the principal resident British merchants and traders duly
authorised by the Consul to hear and entertain Civil suits
within their respective districts - Article 31.
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Consul, or In his absence by a local Court of Equity (art­
icles 6 & 7). Not less than 2 and not more than 4 assessors 
could be summoned to sit (article 3).
5. The Consular Courts were also constituted courts of pro­
bate to grant probate of a will or letters of administration 
to the intestate estates of any British subject, or any 
native of a state or place under British protection.^
6. The Gonsul could exercise within his Consular District
all or any of the powers which, by an Act or Acts of 11 the
Imperial Parliament for the regulation of merchant sea­
men or for the regulation of the mercantile marine, or 
for the enforcement of regulationsregarding quarantine, 
may now ... be exercised by any justice and justices 
of the peace within Her Majesty’s dominions**.
Where an offence was committed just outside the Consular
District, the Consul had no jurisdiction to bring the
offender to trial. This unsatisfactory state of affairs
became evident in the case of Re John & Ors.f or what has
been described by a learned historian as nthe Onitsha
murder case**.^ __
4. Consular courts had no probate jurisdiction in cases 
where the deceased British subject died outside the Colony 
where the court was established. The powers of the Court In 
that Case seem to be limited to taking possession of the per­
sonal property of the deceased, so that it might be kept 
until it could be dealt with according to law; or to granting 
if necessary, a protective administration to an officer of 
the Court (HALL, W.E. Foreign powers, p. 191.)
5. Correspondence respecting the trial of certain persons at 
Sierra Leone for the murder of a slave girl at Onitsha on the 
River Niger, Par* Papers. C.3430. Session 1882, Vol. 46,
pp. 571-630.
6. CROOKS, J.J. History of Sierra Leone, p. 259.
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In September^1880^the Secretary of the Church Mission­
ary Society at Lagos Informed Governor Griffith that in 
1878^one W.F. John, an interpreter to the mission of the 
Church Missionary Society at Onitsha on the River HigerJ. 
had flogged and brutally treated a girl of 15 or 14 years 
of age in his service, whom he was alleged to have ransomed. 
The death of the girl was discovered the following morning. 
The information goes that in the autumn of 1878, the late 
Mr. Consul Hopkins was at Onitsha, and was Informed, nbut 
as his jurisdiction did not extend to Onitsha he took no 
steps to deal with itu * When his jurisdiction was extended 
to Onitsha,the said John had left for Sierra Leone.
When the ca se of this brutal murder was reported to the 
British Government they decided to act. They were, however, 
aware of the procedural and technical difficulties. f f Q m g r  
the culprit was arrested in Sierra Leone In February 18S1 
and detained. In 1882, after considerable difficulty, the 
British Government appointed a Commission under Acts of 
Parliament, one of which dated back to 1536 as the
Co Ionia 1 c our ts had no .jurisdiction in the matter.^
They are 5 (1) 28 Hen VIII C ® p 7 T &  (1536) "An act for the 
punishment of pirates and robbers*1; s. 2(2) stipulated for 
the trial of such persons **by 12 lawful men Inhabited In the 
shire limited within such commission**. (2) 4-6 Geo III, c. 54 
(1806). An act for the more speedy trial of offences comm­
itted in distant parts upon the sea, etc**. (3) 57 Geo III,
^  (1817). An act for the more effectual punishment 
of murders and manslaughters committed in places not 
within His Majesty’s Dominions” .
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After a trial lasting 15 days, the jury returned a unan­
imous verdict of manslaughter against John and the three 
culprits, and they were sentenced accordingly#
In their report to Governor H&velock of Sierra Leone,
8
the Commissioners pointed out that though under the circum­
stances this proceeding by commission under the Great Seal 
was the only means of bringing the offenders to justice, 
yet they thought that it was a most cumbrous mode and 
extremely difficult In practice#
HThe institution of a graniL jury was abolished here 
some yearsago on account of its not wurking properly 
yet under the Commission we had to have one summoned 
which alone was a matter of anxious consideration, 
for the number of the jurymen here Is very limited, 
and if the best have to be taken out to form a grand 
jury, the remainder are less likely to be Independent 
and were apt to be partisans'*.
For the future, the Commissioners suggested that an Act of
Parliament should be passed giving jurisdiction to the
existing courts in the West African settlements, rendering
grand juries unnecessary, or that a commission should be
appointed of a permanent nature# They also suggested that
/prisoners
8. F.F. Pinkett, C.J. of Sierra Leone; T#F. Griffith, 
Colonial Secretary, Sierra Leone; F. Smith, Chief Magistrate 
of Gambia. The original list of Commissioners Included 
W.W. Streeter, Chief Justice of West African Settlements, 
who left for England owing to Ill-health, and James 
Marshal, Chief Justice of the Gold Coast Colony, who was 
also forced to leave for homeowing to ill-health#
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prisoners, natives of Sierra Leone, should be tried at 
Lagos, or the Gold Coast, and vice versa.
To this suggestion, the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies intimated that the proposed new Order in Council 
for regulating consular jurisdiction on the West Coast of 
Africa, if passed, would be more effective than the propo­
sals made by the Commissioners. Consequently, in 1885, an 
important Order in Council for extending British consular 
jurisdiction on the West African Coast was issued.$
The preamble made it clear that the power of the con­
sular officers to exercise jurisdiction sprang from the 
provisions of the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts. Part 1 of the 
Order dealt with general jurisdiction. The jurisdiction 
conferred extended to British subjects, or persons enjoying 
British protection, British ships, and natives of Africa. 
The foregoing provisions were adaptations of the Admiralty 
Offences (Colonial) Act of 1849 and the Merchant Shipping 
Act, 1867, section 11.
Part II dealt with the general law. By article 7(1)i
uThe civil and criminal law to be administered under 
this Order shall be the civil and criminal law in 
force in England at the date of the commencement of 
this Order, so far as applicable and subject to the
/modifications
3* London gazette. April 10th 1885. Hertslet»s Treaties. 
etc., Vol. 17, p. 83.
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modifications and with the additions contained in 
this Order, or for which provision is made by this
Order, or by any Queen’s Regulations made for the
time being in force under this Order” *
By article 7(2), the Secretary of State could declare that 
any of the laws or ordinances in force in the West Africa 
Settlements or the Gold Coast Colony could be applied in 
the consular districts* Thus under article 15 of the 1889 
Order in Council^ which is similar to the one under cons id-
eration, 4 Ordinances of the Gold Coast Colony were modi­
fied and applied to the Niger Protect orate. H  They were i -
'Ihe Niger Coast Customs Ordinance 1894;
The Niger Coast Post Offices Ordinance 1894;
The Nigei* Coast Constabulary Ordinance 1894;
The Niger Coast Fire Arms Ordinance, 1894*
Article 27 related to Assessors. Any male person of good
repute and full age could be an Assessor. Not fewer than 2
and not more than 4 Assessors were to be empanelled at
any time* ”An assessor shall have no voice in the decision 
of a case or in awarding sentence, but the dissent of 
an assessor shall at his request be entered on the 
minutes of the case with any reasons assigned by him 
for such dissent.” (Article 27(5))
10. British Order in Council providing for the exercise of 
Her Majesty’s Jurisdiction in certain parts of Africa and 
in the Island of Madagascar* 1889. London Gazette. October 
22nd, 1889. Hertslet’a Treaties, etc.* Vol. 18, p. 1.
11* Hodges, op* cit. p. 30.
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In certain criminal cases, sentences given toy the 
consular courts had. to toe submitted for review to the Chief 
Justice of the West Africa Settlements, or to the Chief 
Justice of the Cold Coast Colony (Article 29). In civil 
matters, an appeal lay from the decision of the consular 
court to the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone or to the Sup­
reme Court of the Cold Coast Colony. (Article 3G).*^
IHE AFRICA ORDER IN COUNCIL 188$. ETC.15
In 1889 an Order in Council providing for the exercise 
of British jurisdiction in certain parts of Africa and in 
the Island of Madagascar was issued. The provisions in 
this Order were similar to the 1885 Order, except that they 
were more detailed and applied to other parts of Africa 
as well. Part VI, which dealt with criminal law and proced­
ure, is worth notings
uThe crimes punishable under this Order arej-
(1) Any acts or omissions which are for the time toeing 
punishable In England on indictment with death, penal
/servitude.
l i l i  .......................... —' ‘  — i m iniTrfr—m n n .n iM m .n r * —r imrrr »    it. . i. |Mih i.ihhtitotm i.     n n r     n i .  , —ptm-n. mi i im f    i i ■i«h     11 
12. According to instructions issued toy the Secretary of 
State in 1891 under the Africa Order in Council, 1889, the 
appellate system was re-organised. In the Oil River Prot­
ectorate, the Court of Appeal was the Supreme Court of the 
Colony of Lagos. For the Congo Free State, the Court of 
Appeal was the Supreme Court of the Gold Coast Colony1. 
(Hertslet!a Treaties, Vol. 19, p. 1.
13. London Gazette. October 22nd, 1889. Hertslet1s
Treaties, Vol. 18, p. 1*
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servitude, or imprisonment, as treasons, felonies, or 
misdemeanours.
(2) Acts of omissions by this Order ... declared to be 
punishable as offences against this Order.M (Art. 45)
uIn case an act or omission is punishable both as a 
crime under this law in force in England and as an 
offence against this Order, the accused may be tried 
and punished for such an act or omission either as a 
crime as aforesaid, or as an offence against this 
Order, but he shall not be liable to be tried or 
punished in both ways.1* (Article 46)
Only brief mention can be made to the subsequent
Orders. The Africa Order in Council issued in 1892 was
a result of the General Act of the Conference of Berlin to
extend jurisdiction under the 1889 Order to foreigners in
the Protectorates, who were subjects of the signatory
14powers to the Act. x The Africa Order of 1893 applied 
the provisions of the 1889 Order to n natives*1 of any of
n tz
nHer Majesty1 s protectorates when in local jurisdiction*1.
0. THE SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT OP THE TERRITORIES
Towards the end of the 19th century, positive steps 
were taken by the British Government to constitute each 
of the four territories as a colony in Its own right again. 
At this juncture It will be best to treat each territory 
separately. _______ _________ ______
14. HertsLet!a Treaties, Vol. 19, p. 2.
15. " " , Vol. 19, p. 4.
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(1) £ol<3. Coast - Ghana
The policy of the British Government, which until 1872 
was to allow the chiefs to exercise jurisdiction over the 
inhabitants with only an appeal to the English magistracy, 
was abandoned in favour of a more direct control. In 1872 
Sir Bavid Chalmers, who was the Judicial Assessor at that 
time, addressed a letter to the Governor, in which he sub­
mitted proposals nto utilise, regulate, and control the 
power of the hereditary chiefs” and to utilise the grad­
ation of authority which existed from the headman of the 
village through the chief up to the ”Chief or king of a
large district” as a foundation upon which to build up a
16jurisdiction regulated by the local government.
This led to the enactment of the Gold Coast Native Juris -
17diction Ordinance in 1878. This Ordinance was never
brought into opei^ation before it was repealed and re-enact-
18ed 5 years later with improvements in 1883. The prin­
cipal change from 1878 was in regard to appeals. By the 
1883 Ordinance the Chiefs uwith their respective councill­
ors authorised by native law” were to constitute tribunals
16• JONES, W .J .A . History of legislation in connection 
with native .jurisdiction in the Gold Coast and ""suggested 
amendments to the Native Adminis tration Ordinance, 1927* 
(1951) p7T"et seq.
17. No. 8 of 1878.
18. No. 5 of 1883.
with jurisdiction (irrespective of the Chiefs* seniority)
19to try specified civil and crimnal matters. The Ordin­
ance w&s subsequently amended; the present enactment dealing 
with the matter is embodied in the Courts Act 1960.^^
By Letters Patent dated January 13th, 1886, the Govern­
ment of the Settlement at Lagos was separated from the Sett­
lement on the Gold Coast. The limits of the new Gold Coast
Colony were described as comprising ”all places, settlements, 
and territories belong,0-7to us on the Gold Coast In 
Western Africa between the fifth degree of West longi­
tude and the second degree of East longitude” .^1
An executive and a legislative council were created.
Ashanti was annexed to the ”Colony” after the final
conquest of that territory in 1901, by an Order in Council
of September 26th, 1901. The Ashanti Administration Ordin- 
22
ance, 1902, provided for establishing in Ashanti
(a ) A Chief Commi s si oner1s C ourt. This was a court of
record with jurisdiction throughout Ashanti. The extent of
/ the
19. See KORSAH, K.A. (Chairman). Report of Commission on 
Native Courts, (1951) p. 4 et seq.
20. C.A.9. (Republic of Ghana) See Chapter 2 for a synopsis 
of the present judicial system.
Herts let1 s Treaties, Vol. 17, p. 109. A British O-in-C 
dated December 29th, 1887, provided for the exercise of Brit­
ish jurisdiction in the territories adjacent to the Gold 
Coast Colony - see Vol. 17, p. 127.
22. No. 1 of 1902.
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the Chief Commissi oner* s jurisdiction was equivalent to that
of a Divisional Court, except in divorce and matrimonial
jurisdiction. In civil and criminal matters the Court was
to be guided by the law in force in the Gold Coast Colony.
The procedure so far as practicable was to be the same as
the procedure in the Supreme Court of the Gold Coast Colony.
Section 10 stipulated that “in no cause or matter, civil or
criminal, shall the employment of a Barrister or Solicitor
be allowed”!, By section 19 no appeal lay from the decision
23of the Chief Commissioner in any criminal matter.
(k) A District Commissioner* s Court in each district.
In civil cases where the sum involved amounted to £100,
appeals lay to the Chief Commissioner's Court and thence to
the Supreme Court of the Colony. No appeal lay from the
decision of either court in any criminal case. ______ _ _
23. The unjust provisions of this Ordinance came to light 
when Dr. Knowles, a European in Ashanti, was tried in the 
Chief Commissioner's Court without a jury and a lawyer. 
Previous to this, In t3ae words of the Gold Coast Independent, 
our “brothers and friends In Ashanti” groaned““'under the 
sting of iniquitous and oppressive laws” . See post p 7 ?
A propos the provision prohibiting the services of counsel in 
Ashanti courts, the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies 
in answer to a question In the Commons (December 4th,1929), 
stated that “there were weighty reasons in the Interest of 
the native populations for the retention of this prohibition” 
in spite of the public outcry&V
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(°) Native Tribunals I with civil jurisdiction up to £100 and
criminal jurisdiction, except in cases of murder, rape,
robbery, etc® j
The Northern Territories (now known as Northern Ghana)
came to be administered with the government of the Gold
C&ast by virtue of the Northern Territories Order in Council
1901, and the Northern Territories Administration Ordinance,
24
the provisions of which were similar to those of Ashanti,
In view of the fact that Ashanti and the Northern Territories 
were to be administered with the Gold Coast Colony, the 
British Order in Council of 1877 was revoked and replaced by 
a new Order of March 2nd, 1909, which regulated appeals to 
the Privy Council frcm the final judgments of the Supreme 
Court in respect of appeals from the Colony, Ashanti and the 
Northern Territories,
An appeal la y s ^
w (i) as of right from any final judgment of the Court, 
where the matter in dispute on the appeal amounted to 
or was of the value of £500 sterling or upwards, a? 
where the appeal involved, directly or Indirectly, some 
claim or question or to or respecting property or some 
civil right amounting to cr of the value of £500 
sterling or upwards; and
(ii) at the discretion of the Court, frcm any other 
judgment of the Court, whether final or Interlocutory, 
if, in the opinion of the Court, the question involved
24, No. 1 of 1902,
25, St, R & 0 1909, p. 800.
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in the appeal was one which, by reason of its great 
general or public importance or otherwis e , ought to be 
submitted to His Majesty in Council for decision.*
Two further measures were taken to improve the
adm ini strati on of justice in Ashanti. Although these
measures could be described as a s&ep forward in the
development of the a dm inis t ration , yet they did not go
far enough. First, the Ashanti Administration Ordinance,
19OS (Sixth Further Amendment) Ordinance Ho* 8 of 1918,
provided for the appointment of a professional lawyer to
be a Circuit Judge with jurisdiction throughout Ashanti.
Secondly, in 1919 the office of a Circuit Judge was made
permanent. Under Ordinance Ho. 9 of 1919,^^ the Chief
Commissioner (who was only an administrative officer) was
relieved of his criminal jurisdiction in capital cases.
By section 3 the Circuit Judge was empowered to exercises
uall the judicial powers and jurisdiction which in 
respect of criminal causes and matters were 
immediately prior to the commencement hereof 
vested in the Chief Commissioner11»
86* **An Ordinance to constitute the office of Circuit 
Judge of Ashanti and for purposes connected
therewith.**
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He retained, however, exclusive jurisdiction in civil 
causes and matters to which native custernary law was 
principally and substantially applicable.
Togoland (which became a German Colony in 1884) was 
surrendered to the combined British and French forces in 
1914 during the First World War. On July 10th, 1919, after 
the signing of the Anglo-French agreement, the ^British 
sphere*1 of Togoland, which was adjacent to the Gold Coast 
Colony and the northern Territories, was mandated to 
Britain, who administered it as an integral part of the 
!,Gold Coast Colony and its dependencies l1^ 1?
The judicial system followed that of the Gold Coast 
Colony and of the Northern Territories. Thus the Chief 
Commissioner1s Court of the Northern Territories exercised 
jurisdiction throughout the Northern section of the British 
sphere. The Supreme Court of the Colony also exercised 
jurisdiction throughout the Southern section of Togoland as 
it had exercised in the Colony. In civil matters the 
Court was guided by the laws in force in the Gold Coast 
Colony, and in criminal matters by the criminal code of 
the Colony.28
27. As prescribed for by an Order in Council No. 1284 
of 1923.
28. Report by His Britannic Majesty^ Government on the 
Administration of British Togoland for the year 1924.
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The Supreme Court Amendment Ordinance of the Gold 
Coast , ho. 6 of 1923j amended the law with respect to 
proceedings in the Full Court. The provision which made 
the Chief Justice an indispensable member of the Full Court 
was repealed. The main object was to render it unnecessary 
for him to sit on an appeal from one of his own judgments. 
In view of this measure, it was fhrther provided that if 
judges of the Full Court were equally divided (for example 
on an occasion when the Chief Justice was not sitting) an 
opportunity should be given for the case to be heard 
again before a reconstituted Court.
Although the laws relating to the administration of 
justice in the Colony were far from satisfactory, yet they 
compared favouihbly with the Ill-assorted enactments 
applying to the Northern Territories, Togoland and Ashanti. 
The niniquitous and oppressive lawsu in Ashanti caught the 
public1s attention (particularly In Britain) when in 1928, 
Dr. Knowles, a European, was subjected to them during his 
trial for the murder of his wife by shooting.^ He was a 
medical officer in the employment of the administration of 
Ashanti, and stationed at Bekwai. By virtue of his resi­
dence in Ashanti he was tried there, where, according to
— --------------    .. /the
29. For a fascinating and instructive account of the trial 
see 1IECK, A. Trial of Benjamin Knowles, 1933.
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the prevailing law 30 ^as tried by a Police Magistrate
acting as a Circuit Judge without a jury and without the aid
of a barrister or a solicitor. Dr. Knowles was convicted of
murder by the Acting Circuit Judge, whose judgment was final
In criminal matters.31
Judging by the nature of the whole proceeding, it is no
wonder that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
granted the appellant special leave to appeal. After hearing
the appeal, the Judicial Committee advised His Majesty that
the appeal should be allowed and the conviction quashed.
Delivering the advice of the Privy Council, Viscount
Dunedin*-^ made it plain that their decision did not rest on
the denial of a jury, bu£ rather on the ground that the trial
judge failed to direct himself as to the possibility of a
verdict of manslaughter.
The trial aroused a great deal of interest, both in
Ghana and in the United Kingdom. A leading article in The
Times (March 11th, 1930) forecast rightly that the judgment
of the Privy Council Mmight have rendered necessary changes 
in the criminal procedure in the Crown Colonies*1.
The laws in Ashanti were described as ** shocking” , both by
Mr. Pritt, K.G., the appellant* s counsel and by the Daily
/Telegraph
30. Ashanti Adminis teTtio™OrTI~TtfoT^^ 
amended.
31. Ibid.
32. Knowles v. The King Cl93C0 A.C. 366.
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Telegraph. (November 20th., 1929).
This necessitated a visit to Ghana a few years later 
by Mr* Bushe, legal adviser to the Colonial Office, and the 
subsequent enactment of an **Ordinance to make further and 
better provision of courts and for other purposes relating 
to the administration of justice1* however, there were 
other judicial reforms between 1927 and 1935, when the 
Courts Ordinance was passed* Under the Native Administrat­
ion Ordinance, No. 18 of 1927, the Supreme Court ceased to 
exercise jurisdiction in cases touching political or const­
itutional disputes between Native Authorities, or in land 
cases arising between Paramoimt and Divisional Chiefs belong
-ing to different states. Jurisdiction in such land cases
34
was transferred to a newly-constituted Provincial Council.
As a result of the establishment of the West African
Court of Appeal in 1928?^ the enactment of Ordinance No* 28
of 1929 made detailed provision for the hearing of appeals
from the Supreme Court of the Colony to the West African
/Court
33. Enacted as the Courts Ordinance No. 7 of 1935.
34. See Cap. Ill Laws of the Gold Coast 1928. There were 
subsequent ordinances, see e.g. Ashanti - Native Juris­
diction Ordinance, No. 3 of 1932. Northern Territories 
Native Tribunal Ordinance No. 1 of 1932. Togoland under 
British Mandate Native Administration (Southern Section Ord. 
No. 1 of 1932.
35. Constituted by the W.A.C.A. Order in Council 1928.
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Court of Appeal.36 In civil matters the features and cond­
itions of appeal were practically the same as those hitherto 
prevailing in respect of appeals to the Full Court of the 
Supreme Court of the Colony. In criminal matters, an imp­
ortant innovation was Introduced. The grades of appeal, 
conditions of appeal and the powers of the Court in deter­
mining the appeal were practically the same as those 
embodied in the English Criminal Appeal Act, 1907. Hitherto
criminal appeals had lain to the Full Court only by way of
37
a case stated on a point of 3a.w. The only jurisdiction
left to be exercised by the Full Court was in respect of
the hearing of cases concerning disciplinary action over
38
legal practitioners. Similar ordinances relating to appeals
*50
from the Chief Commissioner1 s Court in Ashanti, and from
4-0
the Chief Commissioners Court in the Northern Territories
to the West African Court of Appeal were made.
The wave of judicial reform also spread to the ^British
sphere” of Togoland. The Administration Ordinance, No. 1
of 1930, defined the jurisdiction to be exercised in the 
  „ „  /Southern
36. The W.A.C.A. Ordinance 1929.
37. See, e.g., Criminal Law and Procedure Ord. No. 5 of 
1876, ss. 157-163.
38. Supreme Court Ordinance No. 29 of 1929.
39. W.A.C.A. Ashanti Ordinance No. 17 of 1929.
40. W.A.C.A. Northern Territories Ordinance No. 14 of 1929.
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Southern section by the tribunal of a Head Chief and the
tribunal of aChief, in civil disputes relating to land.
Provision was made for appeals from these tribunals to the
District Commissi oner’s Court and thence to the West African
Court of Appeal* In any land dispute between Head Chiefs
or Chiefs belonging to different divisions, the District
Commissioner's Court waas empowered to exercise jurisdiction
with an appeal therefrom to the Provincial Commissioner's
Court and thence to the West African Court of Appeal. The
Ordinance, however, had one black spot, for the employment
of legal practitioners in any cause or matter brought
before a native tribunal or before a District Commissioner's
Court or a Provincial Commissioner's Court was prohibited.
When Mr. Bushe, the legal adviser to the Colonial
Office, arrived in Ghana, his mind was directed not only to
the iniquitous laws operating in Ashanti, but also th e
existence of separate laws in the country. A new Courts
Ordinance was, therefore, drafted In 1935 as a result of a
series of recommendations made by Mr. Bushe. His first
recommendation was that there should be a unification of
legislation. In moving the second reading of the Bill,
the Attorney-General was proud to say that ”for the first 
time In the history of this Council a Bill has been 
submitted which is expressed to be enacted for the
/whole
84; *
whole of the Gold Coast, Formerly in legislating for 
the Gold Coast, we enacted ordinances piece-meal. That 
is to say* one was enacted for the Gold Coast Colony, 
another for Ashanti, another for the Northern Terri­
tories and another for Togo land. Now, thanhs to the 
new Orders in Council which were promulgated and came 
into force on January first,41 hy Imperial Orders in 
Council, we can legislate for the Gold Coast
The second recommendation of Mr. Bushe was that the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the Gold Coast Colony 
should he extended to embrace within Its ambit Ashanti and 
the Northern Territories. Thus the new Supreme Court was 
styled the Supreme Court of the Gold Coast.
The legal adviser’s third recommendation related to 
the constitution of courts of summary jurisdiction, which 
had hitherto been presided over by 'District Commissioners 
who had no legal training. The Government from then on­
wards, formulated a policy of recruiting trained legal 
personnel to administer justice. By the Courts Ordinance 
of 1935, the Supreme Court therefore consisted of the Chief 
Justice of the Gold Coast and so many puisne judges ad the
Governor might appoint. The Chief Justices and judges of
/the
41, The Gold Coast Courts Ordinances Order in Council, 
November 9th, 1934, provided that a single Ordinance might 
be made for the Colony and Ashanti for the Colony,
Ashanti and the Northern Territories, The Togoland under 
British Mandate Order In Council px^ovlded that the new Sup­
reme Court should function throughout the Northern section 
of Togoland as if that section formed part of the Eastern 
Province of the Colony.
42, Leg. Co. Debates. Session 1935, Issue No. 1, p. 28.
the Supreme Courts of Nigeria and Sierra Leone and the 
judges of the Supreme Court of the Gambia were also made 
members of the Court.
In the same year the Criminal Procedure Code was 
passed.^ At long last an Assessors Ordinance in criminal 
trials was enacted for Ashanti*4^ and the Northern Terri- 
t ories
The new Courts established i J S e H S r
(1) The Supreme Court of the Gold Coast, whose jurisdiction 
extended to Ashanti and the Northern Territories and the 
Colony as a single territory. It was the Court of Appeal 
from the Magistrates’ Courts#
(2) Magistrates’ Courts. These courts took the place of
*  i -  iiiimrfrn~nnni»  IJ r ,— ■ ■ [rn. iai-"T ir-(iin i—. iw-ini-nrTT
District Commissioners’ Courts, The new policy was to 
separate the executive and judicial functions of the District 
Commissioner. Appeals In civil and criminal matters from 
the Magistrates’ Courts lay to the Divisional Court of the 
Suprone Court»
(3) Provincial Commissioners’ Courts. This Court heard and
determined appeals from the decisions of native tribunals.
It also had first instance jurisdiction ixa certain land casei
/between
42. No. 10 of 1935.
43. No. 37 of 1935.
44. No. 38 of 1935.
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between Chiefs. Appeals from the Court in land cases lay 
direct to the West African Court of Appeal*
(4) Ashanti Chief Commissioned s Court* This had original 
jurisdiction in certain land cases in which a Chief was 
a party* It had appellate jurisdiction in respect of 
decisions of magistrates1 courts* the Asantehene!s Court 
and native court3 «
( 5) Northern Territories Chief Commissioner^ Court« The
jurisdiction of this Court was similar to that of the
Chief Commissioner*s Court in Ashanti*
In 1946 after the Second World War* Britain placed
Togoland under the International Trusteeship within the
framework of the United Nations. By Article sf5 Britain*
the Administrator* was given full powers of legislation*
administratlon and jurisdiction in the territory* and she
was required to administer it nin accordance with his own 
laws as an Integral part of his territory with such 
modifications as may be required by local conditions 
and subject to the provisions of the United Nations 
Charter and of this agreement**. By Article 8* the
Administering Authority undertook in framing laws relating
to the transfer of land, to take into consideration native
laws and customs*
In 1956, a year before the Cold Coast attained her
independence* a plebiscite was held In British Togoland 
— _ _ _ _       _  _       /under
45* 1946. Cmd. 7083.
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under U.N. supervision to ascertain the. wishes of the
people of Togoland.46 In May of that ye^r, the people
voted for integration with an ^independent Gold Coast*1 •
In December, the U.K. Assembly, by 63 votes in favour
with none opposed, approved the integration of Togoland
47with an independent Gold Coast.
On March 6th, 1957, the Gold Coast became independent
and assumed the name of Ghana. By an Order in Council of
1 9 5 7 , the West African Court of Appeal ceased to be a
Court of Appeal for Ghana. This necessitated an amendment
to the Courts Ordinance of 19354^ The relevant enactments
were the Courts (Amendment) Ordiinance No. 17 of 1957, and 
of* _
the Courts (ifrnuwdw^nU-) Act No.3# of 195^. By the provisions 
of section 2 of the Courts (Amendment) Ordinance of 1957, 
the Supreme Court was constituted a court of record and 
consisted of:-
(a) The Court of Appeal. Appeals from the decisions of the 
Court lay direct to the Privy Council.
(b) The High Court of Justice.66 The High Court exercised 
 _________  __ _   ,    _ /all
46. The U.K. Government had already indicated that she was 
not willing to continue administering Togoland when the 
Gold Coast became independent.
47. The Times, December, 1956.
48. S7TTT957. No. 279.
49. For a detailed account, see Allott's Judicial & Legal 
Systems in Africa. 1962, Part I, West Africa, "by W.C. Fkow 
Daniels.
50. By the Courts (Amendment) Ord. 1957 the word “High”
was substituted for the word Supreme” •
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all tlx© civil and criminal and admiralty jurisdiction vested 
in the High Court of Justice in England. Also attached to 
the High Court were Commissioners of Assize and Civil 
Pleas.51 The jurisdiction of a Commissioner was largely 
similar to that of a High Court Judge except that he was 
not requireds-
(1) to try any criminal case i/tiere the maximum penalty 
on conviction was death or life imprisonment;
(2) to try any civil case where the amount claimed by 
the plaintiff exceeded £2,500;
(3) to entertain any application by way of habeas
corpus, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition or information in 
the nature of quo warranto; or
(4) to hear any cause or matter in which the validity 
of any Act of Parliament was called in question.
The courts of inferior jurisdiction were the Magistrat­
es* Courts, the Native Courts and Local Courts. The Local 
Courts Act No. 23 of 1958 was passed as a result of Korsah*s 
Report on Native Courts (1951) to provide for the establish­
ment of Local Courts in place of Native Courts.
G-hana was declared a republic on July lst^l961. A 
short description of the republican judicial systeai is 
given in the next chapter.
51. Commissioners of Assize and Civil Pleas Act,
No. 12 of 1958.
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(2) Lagos * Nigeria. Cameroons
Lagos was erected into a colony in her own right 
when it was separated from the Gold Coast by Letters Patent 
dated January 13th, 1886, which also provided for the gov­
ernment thereof* The Legislative Council consisted of the 
Governor and not less than 3 persons.
The boundaries of the Colony ffl.ll between the 2nd 
degree of east longitude and the 6th degree of east 
longitude. By Ordinance Ho# 1 of 1886 all the laws of 
the Gold Coast Colony which had hitherto been in force in 
the settlement of Lagos were declared to remain in force in 
the Colony of Lagos. Ordinance Ho. 8 of 1886 established 
the Supreme Court of the Colony of Lagos. Byaa British 
Order in Council of September 24th, 1886, the Supreme Court 
of Judicature of the Gold Coast Colony was constituted a 
court of appeal for the hearing of and determining of 
appeals from the judgments of the Supreme Court of Lagos. 
Ordinance No./ 2C1 of 1888 repealed the Supreme Court Ordin­
ance No. 8 of 1886 and made further provision for the admini­
stration of justice in the Colony. The Supreme Court Ord­
inance of 1888 provided for the Constitution of thef,Supreme 
Court of Judicature for the Colony of Lagos and adjacent 
territories** . _________________________
52. A British O-in-C of December 29th 1887 had provided 
for the exercise of British jurisdiction in the terri­
tories adjacent to the Colony ot Lagos.
Herts let'.s Treaties Vol. 17, p. 128.
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The Court consisted of a judge or judges appointed by 
the Governor, and also the Chief Justice and every judge of 
the Supreme Court of the Gold Coast Colony who were desig­
nated puisne judges of the Supreme Court of the Colony of 
Lagos. The Full Court was to he a court of appeal and was 
fully constituted by 2 or 3 judges of whom the Ghief Justice 
had to be one. Since Lagos was provided with her own Court 
of Appeals the former British Order in Council of September 
24th, 1886, was revoked in July 1889. A new Order bearing 
the same date - 1889 - provided for appeals from the Supreme 
Court of Lagos to the Full Court and thence to the Privy 
Council.
The Niger Territories, which Included Northern Nigeria,
were secured to the British Crown by nearly 500 treaties
made by the Royal Niger Company (formerly the National
African Company Ltd). A Royal Charter of July 10th, 1866,
had authorised and empowered the National African Company
to hold and retain the full benefit of the several cessions
of territories in the basin of the River Niger and in 
53 _
Africa. by the Northern Nigeria Order in Council dated 
’December 27th, 1899,^ certain of the territories situate
53. 7*~
54. 1899 No. 994 St. r & 0. p. 628. By art® 4 the African 
0-in-C relating to the exercise of consular jurisdiction 
ceased to apply to Northern Nigeria on the coming into force 
of the 1899 Order*
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within the limits of the Order were transferred to the 
British Government from January 1st, 1900 and designated 
the wProtectorate of Her Majesty the ^ueeni{. By the pro­
visions made for the peace, order and good government, the 
British Crown Ytfas empowered to appdint a High Commissioner, 
for'Northern Nigeria. He was authorised to issue proclam­
ations to provide for the administration of justice.
HThe High Commissioner, in issuing such proclamations, 
shall resxoect any native laws by which the civil 
relations of any native Chiefs, tribes, or populations 
under Her Majesty’s protection are now regulated, 
except so far as the same may be incompatible with the 
due exercise of Her Biajesty1 s pjowers and jurisdiction, 
or clearly injurious to the welfare of the said 
n a t i v e s ( A r t i c l e  6)
The Protectorate Court Proclamation No. 4 of 1900 
provided Northern Nigeria with a Supreme Court, a Provincial 
Court presided over by a Resident, a Cantonment Court in 
each cantonment, presided over by a Cantonment Magistrate, 
and lastly native courts at such of the principal towns as 
the Resident might appoint.^ The native courts were pre­
sided over by persons appointed by the Head Chief or Emir.
By the Southern Nigeria Protectorate Order in Council 
dated December 27th, 1899,56 certain of the territories 
formerly administered by the Royal Niger Company were
added to the Niger Coast Protectorate, and designated the 
       , . /Pr ot e ct ora t e
55. Proc. No. 5 of 1900. ‘ ~
56. 1899 No. 995. St. R & 0 (1899) p. 634.
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Protectorate of Southern Nigeria with effect from January lst^ 
1900. Provision was made for the appointment of a High 
Commissioner and his powers for the administration of justice 
were the same as those recorded for the Protectorate of Nor­
thern Nigeria. By the Supreme Court Proclamation No* 6 of 
1900, a Supreme Court of Southern Nigeria was created. The 
exercise of magisterial jurisdiction was vested in the “Comm­
issioners* Courts**.^ The Native Courts Proclamation No. 9 
of 1900 was promulgated in order to provide for the admini- 
&tration of justice in the native courts. By the Southern 
Nigeria Protectorate Order in Council 1906, it was provided 
that the powers hitherto exercised by the High Commissioners 
for the peace, order and good government of the territories, 
should now he exercised by the Governor of the Colony of 
Southern Nigeria and the Legislative Council. In the same 
year the Colony of Lagos was amalgamated with the Protect­
orate of Southern Nigeria, and a new entity “The Colony and
Protectorate of Southern Nigeria** emerged, divided into
 -.....      /thre e
57. Proclamation No. 8 of 1900.
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58three provinces.
The Native Courts Proclamation (Northern Nigeria)
No. 1 of 1906* established formally two classes of native
courtss the Alkalis1 Courts applicable to Muslim districts*
and Judicial Councils suited to non-Muslims. The Alkalis1
Courts consisted of
11 an Alkali* with or without Mallams, Almajiral* or other 
persons acting either in conjunction with the Alkali 
as judges* or sitting as assessors with such powers as 
a Resident** might determine, 59
A Judicial Council comprised an w]3inir* or a chief* or a
district headman* with Mallams or other persons acting 
either in conjunction with the Emir, chief or district 
headman as judges* or sitting as assessors with such 
powers as a Resident*1 might determine. 50
The old judicial system was preserved as far as
possible by the Proclamation. Thus criminal and civil
cases in which natives were involved were tried before the
native courts. The law administered was native law* subject
to provision against cruel punishments.
By virtue of an Order in Council dated November 22nd
1913 and Letters Patent dated November 29th 1913* the
/Niserias
  ■! ■ i »i h i " " i —  i —   ~~i n n ii iii i in i in n i ii m t—m>Mii~ iif — TIT! . ,  mi 11 irm i ii 1 nr~ii ith ■ >■ n iin.in iM ii.i— i«wiiniaiinw»iiM iiii^ni^nT^>mir.Tfrrr-^ «-ii—
58. LUCAS, C.P. Historical Ceography of the British Colonies 
Vol. 3* West Africa* p. 208. The Letters Patent of Feb. 28th 
1906 stipulated that the Colony of Lagos was to be desig­
nated Southern Nigeria. It also provided for the establish­
ment of Legislative and Executive Councils. S.R. & 0. 1906,
p. 885.
59. Section 4. See Laws of the Protectorate of Northern 
Nigeria in force in 1910. ed. by E.A. Speed.
60. Ibid.
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6 1Nigerias were reconstituted. The Colony of Saithern
Nigeria, together with a portion of its Protectorate,
became the Colony of Nigeria. The remaining parts of that
Protectorate, and the whole of Northern Nigeria became the
Protectorate of Nigeria. The Protectorate was divided into
two parts, each under a Lieutenant-Governor, who was subject
to the Governor of the Colony. For the Colony there were
an Executive Council and a Legislative Council as before;
for the Protectorate all executive and legislative powers
were vested in the Governor. For deliberative purposes
there was a Nigerian Council, consisting of the Governor,
the Executive Council, the Residentsand Commissioners of
the First Class. There were also 12 unofficial members.
By Ordinance No. 6 of 1914 a new Supreme Court of
Judicature for the Colony and Protectorate was constituted
/as
61. The Colony of Nigeria Boundaries Order in Council 
November 22nd, 1913. This was amended by an Order in 
Council of May 10th 1917* Both Orders were revoked by the 
Nigeria Protectorate Order in Council of 1922. The Letters 
Patent referred to is recorded in Statutory Rules and Orders 
for 1915, p. 2588. Article XXII stipulated that tf Nigeria 
unless the subject or context otherwise requires, shall 
Include both the Colony and the Protectorate of Nigeria1®.
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as a result of tlxe amalgamation. On amalgamation the Chief
Justice and puisne judges of Northern and Southern Nigeria
62
were abolished* There was only one Chief Justice for 
Nigeria, and such judges as the Governor might appoint; 
hut the Chief Justice and judges of the Gold Coast were 
puisne judges of the Court. The Court had all the juris­
diction of the High Court in England (except Admiralty), and 
as regards infants and lunatics, all the jurisdiction and 
powers of the Lord Chancellor of England* The Full Court 
was a Court of Appeal, and for the purposes of interlocutory 
appeals and applications, it was fully constituted by ft of 
the judges, For other purposes the Appeal Court was con­
stituted by 3 or more judges, of whom the Chief Justice 
had to be one. The decision of the majority prevailed in 
respect of appeals brought before it, but the Chief Justice 
had a casting vote in cases where the judges were evenly 
divided in opinion.^
Effeect was given to native law and custom so far as it 
was not repugnant to natiiral justice, or incompatible with 
the general legislation of the Colony. The local juris­
diction of the Court in the Protectorate was defined, with 
. —  _      /authority
_  7 <hP Nor'/^sfiwn
62. LUGARD, Sir.P. Report on/Ama lgama t i on .■■fluid. 1©SC).
* «^;0 jHn-m.
oo• bection Y• ^^ ^f7
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authority given to the Governor to extend or limit it.
The Provincial Courts Ordinance, No. 7 of 1914, defined the 
jurisdiction of the Provincial Courts established outside 
the limits of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
The Chief Judge of a Province was the- Resident or Commiss­
ioner, who had Unlimited civil and criminal jurisdiction.
In the strict sense of the word there was no right of appeal 
in criminal cases, but a list of criminal cases requiring 
confirmation’ by the Governor operated as an appeal on behali 
of every convicted person whose name was included therein.
In civil proceedings appeals lay to the Supreme Court. No 
legal practitioner was allowed to appear before a Provincial 
Court. In no appeal frdm a Provincial to the Supreme 
Court was the employment of a legal practitioner permittedf 
unless the previous consent of the Chief Justice was 
granted.^ It Is reported that in 1922 over 80 persons 
suffered capital punishment without their being represented 
by counsel.^5
The Native Courts Ordinance, No. 8 of 1914, regulated 
the powersand jurisdiction of native courts. A native 
court consisted of*
(a) an Alkali with or without native assistants, known 
as an Alkali* s Court)$ or
*647" ^ectTon”"^T*™™* “ ~ ~
65. ELIAS, T.O. Groundwork of Nigerian Law, p. 126.
(b) of a paramount or head chief with or without 
minor chiefs, or other persons acting in conjunction with 
the paramount chief# A Court of the paramount chiefs, 
which also exercised executive functions was termed a 
judicial council*
The jurisdiction of native courts and judicial councils 
were defined in the warrants establishing them* A native 
court or judicial council which had jurisdiction over capi­
tal offences, was required, as soon as possible after 
passing a sentence of death, to send to the Resident or 
Commissioner a report of the case, together with all the 
documents and notes of evidence taken in the caae.6^a
A person dissatisfied with the decision of anative 
court in any civil or criminal case, could appeal to such 
court as the Resident or Commissioner directed. But a Res­
ident Commissioner was also empowered to appoint the Court 
of the Chief Alkali or the judicial council or the native 
court presided over by the paramount chief at the capital 
city of his province, to be a court of appeal from all 
other native courts or judicial councils in the province.
Leg&l practitioners were not allowed to appear or act 
for any party before a native court or judicial council.
esa sT 1^3. ~ —  —
66. Ibid, s. 12.
___
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At the end of the First World War in 1919, the former 
German Colony of Kamerun was/Jjortitioned between France and 
Britain. The British mandated area fell into two main 
divisionsj the Cameroons Province, and the Northern 
Cameroons. By the British Cameroons (Administration) 
Ordinance, No. 3 of 1924, the British Cameroons was admini­
stered as though it foxmed an integral part of Nigeria. By 
By the same enactment the bulk of Nigerian law was applied 
to the territories. As from February 28th, 1924, German 
law, in so far as it was previously in force in the British 
Cameroons, was automatically superseded. ^
In 1933, further and better judicial arrangements were 
made for the administration of justice in the Protectorate 
of Nigeria. By the Protectorate Courts Ordinance, No. 45 of 
1933, a High Court was established, consisting of the Chief 
Justice and the puisne judges of the Supreme Court., and 
other judges, and assistant judges to be appointed by the 
Governor.
The High Court in the Protectorate exercised all the 
jurisdiction and powers which were vested In or capable of 
being exercised by the Supreme Court in the Colony, except?
HIT—— T*— ii i i ■ i i i.  - m .mi- ria,i tnrt . t  i ■ fcn .  n mi n i ■ ~ flu t i .  in .n  i i . ii W  I iii n i t .  'p .    r T m i i i  in.miwif. ■ <ii ... Hi .. ■ i ■ mi ■ «i »  i nL. .n
67. See Report by His Britannic Majesty1 s Government on the 
administration of the British Cameroons for the year 1924.
(1925). In 1946, after the 2nd World War, the Cameroons 
were placed under U.1M. Trusteeship on the same lines as 
those recommended for Togoland - Cameroons under U.K. 
Trusteeship. 1946. Cmd. TO82*
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The jurisdiction, powers and authorities of the Supreme 
Court in
(i) probate, divorce and matrimonial causes and 
proceedings| and (ii) admiralty, and (ill) proceedings 
in relation to, for example, the Legitimacy Ordinance,
No. 27 of 1929, The Company’s Ordinance, the Public Trustee 
Ordinance, No. 22of 1928#
Criminal causes were tried in the High Court after 
commital by a magistrate’s court before a judge and jury 
or assessors. Appeals from magistrates1 courts, in the 
exercise of original jurisdiction in any civil matter, lay 
to the High Court. The High Court also heard appeals from 
Native Courts and appeals from the decisions of magistrates* 
courts given on appeals from native courts. In view of the 
establishment of a High Court In the Protectorate, the gen­
eral jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was abolished, with
68the exception of those mentioned above.
The Protectorate was also divided up into areas in 
each of which there was a magistrate’s court established. 
The magistrates* courts had original and appellate juris­
diction in civil and criminal matters.
By the Supreme Court Amendment Ordinance, No. 46 of 
1933, the Full Court was abolished as a Court of Appeal
68* See also Supreme Court Amendment Ord* No. 4-6 of 1933.
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from the judgments of the Supreme Court* By the West African
Court of Appeal Ordinance, Ho. 47 of 1933, appeals hoth in
civil cases from the Supreme Court and the High Court of the
69
Protectorate lay to the West African Court of Appeal*
In 1945 a series of Ordinances were passed to complete 
the programme of judicial reform begun in 1943. For example, 
the Coroners Ordinance, Ho. 33 of 1944, abolished the 
Coroners O'uries. The Magistrates' Gourts (Civil Procedure) 
Ordinance Hoi 38 of 1945, based on the English County Courts 
Act, 1934, introduced a special form of procedure In civil 
matters for use in magistrates' courts, w&Dich had previously 
followed a procedure identical to that in the Supreme Court.
A Schedule to the Ordinance contained a number of forms 
taken from the English County Court forms 1936-9* The 
Magistrates’ Courts (Appeals) Ordinance, Ho. 41 of 1945, 
regulated appeals both in civil and criminal matters. Appeals 
were heard by a single judge of the Supreme Court, sitting 
as an appeal court*
These judicial reforms did not spread to the native 
courts. It was after criticisms had been made by the West 
African Court of Appeal in the Northern Nigerian case of 
Ts&fo G-ubba v. Guandu Native Authority,70 that the legis­
lature was compelled to pass the Native Courts Ordinance 1948 
______ _ _ _______________________________   _ _/to
69. For a brief history of the W.A.C.A. see post.j2.0
70. (ft ¥-7) IX W/lQ/Hm-t
iojl
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to solve the difficulties in the existing law* iSection 3
offc* OL
provided thajfc, where an act or omission constituted£both
against native law and custom and against 'the criminal code,
or any other enactment, a native court might try the case
in accordance with, native law and custom* After a trial in
a native court for homicide, a record of the proceedings
was to he sent to the Supreme Court Judge of the division
in which the native court was situated; he could either
confirm the decision of the court of first instance, acquit
the conviction of a person, or direct a retrial before the
Supreme Court, or substitute a verdict of manslaughter for
one of capital homicide, or substitute a special verdict of
guilty but insane* These powers of the appellate court
were of special importance only to cases tried by courts
administering Muslim law*
The unified legal system in Nigeria was broken up in
1954 after 40 years by the decision of the Nigerian leaders
to set up a federal system of government and a consequent
regionalisation of the judiciary By the Nigeria 
 ________   /Constitution
71. No* 36 of 1948. This Ordinance was to” remain in force 
until October 1st, 1951* For the present position see s* 62 
of t&e Northern Nigeria High Court Law* N.R. No. 8 of 1955* 
Northern Nigeria has now a more suitable Criminal Code based 
on the Sudan Penal Code. See also (1950) 32 J. Comp* Leg.
3rd Series, p. 158.
72. ELIAS, T.G. Blending of tWo legal systems. The T imes, 
Special number on Nigeria, 29th September, 1960.
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(Constitution) Order in Council, 1954 a Federal 
Supreme Court for Nigeria was established. The three 
Regions, Lagos and the Southern Cameroons, were each empow­
ered by law to establish their own High Courts* Appeals lay 
from the decisions of the High Courts to the Federal Supreme 
Court, and thence direct to the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council, and not to the West African Court of Appea 1
rjA
as had been the existing practice.
In October 1960^the Federation of Nigeria attained her
independence. By the Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Coun­
cil, 1960,*^ detailed provisions relating to the judicial 
system were m ade.^ By the Northern Cameroons (Administrat- 
ion) Order in Counci 1^1960 provision was made for the est- 
ablishment of a High Court for the Northern Cameroons. '
In June 1961 the Northern Cameroons Trust Territory (now 
renamed Sardurna Province) voted to join the Northern 
Region of the Federation of Nigeria at a plebiscite held in
February of the same year under the auspices of the United
Nations
. . .. i ,  -       ■ , ^ r v r ^ |l    in- ■■ . In r - - ,r- ■„ ■■■■« ■ ■■■   .i„ . ■■■■■! l ii.mi.
73. S.I. 1954* No. 1146* (Revoked)
74. For a brief note on the W.A.C.A* see post p  A o-o
75. S.I. 1960 No. 1652.
76. For the present legal system see post ^
77. S.I. 1960. No. 1656, s. 12.
78. By the Nigerian Constitution First Amendment Act 1961, 
the Northern Cameroons was admitted to the Federation of 
Nigeria.
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After 42 years of British rule the Southern Cameroons 
was united on October 1st, 1961 with the French Republic 
of the Cameroun in accordance with the result of a pleb­
iscite held in February. The two territories were united 
for the first time since 1919, when the formei* German Colony 
of Kamerun was partitioned between France and Britain.
(B ) Sierra Leone
In 1881, the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone Ordinance ; 
was passed, which among other things stipulated that uThe 
statutes of general application which were in force In
England on the first day of January, 1880M should be In
79
force in the Colony. The other provisions dealing with 
the constitution and jurisdiction of the courts, were 
broadly similar to those of the Gold Coast By Letters 
Patent dated November 28th, 1888,^ Sierra Leone, which 
with the Gambia had comprised the West African Settlements, 
was erected into a separate colony with her own Governor 
and Commander in Chief. An Executive and a Legislative 
Council were established. The office of the Chief Justice 
of the West Africa Settlements was abolished and replaced by 
the office of the Chief Justice of Sierra Leone.
79. No7^"of~1881.' “ ‘ “
80. Except the provision dealing with the establishment of 
a Court of Requests.
81. Hertslet * s Treaties, Vol. 18, p. 723.
82. The Chief Justice Designation Ordinance, 1888, No. 17 
of 1888.
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The power of the British Government to legislate for the 
Colony subject to the right of dissallowance was delegated to 
the local legishture, so long as such local ordinances were 
not repugnant to the laws of England* In 1889 the Supreme 
Court of Sierra Leone was constituted a court of appeal from 
all final judgments of the Supreme Court of the Gambia by an 
Order in Council of April 6th 1889*
On August 24th 1895,85 & British Order In Council made 
under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, empowered the Leg­
islative Council of Sierra Leone Colony to exercise juris­
diction in the territories adjacent to the Colony. The Order 
in fact heralded the proclamation on August 31st 1896 of an 
Ordinance which set forth the fact that the British Govern­
ment had assumed a Protectorate over the territories adjacent
a A
to the Colony of Sierra Leone.
In September 1896 Han Ordinance to determine the mode 
of exercising Her Majesty*s jurisdiction in the territories
adjacent to the Colony of Sierra Leone11 was enacted.
83. Hertslet*s Treaties, op cit. Vol. 20, p. 173.
84. CROOKS, J.J. op cit. p. 325.
85. No. 20 of 1896. The Protectorate Ordinance upon being 
passed into law, was transmitted to the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies, but Mr. Chamberlain found himself unable to 
agree to some of its provisions, particularly those which rel 
ated to lands and which appeared to assume (what was not the 
case) that the soil of the Protectorate was vested In the 
Crown. He accordingly directed the repeal of this Ordinance, 
and an enactment of another ordinance to take its place, poln 
ting out at the same time that an Ordinance dealing with sub­
jects of so much complexity should not have been passed with­
out having been first submittted.w CROOKS, j.j. op cit.327.
? Q o F r2tfCio:rate 0rd* No* 11 of 1897 repealed No. So of 
1896, but the 1897 Ord. in so far as It related to the p.t.o
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The Protectorate Ordinance, 1896, provided for the estab­
lishment of three types of courts) namely;
(a) The Court of the Native Chiefs, which consisted of the
'  • ,  j j . ^ ^ m . . r rftiniinnnTMiirn*.iiiiMiiiriiim»iM i m TT "HI r im i " — “1 ...... . “T —~ '** " '^ »IM 1 ■' i» iiim iiih *b ii . ^  I
courts of the native chiefs as previously established under 
customary law. These Courts decided cases according to 
native law and custom between natives other than those inv 
-olving a question of title to land, and in all criminal 
cases other than cases of murder, culpable homicide, pretendj 
ed witchcraft, slave-raiding, cannibalism, etc.
(b) The Court of the District Commissioner and Native Chiefs] 
This was a court of record and consisted of the District 
Commissioner and 2 or more nominated Chiefs. It had juris­
diction In the excepted cases mentioned under (a). But no 
sentence of death was carried into effect except upon the 
warrant of the Governor. In srriving at a decision the 
Court of the District Commissioner and Native Chiefs was 
guided as far as possible by the laws in force in the Colony.
(c) The Court of the District Commissioner was a court of i
record and consisted of the District Commissioner of the
District and had jurisdiction to hear and determine
(i) all civil cases between persons not natives, or
/between — Tl ...... mu-1 |- i mi m u ii T i m r r  m w i n .m w  m i   n ■nrimiiiwinnii i<n^nni.iwiuwiTin  ^w.imm h ' iw  ■ ....... . ii .■ nrmnnai nn.i imfm Miimmu n il  ....... i h.wlmj n — mi
85 (cont.) ... judicial system remained unchanged. It was 
the section dealing with land which was expubged.
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between a non-native and a native, and all cases involving a 
question of title to land, although arising exclusively 
between natives;
(ii) in all criminal cases other than capital in which a 
person not anative was charged, and also in the following 
cases, notwithstanding that the person charged was a native, 
namely - pretended witchcraft, slave-raiding, dealing in 
slaves, or tribal fights.
In all civil cases between non-natives, or between a 
native and a non-native, any person aggrieved by the decision 
of the District Commissioner, could appeal to the Supreme 
Court of the Colony if the subject matter exceeded £2 5. In 
criminal cases a non-native could appeal to the Supreme Court 
from the decision of the District Commissioner for the pay­
ment of a fine exceeding £50, or for imprisonment for more 
than 6 months.86 No legal practitioner was given the right 
of audience before any of the Courts.
The Supreme Court Ordinance, No. 14 of 1904, was describ­
ed as an Ordinance to consolidate and an end the enactments 
relating to the law as administered by the Supreme Court, and
to the administration of justice in the Colony of Sierra 
87
Leone. The Supreme Court was a superior court of record
86. ^ ’Native* meansany member of the aboriginal races or 
tribes of Africa ordinarily resident within the Protectorate, 
or in the territories other than the Colony adjacent thereto . 
Section 1.
87. Contained In Ordinances of the Golony of Sierra Leone. 
Revised Edition, Vol. II, 1900-1914.
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with jurisdiction and powers basically similar to those exer­
cised by High Court Judges in England. The Court once more was 
empowered to exercise summary jurisdiction at law and in equity 
in certain m a t t e r s . T h e  statutes in force in the County 
Courts In England on the first day of January 1880, were to be
applied in all suitsand matters In which the Supreme Court was
89
to exercise a summary jurisdiction. The Supreme Court was
held at Freetown before the Chief Justice. The puisne judges
usually held sittings of the Circuit Court in the Protectorate
under the provisions of the Protectorate Courts Jurisdiction
Ordinance, 1905.
The Supreme Court Amendment Ordinance, Ho* 14 of 1912,
constituted a Supreme Court and a Full Court which was to be
the Court of Appeal. The Full Court consisted of 3 or more
judges of whom the Chief Justice Hshall at all times be one11.
Appeals lay to the Full Court from decisions of the Supreme
Court of the Colony, or the Circuit Court of the Protectorate
of Sierra Leone. But the Supreme Court still remained the
court of appeal from the decisions of the Supreme Court of
the Gambia. This anomaly was removed by a British Order in
Council of June 13th 1913,^ which constituted the Full Court
of the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone a court of recoi’d to 
 /receive
88. Ibid, s. 70.
89. Ibid, s. 74.
90. St*R*&.0. 1913, p.^Jr? The previous Orders in Council
which constituted the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone a court of 
appeal from the final judgments of the Supreme Court of the 
Gambia are dated 1889 and 1891 respectively.
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receive, hear and determine appeals from the Supreme Court
of theColony of the Gambia. From there, final appeals lay
to the Privy Council.
The Supreme Court Amendment Ordinance, No. 4 of 1923,
eliminated the provision inserted by No. 14 of 1912 by which
the Chief Justice was compelled to preside over the Full
Court of Appeal and so preside in some cases over the court
hearing appeals from his own judgments. The amendment
inserted in 1923 was as follows
w6 (1) The Full Court shall be a Court of Appeal, and 
for this purpose shall be constituted by three or more 
Judges.
(2) When the Chief Justice is not one of the Judges 
constituting the Court, the Judge who under the prov­
isions of section five of this Ordinance is the first 
of the said. Judges in order of rank shall be the pre­
siding Judge.
(3) In all matters brought before the Full Court by­
way of appeal or otherwise the decision of the majority 
of the Judges, in case they shall not agree in their 
opinion, shall be taken to be the judgment of the Court.
Provided that when the Court is constituted by an 
even number of Judges the Chief Justice or In his 
absence the Presiding Judge shall have a casting vote.11
The Magistrates’ Court Ordinance, No. 36 of 1924, was
also enacted to consolidate and amend the law with respect tc
the constitution, practice and procedure of courts having
summary jurisdiction in criminal matters in the Colony of
Sierra L e o n e , T h e  Governor w$,s empowered to divide the
Colony Into judicial districts.
91. S, 2, — —
92. For example, Nos. 29 of 1905, 3 of 1920 8c 9 of 1922.
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When the West African Court of Appeal was constituted 
by an Order in Council of '.November 1928, the Full Court of 
the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone ceased to be a court of 
appeal for the Supreme Court of the Gambia, The West 
African Court of Appeal (Civil Cases) Ordinance, No* 9 of 
1929 provided that appeals from all final judgments and 
decisions of the Supreme Court or the Circuit Court to the 
suit value of L50 or more should lie to the West African
Q'Z
Court of Appeal. Ordinance No* 10 of 1929, related to 
appeals in criminal cases, which lay to the West African 
Court of Appeal.
The Supreme Court Ordinance No* 39 of 1932 repealed 
the Supreme Court Ordinance of 1924 after consolidating 
and amending the law relating to the practice and procedure 
of the Supreme Court. Similarly, the Protectorate Courts 
Jurisdiction Ordinance, No* 40 of 1932, repealed the Prot­
ectorate Jurisdiction Ordinance, 1924, in view of the 
Criminal Procedure Ordinance just enacted. ^  Hitherto, the 
jurisdiction exercised by the Protectorate Courts had 
become unwieldy and heterogeneous in character. The courts 
established in 1932 weres
(1) The Circuit Court, which was a superior court of record
with an original jurisdiction and an appellate jurisdiction 
from decisions of the District Courts.
/(2 )mu— nif i u —.i^ ——i — ..—m —  ■■..■■■■■■■■ n .A w .A j i— A ^imj ijn iiT ir "irirriin irw i m.  i uni mi m * . i  **i * ■   *  m, |
93. W.A.C.A. [Criminal Cases)Ordinance.
94. No. 38 of 1932.
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(2) The Courts of Pis trict Commissioners, known as District
Courts, which exercised civil jurisdiction in matters
between non-natives, or between a native and a non-native;
and summary jurisdiction in criminal cases.
(3) Native Courts. These Courts had civil and criminal
jurisdiction over natives. Section 11 of the Ordinance
stipulated that whenever a ^native11 was sentenced by a
Native Court to a period of imprisonment exceeding 14 days,
the matter must be referred to the District Commissioner,
and 11 such a statement shall be deemed to operate as an
appeal to the District Commissioner, and it shall be 
lawful for him to diminish the period of imprisonment, 
or substitute a fine therefore, or quash the 
convict ion1* •
The Protectorate Courts Jurisdiction Ox^dinance did
more than merely provide for the law relating to the courts
system in the Protectorate. All provisions relating to
criminal procedure, summary conviction offences and summary
ejectment in land cases omitted from the latex* Ordinance
and passed as short separate Ordinances.
Ordinance No. 24 of 1935 repealed and replaced the
Appeals from Magistrates Ordinance of 1877 (re-enacted as
the Appeals from Magistrates Ordinance of 1924). nIn view 
of a decision of the Supreme Court that the right of a 
Crown to appeal, and hitherto unquestioned, did not 
exist, it was considered desirable to overhaul complet­
ely the existing machinery of the law relating to 
appeals from the summary jurisdiction in the Colony and 
to bring oui* legislation relating to such appeals into 
line with more modern enactments in force in other 
countries11. 95
95. TUREETT, I.J. (1937) 19 J.Comp. Leg. 3rd s. 159.
By section 3(1) of the later Ordinance, any person 
dissatisfied with the decision of a magistrate in any civil 
or criminal proceedings to which he was a party could appeal 
to the wSupreme Court in its summary jurisdiction**• The 
Attorney-General could also sppeal to the Appeal Court from 
a decision of magistrate, even though he was not a party to 
the proceedings.
Every appeal was to he made in form of a written 
petition containing all the essential details of the appeal. 
Formerly, appeals were instituted by an oral or written 
notice to the trial magistrate. Provision was also made 
for appeals by way of case stated on points of law. By 
section 33, the Attorney-General of his own motion and any 
person if aggrieved by a decision of the appeal court in a 
criminal appeal could appeal to the West African Court of 
Appeal on a matter of law, but not on a matter of fact.
The Protectorate Courts Jurisdiction (Amendment) Ordin­
ance, No. 9 of 1937, was designed to make provision for the 
better supervision of Native Courtsand for the formal 
establishment and constitution of Native Appeal Courts.
Two classes of Native Appeal Courts were set up, namely 
(i) a Chiefdom Court, and (ii) a Group Native Appeal Court. 
Where in any chiefdom there was a Native Court over which a 
section chief or other member of the tribal authority (not
being the Paramount Chief) habitually presided, such Native
/C ourt ,
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Court was considered subordinate in its jurisdiction to the 
Chiefdom Court; any “native** aggrieved by the decision of 
such a subordinate court could appeal to the Chiefdom. Court. 
A Group Native Appeal Court consisted of the Paramount 
Chief and one or more representatives of each Chiefdom of 
the group, and held sessions at such times and places as 
“the tribal authorities*4 of the group considered necessary. 
The jurisdiction of the Appeal Court was largely the same as 
that exercised by the Native Courts.
The Courts Ordinance, No. 7 of 1945, consolidated and 
improved considerably the law relating to the constitution 
of the Supreme Court and the magistrates* courts of Sierra 
Leone. It created the Supreme Court as a Superior Court of 
Record with jurisdiction throughout Sierra Leone. The 
Supreme Court comprised the Chief Justice and one or more 
puisne judges of Sierra Leone, and also the Chief Justices 
and judges of the Supreme Gourts of Nigeria and the Colony 
of the Gold Coast and the judge of the Supreme Court of the 
Colony of the Gambia, who were designated puisne judges of 
the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone*
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was to be the
same as that of a High Court judge in England, except that
Admiralty jurisdiction differed. The Supreme Court had no
jurisdiction in regard to any question arising exclusively
/between
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between natives involving (i) title to land situate within 
the Protectorate, or (ii) marriage or divorce according to 
native customary law, or any matrimonial claim founded on 
such a marriage, or (ii) where the claim or matter in dis­
pute was below t^e value of £50*
The Courts Ordinance also abolished the summary juris­
diction of the Supreme Court which dated back to 1877. All 
cases below £50 were triable by the Magistrates’ Courts.
The Circuit Courtsand the Court of Requests were also 
abolished. District Courts were now termed Magistrates’ 
Courts.
On April 27th, 1961, Sierra Leone attained her independ* 
ence. A brief account of the present judicial system Is 
given in Chapter Two*
(4) The Gambia
As will be remembered, In 18889^ the Gambia (which had 
been merged in the West Africa Settlements) was constituted 
a separate colony. By the Supreme Court Ordinance, No. 4 of 
1889, a supreme court of the Colony of theGambia was estab­
lished. It was presided over by the Chief Magistrate. The 
Court was a court of record, and possessed and exercised all 
the jurisdiction, powers and authorities which are vested in
or are capable of being exercised by the High Court of
_________ /Justice
96. Hertslet’s Treaties, Vol. 18, p. 614.
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Justice in England, except the jurisdiction exercised by
the English High Court in admiralty cases. The Supreme
Court continued to exercise the powers and authorities
which were vested In the former Court of Civil and Criminal
Justice. In every civil cause or matter In the Supreme
Court, law and equity were administered concurrently.
Criminal trials were held before the Chief Magistrate and
a jury of 12, or if that number could not be achieved, no
97fewer than 6, except in capital cases and in libel, where 
also 7 jurors must be special, and in cases of slave-dealing
qq
r§)pe and other kindred offences against women, perjury, 
and embea a lenient, half of the jurors had to be special 
jurors. By the Mohammedans and Criminal Law (Amendment) 
Ordinance, M<8>*L 12 of 1889, sections 4 and 5 of the Crim­
inal Law Amendment Act 1185, did not apply to Muslims if 
validly married according to the laws, rites and customs of 
Islam to the girl or woman in relation to whom the offence 
was alleged to have been committed."
97. Added by Ordinance No. 3 of 1893•
98o Added by Ordinance No. 13 of 1889.
99. The Criminal Law Amendment Act, 188 5, 48 & 49 Vic. c.69, 
s. 4-, declared it an offence for any person to defile any 
girl under 13. Section 5 deals with defilement of girls
between 13 and 16. Now see Ordinance No. 10 of 1905, which
regulates the jurisdiction of the Mohammedan Court in 
the Gambia.
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The law in foa?ce consisted, of the common law of England 
introduced by the British settlers from Senegal in 1816J- 
Jmperial Acts extending to it, and 11 statutes of general 
application in force in England on the first day of Novembeaj 
1888ts.
By an Order in Council of April 6th 1889, the Supreme
Court of the Colony of Sierra Leone was constituted a Court
of Record to receive, hear and determine appeals from the
Supreme CD our t of theColony of the Gambia* A further Order
in ©ouncil vtfas issued in November 3.891 relating to the same 
2topic* Any person who felt himself aggrieved by any 
decision of the Appeal Court (i.e. the Supreme Court of 
Sierra Leone) could appeal to the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council.
In 1895 an Order in Council regulating British juris­
diction within the territories adjacent to the Gambia wait 
Issued. By this Order, the Legislative Council of the 
Colony was empowered to make regulations affecting the area 
concerned. Article 4 defined the jurisdiction of the Courts 
in the following terrasi-
l{The Courts of the Colony of the Gambia shall have in 
respect of matters occuring within the said territories 
adjacent to the said Colony so far as such matters are 
within the jurisdiction of Her Majesty the same juris-
1. MAXWELL, J *R • (Chief Magistrate) (1896-7) H J. Comp. Leg 
378. BURGES op pit. Vol. 1, p. 262.
2. St.R. & 0. Revised. Vol. 6 p. 5.
3. St. R.& 0. (1893) p. 311.
-diction, civil and criminal, original and appellate, 
as they respectively possess from time to time in 
respect of matters occuring within the said Colony, 
and the judgments ... given in the exercise of the 
jurisdiction hereby conferred may be enforced and 
executed, and appeals therefrom may be had and pros­
ecuted in the same way as if the judgment ... had 
been made or given under, the ordinary jurisdiction 
of the Court** •
The Gambia Protectorate Ordinance was enacted by No. 
11 of 1894.4 Two types of courts were constituted for the 
purpose of the administration of justice?
(1) The Commi s si oner1 s Court. Commis sI oners of dis tricts 
were invested with magis terial jurisdiction over British 
subjects. In criminal matters the Commissioners had the 
same powers and jurisdiction as were given by the laws of 
the Colony to two justices of the peace. In civil matters 
their power® were identical to those given by the laws of 
the Colony to two commissioners of the Court of Requests 
at Bathurst. Appeals from the decisions were prosecuted 
in the same way as if made by a police court or Court of 
Requests within the Colony. In the exercise of the Comm­
issioners1 jurisdiction, it was provided that they should 
apply the laws of the Colony so far as local circumstances 
permitted. Thus the English common law, which formed 
part of the laws of the Colony had extra-territorial oper- 
atlon in the Protectorate.
4* Repealed and replaced by No. 7 of 1902. Subsequent 
enactments include No.s 30 of 1913 and 10 of 1915.
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(2) Native Courts. These Courts were established in each 
district and were presided over "by the H©ad Chief of the 
district. The civil jurisdiction of Native Courts exten­
ded to the hearing and determination of all personal suits 
to the value of £25, and all suits relating to ownership of 
land and succession to the goods of a deceased up to the 
value of £50. The criminal jurisdiction extended to the 
determination of minor offences, such as petty assault.
A person who was dissatisfied with the decision of 
a Native Court could appeal to the Commissioner, who 
might direct further enquiry by the Court or rehear the 
case and give such decision as the circumstances required, 
or grant or withhold an appeal or rehearing before the 
Supreme Court. There was no automatic right of appeal. 
Legal practitioners were not allowed to appear before a 
Native Court, nor in any proceedings removed from a Native 
Court to the Commissioner or to the Supreme Cottart by appeal 
or otherwise, except by special leave of the Commissioner 
ox* of the Supreme Court.5
By Ordinance No. 7 of 1902, a Coux^t df Requests nfor 
the easy and speedy recovery of small debts** was establish­
ed, to be held at Bathurst before the Chief Magistrate or 
two Commissioners. Further, by Ordinance no. 10 of 1905, a 
Mohammedan Court was constituted at Bathurst, consisting of
a Cadi appointed by the Governor. The Court had juris-
 ..     diction
5. Ibid. s. 21. ~
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-diction in all matters, contentions or non-contentiofcts, 
between or exclusively affecting Muslims, relating to civil 
status, marriage, succession, donations, testaments and 
guardianship. Appeals from, that Court lay to the Supreme 
C our t .
As has already been mentioned elsewhere, in 1913 the 
Full Court of the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone was const­
ituted a Gourt of Appeal from decisions of the Supreme 
Court of the Colony of the Gambia.
The Supreme Court (Amendment) Ordinance, No. 16 of 
1915 seemed to indicate either the failure or unsuitability 
of jury trial in the territory. Trial by a judge and 3 
assessors was substituted for trial by jury In all cases of 
offences other than those punishable by death, either (i) 
where the accused elected to be so tried, or (ii) where 
the prosecuting counsel in the Supreme Court applied for 
trial by a judge with the aid of assessors. The Supreme 
Court Appeals Ordinance, No. 9 of 1929, was enacted In vievif 
of the newly-established West African Court of Appeal. (The 
West African Court of Appeal Order In Council, 1928.)
The previous Order, dated 1913, which constituted the Full 
Court of the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone a Court of
Appeal for the Supreme Court of the Gambia, was revoked.
/Cons equently
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Consequently, the G-ambia Supreme Court Appeals Ordinance 
provided that appeals from the Supreme Court in civil and 
criminal cases should lie to the West African Court of 
Appeal on the same grounds as have heen listed for the other 
territories, except that the right of appeal in criminal 
cases was not spelt out in detail. That defect was remedied 
by the Supreme Court Appeals (Amendment) Ordinance, No. 4 of 
1930, which gave a person convicted the same right of appeal 
as was provided for by the English Criminal Appeal Act of 
1907.
Provincial Courts were established in every province in 
the Protectorate by the Provincial Courts Ordinance, No. 5 
of 1935, which repealed the Subordinate Courts Ordinance, 
1933. A Provincial Court was presided over by the Commiss­
ioner or an Assistant Commissioner. It had both civil and 
criminal jurisdiction. It also had concurrent jurisdiction 
over ^natives** with any Native Tribunal in its area of juris­
diction. In civil cases the Court might seek the aid of 
assessors, but the decision was vested exclusively in the 
Court. No legal practitioner was given a right of audience 
in any cause or matter before a Provincial Court, except 
by special leave of the Judge of the Supreme Court. Appeals 
from the decisions of a Provincial Court lay to the Supreme 
Court.
The Provincial Courts Ordinance was repealed by the
/Protectorate
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Protectorate Courts Ordinance No. 13 of 1944. This Ordin­
ance provides for the establishment of a High Court and 
subordinate courts in the Protectorate. The High Court is 
given the same jurisdiction, civil and criminal, as is 
exercised by the Supreme Gourt in respect of matters 
occurring In the former Colony. The Judge of the Supreme 
Court is the judge of the High Court. Subordinate Courts 
are established in every division of the Protectorate.
The present judicial system Is discussed in Chapter Two.
H. WEST AFRICAN COURT OF APPEAL II
As will be remembered, the first West Africa Court of 
Appeal came into being in 1867 when the Supreme Court of 
Sierra Leone was constituted a Court of appellate juris­
diction to hear and determine appeals from the Courts of 
Civil and Criminal Justice on the G-ambia, the Gold Coast 
and Lagos.® The duration of this appeal court was short 
compared with that of the Court now under consideration.^ 
It must, however, be noted that the second West African 
Court of Appeal was not a direct successor to the first.
The necessity for the formation of the West African 
Court of Appeal had agitated the minds of the West African 
leaders in the 1920*8.
6. See ante, p. r o
7. 1867-1877. See British Order In Council, October 23rd,
1877| whereas the second one lasted from 1928-1959. See
S.I. 1959. No. 1977.
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For example, as a result of expenses incurred by the
Nigerian government in respect of an appeal to the Privy
Council, a question was raised by Mr. E.O. Moore in the
Legislative Council as to whether the government would take
the necessary stexos towards the formation of a Court of
Appeal for West Africa. Replying to the question, the
Acting Attorney-General saids^
nAfter full consideration of the views of the West 
African governments, the Secretary of State In 1922 
formed the opinion that it would be impossible to 
adopt the proposal for the creation of an Appeal”
Court for British West Africa without imposing upon 
the West African Colonies considerable additional 
expenditure, which in the present circumstances they 
are unable to afford. He, therefore, decided that it 
was not possible to proceed with the proposal.w
The West African leaders did not lose heart. Luring
the second session of the National Congress of British
West Africa, held in Freetown in 1923, the Hon. T. Hutton
Mills in his address replied to the view of the Colonial
Office in these words
wWe cannot suffer the qtfe&stion of an appellate court 
for British West Africa to be summarily dismissed on 
the score of want of funds. We cannot admit that In 
such an Important reform, urged by a resolution of 
the last session of the Congress, the four Colonies 
cannot together pool the necessary funds which would 
meet the salaries of the Appellate judges ... The 
efforts of their Honours, the Chief Justice of the
/Gold
8. Cited in ELIAS, T.O. Groundwork of Nigerian Law. p*146.
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Gold Coast and the Chief Justice of Sierra Leone in^ 
pressing the matter of a United Appeal Court for Brit-* 
ish West Africa has / s i c  / met with public approval 
and a ppre ci at i on.u 9
At the instance of the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, a conference was held at Accra during October 
and November 1924 11with a view to the formation of definite 
proposalsfor the establishment of a single Court of Appeal
1 ft
for the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone and the Gambia** •
The conference was attended by several judges and law offi­
cers of the three Colonies. After the conference, two 
reports were issued, a majority report and a minority one. 
In March, 1928, the Hon. Mr. Casely Hayford again raised 
the Issue in the Legislative C o u n c i l . O n  the question of 
Nigeria1 s refusal to join the scheme, he said this?
h N o w  when you are dealing with four Colonies in the 
matter of an Institution of this ssort necessary for 
the efficiency, and one of them falls out, the views 
of the three might be considered and given effect to.
I am suggesting the Government should re-open the 
matter, and if the Gambia, Sierra Leone and the Gold 
Coast seriously desire a Court of Appeal, the same 
might be given effect to enable the work of the cour­
ts to run more easily than It is at present*1.
Finally, action was taken by the British Government, and on
N ov ember Is t , 1928* an Order in Council was issued^.
9l S A M F S m T j T T T Wes^ African leadership (195l7p. 73.
10. Ibid5 p. 83.
11. G.C* Leg. Co. Debates, 9th March 1928. Bessidn 28/29* 
p. 173.
12. St.K,&0. 1928 (No. 889) p. 616. This Order revoked the 
Order of 13th June 1913 which constituted the Full Court of 
the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone a Court of Appeal for the 
Supreme Court of the Gambia. Under the 1928 Order, local 
West African Cairt of Appeal Ordinances, which made more de1 
-ailed provisions regulating appeals. In criminal matters 
local ordinances followed the English Criminal Appeal Act 
1907, In respect of grounds and conditions of appeals.p. t. o.
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This Order brought great satisfaction to the people of
West Africa. In the Gold Coast, Governor Slater echoed
the feelings of the people when he said that nthe creation 
of the Court forms a landmark in the judicial history 
of the Gold Coast Inasmuch as its jurisdiction inc­
ludes appeals on points of law and of fact in crimin­
al cases under conditions similar to those envisaged 
under the English Court of Criminal Appeal Act*.IS
As Nigeria had decided to stand out, the new West 
African Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to hear and det­
ermine appeals, both civil and criminal, from the Courts 
of the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone and the Gambia. It consis­
ted of the Chief Justice of the Gold Coast as President, 
and the judges of the Supreme Court of the Colonies, to 
which the Order applied and the judges of the Supreme 
Court of Nigeria. By Article 8 of the Order, the judges 
were empowered to call in the aid of assessors specially 
qualified whenever occasion arose.
In 1933, Nigeria joined, and by the West African 
Court of Appeal (Further Amendment) Order in Council*^ 
provision was made for the Court to hear and determine 
appeals from the Supreme Court of Nigeria.
The 1948 West African Court of Appeal Order in
Council performed two main functions* Firstly, it
/c ons t itut ed——  1 * I I 11 ■ ■ I || — . .f,. r Ii ■["•' II ii n -ITI Ilf  l Il l l-iimmiit t i . mi i i i lmiimii.niirifcnnn........■ mi...Ill . . m winnww ......Mnmg. ..........urn*...mi p.1 -wriiimiiii . ...........  I .mi . i  II. IH I.inn
12. (cont.) Hitherto appealshad lain to the Pull Court 
only by way of case stated. See, e.g. Gold Coast W.A.C.A.
Ord. Mo. 28 of 1929; Sierra Leone, W.A.C.A. Criminal
Cases) Ord. No. 10 of 1929.
13. 7 EcUw. 7 C. 23 (1907)
14. St.R. & 0. 1934. Vol. 1, p. 651.
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constituted the offices of the President and Justice of 
Appeal as permanent members of the Court. Secondly, It 
provided for the creation in the Gold Coast of the West 
African Court of Appeal fund •
With the granting of the 1954 Constitution, Nigeria 
was divided into three Regions, the Southern Cameroons 
and the Federal Territory of Lagos, which together formed 
the Federation of N i g e r i a . T t i e  judiciary was also reg­
ional is ed, and a Federal Supreme Court was established to 
hear and determine appeals from decisions of theHigh Courts 
created for any of the Regions, the Southern Cameroons and 
Lagos, From there appeals lay to the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council,^ So Nigeria fell out.^1?
On March 6th, 1957, the Gold Coast became independent 
and assumed the name of Ghana. By an Order in Council
-| Q
issued in the same year, the West African Court of Appeal 
ceased to be a Court of Appeal for Ghana. Ghana established 
her own appellate court styled the Court of Appeal for 
Ghana.3-® Appeals lay from there direct to the Privy 
Council.
15. S.I. 1954. No. 1146. ~ ~ ~  ™
16. The Nigeria (Appeals to Privy Council) Order In 
Council 1955. No. 706.
17. The West African Court of Appeal (Amendment) Order in 
Council 1955. No. 1821.
18. S.I. 1957. No. 279.
19. Courts (Amendment) Ordinance No. 17 of 1957 and Courts 
(Amendment) Act No. 8 of 1958.
20. The W.A(jCppeal to Privy Council)0rder in Council, 1957, 
No. 1362; the Ghana (Appeal to Privy Council) Order in 
Council, 1957, No. 1361.
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The only territories to which the West African Court 
of Appeal Order in Council applied were .Sierra Leone and 
the Gambia. In 1959, the Principal Order was revoked. By 
the Bierz’a Leone and the Gambia Court of Appeal Order in 
Council, 1959, a Court of Appeal for Sierra Leone and the 
Gambia was constituted, to exercise the powers of an 
appellate court in relation to those territories which 
formerly were exercised by the West African Court of 
Appeal
The new scheme did not last long, for Sierra Leone 
became independent in 1961. By Article 79 of the Constit­
ution,^^ a Court of Appeal for Sierra Leone was established 
from where further appeals lie to the Privy Council?^
At the same time, a Court of Appeal for the Gambia, styled 
the Gambia Court of Appeal, was constituted, to exercise 
the powers of an appellate ccur t in relation to that 
territory.^4 Further appeals lie to the Judicial 
Committee.^
Thus ends the life of one of the most useful experi­
ments of legal machinery set up for the whole of West
Africa. The history and activities of the Appeal Court
/are
21. S.I. 1959. No. 1977.
22. S.I. 1961. No. 741.
23. Ibid, s. 84. See also The Sierra Leone (Procedure in 
Appeals to the Privy Council) O-in-C 1961. No. 74-2.
24. S.I. 1961. 743. See also Gambia Court of Appeal Ord. 
No. 5 of 1961.
25. S.I. 1961. 74-4,
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are yet to be written. It is true that during the lifetime 
of the Court, a number of questionable judgments relating 
especially to customary law have been given. Such a 
failing is to be expected for an appeal court exercising 
jurisdiction from four leading countries whose laws con­
sisted of variations of variations of English law, 
customary law and Muslim law. However, taking all things 
into consideration, it can safely be said that the West 
African Court of Appeal was a success rather than a 
failure. The following are some of the advantages West 
Africa derived from the establishment of the Appeal Courts 
(Ijp It was an appeal court based on African soil which 
held its sittings in the various capitals of the countries 
concerned. It was therefore in a better position to under­
stand and Interpret thelaws of the four countries than an 
external appeal court would have been. Indeed, the Court 
comprised Chief Justices and Judges of the participating 
countries.
(2) The Court contributed to the harmonisation rather 
than the fragmentation of l*West African laws**.
(3) As an intermediary appeal court, it not only sifted 
and reduced the number of appeals to the Privy Council, 
but also It cut down the expenses of litigation.
/(4)
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(4) With the establishment of the Court, conditions of 
appeal were considerably Improved. Hitherto, appeals 
from the decisions of the Supreme Qourt to the Court of 
Appeal in each territory were by way of case stated on a 
point of law.
In conclusion, we can say with Governor Slater 
that the establishment of a Court of Appeal for all West 
Africa was an important step forward in our system of 
judicial administration, and it was fraught with real 
advantages to the peoples of West Africa.
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Chapter Two
SYNOPSIS OF THE PRESENT LEGAL AND JUDICIAL
SYSTEMS
GHANA1
By article 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Ghana, Ghana became a sovereign unitary republic on July 1st
1960. In accordance with the provisions of article 41 of
2the Constitution, the Courts Act of 1960 was enacted*
The judicial power of the State is conferred on the 
Supreme Court and the High Court, and on such inferior 
courts as may be provided for by law, I.e. Circuit Goui’ts, 
District Courts and Local Courts.3 
l*he Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court is the final court of appeal and 
consists of five judges of the Supreme Court, including the 
Chief Justice as President*^ It is a superior court of 
record and has original and appellate jurisdiction* Its 
original jurisdiction relates to questions as to whether an 
enactment is made in excess of the powers conferred on Parl­
iament by or under the Constitution. If any such question 
_ __ /arises
1. The Territories are dealt with according to the order of 
attainment of independence.
2. The pre-republican system is set out fully in ALLOTT,
A.N* (ed.)Judicial and legal systems in Africa. 1962. Partsi 
21-30, West Xfrican by"JW.C7 DAHIEte. ~~ ™
3. The Constitution, art. 41(2). The power to repeal this 
article is reserved to the people.
4. C.A*9* Section 7* The Constitution, art* 44*
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arises in the High Court or an inferior court, the hearing 
must be adjourned and the question referred to the Supreme 
Court for decision.^ The appellate jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court consists of:e
(a) The hearing of appeals from any judgment of the High 
Court in any civil cause;
(b) the hearing of appeals from any decision of a High or 
Circuit Court in a criminal matter exercised in accordance 
with the provisions of this Act or any other enactment;
(c) the hearing of appeals from any decision given by the 
High Court in any other matter whatsoever; and
(d) any other jurisdiction conferred by this Act or any 
other enactments
Provided that-
(a) an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from a judgment 
of the High Court in the exercise of its appellate juris­
diction on any matter except amatter arising out of a crimi­
nal case-
(i) where the High Coui't has affirmed the decision of
the Court from which the appeal is made to the High Court,
by special leave of the High Court, and
(ii) where the High Court has reversed or materially
altered the decision of the Court from which the appeal is
 :......... ...ir.r,....... /made
5. Constitution, art. 42(2).
6. C»A.^ >* s. 3(1).
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made to the High Court upon the High. Court giving leave to 
appeal from it s judgment upon like terms and subject to the 
like conditions a s if the judgment had been given in a suit 
or m t t e r  originating in the High Court* Notwithstanding 
anything to the contrary in any other provision cf this Act, 
the Supreme Court may entertain any appeal from any court 
on any terms which it may think just.1?
2. The High Court f
The High Court was established by article 41 of the 
Constitution. It is a superior court and consists of the 
Chief Justice, or any judge of the Supreme Court or temp­
orary judge or Circuit Judge requested to do so by the Chief 
Justice.® It is duly constituted when it consists of one or 
three judges of such Court.9 Judges of the High Court have 
equal powers.3-°
The High Court has jurisdiction in all matters except;
(a) where an enactment is alleged to be ultra vires;
(b) in an action instituted for the trial of any question
relating to the election, installation, deposition, cr 
abdication of a chief; or (c) in an action*^a for the 
recovery or delivery of stool
/or
7. The Courts Act 1960, C.A.9™sT"T§T*~** ~ « _ _
8. Ibid, s . 2&(2)(2); &s amended by the Courts (Amendment)
Jet '1962 (Act 130) s. 2.
9 • Ibid.
10. Ibid, s. 51; as amended by the Courts (A.) A, 1962, s. 6, 
10a.Such actions are justiciable before a Judicial Commiss­
ioner who has original jurisdiction to hear and determine 
any matters affecting chieftaincy. Appeals from the dec­
ision cf a Traditional Council are also heard by him. (The 
Judicial Service Act, 1960 (0.A.10) s. 5; The Chieftaincy 
Act, 1961, Act 81, Part V.)
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or skin property in connection with any such election*
installation* deposition or abdica tion; or (d) the trial
of any question touching the political or constitutional
relations subsisting according to custonary law between
such chiefs**^
The High Court has appellate jurisdiction from (a) any
decision of a Circuit Court* except a decision given in a
trial on indictment ; (b) any decision cf a District Court in
a criminal case or cf a Juvenile Court; and (c) any other
jurisdiction conferred by the Courts Act or any other enact-
ment f ca? the time being in force.I2 Appeals from the High
Court in both civil and criminal cases lie to the Supreme
Court.3-3 The High. Court has supervisory and revisionary
powers in respect of all proceedings in Circuit Cour 1s*
14
except proceedings in trials on indi ctment* and in respect
of decisions of magistrates.^
5. Circuit Courts
Circuit Courts were established by the Courts Act and
are courts of inferior jurisdiction.^ The Chief Justice is
empowered to divide the Republic into circuits for purposes
of the administration of justice.^ There is a Circuit Court
in each circuit, which is presided over by a Circuit Judge.3-8
11. Courts Act* s. 41(a)-(c).~
12• Ibid, s. 29(fb), a s amended by C . (A.) Act* 1962* s. 3.
13. Ibid* ss. 8(1); 14.
14. Ibid * s. 30* a s amended by C.(A.) Act* s. 5.
15. Ibid* s. 60* as amended by C . (A.) Act* 1962.
16. Ibid * ss. 34-39* as amended by C. (A\.) Act* 1962.
I?• Ibid* s* 34; as amended by C.(A.) Act* 1962.
18. Ibid, s. 35* as amended by C.(A.) Act* 1962.
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In civil matters* Circuit Courts have original juris­
dictions- (i) in all personal suits* whether based on 
contract or tort up to £500; (ii) in suits between landlord 
and tenant up to £500; (iil) relating to guardianship and 
custody of infants; (iv) to grant injunctions and specific 
performance; and (v) over questions relating to title to land 
or other property up to £500.1^ They have no jurisdiction 
in civil casesinvolving chieftaincy disputes.2*-5 Circuit 
Courts have original jurisdiction in criminal matters in the 
case of offences other than those Tifiere the maximum punish­
ment is death or life imprisonment.2! They hage appellate 
juris dicti on from decisions of any District Court in civil 
matters* and subject to the provisions of Part VI* of any 
Local Court* within their Circuits.2*3 Appeals from Circuit 
Gourts other than a decision in a trial on indictment lie to 
the High Court.23 Appeals from decisions of Circuit Courts 
given in trials on indictment lie to the Supreme Court.23a 
4• District Courts
District Courts24 are created in each uJudicial District**.
They are courts of inferior jurisdiction and are presided
/over
19• Ibid, s. &7 (aTas' amended by C . (A^T^Xct* 1962.
20. Ibid, s. 39* as amended by C.(A.) Act* 1962,
21* Ibid* s. 37(b)* (d); as amended by C.(A.) Act* 1962,
22. Ibid.? s. 37(c)* as amended by G.(A.) Act* 1962.
23* Ibid, s. 3§ as amended by C.(A.) Act* 1962.
23a. Grim. Proc. Code (A.) (No. 2) Act* 1962 (Act 116)* s.10. 
The provision of this section replaces s . 337 of the 
Criminal Procedure Code 1960 (Act 30).
24» Ibid* ss. 47-64, as amended by C.(A.) Act* 1962.
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over by District Magistrates,^3 Their original juris­
diction in civil causes is the same as that exercised by the 
Circuit Courts* but up to a limit of £150,23
In criminal matters* the District Courts have juris­
diction to try summarily offences punishable by a fine not 
exceeding £100 or impris onment not exceeding 12 months* or 
both* and subject to certain conditions* indicfatable offences 
other than those punishable by death, or more than 7 years
p r j
imprisonment® ' Any pers on aggrieved by a decision of a 
District Court may appeal in criminal cases to the Judge 
of the High Court for the time being exercising jurisdiction
OQ
over the district In which such District Court Is situated*0 
and in civil cases to the Circuit Court in which such 
District Court is situated*29 Every Dis trict Magis trate 
shall* In respect cf any matter* be subject to the orders 
and directions of the High Court.3*5 
3* Juvenile Courts
The President may be legis native instrument order the 
constitution of Juvenile Courts in any area of the Republic® 
Every Juvenile Court shall consist of not less than 3 
members of the Juvenile Court Magistrates. They shall exer­
cise such summary jurisdiction as the President confers on
them in relation to the hea ring of charges against* a*
   .   _ /the
25® Courts Act* I960, s. 4-8.
26. Ibid* s. 52* as amended by C.(A.) Act* 1962.
27. Ibid, s. 53®
28. Ibid* s. 63* as amended by C.(A.) Act* 1962.
29. Tbid *
30 * TDTtt, s. 61* as amended by C.(A.) Act* 1962*
the disposal of other matters affecting Juveniles ,31 Appeals 
from decisions of Juvenile Courts lie to the High Ccurt*3l&
6• Local Courts
The Minister responsible for local government is emp­
owered to establish Local Courts throughout the Republic .32 
He decides whether one Local Court Magistrate sitting abne 
or three Lora 1 Court Magistrates shall constitute such a 
C o u r t . L o c a l  Courts have unrestricted jurisdiction as to 
persons.34 Their jurisdiction in civil matters extends to 
suits relating to ownership, occupation, etc, of Hand, 
paternity, custody of children, divorce and other matrimon­
ial causes, succession where the law applicable is customary 
law, and personal suits up to the value of £100*35 Where 
the subject matter of a land case exceeds £200, such matter 
shall be determined by the Judge cf the High Coux^t for the 
time [exercising jurisdiction over such a r e a s in criminal 
matters, Local Courtsare empowered to apply certain sections 
of the Criminal Code set out in ss* 146 and 147 of the Courts 
Act, but in no case should the penalty exceed £25 ca? a
sentence of three months imprisonment, or both.37
 ____________ _r___    /Local
31. Courts Act, s. 6 5.
3la» Ibid, s. 29(c), as amended by the C.(A.) Act, 1962.
32 • s* 92(1).
33. Ibid, s. 93( 1) ( 2).
34* i M I# s * 96(1).
35. Ibid, s. 98(1)* as amended by the C.(A.) Act, 1962.
36* Ibid, s. 98(2), as amended by the C.(A.) Act, 1962.
37. Ibid. s » 99®
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Local Courts have no jurisdiction in causes relating to
chieftaincy, or in which the Republic or any public
38officer acting virtu.te cfflcil is a party.
Any party aggrieved by the decision of a Local Court in
causes other than land and succession causes m y  appeal to
the Circuit Court. A further appeal lies from the decision
of the Circuit Court to a Judge of the High Court for the
CljCOjuM
time being exercising jurisdiction ovev the in which
such Circuit Court is situated, upon a point of law, and his 
decision is final*39 Any party aggrieved by a decision of a 
Local Court on an issue relating to land or an interest in 
land tar a succession cause involving land may appeal to the 
High Court and thereafter to the Supreme Court.453 According 
to the new section 144, there shall be an Administrative 
Secretary (Local Courts) who shall be responsible to the 
Minister for the general efficiency of Local Courts.43* Ho 
legal practitioner or attorney may appear or act for or assist 
any party in any cause or matter before a Local Court*42 
The laws in forceg the laws in Ghana comprise the followings
(a) the Constitutionj4 3
(b) Ordinances of the Colonial Legislature and the statutory 
ins truments ma d e ther eunder;
(c) Ordinances and Acts of the independent pre-republican
38® Ibid 9 ss. 96(2), 101, as amended by the C . (A.) Act, 1962
39° Ibid a s. 225(1) and (2), as amended by the c/(A) Act, 196
49» Ibid, s. 326 , as amended by C.(A.) Act, 1962.
41. Ibid, s. 144, as amended by C.(A.) Act, 1962.
4 2 * Ibid, s. 104.
43. The Constitution, art. 40.
to
*
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Ghana leg is lature and statutory ins t rumen ts made thereunder ;
(d ) Acts passed by the Constituent Assembly, for example, 
the Courts Act 1960, cited as C .A/3J., being the 9 th Act of 
the C ons tltuent Ass embly;
(e) Acts of the Republican Parliament and statutory instru­
ments made thereunder;
(f) Acts of the United Kingdom Parliament which applied 
generally to British Dominions, for example the Extradition 
Acts, 1870-1932;
(g) Acts of the United Kingdom Parliament declared to extend 
to Ghana, for example the Colonial Probates Act 1892;
(h) British Orders in Council applicable in Ghana;
(i) The ’’statutes of general application** which were in force 
in England on 2 4th July, 1874, as applied in Ghana immediat­
ely before the commencement of the Courts Act I960;44
(j) ’’The Common law, as comprised in the laws of Ghana, 
consists in addition to the m l e s  of law generally 
known as the doctrinescf equity and cf the rules of 
custoitmry law included in the common law under any 
enactment providing for the assimilation of such 
rules of customary law a s are suitable for general 
application.”45 (The first two are of English origin.)
(k) The law and practice for the time being in force in
England in respect of probate, divorce and matrimonial
caus es .46
btinNMMii .Mtrm.i. I. n» T u n i!  ■mimpii i i mi    i M a iiu g i . . .  i.Mir^ir r i i  fi . i i .. „r,,. |T . | I , , , , , ', , ' t  ■ in-y nr i ■ r .i iitMiii n-rr im .an T^ m T iT ^* n i|i..mni^mfn^ iw
44. Courts Act, 19&Q, s. 154(4).
45. Interpretation Act, 1960. C.A.4, s. 17(1).
4*6. S. 17 of the Courts Ord. (1951 Rev.) saved by s. 154(3) 
of the Courts Act, 1960. C.A.9.
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(1) Customary law.47
FEDERATION CF NIGERIA 
The Federation consists of a Federal Territory cf
48
Lagos and three Regions - Easterp, Northern and Western.
The legal and j udicial s ystem of Nigeria is rather complic­
ated. A detailed description has bden given elsewhere.49 
In the d  rcumstances, only a short account will he given.
The Courts of Nigeria con prise the followings- 
1. The Privy Council
The Privy Council Is the final Court of Appeal. An 
appeal lies to the Judicial Committee from final judgments 
in the Federal Supreme Court in civil cases involving sums 
above £500, and in any civil or criminal proceeding on 
questions as to the interpretation of the Federal Constit­
ution, or the constitution cf a Region.5^
2«, The Federal Supreme Court
This consists of the Chief Justice of the Federation as 
President, not less than three Federal Justices, the Chief 
Justices of each Region, and the Chief Justice of Lagos.
The Federal Supreme Court is a superior court of
_____ /record
■r»inl "'"Itmmi 1 ' hi 'iir  Trtii. i rrnu r ' . i iT lin hi him hi iTfcTrirtiiii.il ■mm i . nlij i mriiirnYrT"M""« mi ■firm  i\* HTirn;nmnnrc.'»nnmir<rmiiiir ‘—ir— T irriw.mn-ini. mmrupmn iT>.. i iii>wrri. i» iniin . i i    mum i i i f p .. iiim . nii[| mw .u.i' imiii h f i." ^ tu which m-ii'i^ u i .
47. The Cons titution, art. 40(f). For the mode of ascert­
ainment of customary law, see CcurtsAct 1960, ss. 66 & 67, 
and the Chieftaincy Act, 1961, Act 85, ss. 58-64.
48. Nigeria (Constitution) 0-in-C. I960. 2nd Schedule, 
arts. 2 and 3.
49. Judicial and Legal systems in Africa. Part I. no. 47
i hh—t-m in urn r v w .i i miii   m u   im i mi ifm  «w mriu imrrrnmnrm».iriiB  .... ............ .. i-r.  ,.im"iimuiniiinnmnii i i.i .n m.11.  * + Ju U.
et seq.
50. Nigeria (Constitution) 0-in-C. 1960. 2nd Schedule, art. 
114.
51. Ibid, arts. 104 & 105.
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record and has exclusive jurisdiction nIn any dispute
between the Federation and a Region or between Regions 
if and in so far as that dispute involves any question 
(whether on law or fact) on which the existence or 
extent of a legal right depends11. 52
It is also a Court of Admiralty.An appeal lies to the
Federal Supreme Court from the decisions of the High Court
of a territory or Region in any civil or criminal case or in
54any proceedings relating to fundamental human rights.
3• The High Court of Lagos
This is the High Court for the Federal Territory. It
consists of the Ghief Justice of Lagos and five or more
judges appointed by the Governor General. It has all the
general jurisdiction exercised by a High Court J u d g e . 5^
The High Court has appellate jurisdiction to he^ ar and
determine civil and criminal appeals from the Magistrates1
Court In L a g o s . A n  appeal from the High Court of Lagos
57lies to the Federal Supreme Court.
4-* Magistrates1 Court (Lagos)
The Governor General may appoint magistrates in the
following grades:- Chief Magistrate, Magistrates of Grades
  -  _ _ _____
52. Ilgeria (Constitution ) O-in-C,£arts£107. See also 
Federal Supreme Court Ordinance No. 12 of 1960.
53. F.S.C.O*, 1960, s. 17; Federal Supreme Court (General
Provisions) Ordinance, No. JL27of 1955, s. 10.
54. Nigeria (Constitution) 0-in-C,/2nd Schedule, art. 110; 
see also F.B.C.0., s. 15(1).
55. Ibid, art. 115; see also H.C.L.O. No. 25 of 1©55, and
H.C.L.Ta7)Q. Nos. 36 and 37 of 1957, and 11 of 1960.
56. Nigeria (Constitution) 0-In-C, 2nd Schedule, art. 119*
5?* Ibid. art. 110. H.C.L.O. No. 25 of 1955, s. 49.
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I, II and III.58 The civil and criminal jurisdiction of 
the Magistrates varies according to their grades. Thus in 
civil matters the Chief Magistrate has jurisdiction in 
personal suits up to £500* The extent of his summary juris­
diction in criminal matters Is £500 fine, or 5 years 
imprisonment.89 Appeals from the Magistrates1 Court lie 
to the High Court of Lagos.89 
The Laws in Force
1 In the hearing and determining of an appeal by the 
Court of Appeal (i.e. the Federal Supreme Court) the 
law to be applied shall be the law applicable in the 
Region from the High Court of which the appeal is 
brought.1 51
In the Federal Territory the laws comprise the following
(a) Acts of the United Kingdom Parliament which applied to 
British Dominions generally;
(b) Acts of the United Kingdom Parliament declared to extend 
to that Territory;
(c) British Orders In Council applying to Nigeria, for 
example the Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council, 1960;
(d) the common law, the doctrines of equity and the statutes 
of general application in force In England on January 1st, 
I9Q0; ______ _
■ r , m  m rr up, i n  - , i  j h  i gmiii m i h t - . i  w i n . . .  mu n  iipim ■■ » ■ ■  i m  h h_l..-Upii.l j _ j h i i  «■■ i n _______ l_4. l
nto,
58. Nigeria (Constitution) 0-In-C,£art. 119. Magistrates 
Court (Lagos) Ordinance, 1955 and as amended.
59. M.C.(L.)o., 1955, ss. 14*80.
60. It)id. ss. 54 -59;: and Nigeria (Constitution) 0-in-C,/%o 
2nd Schedule, art. 118(1).
61. Federal Supreme Court (Appeals) (Amendment) Ordinance, 
No. 28 of 1955, s. 3(2A).
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(e) Nigerian Ordinances in force in Lagos before the 1954 
Constitution;
(f) Federal legislation enacted since the 1954 Constitution 
applying throughout the Federation
(g) the law and practice for the time being in fox*ce in
England in respect of probate, divorce andmmatrimonial 
63causes;
(h) Customary law*^
EASTERN BEOIQN
1. The High Court
The High Court was established by the Nigeria
(Constitution) Order in Council,6  ^and it consists of the
Chief Justice and not less than six fudges. 66 is a
superior court of record and exercises all the powers
(civil and criminal) of the High Court of Justice in
England as may be appropriate to the exei»cise of the said 
67jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the Court in probate,
divorce and matrimonial causes, Is in so far as the practice
and procedure are concerned, see to be exercised by the 
.      /Court
62* Nigeria (Constitution) 0-in-C, I960*
63. H.C.(t.)0., s. 27 (l)-(3). 0
64. Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (1959 Revision)
Gap* 60 s* 16*
65. 5th Schedule Constitution of Eastern Nigeria,(.art. 48*
See also Eastern Region High Court Law, 1955. E.R* No* 27
of 1955, since amended, for example, by No* i f y of I960*
66. 5th Schedule, art* 48(2).
67* Eastern Region High Court Law, ss. 10, 11, 12, 13.
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Court in conformity with the law and practice for the time
cp t o
being in force in England. Appeals fer the High Court
lie both in civil (©0 ) and criminal (£25 or three months)
cases from the decisions of the subordinate courts,*^ and
thereafter to the Federal Supreme Court. The High Court
has revisional jurisdiction over Magistrates1 Courts in
71respect of criminal proceedings.
2. Magistrates1 Courts
A Court is duly constituted when presided over by a 
Chief Magistrates or Magistrates. Every Magistrate is ex 
officio a justice of the peace for the ibgion. Magistrates 
have civil (highest £500) and criminal (£500 fine or five 
years imprisonment) jurisdiction;*?2 within the limits of 
their authority a Magistrate is empowered to hear and deter­
mine appeals from customary courts or from the decisions of 
an Assessment Committee. Further appeals lie to the
High Court.
3. Customary Courts
These Courts are established by the Minister
responsible. ^  The jurisdiction of a Customary Court is
_____  /set
68. E.R.H.C.L., s. 16.
69. Nig. (C.) 0-in-C. 5th Schedule. E. Nigerian Constitution 
art. 51. To be read with E. Reg. No. 27 of 1955, ss. 34 & 35, 
and Customary Courts Law, E.R. No. 21 of 1956, s. 69.
70. Nig. (C.) 0-in-C, 2nd Schedule art. 110.
71. Magistrates Courts (Amendment) Law. E.R. No. 8 of 1958, 
s. 2.
72. Magistrates* Courts Law. E.R. No. 10 of 1955, ss. 8, 17. 
E.R. No. 17 of 1960. 5th Schedule.
73. E.R. No. 10 of 1955, s. 28(a)(b).
74. Customary Courts Law, 1956. E.R. No. 21 of 1956, since
amended, e.g. by C.C.(A.)L. E.R. No. 12 of 1957, 31/58,12/60, 
and 17/60* —
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set out in the warrant establishing it.TO There are two 
grades - "District Court Grade A" , and "District Court 
Grade B". The jurisdiction of a District Court Grade A is 
as follows;- unlimited jurisdiction in land matters and 
matrimonial euases; causies relating to succession and per­
sonal suits up to £50*^  In the case of Grade B Court® the 
maximum suit value is £25* The maximum in criminal causes 
is £50 fine or six months imprisonment in the case of a 
Grade A Court, and £25 fine In the case of a Grade B Court. 
Jurisdiction is exercised over persons of African descent, 
provided that their mode of life is that of the general
community.?7 Appeals from the decisions of Grade A and B
Courts lie to the County Court (if one is eatablished) and 
thence to the Magistrates* Court, and thereafter to the 
High C o u r t . A t  the end of each month every Customary 
Court must forward to the Customary Courts Adviser a list
79
of all causes decided by that Court for review or revision.
The L<aws in Force
The laws comprise items (a), (b), (c), (d) and (g)
recorded for L a g o s a n d  Nigerian Ordinances before the
___________ ,________ ________ ______ _____________ /1954
75. Customary Courts Law, 1956, s* 5(4). Note that the 
expression "customary court" means a County Court and a 
District Court.
76. See E.R. No* 31 of 1958 and the schedules thereto*
77. C.C.(A.)L. E.R* No. 12 of 1957, s. 3.
78. C.C.L., 1956. s. 60(a)(c).
79. Ibid, s* 56(1).
80. See ante* p. / 37
1954 Constitution; Eastern Regional legislation since the
1954 Constitution and statutory instruments made thereunder;
Federal legislation applying throughout the Federation,
81
and customary law*
NORTHERN KEOION
1. The High Court
The High Court of Northern Nigeria is a superior court
of record and consists of the Chief Justice of the Region
and not less than six judges.®^ It possesses all the
(original) jurisdiction vested in Her Majesty’s High Court
of Justice in England* It also includes all Her Majesty’s
criminal jurisdiction exercisable within the Region* Appeals
from District Courts and Magistrates’ Courts, except appeals
involving Muslim matters, lie to the High Court*8^ Appeals
from the decisions of the High Court lie to the Federal
Supreme Court, except that a decision of the High Court
shall be subject to appeal to the Court of Resolution on the
ground that the Sharia Court of Appeal and not the High Court
had .jurisdiction in any particular matter.88
81. It includes Islamic law* See ANDERSON, J.N.D. nCustomary 
law and Islamic law in British African territories1*, in The 
future of customary law in Africa* 1955, p* 77.
8ST. IstTbyto 1960. 3rd Schedule Const,
of Northern Nigeria, art* 49. The writer is highly indebted 
to Mr. S.S. Richardson who corrected the section dealing with 
the Northern Region.
88* art* S©© also N.R.H.C.L. 1955. N.R. No. 8 of
1955, s. 7, and N.R.H.C. (A* )L., 1960, s. 8.
84. Nig. (C.) 0-in-C. 2nd Schedule art. 110. N.R.H.C.L.2/57.
85. N.R.H.C.L., s. 35A inserted by N.R.H.C.L.A. No. 14 of 
I960., s. 17.
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The High Court lias powers of revision in respect of all
proceedings in Magistrates1 Courts and District Courts.w
2* Magistrates1 Courts
The Governor has power to appoiht Magistrates who are
styled Chief Magistrates, and 1st, 2nd and 3rd toade 
87Magistrates . Magistrates have only criminal jurisdiction
and the extent of jurisdiction is as followsj-
Chief Magistrate - fine up to £500 or imprisonment up to
5 years;
1st Grade Magistrate - fine up to £200, or imprisonment up
m m m »' n*nmmir>>m> ■— jwwfcnmr— “ * <r
to 2 years;
2nd G-rade Magistrate - fine up to £100, or imprisonment up
to 1 year;
3rd G-rade Magistrate - fine up to £25, or imprisonment up
—■■— III— ■ i T in iiiK  " n   ...... n in in w  iiBiiami II tmto 3 months.
3. District Courts
By the District Courts Law (N.R. No# 15 of 1960), the 
Northern Region is divided into Districts; in each District 
there is established a District Court, presided over by a 
District Judge, for the disposal of civil causes and matters, 
Appeals from the decisions of Magistrates1 Courts and Dist-
Q Q
rict Courts lie to the High Court#
4. Sharia Court of Appeal
■■in ■■iiMiitfr-irwi T f f i i n i l  imiriiir##     #ihi#w   an  n# n umih i  iw> i i <i \m m
This Court consists of a Grand Kadi, a Deputy Grand
Kadi and two other judges in the Sharia#9^ The Court has
/ .lurisdicti on
tm» .I T  ■ t  ~m r^ ~ i >rnn rtn~nn n r~a*~nwwJ»>iaaiMMaiimii>i#i>i» n w — ru—  m il murin g i i m uiim> m w #
86. N.R.H.C.L*, s. 39.
87. Established by Criminal Procedure Code Law, 1960. N.R.
NO# 11 of 1960, ss. 4-6.
88. Ibid. s. 16.
Ibid~5 s# 279; District Courts Law No. 15 of 1960,3.70.
90. Sharia Court of Appeal Law, 1960. N.R# No# 16 of 1960,
ss. 4(1) and 5*
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jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals in respect of
91regional matters in cases governed by Muslim personal law 
from any decision of (a) a G-rade wAtt native court, (b) a
92Grade MA limited*1 native court; and (c) a Provincial Court.
A limited right of appeal lies to theFederal Supreme Court.
5. Native Courts
Native Courts are established by the Resident of a
QSProvince by warrant. A Provincial Court is established
in each Province in accordance with the provisionsof
section 3 of the Native Courts Law 1956. A distinction is
made between Muslim Native Courts (constituted by an Alkali)
and a non-Muslim Court,which consists of head chiefs or
chiefs sitting with or without a s s e s s o r s . There are five
grades of Native Courts - Grades 11 Au, UA limit edM, UBU , MCH,
and mDw , and their civil and criminal jurisdiction is scaled
95down accordingly. Appeals from native courts of Grades A
and A limited go to the Native Courts Appellate Division of
the High Court; appeals involving Muslim personal law go to
the Sharia Court of Appeal. Appeals from Grade B, C and D 
     /courts
1 *  —I ^  -  ■, —rrf it—i!  '1 in  iini i i r i— r'- in  i n m i r - n  -ii mn Trmrm 'mi .n n im  inm i  w h i  1 nil ~n it  i r ~ r i  rr*m " ■ ii m  nwrrrrnirrnrwti^
91. For definition of Muslim law, see Nig.(C. )0-in-G,^3rd 
Schedule art. 52(5). j
92. Stfrya«iia Court f ‘nflniiWrrrrl Law. S I  I
93. Native Courts law 1956. N.H. No. 6 of 1956, s. 34; and
Nos. 12 of 1957 and 22 of 1958.
94. Native Courts Law 1956, s. 4.
95. See Grim P.C. 1960, s. 394; N.C.L., s. 15, 18; and
N.C.(A.)L., 1958, No. 22of 1958. Under the Penal Code Law, 
1959, N.H. No. 18 of 1959 and by N.C.(A.)L., 1960, in crim­
inal matters Native Courts are guided by the provisions of 
the Criminal Procedure Code Law 1960.
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courts lie to the Provincial Courts and thereafter to the
Native Courts Appellate Division of the High Court or to the
96Sharia Court of Appeal, wherever appropriate in every case* 
Powers of revision are vested in a Resident and a Native 
Courts Adviser*^
The haws in Force
The laws comprise items (a), (b), (c), (d) and (g) as 
recorded for Lagos, and Nigerian Ordinances before the 1954 
Constitution; Northern Region legislation since 1955 and 
statutory instruments made thereunder, federal ^Legislation 
applying to Nigeria.; customary law and Islamic law.
WESTERN REGION 
1 • The High Court
The High Court was established by the Nigeria (Const.) 
Order in Council 1960. 98 it is a superior court of record
and consists of the Chief Justice of the Region and not less
99than six Judges. It possesses all the Jurisdiction - civil 
and criminal - powers and authorities which are vested in 
Her Majesty1 s High Court of Justice in England*^ The Juris­
diction of the High. Court in relation to probate, divorce
and matrimonial causes, is in so far as the practice and 
-  --     /procedure
96. N.C.L. 1956, as amended by the N.C.(A;*)L. 1960* N.H.
No. 10 of 1960.
97. N.C.L., 1956, ss. 55(2) and (5)* *
98. 4th Schedule Constittition of Western Nigeria . 48. 
See also W.R*H.C.L* 1955, and Nos. 7 of 1955, 11 of 1959, 
and 27 of 1957 (4th Schedule).
99. Nig. (0*) 0-in-C. 4th Schedule, art. 48(2).
1* W.R.H.C.LNo* 3 of 1955, as. 11 and 12.
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procedure are concerned, to be exercised by the Court in 
confoimity with the law and practice for the time being in 
force in England.5 It has appellate jui'isdiction in respect 
of appeals both civil and criminal from the Magistrates1 
Courts, a Orade A Customary Court, and a Customary Court 
of Appeal.^ Appeals from the High Court lie to the Federal 
Supreme Court.5 The Chief Justice may require specified 
magistrates to forward to him, or to another judge, a monthly 
list of all criminal cases decided by such magistrates.5
2. Magistrates1 Courts
Magistrates are graded into Chief Magistrates, Senior 
Magistrates and Magistrates.? They are assigned to specific 
districts.5 In civil cases magistrates have jurisdiction (1) 
over all personal suits up to £500; £200; and £100, accord­
ing to their grades; (2) landlord and tenant cases; (3) to 
appoint guardians, and (4) to grant injunctions. In crim­
inal cases magistrates have power to try summary offences 
and can award the following penalties according to grades:-
£500 fine or 5 years Imprisonment: £200 or 2 years: £100 or 
91 year. Magistrates1 Courts have appellate jurisdiction 
 ______ / over
2. W.K.H.C.L. Ho. 3 of 1955, s. 12(1).
3> Hig. (Const) 0-in-C. 4th Schedule art. 51. In civil cases 
appealable amount is £50 or more. In criminal, £85 fine or 
3 months sentence or more. See also W.K.H.C.L. ss. 24 & 25.
4. Customary Courts Law, 1957, s. 48.
5. Mig. (C.) 0-in-C, 2nd Schedule# art. 110.
6. Magistrates Courts (W.K.) Law 1954. Ho* 5 of 1955, s. 37,
7. M.C.(W.R.)(&) L. No. IS of 1959, s. 3.
8. M.C.(W.R.).L. s. 18.
9# Ibid.
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10over customary courts* A magistrate may be appointed by
the Minister to act as a “supervising authority41 to review
decisions of the customary courts#^ Appeals from Magi-
strates1 Courts lie to the High Court#"1*
3. Customary Courts
Established by the Customary Courts Law, 1957, since 
13amended. The Minister may delegate the power of appoint­
ment and of dismissal of members to the Local Government
Board# Customary Courts have jurisdiction over all Niger- 
14ians. There are 4 grades, namely: Grades A, B, C and L, 
and the jurisdiction, both civil and criminal, of each is 
set out in the Schedule*^*5 Grade A Courts are presided 
over by Legal Practitioners and counsel are allowed to 
appear before the Courts .3-6 in civil cases customary courts 
usually administer customary law# In criminal natters the 
courts have no jurisdiction in the following cases - homi­
cide, treason, sedition, rape, procuration, defilement of 
girls and any other capital off ences Appeals from 
customary courts of Grades B, C or I) lie to the Magistrates1
Court and thereafter to the High Court #3*8 Appeals from the
19decisions of a grade A Customary Court lie to the High Court 
10 #M. C . (W *K * ) L* s # "237* “
11. Ibid, s. 42.
12. Nig. (C#) 0-in-C, 4th Schedule art# 51; M.C#(W.R.) L# 
s. 41.
13. W-R. No* 26 of 1957, amended by, e.g. C.C.{A#) L# Nos*
3 of 1958, 11 of 1958 and 34 of 1959#
14# C.C.L. 1957, s# 17.
3*5* Ibid. s. 18.
16. C .C* (A*. )L.W.R# No. 34 of 1959, s. 4 replacing s* 6(1) 
of C.C.L., 1957.
17. Ibid, s# 9, which re|)laces s. 24 of C.C.L. 1957.
18. C.C. (A.) L# (W.R.) No. 3 of 1958, s* 2./19. Ibid, s* 3.
The Laws in Force
They include items (a), (h) and (c) recorded for Lagos
and (4) Higerian Ordinances before the 1954 Constitution 
and statutory instruments made thereunder;
(ii) Federal legislation since the 1954 Constitution applying 
throughout the Federation;
Western Region legislation and statutory instruments 
made thereunder;
m  * From and after the commencement of this law and subject 
to the provisions of any written law, the common law of 
England, and the doctrines of Equity observed by Her 
Majesty1s High Court of Justice in England shall be in 
force throughout the Region.1 20
Subject to the provisions of this Law no Imperial 
Act hitherto in force within the Region shall have any 
force or effect therein provided that ... this section 
shall not revive anything not in force ... or affect 
the previous operation of any Imperial Act to which 
this section applies, or anything done or suffered 
under such Act *..H 21.
(e) Customary law.
sierra m o m
1* The Privy Council
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council Is the final 
Court of Appeal. Appeals lie from the decisions of the Couat 
of Appeal to Her Majesty in Council both as of right and with 
the leave of the Court of Appeal._____
20. Law of England (Application) Law. W.R. Ho. 9 of 1959,s.3.
21. Ibid, s. 18.
22. The Sierra Leone (Constitution) Order in Council. S.I. 
1961/741. art. 84; The Sierra Leone (Procedure in Appeals to 
Privy Council) Order in Council 1961. S.I. 1961/742.
2. Court of Appeal#
This Court was established by the Constitution, and it 
consists of a President and the persons for the time being 
holding or acting in the offices of th©Chief Justice and 
the Puisne Judges of the Supreme Court, who shall be judges 
of the Court of Appeal, andother judges as may be prescribed 
by the Sierra Leone Parliament#25 It shall have such juris­
diction and powers as may be conferred on it by the 
C onst itut i on • ^
3. The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court is a superior court of record and
comprises the Chief Justice and such number of Puisne Judges
as may be prescribed by Parliament.25 It possesses and
exercises all the powers vested in Her Majesty’s High Court
of Justice in England. ° It has no jurisdiction in regard
to questions arising exclusively between natives which (1)
involve title to land situated within the Protectorate;
(2) relate to customary marriage and divorce; or (3) where
the Blatter in dispute is less than £50, or (4-) relate to the
administration of estates of deceased persons who are
natives and such estates lie within the jurisdiction of any 
   ________________________  /native_
23 . 3.1. 1961/741. art. 79(2).
4^. Ibid. art* 79(1).
25. S.I. 1961/741. 2nd Schedule art. 75(1). See also 
Courts Ordinance. 1960 Revision. Cap. 7.
26. Courts Ordinance, ss. 13, 15, 17 and 18.
native court.2*7 Appeals from the Magistrates’ Court lie
28
to the Supreme Court and thereafter to the Court of Appeal.
4. Magistrates’ Courts
Magistrates’ Courts are duly constituted when presided 
over by a Police Magistrate, a Provincial or District
OQ
Commissioner. Every Magistrate’s Court has jurisdiction 
to hear and determine all civil and criminal matters 
arising within the district, or transferred to it by the 
Supreme Court*30 g?he Criminal Procedure Ordinance, Cap. 39 
applies to the Magistrates’ Courts in the exercise of their 
criminal jurisdiction.3"1' Appeals from these Courts lie to 
the Supreme Court.
5. Native Courts
These Courts operate only in the Protectorate as
there are no such Courts in the former Colony. Native
Courts ara? established in each district of the Protectorate.
There are:-33
(1) The Native Appeal Courts, which comprise (a) the
Chiefdom Court, which hears and determines appeals from a 
._______    /nat ive
Ibid, s. 11. Unlike the case in Ghana, the Supreme 
Court has jurisdiction to hear an action on the validity of 
a Chief’s election in the Protectorate - Kami & ors. v. 
Sesav (1959) 16 WACA 86.
l i o l Courts (Appeals) Qrd. No. 1@ of 1960, ss. 3 & 4.
29. 0.0. Cap. 7, s. 28.
30* Ibid j s. 30.
31. Grim. Proced. Ord. (1960 Rev) Cap. 39.
32. No. 18 of 1960. Part II.
33. See Native Courts Ordinance, Laws of Sierra Leone,
1960 Revision, Cap. 8.
native court, and (b) Group Native Appeal Courts, which can 
be established for two or more Cliiefdoms.
(2) The Court of the Native Chiefs, i.e. native courts.
(3) Combined Courts. which can be established In the 
area of any Paramount Chief in whose Chiefdom a number of
^non-natives1 have settled*
Legal practitioners are not allowed to appear before 
any of these Courts.34 There is no right of appeal from a 
native court in civil cases, but the District Commissioner 
has power to review them.35 In criminal cases provision is 
made for all sentences exceeding 14 days Imprisonment to be 
reported to the District Commissioner by a method which is 
to operate as an **appealt *
The Laws in Force
(a) Acts of the United Kingdom Parliament which applied 
generally to the British Dominions.
(b) Acts of the United Kingdom Parliament declared to extend 
to Sierra Leone or adopted by the territory, e.g. The Settled 
Land Act, 1884.
(c) The Constitution and other Orders in Council.
(d) The common law, the doctrines of equity, and the statutes
of general application in force in England on the 1st day of 
  ..    -...................    /January
34. Native Courts Ordinance, s. 6.
35* Ibid, s. 27(2).
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January, 1880, shall be In force in Sierra Leone.36
(e) Local legislation and Statutory Instruments made 
t he reund e v e 3^
(f) Customary law and Muslim law*
THE GAMBIA
The Territory consists of the Colony and the 
Protect orate * A description of the legal and judicial 
systems of the two parts of the Gambia must distinguish 
between the Colony system and the Protectorate system*
The Courts comprise?-
1 o The Privy Council
Aj^peals lie from the decisions of the Gambia Court of 
Appeal to Her Majesty In Council both as of right and with 
the leave of the Court of A p p e a l * 38
2 0 The Gambia Court of Appeal
Established by the Gambia Court of Appeal Order In 
Council, 1961,39 an$ consists of a President and a prescribed 
number of judges* It has appellate jurisdiction both In 
civil and criminal cases over decisions of the Supreme ^
36* Law of England (Application) Ordinance, Cap* 3, s „ 2.
37* E.go there are local enactments relating to matrimonial 
causes *
38. S.!* 1961/74 3, art* 3.
39. Ibid*jinr'-y -*---t'inri'i . Trrio
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Court or the High Court An appeal lies to the Court of 
Appeal from any order of the Chief Justice suspending a 
barrister or solicitor of the Supreme Ccurt from practice 
or striking their names off the Roll*^
THE COLOHY
In the Colony the hierarchy of Courts is as follows s-
5* The Supreme Court, constituted by the Chief Justice.
This Court exercises all the jurisdiction of a High Court.
42It has appellate jurisdiction over Subordinate Courts. 
Appeals from there lie to the Gambia Court of Appeal*
The Bathurst Magistrates* Court. This is a court cf
4*3summary jurisdiction. Appeals lie to the Supreme Court.
5. The ICombo St. Mary Magistrates* Court, as (4).^4
6. The Court of Requests. This only has jurisdiction in 
civil causes to the value of £50. Appeals lie to the 
Supreme Court.45
7• Juvenile Courts.
8. The Mohammedan Court, established at Bathurst by the 
 ____________    /Mohammedan
MM—  H~rm Itm —n TT~~~1 ' I Ti I mil li I ■ 1 nr Til. .11 <111 I nil' "l.ii PH i Win Hill III I III t i -.1. M i I ^
40* Gambia Court of Appeal Ordinance 1961. Ho. 5 of 1961. 
Parts I & II.
41. Ibid3 s. 14*
42. Supreme Court Ordinance. Cap. 5, ss. 14, 15, 17, 53,64 
(laws oifi Gambia, 1955).
43. Laws of Gambia, 1955. Bathurst Magistrates' Court 
Ordinance, Cap. B.
44. Ibid. Kombo St. Mary's District Court Ordinance, C.103
45. Court of Requests Ordinance. Cap. 9.
46. Children and Young Persons Ordinance. Cap. 20. s. 6(1)
155.
Mohammedan LataJRecognition Ordinance.4? it is constituted 
Toy a £adi with original jurisdiction only in Muslim
A p t
matters#
THE PROTECTORATE 
The Protectorate consists of strije of territory on 
either hank of the River Gambia. The judicial system 
comprises j-
1. The High Court, which in respect of matters occurring 
in the Protectorate, has the same jurisdiction, civil and 
criminal, as Is exercised by the Supreme Court in respect 
of matters occurring in the Colony.^ It has appellate 
jurisdiction and powers of revision over decisions of sub­
ordinate courts.Appeals from the High Court lie to the 
Gambia Court of Appeal.5T
2. Subordinate Courts are established in every division 
of the Protectorate, each of which is presided over either 
by, for example, the Senior Commissioner, a 1st Class 
Magistrate or a 2nd Class Maglstx»ate. The Courts have o n U j 
original jurisdiction imfty in civil and criminal matters.^
47. No* 10 of 1905, Cap. 31.
48. Mohammedan Law Recognition Ordinance. Cap. 31, s. 6.
49. Protectorate Courts Ordinance. Cap. 7; P.C.(A.) 0., 
1958. s. 3.
50. Protectorate Courts Ordinance, ss* 20 & 26% P.G*(A.)
0., No* 7 of 1957, s. 4.
51. S.I. 1961/743 at art. 3. Gambia Court of Appeal 
Ordinance, No* 5 of 1961, s. 3.
52. P.C.O. Cap. 7. ss. 11 and 21.
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3# District Tribunals, which consist of a Chief and other
55members appointed in the warrant establishing the Courts, 
They have original jurisdiction only in civil and criminal 
matters involving 1 natives1 (a member of an African r a c e ) 5 ^  
resident in the area. There are 2 grades - Croup Tribuna Is * 
with higher jurisdiction, 5^ and Distrlot TribunaIs ♦
Their decisions both in civil and criminal matters are
56subject to review by the Commissioner of that Division*0
Appeals from the District Tribunals or the Commissioner lie
57to the High Court*
The Laws in Force
(a) Acts of the United Kingdom Parliament which apply 
generally to British Dominions*
(b) Acts of the United Kingdom Parliament declared to 
extend to the Territory.
(c) British Orders in Council applying thereto.
(d) The Supreme Court is empowered to administer ltthe
common law, the doctrines of equity and the statutes of
general application in force in England on the 1st November,
1888.58     ,____
53* District Tribunals Ordinance* Cap* 49, s. 3; District
Tribunal Rules, Cap. 49, s* 4. Subsidiary Leg* of Gambia,
p. 446*
54. D.T.O., s. 7.
55# In criminal cases the maximum for Group Tribunals is 
£25 or 12 months; the civil maximum is £50; in the case of 
District Tribunals the maximum jurisdiction in criminal 
cases is £10 or 6 months; in civil cases - £25. D.T.Rute, s* 6
56* D.T.O., s. 23.
57# D.T* (A*) 0* No. 13 of 1958. s. 5*
58* Law of England (Application) Ordinance, Cap* 3* s. 2.
(e) The law and practice for the time being in foi*ce in 
England in respect of probate, divorce and matrimonial 
causes
(f) Local legislation and Statutory Instruments made 
thereunder.
(g) Customary law and Mohammedan law.
59. Supreme Court Ordinance. Cap. 5, s. 17.
PART II
INTRODUCTION AND RECEPTION OF ENGLISH IAW
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Chapter Three
INTRODUCTION
uOne curious result of our scrupulous respect for 
the s tat us quo is that in our various colonial possessions 
we preserve systems of law which have elsewhere become 
extinct ,**■*•
Though never freely adapted, English law has, as a 
result of settlement and colonisation, been extended over 
a large section of the world,2 In many parts of Africa 
and in India English law has been transplanted into and 
is developing within a cultural society entirely different 
fron the society which created that law. Yet until 
recently, very little attention had been paid In England 
to ascertaining the effect of such transplantation.^
1. BERTRAM, A. The Colonial service, p. 145.
2. HAMSON, C.J. Professor of Comparative Law, Cambridge - 
** Importing legal systems, The Times August 51, 1955. See 
also the correspondence on the same topic by Professor J.N.I 
Anderson, Sept* 3, 1955, Mr. E.H. Cx&llier, Sept. 7, and Dr. 
A.N. Allott, Sept. 10, 1955.
3* At the eleventh hour attempts are being made to cure 
this neglect. Sweet and Maxwell have begun a series entit­
led **The British Commonwealth, the development of its laws 
and constitutions1* under the general editorship of Professoi 
G.W. Keftton. Vol* 10 written by Dr. T.0* ELIAS deals with 
Ghana and Sierra Leone. In 1959, the Restatement of Africar 
Project Was established at the School of Oriental & African 
Studies financed by the Nuffield Foundation, under the gen­
eral direction of Sr. A.N. Allott, Reader in African Law, 
University of London. In December 1959 a full-scale confer­
ence 'attended by judges, attorneys-general and legal 
experts was held in London to discuss the future of law in 
Africa. The British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law, under the chairmanship of Lord Denning,
Kn the Falconer Lectures, delivered at the University of 
Toronto in 1958, Viscount Kilmuir, the Lord Chancellor of 
Great Britain, regretted that nso little has bden written 
on the history of the common law in its travels overseas*’. 
As a result of this apathy, certain rules and institutions 
not even suitable for England were freely exported to 
Africa.4 In spite of these blemishes, there is no doubt 
that that the adoption of the English system of law has 
created a link between the United Kingdom and West Africa 
which is of value to both sides.5
English law consists of three main elements, namely, 
common law, equity and statutes. The introduction and 
adaptation of each of these elements will be considered in 
subsequent chapters. At this stage, it is only necessary 
to recall that English law, as known to English lawyers 
today,is far from Identical to that received in West Africa 
The extent to which English law was Introduced into any 
particular British dependency varied according to the 
manner in which that territory was acquired.______ _________
3. (cont.) ... are making a valuable contribution. Other 
law conferences have been held in Lagos and Accra. In 
1959, Professor A.L. Goodhart edited a series of broadcast 
talks under the title *The migration of the common law* 3 
now published by Sweet" and Maxwell, 1960.
4. Sir Kenneth Roberts-Wray, G.C.M.G., Q.Cj formerly 
Legal Adviser, Colonial Office and Commonwealth Relations 
Office - uThe adaptation of Imported law in Africa11,
(1960) 4 J.A.L. 66-78.
5. By HWest Africa*1 is meant Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone 
and the Gambia.
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The British dependencies fell into four main 
categories - colonies, protectorates, protected states 
and trust territories* Not all of the dependent territories 
were acquired as a deliberate act of policy by the British 
Government* Those that were are generally those which are 
now called Crown Colonies - a Colony being by definition a 
territory which is part of the Queen*s dominions, either by 
conquest, settlement, cession or annexation, and over which 
she exercises absolute sovereignty. Many dependencies, 
particularly those in Africa, accrued more often by chance, 
or through the initiative of an individual or a trading 
company*^
A. SETT IEMENT
It is stated in Ha Is bury* s laws of England*7 that there 
are three forms of settlements. First, occupation of a 
territory may be authorised by the Crown and settlers intro­
duced* Secondly, the Crown may recognise as British 
territory, settlements made by British subjects without 
previous authority* Thirdly, uninhabited islands or areas
in the Arctic or Antarctic may be formally annexed*
6. **Forty territories1* * 1st leading article* The Times, 
30th Becember, 1959*
7* 3rd ed* Vol. 5* uCommonwealth and dependencies1* by
S.A* de Smith, p. 544*
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Gambia, the oldest British dependency in tropical
Africa,^ is listed as one acquired by* settlement, although
views differ as to the actual date.® Even if we accept
the version of the Under-Secretary of the Colonial Office
that Bathurst, the capital of Gambia, was first settled in
1816 by English merchants expelled by the French from 
1 oSenegal, we begin to wonder what sort of settlement It 
was, for according to the 1826 Census that territory com­
prised only 28 European males and 2 femalesi
Sierra Leone, then meaning the peninsular of Sierra 
Leone, is listed as having been acquired by settlement In 
1787* The ^settlers** consisted of aboat 400 negroes and 
MsiXty whites chiefly women of the lowest sort in ill- 
health and of bad character**.
As far as the Gold Coast was concerned, officials and 
text-writers seem to have been in great doubt as to what
category she belonged to* In official returns to the
/Britlah
8* "Gambia11 by M1XWELL, J.R. Chief Magistrate (1896-7) 1 
J.Corap. Leg* & Int. Law, 378*
9* See ante, p.3
10* Report from the Select Committee on Africa (Western 
Coast) Par* Pap, Session 1865* Vol. 5, p* 20 per 
T.F. ELIOT.
11. Par. Pap. Session 1826-7, Vol. 7, 385.
12. Par. Pap. Session 1845, Vol. 31, p. 32.
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British Parliament in 1§45, the Gold Coast is reported to
have been acquired in 1618 under the category of wAfrican
forts** Professor S.A* de Smith, editor of the relevant
title in the third edition of Halsbury, lists the Gold
14Coast as having been acquired by settlement* In the same 
book he admits that It is uncertain if the Gold Coast can 
be deemed anything but a settled colony, likie the Gambia 
and Sierra Leone. ^  In the second edition of Ha Is bury £ 
Professor BerridcwLe Keith, stated that 11 the Gold Coast,
Sierra Leone, and even the Gambia may fall** into the categ­
ory of a settlement#***® On the other hand, in the same 
section in the first edition (of which Sir Charles Tarring 
was one of the joint authors) the Gold Coast is mentioned 
under the heading of conquered and ceded colonies
If these territories, in spite of the real facts, can 
be described as having been acquired by “settlement**, then
dbi/f*VLS’
it is£a remarkable difference which exists between the type
 ______   ....   /of
13* Par* Pap. Session 1§45, Vol. 31 p. 32*
14* Vol. 5, p. 544.
15. Ibid, p. 694.
16. 2noT*ed, Vol. 11, p. 10. See R. V. Thompson. (1944) 10 
W.A.C.A# at p* 201, M i ere KIHG'JDOM, C.J. also tried very 
ably to ascertain the true position of the Gold Coast# Acc­
ording to him, there could be no doubt that “the Gold Coast 
Colony had its origin in the settlement of British subjects 
on the West Coast of Africa, and the original settlements 
formed the nucleus round which what is now the Gold Coast 
Colony has grown**.
17. 1st. ©d* Vol. 10, pp. 566-7*
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of settlement made by the Hew England settlers In America 
and that made by the expelled merchants in the Gambia.
The former group had animus manendi or animus non revertendi 
The same cannot be said of the ,latter group who were a 
handful of business people who went out to West Africa for 
the purpose of trade.
The phrase “acquisition by settlement** meant something 
quite different in the early days of British colonisation. 
**The early colonies**, says L e w i s , “were in practice nearly 
independent of the mother country except as to their 
external commercial relations, and there was scarcely any 
interference on the part of England with the ordinary man­
agement of their internal affairs. Accordingly, there was 
at that time no separate department of the English govern­
ment charged exclusively with the superintendence of the 
government of the dependencies; and the business connected 
them, being chiefly commercial, as assigned first to a 
boai*d, and afterwards for a short interval, to a permanent 
committee of the Privy Council, which had the management 
of the officers of trade to the **Plantationst! .** Lucas 
also emphasises the point that the mainspring of early 
British colonisation was the reproduction of Great Britain 
overseas and not the formation of dependencies of the
British government; and this principle was at times boldly
/and
18. LEWIS, Sir G.C. An essay on the government of
dependencies. (Originally published in lff4T;™edited 
with an introduction by G.P. Lucas, 1891, p. 159.)
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and well asserted by the colonists.1^
There Is no doubb that in the early days, the word
“settlement** was used to describe the position created when
Englishmen settled abroad in such numbers as to form the
bulk of the population, such as the Hew England states.
“But an English dependency, in which the bulk of the 
cultivators or proprietors of the soil are not English* 
men, and In which the bulk of the English residents 
reside there for purposes of government or trade, 
cannot, in strictness, be called an English colony, 
although its government may be under the Secretary of 
State for the Colonial Department** .20
A settlement in the early days corresponded In 
meaning, therefore, to that given in Dr. Johnson1 s 
Dictionary - !,A body of people drawn from the mother 
country to inhabit some distant place1*.21
The point being made here is that the term “acquisi­
tion by settlement**, when applied to the former British 
Colonies peopled by Englishmen, has not the same meaning 
when applied to former British West African territories.
It was one of the features of early colonisation that, ap­
art from statute law, no legislature could be established 
in a settled colony by the Crown, except one which con­
sisted of a representative body having powers of taxation. 
Again, the Crown could not legislate for the Colonies by 
Orders in Council.^ _______________________
19♦ Ibid. p. xxx.
20. lewis, op cit. p. 175.
21. Lewis, op cit. p. 172.
22. JEHKYHS, Sir H. British rule and jurisdiction beyond 
the seas, p. 5.
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Whan colonisation proper spread throughout Africa it 
was found that it was ”unwis© and unsuitable” to allow a 
body of subject or ^uncivilised population” to enjoy the 
ordinary representative institutions, and so the Sovereign 
in Council was given power to legislate for the new type of 
settlements» First, an Act of 184-3,®^ was passed ”to 
enable Her Majesty to provide for the government of Her 
Settlements on the coast of Africa and in the Falkland 
Islands”. After reciting the main purpose very broadly 
in the preamble the Act empowered the Queen to make laws 
for such territories, and to constitute courts. It was 
also lawful for the Queen to delegate her powers and auth­
orities to resident officers.
Later this Act was extended by an Act of 1860*^to
other British possessions “not having been acquired by
cession or conquest nor (except in virtue of this Act) 
being within the jurisdiction of the legislative 
authority of any of Her Majesty1 s possessions abroad.”
Owing to some doubts as to which colonies were sub­
ject to these Acts, both Acts were repealed and superSeded 
by the British Settlements Act, 1887.25 The most notable 
change wasr contained in section 6, in which a British
Settlement was defined as meaning 11 any British possession, 
which has not been acquired by cession or conquest, 
and Is not for the time being within the jurisdiction 
of the Legislature, constituted otherwise than by
 ___  _ . /virtue
237 6 & 7  Viet. Cafu 13. ~ ~
24. 23 & 24 Viet. C«$. 121.
25. 50 & 51 Viet# C*£. 54.
160
virtue of this Act or of any Act repealed by this 
Act, of any British possession."
B. CESSION
This may take the form of a treaty made between states 
recognised by International law, as was the case when 
G-ibraltar was acquired from Spain, or by treaty with 
“native chiefs11* A great portion of the British depend­
encies in West Africa was acquired by treaties of cession?^ 
There was the famous treaty in 1861 between Commander Bedin* 
field and the British Acting Consul on behalf of the Queen 
of Great Britain on the one hand, and Docemo, King of 
Lagos, on the part of himself and the chiefs on the other 
hand.^^ Again, the territory of 11 British Sherbro1* was 
ceded to the British Government on 9th November, 1861, by 
the local chiefs. In the words of the Under-Secretary of 
the Colonial Office, every subsequent annexation to the 
Colony of Sierra Leone was made by treaties of ces s i o n . __
m~ fin  i—run.—ruTHTir—-r~—Tftr~r——T~~Tut—1—tirr—■winowrtm—rrrtn r^ lp rT — n.irw.Mi>>nr»nrwTrw m>ai i iwiii..l.iii|iwMn~wam»iT— irm»i i m m mm^m—
26. “There were many variations of such treaties. Many 
were meaningless scraps of paper signed by Africans masquer* 
ading as chiefs, or who did not know what they were doing, 
in exchange for a bottle or two of spirits. But not all 
were such gin-bottle treaties, and not all of the gin-bottl< 
treaties were ineffedtive* Often they did not commit eithe3 
party to any great extent, though they were enough, and this 
was their point, to demonstrate that Britain’s Interest in 
the area they covered was more widespread and more potent 
than that of any other power.0 “Forty treaties0 , 1st leading 
article, The Times. 30 December 1959.
27. As to the interpretation of that treaty* see Oyekan & 
Ora, v. A dele C1957J 2 All E.R. 785, P.O. See also Amodu 
Tijani v. Sec. Southern Province (1915) 3 N.L.R. 21;
Onisiwo v. A-G for S. Nigeria (1912) 2 N.L.R. 79. As to 
the title of the British Crown In the case of cession, see 
A-G v. John Holt & Go. Ltd. CL91§J A.C. 599 at p. 608.
28. Par. Pap. Papers relating to Her Majesty's possessions 
in West Africa. Session 1875. Vol. 52, p. 805.
29. Sel. Ottee. Rep. on Africa (W. Coast) 1865, Vol. 5, 19,
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However, it appears that neither International law
nor English law had much respect for such treaties* Accord*
ing to Oppenheim,30 “cessions of territory made to private 
persons and to corporations by native tribes or by 
States outside the dominion of the Law of Nations do 
not fall within the sphere of International Law. 
Neither do cessions of territory by native tribes made 
to States which are members of the international 
community*11
With the greatest respect, it is submitted that this rule 
of International law is open to question, for, if the 
native states were not states to be reckoned with, why 
could not the acquiring state have acquired them by occup­
ation on the ground that they were terrae nullius?
The mere fact that the British Government, or their 
agents, were sometimes particular about obtaining the 
consent of the appropriate ruler and his council, shows 
that the treaties were intended to command the respect of 
both parties and to have a binding force.
30. OPPENHEIM, L. Internati onal Law. 8th ed. p. 547.
31. “Great Britain came very near to losing her rights of
priority to certain territory on the Niger through making 
the treaty with a subordinate chief.''' The French refused to 
recognise that treaty. Hence followed a ’race* to a more 
important chief at Nikki. The determination with which the 
British joined in the race shows that they recognised the 
insufficiency of the Boussa treaty, and it was only by 
reaping Nikki first, and concluding another treaty, that 
they were able to retain the region in question.0 LINDLEY,
M.F. The acquisition and government of backward terri­
tory in International Law, p. 170. The passage, it is sub­
mitted, makes the rule of International law very doubtful.
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C . CONQUEST
•phere are examples of territories in West Africa 
which were acquired by conquest. Ashhnti, a region of
32
Ghana, is one; and some parts of Northern Nigeria others.
D. PROTECTORATES AND PROTECTED STATES
The acquisition of a protectorate was often effected 
by a “formal11 treaty with local chiefs. Thus, in the case 
of the former Niger territories, it appears that in 1884 
37 treaties were concluded by Consul Hewitt with the 
various “tribes0 on or near the rivers Niger and Benue, by 
which the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland undertook to 
extend to the chiefs “and to the territory under their 
authority and jurisdiction her gracious favour and prot­
ection0 ; the chiefs, on their part, promising uto refrain 
from entering into any correspondence, agreement, or 
treaty with any foreign nation or power, except with the 
knowledge and sanction of Her Britannic Majesty’s 
Government0 .33
In seme parts of West Africa, the protectorate was 
assumed “with the acquiescence of the tribes0 rather than 
by formal a g r e e m e n t . t h e  case of “protected states0 
there was a definite agreement between the ruler of the
state and the Crown. There is very little difference
_______ _ ____________     /betweenITrtni t I n H f  1 . . , |--- --- ---------- -^---- - --- „----- „ ■imTM n r ^ n n ~ n r II. IIXI»l<ni.l.Wl
32. Hals bury’s Laws of England. 3rd ed. Vol. 5, p. 544.
33. HALL, W.E. A treatise on the foreign .jurisdiction of
the British Crown. 1894. p. 217.
34. Halsbury, op cit;. p. 545.
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between the two types of protectorate, except that, in
general, protectorates enjoy greater autonomy in the
management of their internal affairs in the name of the
local ruler, who is recognised in English courts as being
entitled to sovereign immunity. Examples of protected
states are lacking on the West Coast of Africa.
UA British protectorate1* says jifnkyns, **is a country 
which is not within the British dominions, but as 
regards its foreign relation is under the exclusive 
control of the King, so that its government cannot 
hold direct communication with any other foreign 
power, nor a foreign power with that government.u36
Therefore, at common law the Crown had no power of 
territorial legislation outside the dominions of the 
(Crown. The statutory justification for the British Crown 
to assume jurisdiction over protect orates in West Africa 
and to apply English Haw therein, emanates from the prov­
isions of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1843. This Act 
was passed on the recommendation of Mr. Hope-Scott, Q.C., 
primarily to solve the difficult questions which arose as 
a result of the abolition of the levant Company in 1825.
One of the recommendations of Mr. Hope-Scott was that 1 great 
latitude should be allowed by the Act in its descrip­
tion of the means by which the jurisdiction has been, 
or may hereafter be acquired, and of its extent and 
nature11.38
35. Halsburyts Laws of England. Vol. 5, p. 435.
36* JENKIHS. Britishrule and jurisdiction, p. 165. 
Sobhuza II v. MilleFTlQ^eyT^C. 5llTat/>522.
37. The King v. The Earl of Crewe, ex parte Segkome.
38. JEHKJHS, Ibid, appendix VI.
im.
Hence, the general terms stipulated in its preamble:
”Whereas by treaty, capitulation, grant, usage, 
sufferance, and other lawful means Her Majesty hath 
power and jurisdiction within divers countries and 
places out of Her Majesty1 s dominions: and whereas 
doubts have arisen how far the exercise of such 
power and jurisdiction is controlled by and dependent 
on the laws and customs of this realm, and it is 
expedient that such doubts should be removed.1
Although West Africa was not specifically mentioned,
yet by virtue of the wide terms of the provisions in the
preamble, the relevant territories in West Africa were by
implication within the ambit of the Act.
The Act of 1843 and all the amending Acts were consol*
idated in the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890-1913.39 By
section 1, it is provided that the jurisdiction held by
the Crown shall be enjoyed ”in the same and as ample a 
manner as if Her Majesty had acquired that juris­
diction by the cession or conquest of territory”.
The meaning of this section has been a subject of judicial
interpretation. In Hall*s opinion, ^  this language
does not assimilate the jurisdiction exercised In a 
foreign country, either in nature or degree, to that 
which belongs to the Crown in a conquered territory. 
Its object Is simply to provide that such juris­
diction as may have been acquired by express consent 
or suffergaice of the foreign state shall be exercised 
by the Crown precisely as if it were exercised by 
sole virtue of the prerogative.”
39. 53 5c 54 Viet. Cap. 37; 3 5c 4 Geo. 5. Cap. 16. By s. 2  
of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1913, both Acts may 
be cited as the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890-1913.
40. HALL, W.E. The foreign cowers and jurisdiction of the 
British Crown, p. 11.
41However, in Sobhuza IX v. Miller, a ca^e relating to
the grant of a writ of habeas corpus in the protectorate
of Swaziland, Viscount HALDANE, delivering the advice of
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, said;
”The Foreign Jurisdiction Act thus appears to make 
the jurisdiction acquired by the Crown in a protect­
orate countx*y indistinguishable in legal effect from 
what might be acquired by conquest. It Is a statute 
that appears to be concerned with definitions and 
secondary consequences rather than with new 
principles
In another context his Lordship observed that ”The Crown 
could not, excepting by statute, deprive itself of 
freedom to make Orders in Council, even when these 
were inconsistent with previous Orders.” 48
The effect of the observations made by the noble lord 
would appear to be that the jurisdiction can be exercised tc 
the fullest extent, even if the treaty made between a local 
chief and a representative of the British Crown restricts it 
The theory that the jurisdiction of the British Crown 
in a protectorate is indistinguishable in legal effect 
cannot be accepted as a fait accompli, for the meaning of 
the term ”protectorate” is indefinite and variable. Before 
any view is expressed on its classification, the protector­
ate in question must be critically examined. If, upon a 
proper investigation of the facts it appears that the
internal governance of the protectorate is in legal effect 
 —--------------------------   Zindis tlngulshable
41. 0.9263 A«C. 518 at 522.
Sobhuza v. Miller at p. 588.
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indistinguishable from that of a British colony acquired 
by conquest,^ then section 1 of the Foreign Jurisdiction 
Act can be applied in its entirety.
For the purpose of the exercise of the internal sov­
ereignty by the British Crown under the Foreign Juris­
diction Act in protectorates, special Orders were made, 
in which powers were given to the colonial legislatures in 
the then Gold Coast, Lagos, Gambia and Sierra Leone 
(subject to disallowance) to legislate for giving effect
to all jurisdiction of theCrown acquired in the adjoining 
44territories*
Thus, in 1856, a British Order In Comneil was made to 
vest jurisdiction over ”the protected territories on the 
Gold Coast” on the courts of justice established ” within 
Her Majestyfs Forts and Settlements on the Gold Coast.
E. TRUST TERRITORIES
Trust territories, formerly termed mandated territorie 
like protectorates are not British territories. Countries 
like the Cameroons and Togoland were acquired by the
British Government under the terms of the peace treaty with
 - - T_-.        /Germany
43. Ex parte Mwenya (1959) 3 W.L.R. 767 at 783.
44. See.,7i7g7 St.R.& 0. Revised Vol. OT, Lagos, Dec. 
1887, p. 523* Gambia, Lift* 1893, Vol. 5 ( Foreign Jur­
isdiction”, p. 143); Sierra Leone, Ibid, 1895, Vol. 5, 
(^Foreign Jurisdiction”, p. 165).
45. MONTAGU, A. Ordinances, etc., of Gold Coast, 1852-70. 
P *  1 7 0 S  —  ■■ I ' p  ' T T
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Germany after the First World War. In 1945 they were 
placed under the International trusteeship system in 
accordance with the provisions of the United Nations 
Chart er
THE RECEPTION OF ENGLISH LAW 
The extent to which English law was introduced dependec 
on whether such British dependency w&s acquired by settle­
ment or conquest or cession. The manner in which the dist­
inction is drawn appears to depend on the existence at the
47time of acquisition of a lex loci. In E£®§m&n v. F a i r l i e 9 
the Master in his report said:
apprehend the true general distinction to be in 
effect between countries in which there are not, and 
countries In which there are, at the time of their 
acquisition, any existing civil institutions and laws; 
It being In the first of those cases, a matter of nec­
essity that the British settlers fehould use their 
native laws, as having no others to resort to; 
whereas, in the other case, there is an established 
lex loci, which it might be highly inconvenient all 
at once to abrogate; and therefore, it remains till 
changed by the deliberative wisdom of the new legis­
lative power. In the former case, also, there are 
not, but in the latter case there are, new subjects 
to be governed, ignorant of the English laws, and 
unprepared, perhaps in civil and political character, 
to receive them* The reason why the rules are laid 
down in Books of authority, with reference to the dist­
inction between new-discovered countries on the one 
hand, and ceded or conquered countries on the other, 
may be found, I conceive, In the fact that this dist­
inction had always, or almost always, practically corr* 
esponded with that,between the absence and the exist­
ence of a lex loci . by which the British settlers
________________________________________________ /might
"46. Halsbury, Vol. 5", pp. 435 & 546. See also Cmd. 7082-3; 
m m an<^  Mandated & Trust Territories 
Act (1947) 11 Sc 12 Geo 6. C«$. 8.
47. (1828) 1 Moo. Ind. App. 324.
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might, without inconvenience, for a time, he 
governed; for the powers from whom we had wrested 
colonies by conquest, or had obtained them tgr 
treaties of cession, had ordinarily.if not always, 
been civilised and Christian states, whose instit­
utions, therefore, were not wholly dissimilar to 
our own.”
Judging by the overall effect of the passage, the term lex
loci would appear to refer to an established system of law
of the European type. The learned author of Ha Is bury1 s
Laws of England relying on the judgment of Lord WATSON
CooPeP v. Stuart^  restated the principle in these
words; ”There Is an essential difference between a
possession acquired by conquest or cession, in which 
an established system of law of European type exists, 
and one acquired by the settlement cf British sub­
jects, which is unoccupied, or occupied only by 
un&ivilized inhabitants, and therefore without an 
established system.”
Thus, generally, a distinction is drawn between ”settled
colonies” and ”conquered or ceded colonies”.
F. THE LAW IN SETTLED COLONIES
The case-law under this head clearly indicates that
there are at least two types of settled colonies. The 
______  n _________ ____ _______t_______ /first
48. Vol. 5, p. 691.
49* (1889) 14 App. Cas * 286 at 291. See also Lyons v*
E.I. J2o. (1836) 1 Moo. P.C.C. 272, applied in Yeap 
Chea Neo v. Qng Cheng Neo (1875) L.R.; 6 P.C. 381; 
Isaac Penhas v. Tan Soo Eng £1953*3 A.C. 304; Leong 
& anor v. Lim Ben? Chye"Tl955l A.C. 648.
first type comprises the early colonies, which were popul­
ated by a hulk of Englishmen, such as the lew England 
states in America. The second type consists of colonies 
which were actually held in subjection and governed by the 
British Settlement Act.
(1) Type, I
It has been a time-honoured principle of British col­
onisation that Englishmen, who went out to settle in a 
new country took their rights of British citizenship and 
the laws of their mother country with them. According to 
the Master of the Kolls,^ it had been decided by the
Privy Council that 1 if there be a new and uninhabited^
country found out by English subjects, as the law is 
the birthright of every subject, so wherever they go, 
they carry their law with them, and therefore such 
new found country is to be governed by the laws of 
England.1 52
50. Anon. (1722) 2 P. Wms. 75.
51. It is arguable whether the countries concerned were 
really uninhabited.
52. But note Campbell v. Hall (1774 ) 20 State Tr$ Cal.239 
at 322, where MANSFIELD, L.C.J* said: uAn Englishman in 
Minorca or the Isle of Man, or the Plantations, has no 
distinct right from the natives while he continues there.1 
If the Scottish colonisation of Acadia, later known as 
Nova Scotia or New Scotland, had succeeded, it would have 
been interesting to know whether this maxim would still 
have applied. In 1621, Sir William Alexander, a Scotsman 
who could not be ignorant of the English settlements in 
Virginia or New England, or the French possessions in Acad­
ia, or Canada, and of the great importance of Newfoundland 
for its fisheries, was led to contemplate the advantages o i  
building up a New Scotland overaeas. Having then resolved 
to enter into colonial adventure, he had no difficulty in 
obtaining from King Eames I in 1621 a grant of large and 
extensive territory on the mainland, to the east of the 
river St. Croix, and south of the St. Lawrence, Mlying 
between our colonies of New England and Newfoundland” as a 
foreign plantation. Very few Scotsmen went on this
/p.t.o.
176.
It is absurd that in the colonies they should carry
all the laws of England with them.53 According to
Blackstone,54 l!such colonists carry with them only so
much of the English law as is applicable to their own 
situation and the condition of an infant colonyj such 
for instance, as the general rules of inheritance 
and of protection from personal injuries. The arti­
ficial refinements and distinctions incident to the 
property of a great and commercial people, the laws of 
police and revenue (such especially as are enforced by 
penalties), the mode of maintenance for the establishei 
clergy, the jurisdiction of spiritual courts, and a 
multitude of other provisions, are neither necessary 
nor convenient for them, and therefore are not in 
force. n
Those English settlers also carried with them all the
Immunities and privileges of E n g l a n d . 5 5 _________ _ _ _
52. (cont.) ... expedition. Though he tried to rouse enth­
usiasm by publishing a pamphlet entitled 11 An encouragement 
to colonies11. The Scottish colonies ended when the Treaty 
of St. Germain-en-Laye restored the area concerned to 
France In 1632. Nova Scotia was ceded back to Great 
Britain after the signing of the Peace of Paris. The legis 
lature set up in Nova Scotia was given power to make local 
laws not repugnant to the laws of England# (HAJLIBURTON$
A general description of Nova Scotia. 1825.) Thus every 
hope of Scottish 3aw being imported was completely gone.
See s Royal Letters. Charter and Tracts relating to the col­
onisation of New Scotland^ Qtc. Edinburgh, 1867, The Banna- 
tyne Club. LUCASJ C.P~A Historical geography of the Brit- 
ish D&minions. Vol. V. Canada, Part I. 2nd ed. Oxford 1916, 
p. 172, et seq.
Campbell v. Hall.
54• Commentaries , Vol. 1, pp. 106*7.
55* The Lauderdale Peerage (1885) L.R. 10 App. Cas. 692, 
at p. 744.
L
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It is not clear what the expression Mso far as it is
applicable to their new situation” means. This has been
described as a ”vague and general kind of phrase” with
”sound sense in it”.°5 In the opinion of Lord Blackburn,5^
Englishmen ”cannot be expected to take out with them all 
the machinery of the law; they cannot take out with 
them judges, and justices of the peace, and quarter 
sessions, and everything of that kind that Is estab­
lished In England.
According to Blackstone,55 ”what ^English law_/ shall be
admitted and what rejected, at what times, and under what
restrictions, must, In case of dispute, be decided in the
first instance by their own provin&ial judicature, subject
to the revision and control of the King in Council.”
With the greatrst respect, the uncertainty of what English
law was applicable in a colony could hardly be solved by
this method. It is -therefore not surprising that Governor
Pownall of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay expressed his
anxieties thus;
ttIt is a rule universally adopted through all the 
colonies, that they carried with them to America the 
common law of England, with the power of such part of 
the statutes (those concerning ecclesiastical juris­
diction excepted) as were in force at the time of 
their establishment; but, as there is no fundamental 
rule whereby to say,what statutes are admissible, wha- 
not, if they admit all, they admit the full estabiishi 
ent of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, from which 
they fled to this wilderness for refuge .... Besides^ 
     /a a
56. The Lauderdale Peerage (1885) p. 744.
57. Ibid at 746.
58. Common tallies , Vol. 1, p. 107.
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as the common law Itself is nothing but the practice 
and determination of courts on points of law, drawft 
into precedents; where the circumstances of a country 
and people, and their relation to the statutes and 
common law differ so greatly, the common law of these 
countries must, in its natural course, become differen 
and sometimes even contrary, or at least incompatible 
with the common law of England, so as that, in some 
cases, the determinations arising both from the stat­
ute and common law must be rejected* This renders the 
judicatories of these countries vague and precarious, 
dangerous, if not arbitrary; This leads necessarily 
(let what care will be taken in forming and enacting 
their provincial laws). This leads to the rendering 
the common law of the country different, incompatible 
with, if not contrary to, and independent of, the law 
of the mother country, than which nothing can be more 
Advantageous to the subject and nothing more derog­
atory from the power of the government of the mother 
country, and from the fundamental maxim, that the 
colonies shall have no laws contrary to those of the 
mother country.11
(3) Type..2
Whereas in the former group of settlements the date 
for the application of English law was the date of the four 
ding of the colony,®^in the case of British settlements in 
West Africa, section 1 of the British Settlements Act of 
1843 empowered the sovereign to 1 establish such laws, 
institutions, and ordinances, and to constitute such 
courts and officers ... asmay be necessary for the peace, 
order and good government1 of the territories concerned*”63-
60. Anon. (1722) 2 p. Wms. 75.
61. 6 & 7 Viet. Cap. 13.
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Thus, In the case of Ghana, section 14 of the Supreme
Court Ordinance of the Gold Coast stipulated that**The 
common law, the doctrines of equity, and the statutes 
of general application which were in force in England 
at the date when the colony obtained a local legis­
lature, that is to say, on the 24th day of July, 1874, 
shall he in force within the jurisdiction of the 
court *t
By section 17,63 such laws were declared to apply to the 
colony nso far only as the limits of the local jurisdiction
It ^and local circumstances" permitted* As maa.1 be seen later 
on, decided cases reveal that English law yields to the 
special circumstances and must give way to matters of publi 
policy which apply in a particular dependency*
In the Gambia, the date for the application of English 
law is the 1st of November 1888.^ When the Colony of 
Sierra Leone was established, English common law prevailed
62* Ho* 4 of 187&* This Ordinance has been amended 
several times, but It is still saved by the Courts Act of 
1960 of the Republic of Ghana. S, 154(4) stipulates? 1 The 
repeal by this Act of section 83 of the Courts Ordinance, 
(Cap. 4) shall not be taken to affect the continued applic­
ation of such of the statutes of general application which 
were in force In England on the 24th J«ly, 1874 as applied ii 
Ghana immediately before the commencement of this Acts 
provided that the said statutes shall be subject to such 
modifications as may be requisite to enable them to be con­
veniently applied in Ghana♦ *
63* Ho* 4 of 1874 (Gold Coast - Ghana)* See, e.g. Xeap 
Chea, Heo v* Ong Cheng Neo (1875) L.R* 6 P.C* 381; Penhas v. 
Tan Soo .gxgl (1953) A.C* 304; Leong v* Lim Ben Chve £19561 
A.C• 643•
64* Supreme Court Ord* Ho* 4 of 1889* For the current prov­
ision, see Law of England (Application) Ord. Cap. 3, s. 3. 
(Laws of Gambia, 1955 Revision.)
as from the date of the settlement* However, later on in 
1857, it was found '^expedient to extent to the Colony such 
alterations and amendments of the laws of England as have 
b e e n made since the establishment of the Colonial Legis­
lature”.65 By section 2 of the Ordinance, UA11 laws and 
statutes which were in force within the realm of England 
on the first day of January” 1857 were taken to be in force 
in Sierra Leone. The date was extended to 1862ee and 
finally brought forward to the 1st of January 1880. ^  
Similarly, in Nigeria the date has not remained the same.
At first a short while after Lagos was constituted into a 
separate settlement, the date for the reception of English 
law was declared to be the first day of January 1863.
Later, when the Gold Coast and Lagos were erected into one 
Colony In 1876, the date Was shifted to the 24th Jily 1874^ 
When the Protectorate of Nigeria was united with the Colon; 
the date was further extended to the 1st of January. 19007*
65* An Ordinance tor$mend the Law, 21st Feb. 1857, amendec 
by Ho* 3 of 1862 and^HoV 14 of 1904*
66. An Ordinance to amend the law, Ho* 3 of 1862, repealec 
by Ho* 14 of 1904.
67* S.C.O. Ho. 1.9 of 1881. For the current provision see
S.C.0* Cap. 7, s. 37 (Laws of Sierra Leone 1960 Revision). 
68. Ho. 3 of 1863, s. 1.
69*, Ho. 4 of 1876, same as that of the Gold Coast.
70. This date has been adhered to by all the Regions of tl 
Federation of Nigeria except the W. Region. See, e*g* The
High Court Law, 1955 Eastern Region of Nigeria, Ho. 27 of
1955, s. 14, and Northern Region High Court Law, H.R. Ho* i 
of 1955, ss. 28-33, 35.
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What is the effect of the date of the application of 
English lawin a British dependency? What, in effect, is 
the meaning of the phrase ”the common law, the doctrines oi 
equity and the statutes of general application in force In 
England” asat a particular date? Does the datelimit the 
application of each of the three elements of English law, 
or does it refer only to the statutes of general applic­
ation? Dr, Allott has submitted that by neeescsary intend­
ment the date should govern the rules of common law and
71equity applicable as well*
With the greatest respect, it is submitted that the
adoption of this approach would have rendered the common
/law
71. Essays in African Law* 1960. p. 31.
Of course, nothing prevents a local legislature from 
fixing a date for the application of the English common 
law, but it must be expressly stated. One such example is 
contained in the Courts of Justice Act of 1936 enacted by 
the Cyprus Government (Rev. Laws 1949, Cap. 11; section 
28(1) stipulates that”every court in the exercise of its 
civil and criminal jurisdiction shall apply-
(a) the laws of the Colony j,
(b) the Ottoman laws set out in the second schedule t<
the extent specified therein;
(c) the common law and the rulesof equity as in force 
in England on the 5th day of November, 1914, "save-ihLSo^faa 
as other provision has been or shall be made by any law of 
the Colony;
(d) the statutes of the Imperial Parliament applicable 
either to the Coldnies generally or to the Colony save in s< 
far as the same may validly be modified or other provision 
made by any law of the Colony.”
Thus Dr* Allott* s contention may be valid for the
situation in Cyprus in 1949, but not for West Africa and a
large proportion of the Commonwealth countries.
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law static* As Roscoe Pound has said/ The English
materials as the colonies received them, were for the 
most part set forth authoritatively in the writings of 
Sir Edward Coke, Attorney-General under Elizabeth 
and Chief Justice under James I* Yet the common law 
of England, in the sense of the traditional body of 
legal precepts administered in the King's courts of 
law continued to develop throughout the seventeenth 
century and in the eighteenth century. Also the 
common law as a system had an important development 
in England in the nineteenth century. If the stat­
utes limit American courts to the English legal 
precepts as they stood at In 1601, the traditional 
element of the law would have to stand still in 
America in its early s event eenth-cdntury form, while 
going forward In England. Thus the courts would be 
seriously hampered in dealing with many subjects where 
in default of legislation, resort must be had to the 
common law* Hence, although some courts insist that 
in the absence of statutory rules they must apply 
English decisions as they stood in the firat ysa? of 
James I, the tendency of American decisions is to hold 
that the doctrine and the statutes refer primarily to 
the common law as a sg?s tem«?3 On this ground courts 
consider that they may refer to recent English 
decisions, as against the deventeenth-century authori­
ties, if the former are better expressions of the 
principles of the common law system.1
The view that the date specified for the reception of 
English law refers to English statutes of general applic­
ation is supported by ample evidence from West Africa* In 
1885 the learned editors of the Gold Coast Assize, a legal 
journal, referring to the Supreme Court Ordinance (187&) 
of the Gold Coast Colony, argued that wfrom the very 
punctuation it would appear that the words 'which were in 
force1, etc, apply simply to the statutes of general
72* POUMD, R* Common lawM (1951) 4 Enc. Soc* Sci, 55*
75. Yfriter1 s italics*
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application.***^  Again, the Supreme Court Ordinance of the
Gambia, 1889, mentioned only uthe statutes of general
application which are in force in England on the first day
75
of November** 1888. This implied that the common law of
England as a system was introduced by the Hsettlersw in
1^0 actic
1816 into thenew settlement of the Gambia. The recent/
of the Western Nigerian Legislature also lends force to the 
argument. After having dealt with the English statutes of 
general application in fox'ce in the Begion in a particular 
way, ^  the Western Region Government passed a Law of 
England (Application) Law 1959,^ section 3 of which prov­
ided for the application of the common law and equity 
simpllciter in these wordss
wFrom and after the commencement of this law, and sub­
ject to the provisions of any written law, the common 
law of England and the doctrines of equity observed by 
Her Majesty4 s High court of Justice in England shall be
in force throughout the Region.**
G. THE LAW IN CONQUERED AND CEDED COLONIES
As a general rule, the existing law before the con­
quest or cession is presumed to remain until it is altered
or abrogated. One of the earliest decisions on this point
- - - _ _____ __  . /is
74. Gold Coast Assize. 1884. Vol. 2, No. 5 p. 3.
75. S.C.Q. No. 4 of 1889 as amended. See, e.g. s. 17 (Rev
ed. of the Ordinances of the Colony of the Gambia,
comp. F.A. van der Meulen, (1916-17). See also f*An 
Ordinance to amend the Law (Sierra Leone) 1st Feb,1857
76. MAXWELL, J.R.^Gambia“(1896-7) Vol. 1 J.Comp.Leg. 378.
77. See post, |t> Chapter on statutes of general applic-
O  T* *1 AVI
78. W.R. Ho. 9 of 1959.
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Calvings Case, in which the report says 1 for if a 
king come to a Christian kingdom by conquest, seeing 
that he hath vitae et necis potestatem, he may at 
his pleasure alter and change the laws of that kingdon 
but until he doth make an alteration of those laws the 
ancient laws of the kingdom remain,11
The report went on to make one exception to the effect 
that if a Christian king should conquer an *'infidel 
country11, there ipso facto* the laws of the infidel are 
abrogated, ufor that they be not only against Christianity, 
but against the law of God and nature*1. This exception 
to Mpagans1* was rightly described as **absurdM by Mansfield, 
L.C.J, in the cas© of Gampbell v. Hall,80 It **could not 
exist before the Christian era, and in all probability 
arose from the mad enthusiasm of the ciu sades**
However, a conquered territory becomes a dominion of 
the British Crown, and is therefore necessarily subject to 
the legislative power of the British Parliament* Therefore 
the existing laws are necessarily affected by the intro­
duction of English law as regards adn&mlstgation, appellate 
jurisdiction, matters connected with the exercise of the
8g
sbvereighty, or matters of universal policy. Indeed,
English common law, and English statute law as they existec
at a particular date have been Introduced in some conquered
for ceded colonies. Moreover, existing laws contrary to 
— — _____  /the
79, (1608) 7 Co, Hep, 17, Lord Coke, the reporter of this 
case, gave no authority for this nabsurdexception. See 
Lyons v, E.Z. Co (1836) 1 Moo, P.C.C. 272 at 273,
80, (1774) 20 State Tr, Col. 239 at 32g,
81, Ibid.
82, jlIlYHS, British rule ... t>. 6.
— — hi — WMhmi i i  im m iiM iiJ  n m i in i i . n w n . w v *
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the ”fundamental principles of English, law” are a i  
abrogated*83 In West Africa customary laws were not abrog­
ated so long as those laws were ”not repugnant to natural
84justice* equity and good conscience” .
H. OTHER MODES OF RECEPTION
Xl$ Acts of the United Kingdom Parliament declared to exter
to all overseas territories. Certain Acts of the United
Kingdom Parliament, enacted after the date of reception,
are declared to extend generally to all colonies by virtue
of express or implied provisions of the Acts concerned.
Thus, by section 118 of the Bankruptcy Act,85 uThe High 
Court, the county courts, the courts having juris­
diction in bankruptcy in Scotland and Ireland, and
every British court elsewhere Having jurisdiction In 
bankruptcy or insolvency, and the officers of those 
courts respectively, shall severally act in aid of 
and be auxiliary to each other In all matters of 
bankruptcy.
In the case of Callender. Sykes & Co. v. Colonial 
S,ecretary_,M Lagos and Davies ,86 the Judicial Committee 
decided that the Supreme Court of the Gold Coast Colony 
(including Lagos at that time) had no bankruptcy juris­
diction in 1877, and, therefore, could not act as an 
auxiliary to the English court under section 74 of the Ban]
ruptcy Act, 1869. It decided further that this Act applie;
— -------   -----o
83* E *S* gftto&figg v. (1773) 20 St. Tr. 175 at 181.
84. As to the meaning of this clause see post, tt
the chapter on Equity. ---
85. 46 & 47 Viet. Cap. 52.
86. 11Q91J A.C. 460.
87
to all Her Janesty1 s dominions# Delivering the advice o: 
the Judicial Committee, Lord Hobhouse made the following
QO
observations:
HIiow far the Imperial Parliament should pass law; 
framed to operate directly in the Colonies Is a quest- 
ion of policy, more or less delicate according to 
circumstances# No doubt has been suggested that if 
such laws are passed they must be held valid in colon* 
ial courts of law • ••• If a consideration of the scop< 
and object of a statute leads to the conclusion that 
the legislature intended to affect a colony and the 
words used are calculated to have that effect, they 
should be so construed#”
The following are some more of the Acts of the United 
Kingdom Parliament which were or are in force generally in 
West Africa: -
(1) An Act establishing the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council to hear appeals from the Colonies# (1833)
3 & 4 Will# Cst$>. 41, since amended#
(2) British Law Ascertainment Act, 1859# 22 & 23 Viet <
Cqp>. 63# MAn Act to offer facilities for the more certain 
ascertainment of the law administered in one part of 
the British Dominions when pleaded in the courts of 
another part thereof*”
(3) The Extradition Act 1870-1932# 33 & 34 Viet*
C ^ «  52, etc# Extradition of Criminals.
(4) The Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act, 1878.
41 42 Vlct# C3». 73# ”n An Act regulating the trial of
87. See also the Report of the Commissioners appointed to 
enquire Into the Insolvency Law of Ghana, 1961.
88. Callender, Sykes & Co.. at pp. 466 & 467.
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offences committed on the sea within a certain 
distance of the coasts of the British Dominions.”
(5) The Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881. 44 8c 45 Viet.
Cap-. 69. 11 An Act with respect to Fugitive Offenders in
British Dominions, and for other purposes connected 
with their trial.
(6) The Colonial Prisoners Removal Act, 1884. 47 8c 48 
Viet. Cap. 31. This in effect authorises Inter-commor
wealth transportation.
(7) The Evidencg by Commission Act, 1885. 48 49 Viet
O  • 7  ,
An amendment of the law relating to taking evidence in 
India and the Colonies and elsewhere in the British 
Dominions .
(8) British Settlements Acts 1887 and 1945. 50 8c 51 
Viet. Cflg$. 54; 8 & 9 Geo. 6, Cap. 7. This covers the Gove* 
ment of British Settlements in places where there were no
wcivilised” governments in the European sense.
(9) Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890. 53 8c 54 
Viet. Ga^. 27. Note tbat section 4 of the Act, which req­
uires certain laws to be reserved for the ”signification of
Her Majesty*s pleasure or to contain a suspending 
clause and so much of section 7 of that Act as require 
the approval of Her Majesty in Council to any rules of 
Court for regelating the practice and procedure of a 
Colonial Court of Admiralty shall cease to have effect 
in Sierra Leone” .
89. Sierra Leone Independence Act, 1961. 9 8c 10 Eliz. 2.
Cjnp« 6, 2nd Schedule. See also Ghana Independence Act, 
1957, 5 8c 6 Eliz 2. Cap. 6, 1st Schedule; Nigeria 
Independence Act, 1960. 8 8c 9 Eliz 2, Cm, 55. 1st 
Schedule.
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(10) The Foreign Juris diet! on, Act, 1890 and 1913#
53 8c 54 Viet. C«p. 37; 3 8c 4 Geo. V, Qm&. 16.
By section 9 of the former, power was given to the Queen 
in Council to assign the same jurisdiction to courts in 
British possessions as to British courts in foreign 
countries. In the first schedule to the later Act certain 
Acts of the United Kingdom Parliament, such as The Colonia 
Solicitors Act 1900, and sections 34, 35 and 36 of the 
Companies (Consolidation) ^ct, 1908, could be extended to 
foreign countries under British jurisdiction.
(11) Colonial Stock Acts, 1877 to 1900* For example,
40 & 41 Viet. Ca#. 59, and 63 & 64 Viet. Ca*. 62.
(12) Evidence (Colonial Statutes) Act 1907. 7 Edw. 7,
Cfepu 16. " An Act relating to the proof of Acts, Ordinance
and Statutes passed by the Legislature of any British 
possession” .
By section 5, the Act could be extended to any British pro
tectorate. It was extended to Nigeria and the Northern
Territories of the Gold Coast (now Northern Ghana) in
December, 1922.®°
Acts of the United Kingdom Parliament declared to ext­
end to particular territories.
In addition to British Imperial Acts which apply generally
to all colonies, there are certain Acts which are extended
to specifically mentioned territories. Such Acts are
 _______ ______________  /extended
90. S.I. 1922. No. 1418.
extended by virtue of the provisions in the Act itself, or 
by a local enactment or by Orders in Council* Thus by 
section 1 of the Colonial Probates Act, 1892,®^ it is 
enacted as follows:
tfHer Majesty the Queen may, on being satisfied 
that the legislature of any British possession has 
made adequate provision for the recognition in that 
possession of probate andletters of administration 
granted by the Courts of the United Kingdom, direct* 
by Order in Council that this Act shall subject to 
any exceptions and modifications specified in the 
Order, apply to that possession, and thereupon, while 
the Order is in force, this Act shall apply 
accordingly.”
Consequently, an Order In Council was issued on May
16, 1893, extending the application of the Act to the
Gold Coast Colony. In 1920 It was extended to Ashanti and
Nigeria Colony.®^ In 1939^to the Northern Territories of
the Gold Coast and Togoland, the Gambia Protectorate and
93
the Caieroons under British Mandate.
The following are more Acts of the United Kingdom 
Parliament which were extended or are still cm?rent in 
West Africa:-
(1) The Coinage Acts 1870-1891 were extended to the 
Gold Goast Colony, Sierra Leone and the Gambia by Orders 
in Council.^ _____
91. 55 8c 56 Viet* Cawp. 6.
92. Ashanti - S.I. 1920 No. 1663; Nigeria Colony - S.I., 
1920, No. 887.
93. S.I. 1939. No. 1702.
94. 8.1. 1898 No. 123. See Statutory Rules & Orders, 
(1898) p. 13.
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(2) The Finance Act, 1894. 57 8c 58 Viet. Corf. 30. 
Section 20 of the Act, which excepted property in British 
possessions with regard to the payment of estate duty, was 
extended by Orders in Council to the Gold Coast Colony and 
Lagos in 1895, Sierra Leone in 1896 and 0ambia in 1916.
(3) The Colonial Loans Act, 1899, 62 & 63 Viet* Ca^.31 
By section 1, the British Treasury wasempowered to make 
advances to certain colonies and plaices. The territories 
listed in the Schedule Included the Cold Coast, Niger 
Coast Protectorate, Lagos and Sierra Leone.
(4) The Copyright Act, 1911, was extended by an Order 
in Council to the Oambia Protectorate, Northern Nigeria 
Protectorate, Northern Territories of the Oold Coast and 
the Sierra Leone Protectorate in 1912 .^5
(5) The Administration of Justice Act 1920. 10 & 11 
Geo. V, Cgsjs>. 81. Part II of the Act, which deals with the 
enforcement in the United Kingdom of judgments obtained in 
the superior courts in other British dominions, was extend 
to theGold Coast Colony, Colony and Protectorate of Nigerii 
in 1922, to the Colony of Ofambiain 1923, to Ashanti and th< 
Northern Territoxies of the G-old Coast in 1924.
(6) Evidence and powers of Attorney Act, 1940. 3 & 4
Geo. 6. Cap. 28. Certain sections were extended by Order
       /:
95. By s. 17 of the Ghana Copyright Act, 1961, the Copy­
right Act of the U.K. shall cease to have effect In
Ghana, and the Copyright Ordinance (Cap. 126) is acc­
ordingly repealed thereby. (Act 85 of 1961.)
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in Council to the Gambia, the Gold Coast, Nigeria and 
Sierra Leone in 1941*
£3^ Acts of the United Kingdom Parliament adopted by local 
legislatures
This is another method of introducing English law int 
West Africa. Thus in the Gambia, an Ordinance was passed 
in 1855 to introduce the following Acts of the United 
Kingdom Parliament:98
(1) An Act for preventing malicious injuries to 
persons and property by fire, or by explosive or destruct­
ive substances, 1846. 9 8c 10 Viet. Cwf>• 25.
(2) An Act for the removal of defects in the admini­
stration of criminal justice. (1848) 11 & 12 Viet* Cs$. 46
(5) An Act for further improving the administration 
of criminal justice* (1851) 14 8c 15 Viet. Cop. 100.
All these Acts were declared to be in force in the
Gambia uas fully and completely to all Intents and purp­
oses as if the several provisions of the said Acts 
had been expressly enacted by the Governor or Legis­
lative Council of these settlements ancd confirmed 
by Her Majesty the Queen.n
Q7Again In 1867, an Ordinance was passed to extend an
Act to amend the law of evidence In England in 1851,98 and
the Evidence Act 1853,99 G-ambla. These Acts dealt
/wi th
■— ,■[ n r .... I11 .  H^nT*frn intTfiiw w irrw aw .w r-tiirm riar^tM intfifciiirfnutM is* itK I 1 frtiT iw  11 1 n.B.1 rnwii 1111^ 11 u . i.m ■ i .r r i. nn^imdfti i j j  .j j  i 
3
96. No. 9® of 1855, now repealed*
97. No. 154 of 1867.
98. 14 8c 15 Viet. Ca#). 99.
99. 1§~ 8c 16 Viet. On*. 83.
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with, Inter alia, admissibility of documents in evidence 
without proof of seal, and the competence and compellabilit 
of husbands and wives to give evidence*
In 1872 , an Ordinance was passed to extend to the 
Gambia certain statutes In force in England relating to the 
criminal law, for examples-
(1) An Act to facilitate the performance of the duties 
of Justices of the Peace out of sessions within England and 
Wales with respect to persons charged with indictable 
offences (1848) 11 8c 12 Vict.C,42.
(2) An Act to consolidate and the Statute Law of 
England and Ireland relating to accessories to and abettors 
of indictable offences. (1861) 24 & 25 Viet. C«p. 94.
(3) An Act to consolidate and amend the Statute law of 
England and Ireland relating to larceny and other s itniiar 
offences. (1861) 24 8c 25 Viet. Cup. 96.
(4) An Act to consolidate and amend the statute law of 
England and Ireland relating to offences against the 
person. (1^61) 24 & 25 Viet. C*s». 100.
(5) An Act to amend the law in certain cases of mis­
appropriation by servants of the property of their nasters, 
(1863) 26 8c 27 Viet. Cap. 103.
The Gambia Ordinance No. 3 of 1872 was superseded by 
the Imperial Acts (Adoption) Ordinance of 1899,2 which was
l,by. No., 2 of 1931. .... _ _
1. No. 3 of 1872, superseded by No. 14 of 1899.
2. Gambia, No* 14 of 1899.
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Better provisions have now been made with respect to 
the Criminal law and evidence in the Gambia. The Laws of 
the Gambia, 1955 Revision, contain the following enactments 
Criminal Codes Cap. 21, Criminal Procedure Code, Cap. 23, 
and Criminal Evidence Ordinance, Cap. 26.
Sierra Leone has also been in favour of adopting 
Acts of the United Kingdom Parliament in order to improve 
her own laws. For example, the County Court Acts in force 
in England were extended to the Settlement of Sierra Leone 
by Ordinance No. 4 of 1867,3 "so far as the same can be 
applied, and are not inconsistent with any Royal Charter 
in force in this settlement*1. Again, section 1 of Ordin­
ance No. 3 of 1883, was an adaptation of the English Act 
entitled ,fThe Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881,^ 
subject to certain e x c e p t i o n s H o w e v e r ,  In the same year 
Ordinance No. 12 of 1883,^ repealed the Conveyancing Ordin­
ance. The preamble to the repealing ordinance reads thus:
11 Whereas it is inexpedient and has been declared to be 
unsatisfactory that Imperial Acts of Parliament should 
be embodied by reference thereto In the Ordinances of 
the Legislature of Sierra Leone ...**
3. Repealed by Ordinance No. 12 of 1883.
4. 44 8c 45 Viet. Cap. 41.
5. For example ss, 1, 48 and 69 (viii) (ix) (x) and 72 did
not apply to the Settlement of Sierra Leone.
6. Repealed by Ordinance No. 14 of 1907,
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Thers Is much to be said for the warning given in the
preamble* However, Sierra Leone still believes in the adop­
tion of United Kingdom Acts. Thus, by the Imperial Stat­
utes (Law of Property) Adoption Ordinance,*^ most of the 
pre-1925_ Acts of the United Kingdom Acts relating to 
property and conveyancing have been adopted. The method of 
modifying these Acts shows a remarkable improvement. As 
will be seen from the schedule to the Ordinance, certain 
sections of the various English Acts adopted, are expressly 
precluded from applying In Sierra Leone. In addition, 
there are provisions In the Ordinance which modernise 
specific sections of the English law. By section 3 of the 
Sierra Leone Ordinance, so much of English law as prohibits 
or restricts the alienation or devise of land for charit­
able purposes, or the bequest of personalty to be laid out 
in the purchase of land for charitable purposes, does not 
apply in Sierra Lsenne. It is interesting to note that it 
toojc England at least 70 years before this restriction 
was removed by the enactment of the Charities Act, 1960.^ 
Further, so much of the old English law as specially 
restricted the acquisition, holding or disposition of real 
or personal property by a married woman as suGh, w
7. Cap. 18. Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960 Revision.
8. 8 & 9 Eliz 2, 58. See, for example, s. 38 which
repeals the law of mortmain.
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also excepted*^ Then the law conferring estates in dower 
or by the courtesy, and such totally inapplicable terms
like ”copyhold lands” were declared not to apply in Sierra
T 10 Leo ne*
By section B of the Ordinance^the common law techni- 
calities in regard to conveyances have no application in 
Sierra Leone, At common law to confer an estate in fee 
simple on the grantee it wast essential to limit the property 
to him ”and his heirs” , or in the case of a corporation sole 
to him ”and his successors” . But by virtue of the Convey- 
ancy and Law of Property Act, 1881,^  it is sufficient in 
conveying to an individual to use the words ”in fee simple” . 
This is the provision which would have applied in Sierra 
Leone, But Sierra Leone has borrowed word for word two imp­
orted sections of the Law of Property Act, 1 9 2 5 , in 
addition to section 51 of the 1881 Act, so as to bring her 
property law more up to date, 'The effect of this adoption 
is that by section 8(1) of the Sierra Leone Ordinance, ”A 
conveyance of freehold land to any person without words of 
limitation, or any equivalent expression, shall pass to the
grantee the fee simple or either the whole interest which 
_ .......  -      /the
9* Cap* 18, s, 4, Laws of Sierra Leone (1960 Revision)*
10, Ibid, ss, 6 & 7.
11, 44 & 45 Viet, C»§t, 41, s, 51*
12, S. 60 (1) & (2),
the grantor has power to convey in such land, unless a
contrary Intention appearsin the conveyance* Surely, it
wiould have been less clumsy if the Law of Property Act 1925
had been adopted and modified* The Schedule to the Imperial
Statutes (Law of Property) Adoption Ordinance is hereby
reproduced for ease of reference*
/  •
SCHEDULE.
Date of Statute smd Title,
A6 and 45 Viet, c. 41 
22nd Auguist, 1581.
i and 40 Viet. c. 58 
10th Augunt, 1882.
45 and 46 Viet. c. 39 
10th Auguot, 1882.
47 and 48 Viet. c. 18
3rd July, 1884.
51 and 52 Viofc. c. 69
24th D&osmbor^ 1888.
62 and 83 Vicfc. c. 30
12th August, 1889.
68 end 64 Viet. c. 19
26th July, 1880.
03 and 54 Viet. c. 69
18th August, 1890.
65 and 60 Viet. c. 13 
20th June, 1892.
66 and 87 Viet. o. 21
29th June, 1893.
5S and 57 V iot. o. 53
22nd September, 1893.
57 and 58 Viet. c. 10
18th June, 1894.
59 and 60 Viet, c, 35
14th Auguat, 1888.
1 and 2 Geo. V . c. 37 
16th December, 1911.
Tho Oonvoyandh« and 
Law of Propsrfcy Act,
1881.
The Settled Land Act, 
1882.
Extent to which applied.
The Conveyancing Aot,
1882.
The Settled Land Act, 
1884.
The Trustee Aot, 1888.
Tho Settled Land Act,
The whole Statute except 
csotioao 3 (2), 6 (3), 30, 45,
48, 05, 72 and 73.
The whole Statute except 
Beetiona 3 (ii), 4 (7), 6 (ii), 
9. 10, 11, 14, 15, 10, 17, 
20 (3), 21 (iis), (v) and {viii), 
25, 28, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 (v), 
32, 48 (7), (8) and (10), 48,
49, 58 (viii), 61 and 66.
The whole Statute exoapt 
cections 2, 7 and 11.
The whole Statute except 
eeetions 7 (v) and (vi), and 8.
The whole Statute.
The whole Statute.
The Trujateoa Appoint­
ment Act, 1880.
Tho Settled Land Act, 
1880.
The Conveyancing and 
Law of Property Aot, 
1802.
Hi© Voluntary Con­
veyances Aot, 1893.
Tho Truotoe Act, 1893.
The Trustee Act, 1893, 
Amendment Act, 1894.
Tho Judicial Truotoea 
Act, 1888.
The Conveyancing Act, 
1911.
The whole Statute.
Tho whole Statute except 
sections 8, 10, 13, 15, 17, 
18 and 10.
The whole Statute.
Tho whole Statute.
The whole Statute except 
eoetiom 6, 16, 34, 41, 44, 
48 and 62.
The whole Statute except 
section 2.
Tho whole Statute.
Tho whole Statute except 
sections 4 (ii) (b) and 13.
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The Criminal law of Sierra Leone is also in part 
derived from the Imperial Statutes (Criminal Law) Adoption 
Ordinance,-^whereby the following Acts of the United 
Kingdom have been adopted in Sierra Leone subject to 
certain exceptions. They are:
(1) The Perjury Act, 1911;14:
(2) The Forgery Act, 19X3J15 and
(3) The Larceny Act, 1916*16
4 . POWERS AND ENACTMENTS OF COLONIAL LEGISLATURES
Colonial legislatures are invariably given § general 
power, for example by Orders-in-Council, to make laws for 
the 11 peace, order and good governmenttt of the Colony. 
Firstly, this power confines colonial legislation to the 
territorial limits of the colony. Though subordinate, 
colonial legislatures are in no sense delegates of the 
British Imperial Parliament and have full power to delegate 
legislative authority to subordinate bodies.^
The second condition to be fulfilled by every colonial
18
law before it can be regarded as valid is that it should
not be wrepugnant to the laws of England*1. Without doubt
 /this
)i"l—IllWMT
13. Cap. 27. Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960 Revision.
14. 1 & 2 Geo. 5, C«g>. 2. Sections applicable are 1, 2, 5,
6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16(1), 17 & 19.
13. 3 & 4 Geo. 5, Ce»p. 27. Sections applicable are 1,2,3(3)
4,5(l)(e), 5(3)(a), 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 
18, 19(1), 20 & 22.
16. 6 & 7 Geo 5, Co§>. 50. Sections applicable: 1-11, 13-16,
17(1)(2), 20-82, 33(1)(3)(4), 34-36, 37(l)-(5), 39, 40(1)-
(4), 43, 46, 47, 48(1) & 50.
17. HalsburyV,3rd ed. Vol. 5, 474. See generally Hodge v. R
(1883) 9 App.Cas. 117, P.C.j Powell v. Appollo Candle Oo.
(1885) 10 App.Cas. 282, P.O.
18. The term "colonial law" shall include laws made for
p.t.o
tills meant that Colonial legislatures should "base their 
local laws on English law alone, From the point of view of 
the British colonialist, the rale could hardly be expected 
to be otherwise.
lhat sparked off the fire during the hey-day of colon­
ialism was the meaning of the phrase "repugnant to the law 
of England". It bad agitated the minds of the Southern 
Australian Parliamentarians when Chief Justice Boothby of 
South Australia ruled that certain Acts of their legis­
lature were contrary to English law and therefore invalid^ 
Ipfhen the matter was referred to the Law Officers in the 
United Kingdom, they were of the opinion that Colonial Acts 
were invalid if contrary to United Kingdom Acts* The view 
which was finally preferred Is embodied in "an Act to
remove doubts as to the validity of Colonial laws; known
/as
18. (cont.) any colony either by such legislature as
aforesaid ti*©* Colonial legislature) or by Her 
Majesty in Council" - section 1, Colonial Laws 
Validity Act, 1865.
19. PHILLIPS, O.H. The constitutional law of Ureat 
Britain and the Commonwealth* 2nd edition, 1957,
p. 618.
19 9 •
as the Colonial Laws Validity, Act, 1865.^
Section 2 provides that "Any colonial law which is or 
shall he in any respect repugnant to the provisions 
of any Act of Parliament extending to the Colony to 
which such law may relate, or repugnant to any order 
or regulation made under authority of such Act of 
Parliament, or having in the colony the force and 
effect of such Act, shall be read subject to such Act, 
order or regulation, and shall, to the extent of such 
repugnancy, but not otherwise, be and remain absolute^ 
void and inoperative."
Section 3 provides, "Mo colonial law shall be or be 
deemed to have been void or inoperative on the ground 
or repugnancy to the law of England, unless the same 
shall be repugnant to the provisions of scrne such Act 
of Parliament, Order, or regulation as aforesaid."
The effect of these two provisions was very well put
by JENKYHS^, with whose interpretation the writer
completely agrees.
"This view", (says Jenkyns), "is that a colonial law 
Is void for repugnancy only if it conflicts with an 
Act of Parliament extending to the colony, i.e. an Act 
by which Parliament intends to bind the colony. A 
colonial legislature has therefore full power to alter 
what is sometimes termed the 1 common law of the colony* 
- an expression which in 1 settled1 colonies includes
_______    /the
20.28 & 29 Viet. Gap. 63. If the Law Officers had carefully 
read an earlier Act (7 8c 8 Will. 3, Cap. 22 (1695-6)) - an 
"Act for preventing frauds, and regulating abuses in the 
plantation trade"), they would not have reached the conclus­
ion that Colonial Acts were invalid if contrary to U.K.
Acts. Section 9 of the 1695 Act stipulated "That all laws, 
by 3aws, usages and customs ... which hereafter shall be In 
practice In any of the said plantations, which are In any 
wise repugnant to the before mentioned laws, or any of them. 
so far as they do relate to the said plantations, or any of* 
them, or which are any ways repugnant to this present act, 
or to any other law hereafter to be made in this kingdom, sc 
far as such law sha 11 relate to and mention the said plant - 
ations, are illegal, null and void, to aH intents and purp­
oses whatsoever. (Writer’s italics.) Bee also STOKES, A.
A view of the constitution of the British Colonies in Uorth 
America, etc. 1783, p. 27.
Si. British rule and jurisdiction, p. 71. See al30*p#
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the whole law of England, statute law as well as 
common law, so far as applicable to the colony at the 
date of settlement . It is not, therefore, a complete 
statement to say that a colonial legislature 'may make 
laws opposed to the English common law* , for it may 
also make laws opposed to an English statute which, in 
the absence of such colonial legislation, would be in 
operation in the colony, not because made applicable 
to the colony, but merely as part of its 'common 
law* *H
In practice, the conflict between colonial and
imperial law rarely arose, for in most of the dependent
territories, the British Grown had power to disallow any 
22colonial law. Moreover, a colonial governor was empower­
ed either to refuse his assent, or to reserve bills f* for 
the signification of Her Majesty's pleasure** • Even if 
such legislation had been enacted, the condition that a 
colonial legislation should not be repugnant to English law 
would have been enforced by the decision of the local jud­
iciary in the colony, in the first instance, and ultimately 
of Her Majesty's Privy Council, upon an action or suit at 
law, duly brought before such a tribunal to declare and 
judge a colonial statute either in whole or in part, to 
be ultra vires and void.^^a ^
21* (cont.) ...Bee also Phillips v. Eyre (1870) L.K. 6 Q.B.
1, Hi el v. The Qae"en~T1885) 10 A.C* 675, per Lord 
Halsbury at p. 687.
22* Bee, e.g. The G-old Coast (Constitution) Order in 
Council, 1950. S.I. 1950. No. 2094, s. 60.
22(a). TODD, A. l^arliamentary government in the British 
Colonies (1894) p. 30S. "
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As a result of these limitations, the dependent legis­
latures in West Africa simply had to model their laws on 
English law. In fact, the legiahtive councils were u guided” 
by the Colonial Office. Thus , In introducing the Bill to 
amend the law relating to Trade Marks in 1923, the Attorney- 
General of the Gold Coast admitted that the uBill follows 
closely the provisions of Part 1 of the English Trade Marks 
Act, 1 9 1 9 . . . Again, during the debate on the Stamp 
Amendment Ordinance, the Attorney-General of the Gold Coast, 
referring to the definition of "conveyance on sale” , given
in the Bill, observed that "There Isnothing novel In this.
It has been the law In England for the last 40 years.
In fact the whole Bill is copied from the English 
Stamp Act of 1891. It follows the Nigerian Stamp 
Ordinance” .^4
Mention could also be made of the Gold Coast Ordinance 
further provision for the execution of instru­
ments under the authority of a power of attorneys under 
the old law in England, an agent using such power of 
attorney, had to sign in the name of the principal or 
person for whom he was acting. That position was altered 
by the Conveyancing Act of 1881, whereby a representative o3 
a company in the United Kingdom could use his own name and
his seal. That provision was, however, never applied to 
    _ _ _ _ _  /theM il Win HM .. .  . p , ■fL-T  1~mfri—rrar !■ i| i wm 1 » i i , ifinnrr—Lgm  I Wiimn
23. Gold Coast Leg. Co. Debates, Session 1923-24. 2lst 
March 1923; p. 265. More specific ©xemples will be 
considered later.
24. Gold Coast Leg. Co. Debates, Session 1932-33, p. 292.
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the G-old Coast, and the object of the Bill was to apply
25that provision*
Sometimes an enactment based on English law was 
borrowed from another Commonwealth territory. By an Ordin­
ance dated 10th July 1851, the Gambian legislature adopted
OfJin<WHC es
10 of the Sierra Leone [pa rrent ly in force when Gambia was
2 6a dependency of Sierra Leone, In fact, it had been the
aim of the Colonial Office that there should be uniform
legislation and administration in British West Africa*
Thus, in introducing a Bill to amend the law relating to
Trade Marks, the At tor ney-Gene ral of the Gold Coast said
that ”The Secretary of State has pointed out the great 
desirability of securing unifoimity of legislation 
on this matter throughout British West Africa; and 
accordingly this Bill Is found in terms similar 
to those of the corresponding legislation in the 
other parts of British West Africa” . ^
The Comptroller of Customs of the Gold Coast in introducing
a Bill to regulate the importation and sale of folded
woven goods, pointed out that it had always been one of his
ambitions to see as far as was reasonably possible, the
same legislation enforced in all the British Vilest African
Colonies, He also intimated that the Bill would be enacted
25. Gold Coast Leg. Co. Debates. 1st Session 1935. p. 50.
26. Ho* 6 of 1851 repealed by Ho. 20 of 1916.
27. Gold Coast Leg. Co. Debates, Session 1923-24. December 
1923, p. 265.
In Nigeria, Sierra Leone and the Gambia, if it had not 
already been enacted*^®
“The Southern Nigeria Forest Act” which, as The 
Nigerian Chronicle remarked,^9 “like almost all other laws
mm— am A n a— iniwn <i i   .......... »II» Ifc.i.m  I ■ i i r n  ^
that have come to us in this Colony of late, xs
modelled after the Indian Act although the conditions
existing in these places are not identical” , was
enacted in 1911. The procedure of case stated incorporated
into the Gold Coast Criminal Procedure Code Bill, 1935,
was t©ken verbatim from Trinidad. Even as recently as
1952, the Gold Coast Public Trustee Ordinance was based on
the Nigerian model*31 xn the words of Mr. Branigan,
Minister of Justice, “although this Bill was based on the 
Nigerian Ordinance, it equally corresponded with 
similar legislation in Malaya, in Kenya, in Singapore, 
in Rhodesia and in Tanganyika. It follows the Niger­
ian Ordinance most closely, however, because I think 
it is always advisable that in this kind of legislation 
we should try and keep in step with a country which is 
closely tied to ours by commercial and other ties.”3*2
There are many other examples of the enactments
modelled on English law, some of which will be considered
latar.33
2Q* Ibid, 1st Session 1933, p. 52.
29. The Nigerian Chronicle, September 15, 1911.
30. Leg. Co. Debates. Session 1935, issue No. 1, p. 51.
31. Mr. Magnus Sampson, M.L.A., was unhappy about this
trend of affairs. Great laughter was aroused by his 
remarks - wi have no objections to urge against the 
Bill, but I am wondering why the Gold Coast laws are 
always based on Nigerian laws. It is time the Gold 
Coast made laws for Nigeria to copy” - Leg. Ass. Deb. 
Session 1952, issue No. 2, p, 18*
32. Ibid.
33. See, e.g. post, &-c .
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5. POWERS AND ENACTMENTS OF INDEPENDENT COMMONWEALTH 
LEGISLATURES
The attainment of complete independence means also the 
acquisition of legislative independence* subject to the 
•written cons titution. Thus section 42 of the Sierra 
Leone (Constitution) Order in Council, 1961, stipulates 
that w subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Parl­
iament may make laws for the peace, order and good govern­
ment of Sierra Leone** • This section is identical to 
section 31(1) of the Ghana (Constitution) Order In Council, 
1957, which was the subject of judicial interpretation 
when two Muslim leaders were served with deportation orders. 
In the course of his judgment at the Mimasi Divisional 
Court, Mr. Justice Smith explained the Import of the 
expression thus s
**If, as I hold, the words 1 peace, order and good gov­
ernment1 unqualified in any way are plenary powers 
possessed by the Imperial Parliament, then it follows 
just as it would in England, that the_Court here has 
no power to inquire into this Act** -£fche Special Act
under which the two leaders wei*e deported
It has been decided by the Federal Supreme Court,
that the power entrusted to the Parliament in Nigeria to
/ma&e
34* The Times, Oct. 26, 1957. Lardan v. Attorney-General
& ors. (No. 2) £1957)3 W.A.L.R. 114 at p # I2g.
35. Doherty & W. Nigeria Development Corporation v. Sir 
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa & ors. The Guardian Law 
Reports, November 13, 1961. ?
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make laws for the peace, order and good government of 
Nigeria did not entitle the Federal Government to pass an 
Act which was ultra vires the Constitution.*^
However, there Is no doubt that an independent 
Commonwealth territory in West Africa can pass any Act 
which is to all intents and purposes repugnant to a United 
Kingdom Act declared to extend to that particular territory 
either by express words or by necessary Intendment.
For, after independence, the Colonial laws Validity Act, 
1865, ceases to apply. Its place is taken by the Statute 
of Westminster, 1931.®*^ Section 2(2) of which stipulates i
**No law and no provision of any law made after the 
commencement of this Act by the Parliament of a 
Dominion shall be void or inoperative on the ground 
that it is repugnant to the law of England, or to the 
provisions of any existing or future Act of Parliament 
of the United Kingdom, or to any order, rule or regul­
ation made under any such Act, and the powers of the 
Parliament of a Dominion shall Include the power to 
repeal or amend any such Act, order, rule or regulation 
In so far as the same is par t of the law of the 
Domini on.u
As far as the scope of the Chapter is concerned, it
only needs to be observed that the power conferred on an 
  _____ _ _  / Ind ependeni
36. The Act in question was the Tribunals of Inquiry Act, 
1961. It is understood that the F.S.C* has granted applic­
ation for leave to appeal to the Privy Council - West Africa 
December 16, 1961. Thus in the pre-republican Ghana case of 
Ware v. Qfori-Attah & an or .(1959^ G.L.R. 181, MURPHY , J., 
ruled that the Statute Law (Amendment) No. 2) Act, 1957, 
under which the Minister may, inter a l i a , order the stool 
property to be held by a local government council, was 
Invalid on the ground that it was contrary to s. 35 of the 
Ghana (Constitution) Order in Council, 1957.
37. 22 Geo 5, C o p . 4
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independent commonwealth country was the power to amend or
repeal any act of the United Kingdom Parliament whatsoever,
in so far as -that Act was part of the law of the country 
*58
concerned#
It was not quite clear whether the wordd ** ex I sting or
future Act of Parliament*1 excluded the statute itself
from being amended, but the wording of section 2 of the 1st
39Schedule to the Nigerian Independence Act, 1960, confiims 
the view that the statute itself can be amended. By section 
3 of the Statute of Westminster it isemcted that the 
nParliament of Dominion has full power to make laws having 
extra-judicial operation**.
It is evident that the effect of these two sections 
is to restrict the application of English colonial law#
Thus sections 735 and 7256 of the Merchant Shipping Act,
1894, and sections 4 and 7 of the Colonial Courts of Admir­
alty Act, 1890, which limited the powers of colonial legis-
40latures no longer apply to Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone.
As a result, any of the three sovereign states can repeal
the whole of the English Merchant Shipping Act 1894, and
replace it with her own* In fact by the Ghana Merchant
Shipping (Liability of Shipowners and Others) Act, 1961, the 
 r : .    /Parliament
38# WHEARE, K.C# The statute of Westminster and dominion 
status. 5th ed. (1953) 161; The cons titutional structure 
of the Commonwealth. 1960•
39# 8 & 9 Eliz, 2, Ca$. 55#
40. Sierra Leone Independence Act 1961, Ghana Independence 
Act, 1957.
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Parliament of Ghana have amended Part VIII of the English 
Merchant Shipping Act of 1894 and section 2 of the Merchant 
Shipping (Liability of Shipowners and Others) Act, 1900,
In so far as the Republic 5s c one erne di ^
Further, it 5s within the competence of the legis­
lature of an# of the independent commonwealth territories 
to abolish appeals therefrom to the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council. If such a step is taken as has been 
done in the case of the Republic of Ghana,^ the result 
would be that future decisions of the Judicial Committee 
would not bind that country.
6. APPLICATION OF CURRENT ENGLISH IAW
In the laws of all the territories in Yifest Africa 
(except Sierra Leone) providing for the establishment of 
superior courts, there is a section which regulates the law 
to be applied in probate and matrimonial causes. Thus by 
section 16 of the High Court of Lagos Ordinance, it is 
enacted that *43
uThe jurisdiction of the High Court in probate, divorce 
and matrimonial causes and proceedings may, subject to 
the provisions of this Ordinance, and in particular
41. Act 57 of 1961, Ghana.
42. Ghana (Consequential Provision) Act, 1960. 8 & 9 Eliz. 
2, Cags. 41. It was clearly stated at p. 11 of the Ghana 
Government Proposal for a Republican Constitution tha$, on 
the establishment of the Republic, all appeals from
the courts to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
would be discontinued* White Paper No. 1/60.
43. Cap* 80, Laws of the Federation of Niger5.a, 1958 Rev* 
This provision applies in all the Regions of the Fed­
eration, since umarxlage other than marriages under Moslem
. b * o.
of section 27, /which deals with the application of 
native law and cus tomJ7 and to rules of court, be 
exercised by the Gourt in conformity with the law 
and practice for the time being in force in England*11
The law11 refers to the subdtantive divorce and pro­
bate laws current in England, including recent legelation* 
Thus, by interpretation, the superior courts in West Africa 
are empowered to apply, for example:
The Matrimonial Causes Act 1950
The Matrimonial Ouases (Property and Maintenance) Act, 
1958;45
43. (cont•) ••• law or other customary law; annulment and
dissolution of and other matrimonial cuases relating thereto #6
are" matters within the exclusive legislative competence of 
the Federation. (See Schedule to the Constitution of the 
Federation of Nigeria, Pt. I, 1960.) But the jurisdiction of 
a High Court of a Region in relation to marriages and annul­
ment and dissolution of marriages shall, nso far as practice 
and procedure are concerned, be exercised in conformity with 
the law and practice for the time being in force in England? 
Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1958, Regional Courts (Fed 
-oral jurisdiction) Ordinance, Cap, 177.
In Ghana wnotwithstanding the repeal by this Act/Courts 
Act 196Q7of sections 16 and 17 of the Courts Ordinance,
(Cap. 4J /which relate to infants aftd persons of unsound 
mind and to probate and matrimonial causes respectively/ 
those sections shall continue to apply in Ghana until other 
provision^ is made by law11* In 1961 a Government White 
Paper on Marriage, Divorce and Inheritance, was published.
By section 8, it was proposed to introduce a uniform divorce 
law for all marriages, whether customary or under the Marr­
iage Ordinance; now the Government has taken action by intro 
-ducing a Marriage, divorce and inheritance in 1962.
For Gambia, see Supreme Gourt Ord. Cap. 5, s. 17. Sierra 
Leone has her own Matrimonial Causes Ordinance, No. 9 of 
1949 (Cap* 102, I960 Revision) based on the English model*
44./7-Geo# 6, C«9* 25, which regulates the law of divorce & 
nullity of marriage, judicial separation and restitution of 
conjugal rights; declaration of legitimacy, alimony, maint­
enance and custody of children. See also the Ghana case of 
Manu v. Janu, (1959) G.L.R. 21.
45. 6 Sc 7 Bliz. 2. Cs^. 35.
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The Divorce (Insanity and Desertion) Act, 1958;^
An Act to enable a person to marry certain kinf'(for 
example sister, aunt or niece) of a former spouse, 
1960.4?
It has been held in Okpaku v. Okpaku^ that unless
they arise out of suits for divorce or judicial separation,
or In respect of payments made by third parties to provide
for necessaries for a deserted wife, a superior court of
Nigeria has no jurisdiction to entertain claims for
maintenance. The appellate court refused to make an order
for maintenance first, on the grounds that the English Act
entitled the Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act,'49
of 1895, was not a statute of general application. The
reason why the statute was not regarded as one of general
application was that it did' not apply to Scotland and
Ireland. With the greatest respect, the fact that an Act
does not apply to Scotland, does not deny it the status of
a statute of general application, for Scottish civil law is
very different from English law, and also most of the
/le gislat-
46. 6 & 7 Eliz. 2. Cap. 54.
47. 8 & 9 lliz. 2, Gap. 29,
48. (1947) 12 W.A.C.A* 137; query whether the Matrimonial
Proceedings (Magistrates* Courts) Act, 1960 - 8 & 9 
Eliz. 2, Gap. 48 - will apply in West Africa, for the 
jurisdiction is vested in Magistrates* Courts.
49. 58 & 59 Viet. Cawp. 39. The Act has been amended and 
improved upon by the Summary Jurisdiction (Separation & 
Maintenance) Act, 1925* Notes the court system has been 
reorganized since Nigeria became a federal and indep­
endent c ount ry/.
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legislation of the United Kingdom Parliament in civil 
matters are excepted from application in Scotland.
The second reason of the Supreme Court was that the 
procedure laid down In the 1895 Act under discussion provi­
ded for a hearing before a court of summary jurisdiction, 
with an appeal to the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty 
Division of the High Court. Therefore, the Supreme Court 
(now the High Court) of Nigeria, being a superior court of 
record, was not the appropriate court, as the matter in 
dispute was a claim for maintenance. This second reason 
is more tenable than the first. In the course of the 
judgment the Supreme Court pointed out that there is no 
local ordinance providing for maintenance simpllciter. If 
that is the case then there Is a lacuna in the laws of 
Nigeria which must be filled. One wonders why this gap 
should have escaped the attention of legislatfcrs in Nigeria 
and, as far as it is known, in Ghana too. Yet as early as 
1885, [an Ordinanc e to amend the law relating to divorce and 
matrimonial causes in Sierra Leone, whereby section 10 
deserted wives could claim maintenance orders against their 
husbands.50 The current legislation is embodied in the 
Married Women1s Maintenance Ordinance of 1 8 8 8 . Gambia is
50* No. 7 of 1858* An Ordinance to amend the law relating 
to Divorce and Matrimonial Causes in Sierra Leone.
51* No. 7 of 1888. See Laws of Sierra Leone (1960) 
Revision, Cap. 100.
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A»<x S' cx (% o ct
Maintenance of Deserted Wives Ordinance,
which entitles a deeS'erted wife to summon her husband
before a police magistrate of^two justices of the peace in
petty sessions. The magistrates, if satisfied that the
husband being able to maintain the wife has wilfully-
refused or neglected so to do.,, and has deserted his wife,
may make maintenance orders against the husband. The
maintenance orders are terminated if the wife is proved to
52
be guilty of adultery.
Quite apart from the two ordinances mentioned, a wife
living apart from her husband has authority at common law
to pledge his credit for necessaries suitable to her
station in life.^3 This common law has been accepted in
Ghana and in Nigeria. Indeed, in the Ghana case of
Davy-Hayford v. Davy-Hayford ACOXATSE, J., in dismissing
a claim for maintenance (without a petition for divorce)
against the defendant husband, said, ttl find that at
common law, a wife had no right to sue her husband in 
contract, all that she had power to do was to pledge 
his credit.**
A wife also has authority in equity to borrow money 
- ......        /within
52. No. 8 of 1887, amended by No. 11 of 1916. Laws of 
Gambia, 1955 Revision, Gap. 11.
53* Wilson v. Glossop (1888) 20 Q.B.D. 354 at 357.
54. Unreported. Div. Court at Sekondi, Western Judicial 
Division. Suit No. 52/1957.
within the same limit* ^
It does appear now that in the absence of current 
legislation on this point, deserted wives in Ghana and 
Nigeria would only have their remedy at common law and in 
equity* However, assuming that the English Summary Juris- 
diction (Married Women )Act, 1895, had been held to be a 
statute of general application, would a claim for mainten­
ance without more 3 n « i  Have succeeded either in a Nigerian 
magistrates* court, which is a court of summary juris­
diction? As a rule, magistrates ha^e jurisdiction !tin all 
personal actions, whether arising from contract or 
from tort, or from both, whefce the debt or damage 
claimed, whether as balance of account or otherwise 
is not more than £5QQW * 56
It is not likely that a married woman whose husband
has been guilty of wilful neglect to provide reasonable
maintenance for her or her infant children, whom he is
legally liable to maintain, can apply to a magistrates*
court for an order, by virtue merely of the passage just
quoted* However, if the Statute were held to be one of
general application, it is submitted that magistrates*
courts, being courts of summary jurisdiction, would be 
_ ...     /able
BOare v. 3 out ten (1869) L*H* 9 151, as explained
by DENNING, L.I. in Biberfeld v* Berens C1952J 2 Q.B. 
770, at 783; CL9523 F i l l  E.R. 237, at 243.
56. Magistrates* Court (Lagos) Ordinance* Cap. 113.
Section 14(l)(a).
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able to apply the Statute, on the ground that statutes 
declared to be of general application have force both in 
the superior and inferior courts of West Africa (customary 
courts excepted).
Judging by the wording of the Matrimonial and probate 
laws provision just cited from the High Gourt of Lagos 
Ordinance, it is made perfectly clear that any Act of the 
United Kingdom Parliament enacted in connection with pro­
bate and matrimonial causes will extend even to the indep­
endent Commonwealth countries of West Africa. This view 
might appear to be contrary to section 4 of the Statute of 
Westminster, 1 9 3 1 ^  which reads thus;
ttNo Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom 
passed after the commencement of this Act shall 
extend, or be deemed to extend, to a Dominion as 
part of the law of that Dominion, unless it is 
expressly declared in that Act that that Dominion 
has requested, and consented to, the enactment thereof1
It could, however, be argued that as the provision was
part of the existing laws of the colony before independence
there is really no conflict.88 Nevertheless, whilst there
 _______      /i*
57. This section is incorporated in the independent Acts 
of Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone.
58. uThe expression ’the existing laws1 means all Ordinan­
ces, laws, rules, regulations, orders and other instruments 
having the effect of law made or having effect as if they 
had been made in pursuance of the existing Orders and 
having effect as part of the law of the Colony and Protect­
orate of Sierra Leone or any part thereof immediately 
before the commencement of this Order.11 - The Sierra Leone 
(Constitution) Order in Council, 1961. S.I./741.
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Is no objection to the application of this provision in
dejjendent territories, it is rather far-fetched for an
independent country, such as Ghana or Nigeria, to give a
legislative carte blanche to the United^Parliament on
matters relating to probate and the dissolution and annul-
57ment of marriages. The two societies are socially and
culturally different. When members of the United Kingdom
Parliament are debating on such bills they think primarily
58of the social condifcibhsnln England*
In practice, however, a limitation can be exercised on
the rather wide terms of the provision, for, as It has
been observed by a former learned judge of Ghana
uUpon a careful perusal, however, of section 16 (now 
section 17)60 it will be seen that the jurisdiction 
conferred is expressed in such terms as to be merely 
permissive and not campulsory. the words being that 
* the jurisdiction hereby conferred upon the court in 
probate, divorce, and matrimonial causes MAX...! be 
exercised by the court in conformity with the law and
5*7. In the Kenya case of Bashir v. Commissioner of Lands 
Ll96CfJ A.C. 45 at p. 62, the Judicial Committee have drawn 
attention to the uncertainty Involved in the adoption Min 
advance futufce English legislation of unknown content*1 •
58. Examples of customs peculiar to the English are arti­
ficial Insemination by donor, and whether change of sex 
should be a ground for divorce. In Polling v. Dolling . The 
Times. May 22 1958 (otherwise unreported), It was held tabat 
the latter was not a ground for divorce by the Gourt of App­
eal. Sir Reginald Manningham-Buller, the Attorney-General, 
in a written reply, stated in Parliament that the conduct of 
the respondent In changing his sex did not amount to 
cruelty] (The Times, November 28, 1958.)
59. REDWAR, H.W.H. Comments on some ordinances of the Gold 
Coast Colony, etc. 1909. p. 19.
60. Courts Ordinance, Cap, 4 (1951 Revision) - repealed. 
Section 17 is still saved by the Courts Act of 1961*
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practice in force in England ...
With regard to this permissiv© character of the 
probate jurisdiction, it is submitted that it is 
reasonably clear after a perusal of sections 16 and 19 
(now sections 17 and 87(1))8 *^ that the intention 
must have been to permit the admission to probate of 
wills of natives not executed with the formalities 
prescribed in English law.*1
Further, there is the proviso that Acts of the 
United Kingdom Parliament, declared either by the local 
legislature or by the local superior courts to extend 
within the jurisdiction of the courts, shall be in force 
so far only as the limits of local jurisdiction and local 
conditions permit.
61. Courts Ordinance, Cap. 4 (1951 Revision) - repealed. 
Section 17 is still saved by the Courts Act of 1961.
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PART III 
THE COMMON LAW
PART III 
THE COMMON LAW 
Chapter Four 
A. NATURE AND CONTENT
The authority for the application of the common law of
England in West Africa is now contained in the various
(rS
local MgiaiMtaNb providing for the application of English 
law. In Sierra Leone, for example, section 37 of the Courts
I
Ordinance stipulates that;
^Subject to the provisions of this and any other 
Ordinance, the common law, the doctrines of equity 
and the statutes of general application in force in 
England on the 1st day of January, 1880, shall be in 
force in Sierra Leone.*f
What is the nature of the common law that is declared
to have been introduced into West Africa? Over the years
the virtues of the common law of England have been extolled
to lofty heights. In one of his lectures^ Mr. Justice
McCardie sounded his praise in the following words;
**When I reflect upon the spread and acceptance of our 
common law principles throughout the United States 
and Canada and Australia and New Zealand, may I not 
say that nothing has left a deeper or more beneficent
1. Laws of Sierra Leone, Cap. 7 1960 Revision. There are 
variations in British colonial history. The Zanzibar 
Order in Council, 1924, speaks of the nsubstance of 
the common law1*.
The law, the advocate and the judge. (London, 1927. 
Solicitors’ Law Stationery Society, p. 17.
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Impression upx3n the Western world than the common law 
of England* Its work can never he undone. Its 
spirit and its ideals must ever live. If this 
country were to sink tomorrow beneath the waves, the 
record of the common 3a w of England would stand for 
ever on the noblest pages of history.11
The common law has sometimes been presented by
admirers as a system without fault* Sir Frederick Pollock
(perhaps the chief exponent In this centuryjpersonified
the system into °Our lady the Cojimon Law*1 * But, let It be
noted that even though Sir Frederick was prepared to do
homage to 0Our lady the Common Law0 , he made it clear in
his address to the students of Columbia University that
he did not worship her as a goddess exempt from human
judgment or above human sympathy. °8he is no placid 
Madonna sitting in a rose garden; rather she Is
like the Fortitude of the Florentine master, armed and
expectant, her battle-mace lightly poised in fingers 
ready to close, at one swift motion, to the fighting 
grasp. Neither is she a cold minister of the Fates. 
Her soul is founded in an order older than the gods 
themselves, but the joy of strife is not strange to 
her, nor yet the humours of the crowd. She belongs 
to the kindred of Homer* s gods, more powerful than 
men but not passionless or infallible. She can be 
jealous with Hera, merciless with Artemis and astute 
with Athene
Very few writers have been bold enough to attempt an 
exhaustive definition of the term 0common laww *^ It is
mi *— .*■— w w1—  h iiiiii.h. im^ h j.i. * - * * — * * ■ * * - . p . T 1 ' n " I • i *trM‘~*irT»ii»^r»-riirM*nr»‘~ ,» '^ f r ‘“-Ti—n«n-nritr n jH - B « n n  i>iniin  n p i r p —
3. POLLOCK^ Sir F. The genius of the common law. New York, 
1912. The Carpenter Lectures, 1911, p. 2, See also;
HARVEY, C.P. The advocate* s devil. (1958) p# 84. This 
excellent little book is a joy to read*
4* The adjective ncommon** came into use seven hundred years 
ago to describe the law common to the whole of England* The 
migration of the common law. 1960. Title uIntroduction0 by~ 
the Lord Chancellor, p. 3.
an expression easier to identify by its main characteristic 
than to define* Perhaps this is why it has been described 
as °the natural heritage of Englishmen0 . Merely to define 
it as that part of the law of England which, before the 
Judicature Acts of 1873-75,was administered by the common 
law courts as opposed to equity, is not enough*^ Sir 
William Blacks tone, one of the great English writers on 
law, divides the municipal law of England into two kinds; 
the lex non scripta. the unwritten or common law; and 
Isx scripta* the written or statute law;
°This unwritten or common law is properly disting­
uishable into three kinds; 1* General customs, which 
are the universal rule of the whole kingdom, and form 
the common law in its stricter and more usual signif­
ication* 2. Particular customs, which for the most 
part affect only the inhabitants of particular 
districts. 3. Certain particular laws, which by custom 
are adopted and used by some particular courts, of 
pretty general and extensive jurisdiction*0 6
By 0general customs11 or the 0common law0 properly so-called,
he means °that law by which proceedings and determinations
in the King* s ordinary courts of justice are guided and
directed0 Blackstone also gives examples of them and
describes them as the doctrines that are not set down in
any written statute or ordinance, but merely depend upon 
 ________    /immemorial
5. JOWITT, Bari. The Dictionary of English Law (1959) 426. 
6* 1 Comm* 67*
7. 1 Comm* 68.
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immemorial usage, that is, upon common law, for their
support. In brief, as Pollock and Maitland put it,8 °The
custom of the King’s Court is the custom of England and
becomes the common law0 . The fact that the common law,is
based upon custom is, as Allen points out, beyond doubt;
but assuredly it is not merely an agglomeration of
spontaneous customary rules unless °we are to ignore the
vital influence of judicial interpretation upon our law0 *^
The Influence of the judiciary on the common law is equally
stressed by Kent. In his Commentaries on American law* he
10observes that;^
°A great proportion of the rules and maxims which con­
stitute the immense code of the common law grew into 
use by gradual adoption, and received, from time to 
time, the sanction of the courts of justice, without 
any legislative act or interference. It was the applic 
-ation of the dictates of natural justice, and of 
cultivated reason to particular cases.0
In the just language of Sir Matthew Hale, 3--** the common law
of England is °not the product of the wisdom of some one 
man, or society of men, in any one age: but of the 
wisdom, counsel, experience, and observation of many 
ages of wise and observing; men.0
8. History of English law. 2nd ed. 1952, Vol. 1, p. 184.
9. Law in the making (1951) 5th ed. p. 65*
10. KENT, J. Commentarieson American law (1873) 12th ed. 
ed* by O.W. Holmes, Jr., p. 53S5.
11. Preface to Rolle’s Abridgment.
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The term 11 common law” is used by English lawyers with
unfortunate diversities of meaning. The common law in its
old home can be contrasted with the other branches of the
law in at least three different ways;
1. Common law and statute law - In this sense, the
term ” common law” is used to describe the whole of the law
except that which has its origin in statutes. According to
the observation of an eminent English Chief Justice, ”the
statute law is the will of the Legislature in writing; 
the common law is nothing else but statutes worn out 
by time; all our law began by consent of the Legis­
lature, and whether it is now law by usage, or writing 
it is the same thing*” 12
Firstly, the common law comprises what Blackstone
describes as ngeneral customs11 wThat is that law, by which 
proceedings and determinations in the King* s ordinary 
courts of justice are guided and directed. This for 
the most part, settles the course in which lands 
descent by inheritance; the manner and form of 
acquiring and transferring property; the solemnities 
and obligations of contracts, the rules of expounding 
wills, deeds, and Acts of Parliament; the several 
species of temjporal offences; with the manner and 
degree of punishment; and an infinite number of 
minute particulars, which diffuse themselves as 
extensively as the ordinary distribution of common 
justice requires”* 13
There have been statutory modifications to a number of the
examples given by Blackstone. Secondly, the unenacted law,
or the common law in the first sense, comprehends the law
  /merchant.
12* Collins v. Blantern (1765) 2 Wils. K.B* 541 at 348.
13. 1 Comm. 68.
Blackstone treats the law merchant under his second branch
of the unwritten laws of England* He describes it as ”a
particular sys tern of customs used only among one set 
of the King1 s subjects, called the custom of the 
merchants or lex mercatoria; which, however different 
from the general rules of the common law, is yet 
engrafted into it and made part of it; being allowed, 
for the benefit of trade, to be of the utmost validity 
in all commercial transactions*” 14
The process of the ”engrafting” was by no means smooth. In
his treatise on the law of sale, Lord Blackburn observes;
”There Is no part of thft history of English law more 
obscure than that connected with the common maxim, 
that the law merchant is part of the law of the 
land•” lb
Early writers on the law regarded the law merchant as
a branch of the law of nations. Undoubtedly, however,
there was a time when the law merchant, though the law of
England, was also the law of other nations and was the law
of England because it was the law of other nations. The
statement that the law merchant is a branch of the law of
nations sometimes meant no more than that it was free from
certain technical rules of the common law. 1 It was
_ _ _ _ _  /certainly
14. 1 Comm. 75.
15. A treatise on the effect of the Contract of Bale.
London, 1st ed, 1845. p. 207.
16. SMITH, J.W. A compendium of mercantile law. 13th ed., 
by II.C. G-utteridge 5c ors. 13th ed., 1931, p. ccviii, 
The historical introduction relied on by the writer 
was written by Sir John Macdonell*
certainly administered in a different manner from that in
which the common law was administered. The statement was
true in so far as it also demonstrates the fact that
mercantile law grew in great degree out of the transactions
between different nations* Sir John Davies, writing in
the 17th century, enumerated the differences between the
law merchant and the common law, most of which have now
lost their significance. There is, however, one distinctioi
which exists todays °... in a sute at the common law no 
man1 s writing can be pleaded against him as his act 
and deed, unless the same be sealed and delivered; 
but in a sute between merchants, bills of lading, 
bills of exchange, being but tickets without seals, 
letters of advice and credences, policies of assurance, 
assignations of debt, all of which are of no force at 
common law, are of good credit and force by the law 
merchant.0 17
Although the law merchant was in its early stages
~fi%3Ernthe common law, yet it was developed by such eminent
judges as Lord Mansfield to form part and parcel of the
I Bcommon law. Thus lav/ merchant had a three stage growth.
The first stage began when mercantile law, so far as it 
existed, was administered in special courts. In the second
17. Cited in Smith1 s Mercantile law* p* ccxxi.
18. For simplicity, the expressions Mercantile law11 and
the law merchant0 are being used inter-changeably.
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stage, mercantile law chiefly consisted of a body of
customs, to be proved in case of doubt as facts, and binding
only upon a special class* The third and final stage
covers a period in which these customs are Incorporated
into the general law, and are binding upon all, whether
19merchants or not*
Our third proposition is that the common law of 
England comprehends international customary law* In the
20
case of West Hand Central Gold Mining Co* Ltd* v. The King
■■i*miiu>H— riiiia « a in fT iii *r~n ■» ■  .. a m  'im— nnwm mu* .r m i ....  wim| .rrmi.i ■«>.. .. m nur m  if-m in i iT m ii.n T iTnrM-nioiiMi* m n m        imitanw
Lord Alverstone, C.J., made the following observations;
°*.* The second proposition urged by Lord Robert 
Cecil that International law forms part of the law 
of England requires a word of explanation and comment. 
It is quite true that whatever Las received the common 
consent of civilised nations must have received the 
assent cf our country, and that to which we have 
assented along with other nations in general may be 
called international law, and as such will be acknow­
ledged and applied by our municipal tribunals when 
legitimate occasion arises for those tribunals to 
decide questions to which doctrines of international 
law may be relevant^ But any doctrine so Invoked must 
be really accepted as binding between nations, and the 
international law sought to be applied must, like 
anything else, be proved by satisfactory evidence, 
which must show either that theparticular proposition 
put forward has been recognised and acted upon by our 
country, or that it is of such a nature, as has been 
so widely and generally accepted, that it can hardly 
be supposed that any civilised state would repudiate 
it. The mere opinions of jurists, however eminent or 
learned, that it ought to be so recognised, are not in 
thems e1ves su f fi ci ent•
19* Smith1s Mercantile law* op cit* p. ccxxv*
20* fl905j 2 K.B. 391 at p. 407.
It is well established that It Is the common law of 
this country that not only ambassadors, but members of their 
suites, are exempt from judicial process. The Diplomatic 
Privileges Act 170821 merely declared the law and did not 
achieve any change in the law.2^ Before this Statute, 
this immunity accorded to an ambassador derived from the
0 7
c omi ty of na t i ons .
Fourthly, the term common law, in the broad sense,
would appear to include ecclesiastical law* Blackstone,
following Lord Hale, classfies the civil and canon laws as
part of the common law, which by custom, are adopted and
used In peculiar jurisdictions.^ This is how Lord
Blackstone defends the propositions^
11 It may seem a little Improper at first view to rank
these laws under the head of leges ncnscriptae, or 
unwritten laws, seeing they are set forth by 
authority in their pandects, their codes and their 
institutions; their councils, decrees, and decretals;
/and
21. (1708) 7 Ann. Cap. 12.
22. The Amazone fl94Q]' £ ./>4Q per GODDAHD, L.J.
23. H. v. A.B. (1941) Sub nomine H. v. Kent (1941) 110
L.J. K.B. 268.
24* Grump v* Morgan » Supreme Gourt of Korth California; 
"(1843) 3 Ired. Ecu 91. Reported also in Readings on 
the history and system of the common law, by Pound
& Plucknett T l 9 2 7 ) p *  325*
25. 1 Comm. 79-80.
and enforced by an immense number of expositions, 
decisions, and treatises of the learned in both 
branches of the law. But I do this after the example 
of Sir Matthew Hale, because it Is most plain that it 
is not on account of their being written laws, that 
either the canon law, or the civil law, have any 
obligation within this kingdom; neither do their force 
and efficacy depend upon their own intrinsic authority, 
which is the case of our written law, or acts of 
parliament...
But all the strength that either the papal or 
imperial laws have obtained in this realm (or indeed 
in any other kingdom in Europe) is only because they 
have been admitted and received by immemorial usage 
and custom in some particular cases, and some parti­
cular courts; and then they form a branch of the leges 
non scriptae. or customary laws; or else, because they 
are in some other cases introduced by consent of 
parliament, and then they .ewe their validity to the 
leges scriptae. or statute law*H
In spite of Blacks tone* s commentary, views differ as
to whether ecclesiastical law forms part of the common law
in its broad sense. In one case, TINDAL, L.C.J. spoke of
nthe common law of England of which the ecclesiastical law
forms a part11.26 An American judge regarded it was an
entire mistake to say that the canon and civil law, as
administered in the ecclesiastical laws of England are not
part 3 of the common laww But, on the other hand, in
the American case of Burtis ?, Burtls.2® Chancellor Sanford
26. Beg. v. Milles ( ) 10 C^L. Sc F. 534 at 678.
Blackstone, however, was cf the opinion that the juris­
diction of the spiritual courts was not suitable for export 
- 1 Comm. 107.
27* Grump v. Morgan op cit.
28. 1st Hopkin1 s Chanceiy 557 New York, 14. American
Decisions 563. See also; American Journal of Compar­
ative Law (1908) Vol. 21, p. 231.
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held that ecclesiastical did not form a part of the common 
« law* In the courst© of his judgment, he said:
°The English law concerning divorces ... is chiefly 
the ecclesiastical law and not the common law of 
that country.0
2 . Common law and equity: In another sense the common law 
is used to refer to the whole of the law (enacted or 
unenacted) excepting that portion which was developed and 
administered exclusively by the old Court of Chancery, and 
which Is distinguished as equity. We shall, however, 
confine the meaning of the common 3aw under this head to 
Imply unenacted law* It is arguable whether the distinction 
is really valuable. The method of case-law which disting­
uishes the common law from other types of law equally 
applies in equity in its modern form, and In the admiralty 
and ecclesiastical jurisdictions. According to Lord Wright 
it is arbitrary to restrict the term ncommon 3a wn to the 
law enforced in the old common law courts. In his view, the 
common law and equity should be treated as forming a single 
body of l a w . ^  Indeed, since the Judicature Act of 1873, 
common 3aw and equity have been administered concurrently 
by the same courts. Lard Wright correctly points out that 
the working common lawyer is habitually using as part of
29. Legal essays and addresses: Title - uThe Common Law 
in its old horne1^  p . 330•
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his tools conceptions and remedies provided Inequity, such
as the remedy of injunction or specific performance. In
the opinion of the noble lord 0it is Impossible to conceive 
what we now regard as the modern common law without 
these and many other like concepts, which, though 
imported originally from equity, are as much a part 
of his daily work as the ideas of negligence, or 
conversion, or damages, and indeed are essential to 
functioning of the common law: without them 
the common law could not have survived.° 30
It does not follow, however, that equity is not in
itself a distinct source of law. In English law, equity
has become, in the course of time, a technical system
which Is distinguishable from the common l a w * ^
3. Common law and Special law. In yet a third sense,
the term 0 comm on law0 can be used to refer to the 0 genefcalt
law0 of the land, as opposed to the various fornis of
special law, such as local customs, which have to be
specially pleaded and proved before the courts before they
are r e c o g n i s e d . ^ _____ ___________________________
30. Lord Wright op clt. 331.
31. ALLEN, O.K. Law in the making (5th ed.) p. 399.
English equity, said Austin, Marose from the sulkiness 
and obstinacy of the common law courts which refused 
to suit themselves to the changes which took place In 
opinion, and In the circumstances of society0 ~ 
Lectures on jurisprudence. 5th ed. 1885, p. 615.
32. SALMOND, J.W. Juriaprudence. 3rd ed* 1910, p. 33*
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B. MIGRATION AND CONDITION OF APPLICABILITY
In Chapter Two we pointed out that the extent to 
which English law is introduced into any particular terri­
tory varies according to the manner in which It was 
acquired* If it was acquired by settlement, then the 
common law of England, being the natural heritage of 
Englishmen, Is directly applicable.*^ In the case of con­
quered or ceded countries which already had laws of their 
own before acquisition, the British Crown has power to 
alter or change those laws, but until then, the old laws 
of the country operate (unless such laws are repugnant 
on religious or ethical grounds). Thus Blackstone in his
Commentaries observed that: HOur American plantations are 
principally of this latter sort, being obtained in 
the last century either by right of conquest and 
driving out the natives (with what natural justice
I shall not at present inquire) or by treaties. And
therefore the common law of England, as such, has no 
allowance or authority there.0 34
However, W m  local legislation^ enacted in the course of
time, established the common law of England in all the
British American colonies except the Province of Quebec.
33* '1.B1. Comm. 107. ”
34. 1.B1* Comm. 108.
35* STOKES, A. A view of the constitution of the British 
Colonies in North America, etc* 1783, p. 30. Even now, the 
common law of the Province of Quebec, except in commercial 
matters, is 0French law” - coutume de Paris. The common 
law of the other Provinces, as well as of Quebec in commer­
cial matters Is the English common law. See: (1897) 2 J. 
Comp. Leg* 26; The Migration of the Common Law. 1960, p.37. 
See also CHI TTY, J • Prerogatives of the Crown. 1820, p. 32.
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Until English law has been introduced in such Countries 
acquired by conquest or cession, it would appear that the 
English common law would not be applicable automatically. 
Thus, It is recorded that when Jamaica became an English 
Colony and claimed English law as its consequential right, 
the British Crown not only denied such a right, but dis­
allowed an Act36passed in the Island for declaring such 
law to be in force there; eventually, however, an Act was
passed in Jamaica which declared that wall such laws and 
statutes of England which have been esteemed, intro­
duced, used, accepted, or received, as laws in this 
Island, shall and are hereby declared to be and con­
tinue laws of this His Majesty1s Island of Jamaica 
for ever.0
For similar reasons the common law of Bechuanaland
is not the English common l&w but Roman-Dutch
Trinidad retains much of the original Spanish law; the Cape
of Good Hope and Ceylon retain a large amount of Roman-
Dutch law, and Malta, which was a municipality of the
Kingdom of Sicily, retains the old Sicilian law as modified
by the subsequent legislation of the Grand Masters.
In West Africa, despite tke introduction of English
law, customary law is deemed applicable in causes and
  /matters
36. 35 Car. 2, Ca*>. 13. See HOWARD, J.H. The laws of the
British Colonies in the West Indies & other parts of
America~. Cl827y p . xi.
37. 11896-7) 1 J.Comp. Leg, 137.
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matters where the parties thereto are natives. The courts 
in most West African territories are enjoined to observe 
and enforce the observance of such customary laws, not 
being repugnant to natural justice, equity and good
•SJQ
conscience. w
The common law emigrant, or the English common law, 
has usually been subject to certain restrictions in its 
new home. Englishmen and women who went out to settle in 
a new country carried with them nso much of the English law 
as is applicable to their own situation and the condition 
of an infant colony**. One reason for this time-honoured 
principle is that, since the common law is the birthright 
of evdry Englishman wherever he may go, he accordingly 
carries his law with him.39 With the greatest respect 
this rule is too wide* for an Englishman going to an 
English dependency, which is not an English colony, does 
not necessarily live under the English law. In Campbell v. 
IBali, ^  lord Mansfield* s fourth proposal gave weight to 
this views
ttThe law and legislation of every dominion equally 
affects all persons and all property within the 
limits thereof, and is the true rule for the decision 
of all questions which arise there. Whoever 
 ______  /purchases
38. law of England (Application) Ordinance, Cap. 3. s. 5 
(Gambia)•
39. 2 p. Wms. 75.
40. (1774) 20 State Tr. 323.
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purchases, sues, or lives there, puts himself under 
the law of the place and in the situation of its 
inhabitants* An Englishman in Minorca * or the Isle 
of Man* or the plantations, has no distinct right 
from the natives while he conHSuea tljsre*”
As Lewis rightly points out, the true reason for the
rule seems to be that the English settlers take out with
A O
them the common law of the mother country as of necessity^
owt
They could not create ^ offhand a new body of law, and it is 
likely that there would be no persons sufficiently acquain­
ted with any foreign system of law n m t  to be able to 
administer it* Moreover, the system of law under which 
they had lived, to which they were accustomed, and which 
is expressed in their native language, was, on the whole, 
the best suited to their wants, however different the cir­
cumstances of the colony might be from the mother-country* 
From my earlier remarks, it is evident that this 
reason does not apply to dependencies acquired by cession 
or conquest already possessing their own legal systems*
In West Africa, as has already been observed, irrespective 
of the actual mode of acquisition by the British, special 
statutory provisions were made for the application of 
English common law. In the Gambia, for example, such law 
is applicable uso far only as the limits of the local
jurisdiction and local circumstances permit and subject to
...... /any
Hr'. —  U>cnrtLy Of* ^ ^ P ib J d f C V ^ r r ^  ~/
42. LEWIS, op cit. 197. ,cJcf lootrs*,^ I
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any existing or future 3Local Ordinance** What does this 
proviso mean? In interpreting a similar section applying 
to Kenya, DEOTIHG, L.J* made the following observations^
uThe next proviso says, however, that the common 
law is to apply Subject to such qualifications as 
local circumstances lender necessary1 • This wise 
provision should, I think, be liberally construed.
It is a recognition that the common law cannot be 
applied In foreign lands without considerable 
qualification. Just as with an oak, so with the 
English common law* You cannot transplant it to the 
African continent and expect it to retain the tough 
character which it has in England. It will flourish 
indeed but it needs careful tending. So with the 
common law. It has many principles of manifest 
justice and good sense which can be applied with 
advantage to peoples of every race and colour all 
the world overs but it has also many refinements, 
subtleties and technicalities which are not suited 
to other folk. Ihese off-shoots must be cut away.
In these far off lands the people must have a law which 
they understand and which they will respect. The 
common law cannot fulfill this role except with 
considerable qualifications. The task of making 
these qualifications is entrusted to the judges of 
these lands. It is a great task. I trust they 
will not fail therein.
Lord Denning* s remarks are very helpful, but with the
greatest respect the task must not be entrusted to the
courts and the judges alone. Judges themselves have
admitted that nothing is more difficult than to know
which of the English laws is to be regarded as imported
.........    /into
43* Laws of the G-ambia (1955 Revision) Cap. 3, s. 2*
44 • M a l l  I M * V* Attorney-General. 0-955J 1 All B.R. 646, 
653; 09563 1 Q.B. 1; C1955J 2 W.L.R. 649, affirmed? 
£19573 A.C* 253.
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into the Colonies.45 The effect of entrusting this task 
to the judges alone is to make the rules relating to the 
applicability of English law overseas so vague and ill- 
defined as to leave a wide discretion to the courts 
abroad, and even to cast doubt upon the extent of the 
legislation* Howard, in his book on the laws of the 
British Colonies in the West Indies and other parts of
America, has made the following observations on the
subject? ttIt is clear that the English laws are partially 
in force in many parts of our American possessions; 
but it is equally clear, that for want of certain 
admitted principles, upon which the applicability 
of those laws can be established, it is very difficult 
to define which of them do, and which do not extend 
tt> the Colonies respectively; and that, on the 
contrary, the greatest difference of opinion exists 
on the subject both at home and in the colonies.*1 46
It is submitted that It should have been the primary
duty of the local legislatures to decide what aspects of
English common law should have been regarded as having been
imported. It is only after this has been achieved that
the judges should ensure that such aspects of the common
law are applied subject to modifications and local
conditions. The closest example of a more systematic
reception of the English common law comes from British
Guiana. In 1912 the Government of British Guiana appointed
45. Whicker v. Hume (1858) 7 H.L.C. 124 at p. 161.
46. HOWARD, J.H. The laws of the British Colonies in the 
West Indies & other parts of America . (T8§7T*Vol. I , 
p. xii.
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a Commission to Inquire whether any changes in the common 
law of the territory (which was Roman-Dutch law) were 
desirable. The Committee, under the chairmanship of Mr. 
Hunan, were unanimous that Roman-Dutch law in British 
Guiana should be replaced by the common law of England •
The particular aspects of the common law recommended to be 
adopted were made clear In the following extract from the 
Report t 47
wWe recommend the introduction of English common 
lav/ in regard to all mercantile matters, to all dom­
estic relations (including marriage, judicial 
separation and divorce, the law of husband wife, 
parent and child, guardian or curator and minors, 
and master and servant), to the law of delicts or 
totfets, agency, suretyship, liens, inteste succession, 
and in fact to all the law of persons, things, 
obligations, inheritance, and every other description 
of matters whatsoever not dealt with by legislation 
or otherwise expressly exempted.**
The Commission were unanimous that the English law of
real property should be expressly excluded. On that topic
they declared that uWe have no desire to introduce the
complicated incidents of English real property lawu .
The draft ordinance prepared by the Committee and entitled
**An Ordinance to coditfy and to substitute the English
common law and principles of Equity for the Roman-Dutch
common law** became law in 1916 .4®
— — I 1"11 "m  1.. ....... T — T ri m i  I"* ““ill— mm—rr-mtri— mr-worm i ||*||'W>||WHI« IIIII H u iN ihiii m\» i..m w m w  w n Ml Ilium H.H'I T III . i I . IT   Ml ....... . .... . Ml - ~n, pun
47. XEE, R.W. The common law of British Guiana. (1914) 14 
J • C omp. Leg. n • s . 44 7; LED LIE , J . C . Roman -Dut ch law in 
British Guiana and a West Indian Court of Appeal. (1917) 17 
J.Comp* Leg. n.s. 217-226.
48. The Civil Law of British Guiana Ordinance, 1916.
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The reception of the English coram on law in West Africa
has not been subjected to such a systematic approach as
was done in British G-uiana. The various legislatures have
not been very keen to ascertain the extent to which the
common law applies in the different territories* Here and
there one comes across a modification or rejection of a
particular feature of the common law, but these efforts
have been spasmodic and unsystematic* Thus in Sierra Leone
it was not until 1933 that so much of the English common
law as specially restricted the acquisition, holding or
disposition of real property by a m r r i e d  woman, and
much of the common law as conferred estates in dower or by
courtesy, were abolished by legislation*4^
In West Africa, therefore, it can be stated that the
manner of the ascertainment of the applicable common law
is based upon the principle of uwait and see11, If there is
a Case in court the judges will doubtless give a ruling*
Otherwise one must live in the realm of uncertainty. As
has been pointed out elsewhere, this was also the view of
Blacks tone, who suggests in his Commentaries that uwhat 
shall be admitted and what rejected, at what times 
and under what restrictions, must in case of disputes 
be decided in the first instance by their own
provincial judicature*,*u 5 0 ___
49. Imperial Statutes (Law of Property) Adoption Ord*
?> Cap. 18 (1960) Revision* ss. 4 & 5. See also Bright 
v* Bright1 s Executors (1958) 16 W.A.C*A. 50*
50. 1 Comm. 107*
However, the assumption of such a view did not prevent the
venerable author from listing a number of common law
principles which in his opinion were unsuitable for export.
Thus he admits that ”The artificial refinements and dist­
inctions incident to the property of a great and 
commercial people, the laws of police and revenue 
(such especially as are enforced by penalties), the 
mode of maintenance for the established clergy, the 
jurisdiction of spiritual courts, and a multitude of 
other provisions, are nelthex* necessary nor convenient 
for them, and therefore are not in force.st 51
If Blacks tone were to come back to life today, he would be
astounded to see the extent to which the common law of
England has been received abroad. With respect to English
real property, he would have realised that the reception
has been mixed. On the one hand, in British Guiana, it
was expressly rejected. In 1844, when the Government of
Hong Kong proposed to adopt the English real property law,
Stephen objected. To him ttif there be any subject on which 
the applicability of the law of England to local 
circumstances is questionable it is In regard to 
real property.” 52
On the other hand, it has been received in America, subject
to certain exceptions.^ 5 In West Africa English land law 
....................   /which
51. 1 Comm. 107. See also The Lauderdale Peerage (1885) 
L.R. 10 App.Cas. 692 at 746.
52. HALL, II.L. The Colonial Office (1937) p. 135.
53. E.g. ”The incorporeal hereditaments which subsist by 
our law are fewer than -those known and recognised by 
the Englishi law. We have no such rights as advowsons, 
tithes, dignitaries” - KEIHT, J. Commentaries on 
American 3aw (1873) Vol. 3, p. 402,
which was imported good side by side with customary land
54
tenure* In the Ghana case of Nsiah v. Union Trading Co., 
KORSAH, C.J. has ruled that leashold interest in land is 
still in Ghanaian law personal property, on the ground that 
laws enacted in the United Kingdom to improve English land 
law after 1874 are not applicable to Ghana* Why countries 
in West Africa should accept the intricate principles of 
English land law evolved down the centuries in conditions 
totally different from those to be found in Africa, is 
difficult to understand*
Secondly, Blacks tone would, however, have discovered 
that there are conflicting decisions in America especially 
as to whether or not the jurisdiction of the former eccles­
iastical courts in England formed part of the common law 
transported there. It is natural for such a question to 
have worried the early judges of the United States, once it 
is appreciated that, prior to 1857, the eEclesiastical 
courts in England had exclusive jurisdiction in matri­
monial matters with authority in certain cases to grant 
a decree for the dissolution of marriage*^S In addition to 
this, the ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction in relation
to the grant and revocation of probates of wills and letters
54* (1959) G.L.R* 79 at p. 84* See also Ansah & anor v. Joe 
& ors* Sup* Ct* Civil App* No* 17/61. Judgments Jan- 
June 1961* Unreported, p. 140*
55. **An Act to amend the law relating to Divorce and
Matrimonial Causes in England** (1857) 21 & 22 Vlct* 
C&§>* 85*
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of administration in England,56 If the American colonists 
did not take this part of the law with them* there would 
he a hig gap to he filled# There are two cases of 
interest# The first is the American case of he Barron v# 
he Barr on decided in 1862* In that case, the wife
petitioned to the Supreme Court of Vermont for a decree of 
nullity of marriage on the grounds of the alleged physical 
impotence of the hushand# It was found that in a lower 
court the hushand had refused to submit to a medical 
examination# However, in the Supreme Court, the husband^ 
objection to the wife* s notion was on this ground? that 
the whole jurisdiction and power of the Court over the sub*
ject of granting divorces and annulling marriages, was
given by statute, and that as the statute did not give the 
Court power to require such an examination, it did not, 
therefore, possess such authority* POLAND, Ctj*, In his 
judgment admitted that as there were no ecclesiastical 
courts in America, the American courts had no authority to 
exerfcise jurisdiction in this branch of the law until they 
were invested with jurisdiction over matrimonial causes
----------------- — -----------     - A y
56. "An Act to amend the law relating to Probates and
Letters of Administration in England." (1857) 21 & 22
letifc'Ca#. 77.
57. 35 Vfc**. 365. See POUMD & PLUCKHE'iT. Readings on ... 
system of common law, op cit. 325. ^
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by the legislature. But the learned Judge went on to
observe that **When the legislatures establish a tribunal 
to exercise this jurisdiction, or invest it in any 
of the already established courts, such tribunal 
becomes entitled, and it is their duty, to exercise 
it, according to the general principles of the common 
law of the subject, and the practice of the English 
Courts, so far as they are suited to our condition 
and the general spirit of our laws, or are modified 
or limited by our Statute.**
The other case was decided in 1 9 0 7 . It came before 
the United States Court for China# Primarily, the 
question was whether this Court had jurisdiction in matri­
monial cases, including divorce. That question resolved
Itself into another - 11 whether the law on the subject 
(divorce and separation), as administered by the 
ecclesiastical courts, constituted a part of the 
common law of England which has been introduced into 
the United States at the date of the change of 
sovereignty.u
There were two views on this topic presented to the 
Court. There was the view of Professor Bishop, who laid 
it down In his work on Marriafoe and D i v o r c e , ^9 that such
58. Heuben R. Mcdermid v. Alice I*. Mcdermid. (1807). In
The U.S. Court for China at Shanghai, (1908) 21 Amer*
J.Xhfoap. Law, p. 225. See also ibid, id. 233 for the 
case of Re probate of the will on John Pratt Roberts,
where the question was whether the law governing the
administration of estates was part of the imported 
common law of England. The learned judge cited a num­
ber of authorities to show that this was in fact the 
Case. Indeed Judge Woerner, expressed it thus; **The 
common law of England, as affected by the statutes ... 
(and others relating to probate,) which were enacted 
before the settlement of the American Colonies, is at 
the basis of the American statutes concerning admini­
stration, and the law In the American States in so far 
as it has not been supplanted by their own statutes.*1 
(Woerner, American law of Administration Vol# 1, p.136!
it—nr— i T ~ i m r r r r 'M •" ■' iiifiir j i i  i im!■— inm«F t iim'iiw i m i ni^ min.  ir w n « Miit  n mm HI» «i< i mu * —■ *
59. Vol. I. Chapter 4.
law was transplanted. The contrary view was held by 
Chancellor Sanford in Burtis v* Burt is ,60 an& the 
judge of the United States Court for China in the case
under discussion agreed with the ruling in Burtis v. Burtie.
Cl/t(0T
The decision is remarkable, and it Is doubtful whether ^ 
Sanford1 s dictum is right* It is agreed that between the 
arrival of the American colonists and the organisation of 
the courts, the jurisdiction to grand divorce must have been 
in abeyance. But, as soon as the matxUmonial and probate 
jurisdiction was conferred on the courts, the necessary inf­
erence is that such courts then had the power to grant 
divorce and probates according to the principles of the 
common law of England in the broad sense.^
How far can It be stated that Ecclesiastical law 
formed part of the common law introduced into West Africa?
As will be seen from the chapter on the evolution of the 
judicial system, prior to the enactment of the English 
Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857, the juris­
diction of the courts in matrimonial c auses in Yifest Africa
/was
60. 1 Hopk. 557.
61* All that the Hew York Court decided was that corporeal 
impotence was not a cause of divorce under the 
existing laws, and that the English law of divorce on 
that point had never been adopted* Well before 1873, tl© 
jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery on this subject 
was extended to enable the Chancellor to declare such 
marriages void - KEHT; Commentaries, Vol. 2, p. 114.
■■wmniMi.iJiMn f *■»■.!in■ mii i'.—iii.m* * r
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was as uncertain as that of the American jurisdiction in
former days* Thus in Sierra Leone a special Act had to he
passed in 1829 to declare the marriage of Stephen and Maria
Antoinette uto be dissolved, void, and of none effect, and
to enable him to marry again** *6^ In the former Gold Coast
Dr. Madden was informed by the President of the Council of
Government that he (the President)- had to take cognizance
of the cases where application for divorce had been made
to him, and once, in the instance of a woman married to a
European, he had pronounced a formal **sentence1* of divorce
and had the sentence duly recorded in the archives of his
office#63 Eortuh&tely, this somewhat uhhappy state of
affairs did not last for very long* On the enactment of
the English Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act in 1857,
which transferred the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical
courts in matrimonial causes to an English Special Court,
jurisdiction in matrimonial causes was vested in the Sup-
reme Court of the Colony of Sierra Leone in 1858# The
Supreme Court was also invested with probate jurisdiction
/similar
62* Ordinance dated 14 th July 1829* See Grds * for the 
Colon y of Sierra leone 1811-1857, compiled by 
A# Montagu. Vol. I, p. 22*
63. Report of H.M* Commissioner of Inquiry on the State of 
the British Settlements on the Gold Coast^ Sierra
Leone and the Gambia. Par Pap. Session 1842. V.12,p.15
64. Ho# 10 of 1858, s. 8, rapeq,led by Ho. 14 of 1904 
(S ier ra Le one) *
similar to that exorcised by Her Majesty1 s Court of
Probate in England#6S3
On the question of suitability of English law to
overseas countries, the Privy Council has held in a
number of cgses that there are rules of English law
independent of statutes which can be regarded as applicable
wherever English law Is introduced* Thus, in the case of
Yeap Chea Neo v* Ong Cheng Heo,66 being an appeal from the
Straits Settlements, the Privy Council held that the
English law against perpetuities applied in Penang.MThis
rule, which certainly has been recognised as existing 
in the 3aw of England independently of any statute is 
founded upon considerations of public policy which 
seem to be as applicable to the condition of such a 
place as Penang as to England viz* to prevent the 
mischief of making property inalienable, unless for 
objects which are in some way useful or beneficial 
to the community. ♦#11
**The law of England has, however, made an exception, also 
on grounds of public policy in favour of gifts for 
purposes useful and beneficial to the public, and 
which In a wide sense of the term, are called chari­
table uses, and this exception may properly be assumed 
to have passed with the rule into the law of the 
Colony*** ^
While so much of that law as can be said to relate to
matters and exigencies peculiar to the local condition of
England and to be inapplicable to the conditions of the
  /overseas
/o i /SYtf . At r iu eW. otoJuJ isr?
66# ? 1875X L*H* 6 P.C* p. 381. 'fhe case concerned a will 
drawn in the style of an English will, and attested 
according to English law, and the main question in 
the suit was the effect of the bequest of the resi- 
durary estate to the executor#
67* Ibid* at p. 39^-.
overseas territory is not be treated a s so imported, the
process of selection must rest on a solid basis,
vSm*, the Privy Gouncil in an appeal from the
Supreme Court of the Federation of Malaya, held that the
English rule that a condition subsequent in partial
restraint of marriage, when annexed to a bequest of
personalty, is ineffective to destroy the gift unless the
will in question contains an explicit gift over of the
legacy to another legatee, is applicable in Penang*66
Finally, let it be noted that although the common law
of England consists of a collection of principles to be
found in the opinions of sages or deduced from universal and
immemorial usage, and receiving progressively the sanction
of the courts, it Is nevertheless true that the common law
(so far as it is applicable overseas) has been recognIsed
and adopted a s one entire system.6^ As Roscoe Pound rightly
observed in his article on the reception of the common law
in America ulf the statutes limit American courts to the 
English legal precepts as they stood in 1601, the 
traditional element of thelaw would have had to stand 
still in America in its early 17th century form, 
while going forward in England,M
Very often, one cernes across the statement - nthe common
law does not alter*1 .72. if by that it is meant that the
/ common
68* Leona & anor. v. £l955j| A.C, 648.
69* See, e.g* KEHTs Commentaries on American law. Vol* 1,537 
70* (1931) 4 Ency* of Social Sciences p, 53*
71* See, e.g# a lecture by Sir Patrick Devlin (as he then 
was) (1954) Grim, L.R* 661 at p, 663.
common law Is static, then the statement is obviously
erroneous* The better view is that the common law is a
system which consists in applying to new combinations of
circumstances those rules which are derived from legal
principles and judicial precedents*^ The genius of the
common law is that the mox*e it changes (or seems to
change) the more it is the same thing* To Lord Wright,
this maxim is a fiction. He would rather say that "the law 
is a living organism constantly growing, expanding, 
adapting itself, like a tree, which maintains Its 
Identity all the time, though in its hill growth it 
looks very different from what it was when it was a 
sapling." ^
The reason for the title of Lord Denning1 s
courageous little book, The Changing Law* was because so
many people think that the law is certain and that It can
only be changed by Parliament. "The truth is that the law 
is often uncertain and it is continually being 
changed, or perhaps I should say developed, by the 
judges'*.
"This process of gradual change has been the very 
life of the common law** * 74 There is an abundance of
evidence to sujfp ort Lord Denning1 s observation?
"Compare, for instance, the law of negligence a 
century ago with what it is today. Or take the rules 
as to the vicarious liability of an employer for the 
wrongful actd of his servants. In the time of 
Henry IV it was said that the employer could not be
72. Astatement of Lord Wens 1 eydale "- See MigratTon of the 
Common Law op fcifc, p. 4. Mr. Justice Holmes, an American, 
echoed this when he wrote "the life of the law has not 
been logic? it has been experience" - Tie common law.
(1881) p. 1. —  “ ~
73. Ld* Wright. Legal essays & addresses (1939).
Titles "The study" of law" 401 • An address delivered 
to the University of London Law Society, 1937.
See also (1938 ) 54 L.Q.'fi. 185-200.
74. The changing law (1953) p. vii.
held liable for M s  servants* acts because they 
were not his acts. After the middle of the last century 
vicarious liability was becoming recognised as the 
general lule, but it was still said that the employers 
would not be liable for frauds of a servant even in 
doing the class of acts he was authorised to^do, if 
he did them for M s  own personal advantage. That limi­
tation was swept away twenty years ago by the House of 
Lords.75 The modern idea is that the employer who 
employs his servant for M s  profit, should bear the 
loss caused to others by the servant* s torts while 
apparently engaged about the employer* s business just 
as much as if the employer himself was actually so 
engaged. Again, it used to be said that there could be 
no liability in tort without culpa. But that idea has 
long been implicityly disregarded and now it is 
explicitly disavowed... Hence the cases of strict lia­
bility (Hylands v. Fletcher)76 and a breach of a 
statutory liability, and the cases of vicarious liab­
ility in respect ofindependent contractors or of 
specially qualified managers or s Mpmasters with 
whose management the employers are by law forbidden 
to interfere.** 77
Indeed, if the common law of England had not been 
transplanted overseas as a living organism, the receiving 
countries would have been deprived of the sound rule 
enunciated by the House of Lords in the **Snail in the 
Bottle Case**.^ In 1842 it was axiomatically assumed that 
the doctrine of privity also operated in tort. Thus if A 
had broken a contract with B and the breach also injured C,
C could not sue A in tort because A was not privy to the 
contract. This attitude is illustrated by the Case of
ntimmrB—rfirtirrTnrm-wnirmTT.— i in—nffiminwiinmrmiipiMim^aTin^ i—n in m n rn  i nw i inTra»ii«<iir^ iiiiiMi.iimini Mi iiir'iwiiinnjuWTTWiiiiia
r
77* Lord Wright: Essays: **The study of I to** p. 400. 
78* honoghue v. Stevenson C193&} A.C. 562.
TJxe case referred to is 
L19l£) A.C, 716.
Lloyd v. G-r^ce, Smith & Co.
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of Winterbottora v. Wright.79 The reasoning in that case,
despite it3 evident fallacy, proved all too attractive to
courts imbued with 19th century notions of the supremacy
of "bargains" and the fetish of "privity*1. It was only
after a long and expensive history that it met its quietus
<r\f
in the famous^Lords decision in honogfcue v. Stevenson 
in 1932*^ In that case a manufacturer of ginger beer had 
sold to a retailer ginger beer in an opaque bottle* The 
retailer resold it to A who entertained a young woman of 
her acquaintance with its contents* These included the 
decomposed remains of a snail which had found its way into 
the bottle at the factoi^y. The young woman alleged that 
she became seriously ill as a result, and sued the manu­
facturers for negligence* It Is true that there was no 
contractual duty on the part of the manufacturers towards 
her#, but nevertheless a majority of the House of Lords 
held that he owed a duty to take care that the bottle did 
not contain noxious matter and that he was liable if the 
duty had not been performed* Lord Atkin* s classic statement 
of the principle is one which can apply to all people that
dwell on this earth. The relevant portion reads;
 ________________  /"The
79* Winterbottom v* Wright (1842) 10 M & W 109* See also 
FLEMMING, J.C* The law of torts (1957) p. 152; and 
WINIrFIELD on Torts”'( 1954) pV 482*
80* £ 3.9323 A.C. 562* The Privy Council in Grant v*
Australian Knitting Mills Ltd. 0*9363 A.C. 85 
followed Lonoghue!s case*
HThe rule t M t  you are to love your neighbour becomes 
in law, you must not injure your neighbour; and the 
lawyer’s question, who is my neighbour? receives a 
restricted reply* You must take reasonable care to 
avoid acts or emissions which you can reasonably 
foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour.
Who then, in law is my neighbour? The answer seems 
to be - persons who are so closely and directly 
affected by my act that 1 ought reasonably to have 
them in contemplation as being affected when I am 
directing my mind to the acts or omissions which 
are called in quest!on*M ^
It is declarations of the common law in such terms as 
these which are suitable to the rapidly changing Africa* 
Thus the experiment of Denning J., (as he then was) which 
consisted of tapping a slender stream of authority which 
had flowed in equity to improve the common-law doctrine of 
estoppel in the High Trees^case, has been applied with 
approval in the Ghana case of Bassil v. Said % & sons *
OP cit* p. 580*
82. £19473 K.B. 130. In Combe v. Combe £195:0 K.B. 215;
£19513 1 All E.R. 767 DENNING, L.J. (as he then was) 
restated the doctrine thus? "The principle, as I
understand it, is that, where one party has, by his 
words or conduct made to the other a promise or 
assurance which was intended to affect the legal 
relations between them and to be acted on accordingly^ 
then, once the other party has taken him at his word 
and acted upon it, the one who gave the promise or 
assurance cannot afterwards be allowed to revert to 
the previous legal relations as if no such promise 
or assurance had been made by him w 
83* (1957) 3 W* A.L.R. 231.
• * •
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C. SOME DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THE COMMON LAW 
OF ENGLAND
The common law has no doubt many features. Under this
head it is intended to discuss^its salient features^ only -
namely - judicial precedents, jury trial, prerogative writs,
including that of Habeas Corpus, and the independence of
the judiciary.
I. THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT^
In all the countries where the common law has been
introduced, the custom of attributing exclusive or all but
exclusive authority to judicial decisions has taken root.
The common law method of judicial precedent, or the theory
stare decisis as it is sometimes called, is the very
backbone of English law. In the words of Lord 
______     /Wright
84. On this topic the following books are recommended for 
further readings- DICEY, A.V. Lectures on the relation 
between law and public opinion in England, 1926: 
GOODHART, A.L. Essays in juris prudence and the common
,  ^  — I'lW i will i w».+ta7a i . »»ii n - n  irc .uw yi ^ i ■■■     m u tu M iO n .
law (3,931) pp. 50-74; - Precedent in English and con- 
tinental law (1934);; ELLEN, C.K. Law in the making.
5th ed., (1951) & subsequent editions; PHILLIPS, *0.H.
A first book on English law (1955) 3rd ed. pp. 114-135; 
ALLOTT, A.N. Essays in African Law (1960) pp. 28-51; 
ELIAS, T .0. British colonial law (1962) pp. 18-36; 
HALSBURY* S Laws of England, 3rd ed. Vol. 22, pp. 769 
eb seq.
Wright,85 the idea is so deeply impressed In the mind of an 
English judge that he finds It hard to approach any 
problem except by first turning to the authorities.
In one English case,86 PARKE, J., observed:
”Our common law system consists in the applying to new 
combinations of circumstances those rules of law which 
we derive from legal principles and judicial 
precedents; and for the sake of attaining uniformity, 
consistency, and certainty, we must apply those rules, 
where they are not plainly unreasonable and incon­
venient, to all cases which arise; and we are not at 
liberty to reject them, and to abandon all analogy 
to them, in those to which they have not yet been 
judicially applied, because we think that the rules 
are not as convenient and reasonable as we ourselves 
could have devised* It appears to me to be of great 
Importance to keep this principle of decision steadily 
in view, not merely for the determination of the 
particular case, but for the interests of law as a 
science.*1
Sir William Blackstone In his famous Commentaries, 
lays down the general rule that the decisions of courts of 
justice are evidence of what is the common law.8’*' Hence
/it
8 6 » Essays . op tit, p# 341. As against this view a
satirist has suggested that the resolution to follow 
precedents Is the same as a determination to perpet­
uate a wrong decision. ”lt is a maxim” , says Gulliver, 
”among^urJ/ lawyers, that whatever has been done 
before may legally be done again, and therefore they 
take special care to record all the decisions formerly 
made, against common justice and the general reason 
of mankind. These, under the name of precedents, they 
produced as authorities to justify the most iniquitous 
opinions, and the judges never fail of directing 
accordingly.” SWIFT, J. Works XI, ed. by Sir Walter 
Scott (2nd ed.) p. 318 - Cited in Dicey at p. 366.
86 • Mirehouse v. Kennell (1833) ICL & F 527 at 546.
87. 1 Comm., 71.
251.
it is the theory of stare decisis which keeps the common 
law alive. Blaekstone, who also defends judicial
88precedents for the sake of certainty of the law, says?
l(Por it is an established rule to abide by former 
precedents, where the same points come again in 
litigation; as well as to keep the scale of justice 
even and steady, and not liable to waiver with every 
new judge1 s opinion; as also beeaxise the law in that 
case being solemnly declared and determined what 
before was uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, is now 
become a permanent rule, which it is not in the 
breast of any subsequent judge to alter or vary from, 
according to his private sentiments; he being sworn 
to determine, not according to his own private 
judgment, but according to the known laws and 
customs of the land.w
But strict adherence to this principle may perpetuate a
bad law* As the learned jurist himself admits, if a
former decision is found to be manifestly absurd and unjust
it should be declared that such a sentence was not law.B9
Another reason for precedent may be termed respect for the
opinion of one(s ancestors.90
As against this view, Mr* Justice Holmes (one of the 
great American judges of his day) hassaid that;
11 It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule 
of law than that so it was laid down in the time of 
Henry IV* it is still more revolting if the grounds 
upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, 
and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of
the past.u 91 _ _ _
88. 1 Comm*, 69.
89. Ibid, 70.
90* G-OGDHART in his Precedent in English and continental 
IftW lists 12 reasons.
The m o d e m  method of precedent in England depends 
upon a clear and unchangeable hierarchy of courts. It has 
been said that three conditions must exist for the success­
ful working of the doctrine. There must be (1) a central­
ised judicial system; (2)- a group of learned lawyers, both 
at the Bar and on the Bench, who are bound together by a
common professional tradition;: and (3) an independent 
np
Bench. Briefly stated, the mechanics of the systems is 
that every court is absolutely bound by the decisions off 
all courts superior to Itself, but the highest court of 
the land holds Itself bound by its own previous decisions* 
Thus in England the rule is that;
(a) The decision of the House of Lords upon questions 
of law must be followed by every inferior court.93 The 
House of Lords also holds itself bound by its previous 
decisions. As the Earl of Ha Is bury, L.C., admitted in 
London Street Tramways Co. v. London County Council,9^
timrrH—m —lw¥l»~in>iirwiirtww^wrnyfnmiiiigtniniri mu ifci~^ iiiin.ar'iniifPimnmiaiiw wmi ■rmM.n^*nm»HMnirTa.iiiinwiiimirt<wr;iimii .............................  i ■iiihwiiihbiii^ iii —mm i *
Interest relpublica^ that there should be finis litium
at some time. An erroneous decision of the House ean be
set aside only by an Act of Parliament.^5
92* Sir William Holdsworth; Some lessons of our legal 
history (1928) p. 20.
93. French v. Macale. (1842) 2 Dr. 8c War. 269 at 283.
94. O B 9 8 7  A . C .  375 H.L.
95. Ibid at p. 3SrO
(b) The decisions of the Court of Appeal upon 
questions of law bind the courts of first instance.
Although the Court of Appeal is bound by its own previous 
decisions, the Court in Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co.,96 
laid down three exceptions to this rule, namely, thats- 
(1) the court is entitled and bound to decide which of two 
conflicting decisions of its own it will follow; (2) the 
court must refuse to follow a decision of its own which, 
in itsopinion, is inconsistent with the decision of the 
House of Lords; and (3) the court is not bound to follow
a decision of its own if it is satisfied that it was given 
per in cur iam, for example, when the court has acted in 
Ignorance of a previous decision of Its own or of a court 
of co-ordinate jurisdiction which covered the case before 
it, or when it has acted in ignorance of a decision of the
House of Lords, or a statute. ^
(c) The Court af Criminal Appeal regards itself as
generally bound by its own previous decisions. But in H.v.
98Tailor, the Court of Criminal Appeal, in overruling a
 /previous
96^ t l W d J  K.B.r 718. On appeal to" the House of Lords the 
substantive p M n t s  was reversed, but the principle 
enunciated was not questioned. See also 0.946]) A.C. 
163. q^ s
97. The Court of Appeal does not regard itself Abound by 
the decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeal, even if 
both Courts are of the same standing, but each others* 
decisions are treated with great respect. See ThOrne 
v. Motor Trade Association 0-957]) A.C. 79^, as to how 
such conflict may be resolved.
98. O-9503 2 K.B. 368. It was a case of bigamy.
previous decision In Hex v. Treanor,99 a&0pted a more
suitable principle. Lord Goddard stated it thus;
”This Court, however, has to deal with questions 
involving the liberty of the subject, and if it finds 
on reconsideration, that, in the opinion of a full 
court assembled for that purpose, the law has been 
either misapplied or misunderstood in a decision which 
it has previously given, and on the strength of that 
decision, an accused person has been sentenced and 
imprisoned, it is the bounden duty of the Court to 
reconsider the earlier decision with a view to seeing 
whether that person had been properly convicted.**
(d) Divisional Courts are bound in civil cases by 
decisions of the Court of Appeal,^and probably by the 
decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeal In criminal 
matters. Divisional Courts are bound by their own previous 
decisions,2but subject to the same flexible exceptions enun­
ciated for the Court of Appeal. In Nicholas v. Penny.3 the 
Divisional Court dissented from its previous majority 
decision In Melluish v. Morris A  which must now be regarded 
as of no authority.5
(e) In principle a judge of the High Court sitting
along, is not bound by the decisions of another High Court
judge, although one High Court judge will seldom depart 
  _____    m______  /from
99. £1931] 1 All E.R. 330.
3** Read v. J cannon (1890) 25 Q.B.D. 300 at 302-3.
2. Huddersfie Id (Police Authority) v. Watson (1947) K.B.
842 at 846.
3. C195GD 2 K.B. 466.
4. C19383 4 All E.R. 98.
5. See ALIEN, C.K* Lav/ in the making (5th ed.) p. 230; and 
WINDER, W.H.D• Divisional Court precedents, 9 M.L.R.257.
255.
from the decisions of the other.^ The previous decision 
must he palpably wrong for him to do so.
(f) The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council Is In 
theory only an advisory body to the sovereign. The Judicial 
Committee, which Is a tribunal of Privy Councillors, was 
created by the Judicial Committee Act, 1833, for the 
purpose of hearing appeals, which before the passing of the 
Act could be brought before the Sovereign, or the Sovereign 
in Council. It is the final Court of Appeal for a few of 
the Commonwealth t erritories, and all the British depend­
encies. It Is also an appellate court for English eccles­
iastical and prize courts. Prom the foregoing, it can be 
seen that the Judicial Committee occupies a peculiar 
position. As a general rule the decision (or more 
accurately the advice) of the Judicial Committee is not 
binding on English courts*7 except in ecclesiastical or 
prize cases. But as KBfflEDY, J., observed in Dulieu v. 
Whited 11A judgment of the Privy Council ought of course to 
be treated by this Court as entitled to very great weight
indeed; but is not binding upon us .** Contrary to the
/oroeedure
■— i u—  iWiHHWHM|n* i w a i ^ niil« i,n » ) I— '■pmn.iw—n.m  ihi 1. 1m  m ■ n   ■mi. 'I—  W i  iwn* i mm* ^ i W l i l ^ i H ' i i r t in W ln if  I ■   ai I i i na— I  n ■ m i .
6* Green v. Berliner Cl936] 2 K.B. 477 at 493-4.
7. London Joint Stock Bank v. Macmillan Cl91ff) A.C. 777.
8. pL90lX2 K.B. 669 at 677.
procedure of the House of Lords, the Privy Council does not
hold itself as bound by its own previous decisions. Thus
in Mercantile Bank of India Ltd. v • Central Bank of India
Ltd. ,^which was an appeal from the High Court of Madras on
a point of mercantile law, the Judicial Committee clearly
refused to follow Its own decision given in the Ghana case
Commonwealth Trust v. Akotey.1® Again, in criminal
matters where life and liberty are at stake, the Privy
Council will not hesitate to reject even a recent decision
of Its own.-*-1 However, in constitutional matters, It
seldom reverses its own decision.12
It is not very clear as to how far the decisions of
the House of Lords bind the Privy Council on a point of
English law xoure and simple. It can be argued that since
it is an open secret that almost all the members of the
Privy Council are also judges in the House of Lords, there
should be no difficulty in the way of the Privy Council in
following the decisions of the House of Lords. Thus the
principle of negligence enunciated by the Lords in Ponoghue
v . Stevenson in 1932,1^was followed four years later by the
/Privvr1 1 * ' ——— ~   1 i ii ii 1| 1 ■■■nr11 ■ 1 ——~~~T ' ir - r l—r l  hibi ■nirn.w ili i 'urnn—■ 't-tth.■ in-irrt. r      w  r.miiiiinniiwn iimnmir r     i i> i mi r finmin ijit^nnn irw n ■ nii mm mtihWi.iiii.
9. 0-938] A.C. 287.
10. tl926] A.C. 72. Even the High Court in England refused
to follow it in Jerone v. Bentley and Co. [19523 2 All
E.R. 114. —
11 • Hkambule v. R. £l950j A.C. 379.
12• Ontario v. Canada Temperance Federation Cl946^
A.C. 193.
13. ^932] A.C. 562.
Privy Council in Grant v. Australian Knitting Mils Ltd.^4
But as English law in the various Commonwealth countries is 
not necessarily the same as that in England, it is not safe 
to predict the situation* Similarly, it must not he taken 
as a foregone conclusion that the decisions of the Privy 
Council have no binding effect whatsoever on English courts* 
Recently, the Judicial Committee in Overseas Tankshio !(U.K.[ 
Ltd. v* Morts Dock & Engineering Co. Ltd t^ 5 popularly known 
as The Wagon Mound, has refused to follow the rule concern- 
ing liability for the direct but unforeseeable consequences 
of a wrongful act, generally believed to have been estab­
lished by the Court of Appeal in Re PQlemls [1922J 3 K.B*
5 6 0 The Privy Council held that the decision in Re 
PQlemls was not good law, and that the essential factor in 
determining the consequence of a tortious act of negligence 
is whether the damage is of such a kind as the reasonable 
man should have foreseen. Although the Court of Appeal is 
bound by its own decision, it is hoped that the Court of 
Appeal and the High Court of England will follow the 
decisions of the Privy Council^'"'’ C<KS*-
It need hardly be said that the decisions of the Privy
Council, which/ds the highest Court of Appeal ta some of
/the
14. C1936J A.C. 85.
15. C196XJ A.C. 388.
16. For a stimulating note see; wObituary; Re Polemis11 by 
A*LJfc (1961) 77 L.Q.R. 175-178.
the Commonwealth countries, hind all such courts. The 
implications of this last statement will he discussed in 
another context.
Finally, some other principles governing the operation 
of the English doctrine of precedent must he noted. The 
first point is that the principle of stare decisis is appl­
ied in England to the construction of statutes as well as 
to the ascertainment of the common law and equity rules. 
Secondly, the successful operation of the principle depends 
on a first class system of law reporting. Thirdly, a 
distinction is made between a binding authority and a 
persuasive authority* As a general rule, courts must 
follow a binding precedent even though tl^ey disapprove of 
it. But English judges through the **art of distinguishing**
USU* IXu
are mfcm&tL able to free themselves from the rigid doctrine.
That which is binding is often termed the ratio decidendi.
i.e. the general reasons given for the decision, or the
general grounds upon which It Is based, detached or
abstracted from the specific peculiarities of the case
*17which gives rise to the decision. Statements made by
English judges which are not necessary to the decision are
technically termed obiter dicta, which oieans wthings said
by the way**. These dicta have only persuasive authority on
/ the
17. HAXjSBUKY1 S haws of England. 3rd ed. Vol. 22, 796.
For a detailed discussion see G-OOBHART, A.L. sEssays.
the judges. In the absence cf binding precedents, per­
suasive authority is also given to the decisions of the 
Privy Council, Irish, Scottish, Commonwealth and United 
States’ courts.
(a) Judicial precedent in West Africa.
The subject divides itself into two. Firstly, there 
Is the question of the operation of the doctrine in West 
Africa, and secondly, there is the question of the auth­
ority of decisions of the courts in England on the West 
African courts*
A quick reference to the chapter dealing id th the
courts system in West Africa will reveal that the structure
of the courts Is largely similar to the English system,
which was reorganised by the Judicature Act, 1873. There
are, however, some courts existing in England which were
never introduced into West Africa. In addition there lave
been modifications on the English model. Appellate courts
in West Africa exercise both civil and criminal jurisdiction
The hierarchy of the courts is the sarae(except that there
are no ecclesiastical courts). The highest courts arei-
the Court of Appeal for Sierra Leone, the Gambia Court of
Appeal, the Supreme Court In Ghana (formerly called the
Ghana Court of Appeal), and the Federal Supreme Court in
Nigeria. The final appellate court for all the countries
/except
except Ghana, is the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council# All the local courts mentioned can he described 
as the direct successors to the now defunct West African 
Court of Appeal, which itself had succeeded the Full Courts*
The appellate courts in West Africa can be considered 
to be of the same standing as the English Court of Appeal 
and the Court of Criminal Appeal.
Next in order come the Supreme Courts of Sierra Leone 
and the Gambia and the High Court of Ghana, and in all the 
Regions of the Federation of Nigeria, including that of 
Lagos. The jurisdiction of these courts is very similar to 
that exercised by the High Court in England. In addition, 
the local High Courts have appellate jurisdiction in 
respect of appeals from the Magistrates1 Courts or Circuit 
Courts (as is the case in Ghana). The Courts of Appeal and 
the High Court are termed superior courts. Unlike the 
position in England, some Magistrates1 Courts, for example 
in the Eastern Region of Nigeria, and some customary 
courts, as in the Western Region, have appellate juris­
diction in both civil and criminal matters originally 
decided in the customary courts, in a country where the 
customary courts are graded, it would appeaSTthat decisions
of a higher customary court would bind the lower courts.
/Thus
Thus in the Ghana case of Anane v. Mensah,3-® the Court of 
Appeal (now the Supreme Court) said uNatii$© customary law is 
peculiarly w i ’thin the knowledge of the native courts, and 
the opinion of a superior native court on native cuat?6m 
must be preferred to the opinion of an inferior native 
court, unless it is either ccntrary to a decision of the 
Supreme Court of the Privy Council on the point*..11 
The inference to be drawn from this statement is that the 
decisions of the Superior Courts bind local customary courts 
and that decisions of customary appeal courts bind customary 
courts of first instance. Indeed, in the Western Region 
of Nigeria Grade A Customary Courts, presided over by 
legally qualified judges, notice is taken of decisions of 
the former West African Court of Appeal, and they are 
regularly cited by counsel who have a right of audience in 
such courts. Nevertheless it cannot be said 'that the 
method of precedent has really been established at the 
level of courts of inferior jurisdiction since the 
decisions of such courts are not reported*
Case law in West Africa confirms the view that the
English doctrine of precedent forms part of the received
laws. Thus, in Qsumanu v. Amadu.3-9 the West African Court
of Appeal ruled that in civil cases it was bound to follow 
_____________________________________________________ /previous
18. (1959) G.L.R. 50 at p. 53.
19. (1949) 18 W.A.C.A. 437, overruling Dompreh v.
Marfo 12 W.A.C.A. 349.
previous decisions of its own, as well as those of courts
of co-ordinate jurisdiction# The Court added that:-
^The only exceptions to this rule (two of them 
apparent only) may thus he summarised:
(1) The Court is entitled and hound to decide which 
of two conflicting decisions of its own it will 
follow#
(2) The Court is entitled to refuse to follow a 
decision of its own which, though not expressly over­
ruled, cannot, in its opinion, stand with a decision 
of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council or 
the House of Lords *
(3) The Court Is not hound to follow a decision of its 
own If it Is satisfied that the decision was given 
per incur!am#11
!»■ mu     i i   ....... i n
The Court also adopted the principles enunciated by
the English Court of Criminal Appeal in R# v* Taylor
with regard to the reconsideration of previous decisions
of the latter court#^ The rule laid down by the West
African Court of Appeal was that it would not be
invariably 1m bound by its own previous decisions, but as
a matter of practice no previous decision by it would be
reviewed save by a full court constituted by five members.
The principle enunciated by the West African Ccurt of
Appeal that the appellate court was bound to follow its
own previous decisions must be taken to mean that such
decisions bind only the courts of the territory from v/hich 
 _________________________     /the
20 . P.950U 2 K.B. 368.
21. (1950) 13 W.A.C.A. 114.
the the appeal was brought. For the laws in the four terri­
tories, even on a question of English law is not the same. 
As early asl955 the West African Court of Appeal in the
pp
case of Nertherland Distillery v. J.H. Henkes1 Distillery#
■M1I . .U  HiiiiMiinimnnwnflTiTrwi innnmpn —iw  iwMi~^nmmTiiiM»iiwii>ii^^if^ ii^V i. inn im ia iw im w iiM w rrf inm m u n m iw i. m n ir iH i. i iiirnimii.iri m i . i i ~n~"nim n» mi f i r
on a question relating to trade marks, held that the 
decisions of the Full Court of Nigeria (which before It 
was abolished Was of equal standing with the West African 
Court of Appeal^p^ was not binding on the Divisional Court 
of the Gold Coast or the West African Court of Appeal. 
DOGRLX, J •, delivering the judgment of the Court gave the 
reasons thuss-
nThe Full Court of Nigeria was a Nigerian Court and 
every Judge sitting in that Court, whether he was sub­
stantially a Nigerian Judge or not, was for the 
purpose of the matter In hand a Nigerian Judge. The 
Full Court of Nigeria had no appellate or other 
powers in regard to any Court in the Gold Coast.
It therefore follows that M.tken, J., was not bound 
by the decision of the Full Court of Nigeria, although 
It was his duty (and he fulfilled that duty) to con­
sider very carefully any decision of the Full Court 
of Nigeria. The West African Court of Appeal is 
clearly not bound by the decisions of the Full Court 
of "Nigeria.**
At best it could only be said that the decision of the
Full Court of Nigeria was of a persuasive authority.
In every territory of West Africa the High Courts or
are ..courts of co-ordinate
22. (1935) 2 W.A.C.A. 258 at p. 369.
23. See ante p. /£.© History of W.A.C.A. JLi
jurisdiction. A High Court Judge is therefore not bound by
a decision of a court of equal and concurrent jurisdiction 
24
with his own.
Aft ex’ Reviewing the English authorities on this point* 
BROWN* C.J., in Qlawoyin v» Attorney-General of Northern 
Nigeria said
”lt would therefore appear to be clear that while a
judge sitting at first instance will accord great 
weight to a previous decision of a judge of co-ordinate 
jurisdiction, and will only depart from it with reluc­
tance and after the most careful consideration, he 
commits no breach of principle if he does « for he is 
not bound by it.”
In the same case, the learned Chief Justice ruled that 
the High Court in the Northern Region sitting in its appell­
ate jurisdiction is analagous to a Divisional Court in 
England. Therefore such a court will be bound to follow its 
own decisions subject to the three exceptions laid down by
Lord Goddard in Nicholas v. Penny.
In Ghana the doctrine of precedent is now written down 
in the Republican Constitution. For our purpose Article
42(4) stipulates that ”The Supreme Court/which Is the
  /f ina 1
24 m Sasraku v. David (19597" gTlTR. 7 at p. 14.
25. (19607 N.R. N.L.R. p. 53 at p. 58. But a Court of co­
ordinate jurisdiction has no power to treat the 
decision of another such court, even if acting outside 
Its jurisdiction, as a nullity. Pon v. Omanhene Atta 
Fua, Div. Ct. 1921-25, p. 11.
final Court of Appeals/shall in principle be bound to 
follow its own previous decisions on questions of law, and 
the High Court shall be bound to follow previous decisions 
of the Supreme Court on such questions ...
(bl The Authchritv of Decisions of English Courts over
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West African Courts 
In respect of the decisions of the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council there Is no doubt that where it is 
the final Court of Appeal itsdecisions bind the courts of 
the country from which the appeal was made* As It was 
pointed out in a Nigerian c a s e / ^  courtsmust give precedence 
to the decisions of the Privy Council before those of any 
other tribunal. The statement from the judgment of a New 
Zealand case even goes further. In that c a s e / 8 HERDMAN, J. 
said i-
uAlthough modern opinion in Great Britain seemsto be 
unanimous in holding that the statement of the law 
in the Victorian c a s e ^  iS either erroneous or 
obsolete, we in New Zealand are no doubt bound to 
follow their lordships* judgment unless the facts of 
Z the present case can be distinguished from the facts 
of the case which the Privy Council decided*u
Where the decision of the Privy Council was based on
a question of English law prevailing in the country
concerned, it can be said that such decision ought to be
binding only on the courts from where the appeal came,
/even
26. The Ghana Constitution, 1960.
• Thomas & ops v. Ademoia (194-5) 18 N.L.R. 12 at p. 23.
28. Stevenson v. Basham & anor (1922) N.Z.l.R. 225 at 231.
Hllnm^P^E.ian > .m  i — ntm i i»limi>n i iirn iim  i i rm . iO *  r
- Supreme Court.
29. Victorian Railway Commissioners v. Coultas (1888) 13 
App.Cas. 222.
even though the law has been changed in England. Similarly, 
where the question involved on appeal to the Privy Gouncil
IS ooi .
concerneidjjL customary law k m p M w  from/Jitflgeria, $ since 
the Privy Council will be sitting as a Final Gourt of 
Appeal N±geria,jf one weald have thought that such a 
decision will only bind Nigerian courts and not, for 
example, courts in Sierra Leone. Indeed, the Ontario 
Court of Appeal in refusing to be bound by the Privy 
Council decision in the Victorian case lust mentioned,
■i' ni i - n im' V  w
argued that since that case was an appeal from a New
30Zealand court, the Canadian Courts were not bound ty it.
As against this view, there is the Ghana case of* Gnogen v*
*  m hi in m rnrnim m m +m **
hevftntis & Co. Ltd.,51 where Adumua-Bossman, J*, considered 
himself as bound by a decision of the Privy Council. He
said; tTSuch a case was that of ffewarl v* Singh & anor, (1908)
miwwiWHiiiM»ii i %  I wffrrrliii mwihmiiiIIii i> I»m III i <r % 9
24 T.L.R. 884), which was decided by the Privy Council on 
appeal from an Indian Court, and which, as a decision of the 
Privy Council is binding on the Supreme Court of Ghana.”
The present position in Ghana is thad; the High Court is 
bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court on questions of 
law, and neither the Supreme Court nor the High Court is 
bound to follow the previous decisions of any other court on 
questions of law.3s___
30. Negro v. Pietro* s Bread Co.Ltd. (1955T~0nOer). 1127
31. (19£9) G.L.R. 105 at p. 115.
32. Ihe Constitution 1960* Art. 42(4)#
267.
It is respectfully submitted that the view expressed 
by the Ontario Court in the Negro case is to be preferred. 
This view is really not contrary to the opinion expressed 
in Fatuma Binti Mohamed Bin Salim BukksJnLuwen v. Bakkshuwen 
by the Privy Council.33 In that case their Lordships appro­
ved a statement made by 11 the experienced judges of the 
Gourt of Appeal for Eastern Africa” to the effect that they 
did not doubt that on a question of Muslim law decisions off 
the Privy Council in appeals from India must bind them in 
appeals from the High Court of Zanzibar. Their Lordships 
then extend.ed the principle to appeals from Kenya.
Whatever the merits involved in this method, if it is 
correct that Muslim law in India is the same as that in 
Kenya, then the opinion expressed by their Lordships Is 
the right one. On the other hand, if Muslim law is not 
the same in both countries, then the decision will have 
to be reviewed.3^
Where the point involved in an appeal to the Privy 
Council is a question of English common law pure and simple,
then if a Privy Council decision differs from that of the
/Hous e
33. 0.9523 A.C. 1 at p. 14 P.C.
34. It is submitted that such a course will rather 
enhance the position of the Privy Council. In South 
Africa the immediate cause for the abolition of app­
eals to the Privy Council was as a result of Pearl 
Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Union Government £1954*3 A.C.570 
where the Privy Gouncil overruled the judgment of 
four members of the Appellate Division on what was a 
pure question of Roman-Dutch law. One South African
/author
House of Lords, the courts in West Africa are bound to
follow the decision of the House of Lords, for, as the Privy 
Council itself admitted in Robins v. National Trust Co.Ltd.?^ 
the House of Lords *'is the supreme tribunal to settle 
English law, and that being settled, the colonial court, 
which is bound by English law, is bound to follow it**.^
As the personnal of both courts is almost the same at any 
given time, there is no doubt that the law settled at the 
House of Lords will be applied by the Privy Council
34* (cont.) ..author, criticising the judgment said that 11 It 
is no reflection on the members of the Judicial Comm­
ittee, therefore, to say that neither in the past nor 
in the case under consideration have they been happy 
in the application of a system of law with which they 
were not even on a footing of nodding acquaintance.
Hot that they are to blame, but a ridiculous arrangement 
which charges them with an impossible task.u (1943) 60 
S.A.L.J. at p. 476. See J.Comp.Leg. 3rd s* (1950)
Vol. 32, p. 83.
35. £19273 A.C. 515 at p. 519. In Will v. Bank of Montreal.
(1931) 3 Dominion L.R. 526, FORD J*, (Alberta Sup.Ct.) 
ruled that where a Canadian Court in attempting to 
apply English law discovers that a decision of the Privy 
Council is in conflict with a later decision of the 
House of Lords in which the error of the decision is 
expressly stated, it must apply the law as enunciated
in the later decision.
36. The term ucolonial court1* must be taken to Include an 
independent Commonwealth court.
37. Indeed, the Privy Council In Grant v. Australian Knitting 
Mills Ltd. (1936) applied the 3a w as settled four years 
earlier in Donoghue v. Stevenson (1932).
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Where the statement of English law made by the 
local court of appeal differs from that of the English 
Court of Appeal should one regard the law as stated by the 
local court of appeal as erroneous? In Robins * cQse. 
Viscount DUNEDIU, delivering the judgment of the Privy 
Council supplied the answers
HWhen an Appellate Court in a colony which is regulated 
by English law differs from an Appellate Court in 
England, it is not right to assume that the Colonial 
Court is wi^ong. It is otherwise if the authority in 
England is that of the House of Lords ... Equally, 
of course, the point of difference may be settled 
as far as the Colonial Court is concerned by a 
judgment of this Board.” 38
The bffect of Viscount Dunedin*s statement is that as
there is no channel of appeal from the local court of
appeal to the English Court of Appeal, the decisions of the
English Court of Appeal should at best be considered as of
persuasive authority by the local court of appeal. If, on
the other hand, a question of English law pure and simple
has been settled by the Privy Council, then the law as
settled by the Privy Council should be followed by the
local courts of appeal, even though such latter decision 
  ,        /may
38* Qp cit. at p. 519. This question of discrepancy of
views between the Privy Council and those of the Court 
of Appeal had been a source of embarrassment to the 
courts in Canada and Australia some time ago.
It can now be regarded as finally settled. For 
further reference, see Fanton v. Denville (1932) 2 
K.B. 309 j Toronto Power Co. v. 1915) A.C. 734
the dictum of GREER, L.J.j and finally Wilsons and 
Clyde Coal Co. v. EnglishS106IJPC 117.
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may conflict with a decision given hy the English Court of 
Appeal# This view is on all fours with the Australian case 
°f The Wagon Mound, in which the Privy Council regarded the 
Court of Appeal decision in Re Polemis on the point of deter­
mining the consequence of a tortious act of negligence as 
erroneous • But supposing the principle of English law 
which was laid down by the Privy Council is over 30 years 
old, and today the English Court of Appeal makes a pronounce­
ment that that decision of the Privy Council was not a 
correct statement of English law, are the Commonwealth 
courts for whom the Privy Council is still a final appellate 
court, to be bound by the old decision of that Court? A 
Commonwealth court would argue that since the Privy 
Council was sitting as a final appellate court for, say, 
Nigeria, it would not be bound by such decision. But can 
the Federal Supreme Court of Nigeria ignore that decision 
of the Privy Council? It appears that it cannot, and the 
Federal Supreme Court can only be saved such embarrassment 
through the action of the legislature. The points just 
raised are illustrated by the refusal of the English Court 
of ^PPoal in Re Hastings to follow the judgment of the Privy 
Council given in the Nigerian case of Efeko v. Officer 
Administering the Government of Nigeria. The point involved
PpltCG. Hv~> f-or- G,
was the right of a person whose^writ of habeas corpus has
/been
been refused by the High Court. The whole matter is 
discussed later.
In practice, the courts in West Africa treat with 
great respect decisions of the High Court and the Court of 
Appeal*'^
As has already been stated, the method of judicial 
precedent is also applied to the construction of statutes 
In England, it has been held that if two statutes are In 
pari materia» any judicial decision as to the construction 
of one uis a sound rule of construction for the otheru
But this rule cannot be applied too rigidly. The mere fact
that certain statutes In West Africa are ^identical1* to 
English ones does not mean that they are in pari materia.
As has been observed elsewhere, there are different types 
of enactments in force in the West African territories
(1) Acts of the United Kingdom Parliament which are of 
universal application in all British dependencies until 
such acts are repealed on attainment of independence, e.g. 
the Territorial Yifaters Jurisdiction Act, 1878# ^
39. See post p. 2-*7 8
40. In Amiss ah v. Amiss ah Biv.Ct. 1926-9 (Ghana) YATE&, J., 
regarded himself as bound by the English decision In 
Stoate v. Stoate 3 Law Times, n.s. 757 - a case relat­
ing to the time of the discharge of an order for
payment of alimony.
41. See the valuable contribution to this topic by ALLOTT, 
A.N. Essays, p. 28 et seq.
42 ♦ v. Mason (1788) 2 T.R. 581 at 586. See also ODG-ERS, 
G.E.; T he c on s t rue tl on of deeds and statutes, 4th ed.
■ Pllllg     in  I ■■ ................................ ................................ *  1r
1956, p. 241 et seq.
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(2) Acts of the United Kingdom Parliament, although enacted 
after the date of recexotion of English law, are extended to 
Commonwealth territories by Ordersin Council, e.g* The 
Finance Act, 1894.
(3) “Statutes of general application in England1* as on a 
particular date, which are declared to be in force in the 
West African territories in accordance with the date of the 
establishment of a local legislature.
(4) Acts of the local legislature which are sometiimes 
based on an Act of the United Kingdom Parliament, or on 
English common law.
A question arises, therefore, as to the manner in 
which the rule of contruction is to be applied with regard 
to Acts of the United Kingdom Parliament which are of 
universal application in all British dependencies, there 
is no dcubt that Commonwealth countries are bound by the 
interpretation of the Act judicially decided by the English 
Courts. Aa Ur. Allott has rightly pointed out, it can be 
argued that such Acts are designed to form a coherent 
system of law prevailing the British possessions, and that 
it would be most undesirable if different interpretations 
of such legislation were to be found as between one court 
in Britain and the colonies and a n o t h e r T h e  same canon 
of interpretation is applied to Acts of the United Kingdom
Parliament extended to Commonwealth territories by Orders
________     /in
43. ALLOT!, A.N. Essays, p. 41.
In Council. The true reason is that such Acts are really 
in operation in England nln respect to the Commonwealth**. 
Therefore it is only an English court which can have the 
final say in the interpretation of English Acts of 
Parliament•
The same method of approach cannot he adopted for the
interpretation of win t have "been termed wstatutes of
general application in England1* declared to be in force
in West A f r i c a .44 Such statutes are declared to be in
force uso far only as the limits of the local jurisdiction
and local circumstances permit and subject to any existing
or future local Ordinance**. Thus In the recent Ghana case
Coleman v. Shan g . 4 5 which turned on whom Letters of
Administration of a deceased intestate under the Marriage
Ordinance should be given, the Privy Council held that
ap&rt from the Interpretation Ordinance (Laws of the Gold
Coast, 1951, Cap. 1)46, construing Statute 21 of Henry
VIII, Cajt. 5, and the Statute of Distribution (1670), which
were statutes of general application, the Courts of Ghana
were entitled to apply the words ttwifett and wwidowK to all
persons regarded as lawful wives or widows according to the
law of Ghana • It follows therefore that Ghana courts are
/not
44. As to what are statutes of general application see
f ost, C §19631) 2 All E.H. 406 at 411.
46. How see Interpretation Act 1960(c.A.4) s. 26*
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not bound by the decisions of English courts in inter­
preting sections of statutes of general application. Local 
circumstances must be given pride of place. It has also 
been held that a decision of an English court based on a 
statute which by virtue of the date of reception in Ghana 
is not regarded as one of general application will not bind
the court s.4* 7
The rule of construction mentioned earlier on comes 
into play only when comparing Acts of the local legis­
latures with similar provisions in the United Kingdom.
Some of these Acts are adopted wholesale from similar ones 
In the United Kingdom. Such Acts are The Imperial Statutes 
(Criminal Law) Adoption O r d i n a n c e , 4S Which provided for the 
application of the following English Acts subject to minor 
alterations in Sierra Leone: The Perjury Act, 1911; The 
Forgery Act, 1913; The Larceny Act, 1916f Other Acts may be 
modelled on a United Kingdom statute. Thus in the Western 
Region of Nigeria The Property and Conveyancing Law 1951,49 
is based on the English Law of Property Act 1925. The 
Ghana Administration of Estates Act, 1961,^ was modelled 
on the English Act of 1925. What then should be the guiding
light for such courts? As early as 1879 the Privy Council, 
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47. Ampofo v. Quartey (1928) Div.Ct. 1926-9, p. 151 at 152.
48. Gap. 27 Laws of Sierra Leone (1960 Revision).
49. W.K. Mo* 21 of 1959* Laws of Western Nigeria 1959, Rev.
Gap. 100.
50* Act 63*
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Ri0nTrimble v. Hill, -y an appeal from NewSouth Wales, 
expressed their view in the following terms;
uTheir Lordships think the Court in the Colony might 
well have taken this decision as an authoritative 
construction of the Statute. It is the judgment of 
the Court of Appeal, by which all the courts in 
England are bound, until a contrary determination 
ha® been arrived at by the House of Lords. Their 
Lordships think that in colonies where a like 
enactment has been passed by the Legislature, the 
Colonial Courts should also govern themselves by it.M
The successful application of the rule laid down by 
the Privy Council depends on the local statute being in 
pari materia. But can it easily be proved that a statute 
passed by two different Parliament is in pari materia? 
Happily enough, the Privy Council in m o d e m  times have modi­
fied their views considerably. Sir Henry Strong, delivering 
the advice of the Board in G-rand Trunk Hailway Co. v. 
Washington, ^  declined to hold that the Canadian Court of 
Appeal in Ontario was justified in regarding Dominion Acts 
for the regulation of provincial railways a sin parjf materia 
with an Act of the United Kingdom Parliament. uAs these 
are enactments emanating frcm a different legislative body 
from that which passedthe statute to be Interpreted, and 
cannot be said to be in pari materia with that, their Lord­
ships are unable to see that they ought to have any
influence upon the question to be decided arising exclusively
_ _ _  _    /u]5on   — tmn»m unm i . i i       mwnn. i .  iiinguiiif . ^ h iMyiii— ......... i m  m
(1879) 5 App.Cas 34-2 at p. 344. See also Catterall v 
Sweetnan (1945) 9 Jur. 951 at p. 954.
Qisnfj r.c a?s“ - * /»  xs C
upon the Dominion Act, and relating only to Dominion 
Railways.u
In Chettiaf v. Mahamtee ,55 (on an appeal from Ceylon) 
the Privy Council went even further;
11 It is, however, one thing to presume that a local 
legislature, when re-enacting a f o m e r  statute, intends 
to accept the interpretation placed on that statute 
by local courts of competent jurisdiction with whose 
decision the legislature must be taken to be familiar; 
it is quite another thing to presume that a legis­
lature, when it incorporates in a local Act the terms 
Jbf a foreign statute, intends to accept the inter­
pretation placed on those terms by the Courts of the 
foreign country with which the local legislature may 
or may not be familiar. Thers is no presumption that 
the people of Ceylon know the law of England, and in 
the absence of any evidence to show that the legis­
lature of Ceylon at the relevant date knew, or must 
be taken to have known, decisions of the English 
Courts under the Moneylenders Act, there is no basis 
for imputing to the legislature an intention to 
accept those decisions.tt
From the foregoing, it is clear that the rule in Trimbl
^  * ■ B M ii.ilM ii i r  '"m n iiirrm n
v. Hill has been modified. It does not mean, however, that
courts in West Africa should completely ignore decisions of
English courtson the interpretation of statutes similar to
those of the United Kingdom. The pi&ctice of the superior
courts is to pay the highest regard to decisions of English
courts. Thus in interpreting the meaning of t5any person
aggrieved11 within the context of the Criminal Procedure
C o d e , the Ghana Court of Anneal preferred the inter-
53. Ci95Qj A.C.481 at p. 491. In view of this decision, it 
is respectfully submitted that the dictum of the West 
African Court In Motayo v. Commr. of Police (1950) 13 
WACA at p. 117, is no longer to be relied on.
54• Pormaa State Council v . Anau (1957) 3 WAIR 295.
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pretatita put on that expression hy the English courts to 
that decided by the West African Court of Appeal. On the 
other hand, it has been held in Karam v. Commissioner of 
Income Tax. ^  that it is not safe for local courts to rely 
upon decisions of English courts or any other court in the 
interpretation of any Income Tax Act. If, of course, there 
is a decision of the Privy Council which interprets a local 
statute, then the local courts are bound by such decision.
(c) Conclusion
The foregoing is an epitome of the method of 
precedent in West Africa. What are the future prospects 
for the doctrine? The successful operation of the doctrine 
inter alia dejoends on a first-class system of law reporting, 
but the system of law reporting has not been able to catch 
up with the development of law in West Africa today. At 
the time of writing, Nigeria is the only country which has 
been prompt in reporting the decisions of the courts.
Ghana is two years behind with its law reports. The law 
reporting in Sierra Leone is very unsatisfactory. It is 
only recently that decisions of the defunct West African 
Court of Appeal on appeals from Sierra Leone have been 
published as Volume 16 of the W.A.C.A. reports. There Is 
hardly any system of law reporting in the Gambia.
/It"    ■■iTiwri'iii ii ■ ■— .MiiMiii i» i mi i . . *■ 1 1 ^ . " f ' | —mi 1—ri—nrra i n mai~rig~i iri ~nfiMiJ—f  i.» -irmrT i n_ iui.     mi
55. (1948) 12 W.A.C.A. at p. 339 (Ghana).
It has also been established that the doctrine of 
precedent succeeds best in a country with a uniform and 
centralised judiciary. How the challenge is going to be 
faced in the Federation of Nigeria remains to be seen.
As regards the authority of decisions of English 
courts on West African courts, a caveat must be put in.
No doubt the greatest respect must be accorded to such 
decisions, but, as Pollock has observed, Mthis just and 
necessary respect, if not informed by a due measure of 
intelligent criticism, tends to degenerate into mechanical 
slavery1*.56 Recalling his experience in India, this great 
ex£)onent of the common law added;57
nOne may find indeed that imitation is now and then 
carried to excess. Not only the decisions of Indian 
superior courts: and of the Judicial Committee on 
appeal therefrom, but those of English courts, are 
cited wholesale throughout British India, frequently 
by advocates who cannot know much of the common law 
and before judges or magistrates who may know as 
little; and the citations, one suspects, are too 
often not even from the report but at second hand 
from text books. Even technical rules of English real 
property law have been relied on in Indian courts 
without considering whether they had any reasonable 
application to the facts and usage of the country.
Some Indian judges, even in the superior judgment 
seats of the High Courts, have forgotten that the law 
they administer (with strictly limited exceptions) is 
not English law as such, but 1 justice, equity and good 
conscience1 interpretated to mean so much of English 
jurisprudence as appears to be reasonably applicable, 
and no more. Blind following of English precedents
according to the letter can only have the effect of
  /reducing
56. The genius of the common law at p. 114.
57. Ibid at p. 92.
reducing the estimation of the common law by 
intelligent Indians to the level of its more tech­
nical and less fimitful portions, and making those 
portions appear, if possible, more inscrutable to 
Indian than they do to English lay suitors.u
Prom this self-explanatory passage a few lessons can
be deduced. Firstly, less use should be made of obiter
dicta of English judges. Secondly, decisions of a single
judge should be sparingly cited or relied on, for High
Court judges everywhere are too enthusiastic in laying
down what in their opinion is the law. Thirdly, judges in
West Africa should be more inclined to draw upon judicial
experience, past and present, in all the common law
countries. This gives to the common law the flexibility
and dynamism required to meet the demand for change.
Indeed, decisions of the Commonwealth countries will shew
us how the application of the common law abroad has been
limited to suit local . The prospect Is not grim,
for a start in that direction has already been made. In a
recent case decided by the Federal Supreme Court of Nigeria,
the appellate court 9 found the decisions of the Australian
courts h e l p f u l 9 *58
58* Doherty & the W.Nigeria Development Corporation v *
Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa & ors. The Guardian. 
November 13, 1961.
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II JURY TRIAL^59)
Jury trial, which has been described as the most 
distinctive part of the common law, has not been received 
In Weast Africa without modif icati on.60 At common law it 
is a system under which no man can be convicted off felony 
unless he has been found guilty by a jury of twelve 
ordinary citizens. Professor Goodhart has quite rightly 
remarked that 9the jury system isthe most effect guard 
against governmental tyranny ever devised if - and this 
is an essential if - the ordinary citizen is prepared to 
show courage and independence.96-1-
The modification of jury trial in West Africa was 
not attained in one process. At the very beginning the
system of jury trial was introduced without any quali­
fication whatever. Thus, by the provisions of the Charter
59. The most up-to-date account on Jury Trial In Africa 
is that by JEAR'fK J.H.; 9Tria3L by jury and trial with 
the aid of assessors9 (1960) &  JAL 133; (196:1) 5 JAL 
36-47, 82-98. See also KNOX-MAWER. R.s 9The jury 
system in British Colonial Africa (1958) 3 JAL 160-3;
9Juries and assessors in Criminal trials In some comm­
onwealth countries; a preliminary survey9 (1961) 10 
ICX£& 892-8; MACAULAY, B. “Assessors in cximinal trials 
In West Africa9 (I960) Grim. L.R. 748-58, 825-32,
60* Although the practice and procedure of the High Court 
relating to the trial of Indictable offences are 
exercised, as near as possible, in accordance with the 
practice and procedure in the like cases of the English 
High Court of Justice Jury Ordinance. Cap. 90 Laws of 
the Federation of Nigeria, 1958 Revision, s. 82.
The migration of the common law. 1960, p. 8.
of Sierra Leone, 1821, the Sheriff was invested with the 
power and authority of summoning juries both In civil and 
criminal cases. The cumbersome system of grand jury in 
criminal trials had also been made part of the laws applic­
able in West Africa. Yet as early as 1816, the Commiss­
ioners sent out by the British Government to investigate 
the state of the settlements and forts on the coast of 
Africa, had stated that if the grand jury could be legally 
dispensed with it would be getting rid of a great nuisance - 
their mode of proceeding being, in spite of all admonition, 
very unsuitable to the spirit of their situation.52 
In spite of criticisms such as these, grand juries persisted 
in West Africa until they were abolished, for example In 
Sierra L e o n e , 6 6  an& the Gold Coast in 1853,64 and in the 
Gambia In 1867.55 The Sierra Leone Ordinance categorically 
stated “That the proceeding by grand jury In criminal 
prosecutions In the said Colony be and the
same is hereby abolished; and that it shall no longer be
62. Par Pap. Session 1816, Vol. 7&,p. 121.
63. An Ordinance to amend the laws relative to Jurors & 
Juries in the Cblony of Sierra Leone. No. 59 of 1853; 
(March 13, 1853.)
64. Supreme Court Ordinance, No. 4 of 1853 (April 6, 1853.
65. Jurors & Juries Amendment Ordinance* No. 6 of 1867, 
s . 2.
necessary for the sheriff to summon persons to attend to 
serve as grand jurors In the Courts of Quarter Sessions 
of the Peace, and oyer and terminer and gaol delivery or 
other superior criminal court in the said Colony1'
Provision m s  made for the trial of all offences by the 
criminal courts by a xorocess of information. All issues 
of fact joined on every such information In any of the 
courts mentioned were to be tried by two or more commiss­
ioners or justices of such courts, "and a jury of twelve 
good, and lawful men impanelled in the usual manner and 
sworn to give a verdict according to the evidence"
The next major modification of the jury system occurred 
in 1866 when jury trial in civil cases was abolished in 
West Africa. Several witnesses who appeared before the 
Select Committee on Africa in 1 8 6 5 , had criticised the 
system of jury trial in West Africa, especially in civil 
cases. In his evidence to the Committee, Governor Blackall 
of Sierra Leone observed:
uThe jury system with regard to trials of criminals, 
I think works fairly, although I have known instances 
where prejudice has been brought to bear, but I think 
that occurs which is common to all small communities 
where the question to be tried is well known and talked 
over among a very small number of people, from whom 
the jury has to be chosen in civil cases ...
generally the juries are prejudiced•11 69.
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66® No® 59 of 1853 (Sierra Leone S.I® _)
67® Ibid, s. 2 .
68® Sel. Cttee Rep® 1865, Vol. 5©
69* Ibid, p. 323*
It is evident from 'the nature of the evidence given
befox^e the Select Committee that the main cause of the ci’it~
Icism of jury trial in civil cases was due to ‘the breakdown
of race relations in Sierra Leone. It was alleged by the
Europeans that an nAkoo jury /in Sierra Leone/will never
convict an Akoo* and that they will never acquit a
Whiteman or a Timmanee* and that the verdict of an Akoo is
generally agreed upon out of court before the trial comes
on11* On the other hand* the Judicial Assessor In the
Gold Coast* William Hackett* told the Committee that he did
not find that unative jurymen” in the Gold Coast Invariably
gave their verdict in favour cf their countrymen. However*
the Select Committee in their recommendati ons to the British
Parliament pointed out that trial by jury was inapplicable
in a great many instances in West Africa. Hence* when the
West African territories were re-united in 1866* a series cf
ordinances were aaacted for the better administration of
justice in the West African Settlements.170 These Ordinances 
_   ,      _ ._ _ _ ..... /drafted
70. Reference has already been made to these Ordinances -
see ante p. 42 et seq,• No. B  of 1866* The Gambia; No. 4 
of 1866* Sierra Leone; No. 7 of 1866* Lagos; and No. §9“ 
of 1866* the Gold Coast. There w& s no jury system in 
Lagos in 1865; so It is not accumte to say that civil 
juries were abolished in Lagos. See Select Committee 
Report* 1865* Vol. 5* p. 558. Indeed* s. 15 of the 
Lagos Civil Liability (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act*
No. 33 of 1961* empowers a jury to assess damages In 
cases where a plea of co ntributory negligence is raised*
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drafted In Sierra Leone by CARR* C.J.* in compliance with 
Governor Blackall's request* and passed by the LeglsGatlve 
Councils of Sierra Leone* the Gambia, the Gold Coast and 
Lagos, provided inter alia for the abolition of jury trial 
in civil cases*
In transmitting the draft ordinances for the consider­
ation of the Governor, the learned Chief Justice*7^  justified 
his action thus s*7^
wIt will be seen that by these Ordinances trial by 
jury is only allowed in criminal cases, and not in 
civil suits. A few remarks may be necessary in 
explanation* In criminal cases the question sub­
mitted to the jury upon the evidence is a very 
simple one, viz.* * whether the prisoner be guilty 
or not guilty* ; and in well conducted prosecutions 
the whole of the evidence bears upon that point. 
Further qualified jurors are usually persons of some 
property and they have an interest in the repression 
of crime* and in giving security to life and property 
by their verdicts. In civil suits the case is some­
what different. These suits are usually actions' 
arising out of canmercial transactions and complicated 
accounts* The issues raised by the pleadings are 
oftentimes many and various. The litigating parties, 
if not on friendly terms with the jurors* are general!; 
well known to them*.. Add to all this, the advocacy 
of these attorneys, without any public opinion to 
check them in their course, and the jealousies exist­
ing between the different races and tribes inhabiting
  _____ /these
71* Chief Justice Carr was°*^T°^olouredtt West Indian “ ~
appointed Queen1 s Advocate of Sierra Leone in 1840, 
and Chief Justice in 1841; which position he occupied 
for more than a quarter of a century. He retired In 
1867 on a pension of £1000 p.a. and died in 1880 - 
OR00KS, J .J . A history of the Golony of Sierra Leone, 
pi 171.
72. Par. Pap. Session 1867, Vol. 49, p. 522.
these Settlements, and it is not to he wondered at 
that verdicts in civil suits on this coast should have 
given less satisfaction than verdicts in criminal 
cases. With the right of appeal given by these 
Ordinances, and the provisions before referred to for 
taking down the evidence by the officer of the court,
I think the decision of civ II suits may be safely left 
to the resident magistrates at the other settlements, 
and to the judges of the Supreme Court at Sierra 
Leone, without a jury.”
Although a number of the reasons given for the 
abolition of civil jurie s are tenable, It must be pointed 
out that Governor Blackall's administration in Sierra 
Leone did the right thing for the wrong reason. Hot 
unnaturally, the inhabitants rebelled. A petition signed 
by nearly 800 people was sent to the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies. They stated clearly that criticisms of 
jury trial in civil cases did not emanate from the bulk of 
the inhabitants. That sane European elements who advocated 
its abolition were biased was clearly stressed. They were 
alarmed that nthis Ordinance abridging the Constitution of 
its rarest and most valuable part, calling upon Her Most 
Gracious Majesty to deprive the inhabitants of an instit­
ution of the Cblony enjoyed by them from time immemorial 
here, was passed at one reading - passed in less than an 
hour - passed while members of the Legislature in less 
than that period; and Her Majesty1 s other loyal subjects 
here generally were profoundly ignorant at all of its 
existence*. Can Her Gracious Majesty, then, give Her
royal sanction to this Ordinance, so destructive to the
/ Interests,
interests, constitutional rights, and liberties of your 
Lordships* petitioners, introduced as It was, unsustained 
as it has been, and passed, too, under such unlawful
circumstances?” 1^
The Secretary of State, after careful consideration,
advised the Queen to confirm the Ordinance, but he did not
refrain from expressing his regret at the manner in which
it was passed*
Over a period of years, jury trial in criminal cases
in West Africa has undergone modification* The following
are a few examples
(a) Humber of a jury. The English peculiar tradition
of trial by a jury of twelve men and wanen has been
broken through In West Africa. In Nigeria, on a trial of
any capital offence the jury consists of twelve jurors, of
whom not less than seven may be special jurors. On the
trial of any offence other than a capital offence, the jury
should consist of eight jurors who may be either common or
*74special jurors or some of one and some of the other* In
the Gambia the size of the jury in all criminal trials
75
remains at twelve, whereas in Ghana, in cases tried with
a jury (for example capital offences) the trial must be 
      /wi th
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73* Par* Pap. 1867, vol. 49, p. 544.
74* Jury Ordinance, Cap. 90 Laws of the Federation of
Nigeria (1958) Revision, ss. 26 & 27. The Ordinance 
applies to the whole Federation. See also Jury Law - 
Laws of Western Nigeria, 1959, Rev* Gap. 53.
75. Supreme Court Ordinance, Cap. 5 (1955 Rev*) s* 33.
Cf. Criminal Procedure Code, Cap. 25, s. 226*
with a jury of seven persons**70
(b) The unanimity rule; According to English practice, 
the verdict of a jury in criminal cases must be unanimous.
In the course of his lectures on Trial by jury/in England^/ 
Sir Patrick Devlin (a& he then was) observed that ^whatever 
Its origin, unanimity is now so ingrained in our procedure 
that its eradication would seem to take from the verdict a 
virtue that In criminal law it needs. The criminal verdict 
is based on the absence of reasonable doubt. If there 
were a dissenting minority of a third or a quarter, that 
would of Itself suggest to the popular mind the existence of 
a reasonable doubt and might impair public confidence in 
the criminal verdict” .*7,7
The advantages of the unanimity rule must not be 
stretched too far. It could encouragegpnuine dissenters to 
be false in their oath. This rule in England is very much 
in need of reform. The verdict in Scotland has always gone 
by a majority. A compromise has been struck in West 
Africa* On the trial of any capital offence, 'the verdict 
of the jury must be unanimous.*70 This rule is, however, 
qxxalified in Nigeria* Section 65 of the Jurv Ordinance
m— ■*t a m m n M  ...... IIP! — . II.« —— r —— T- ITT"' I i "" T“'................III!" —'Till II iwrt-r-f ITT—irr-nri-im ■ IIQ-I . unv^ 'f
77. The Hamlyn Lectures« London, 1956* Stevens & Sons Ltd. 
p. 56.
78. Ghana Crim. Proc. Code I960, s. 285(4);
Gambia ” ” ” Gap. 23. s. 256(2)(b); Sierra
Leone Jurors & Assessors Ordinance, Gap. 38 (1960 Rev.)
s. 27(1); Nigeria Jurors Ordinance, Cap. 90 (1958 Rev. I
s . 64(a ).
stipulates that on the trial of any capital offence if, on 
the expiration of two hours from the time when the jury 
began to consider their verdict, the foreman of the jury 
informs the court that the jury are agreed in the proportion 
of eleven to one or ten to two or nine to three, that the 
accused is not guilty of the capital offence, but is guilty 
of a lesser offence, the majority verdict may at the dis­
cretion of the judge, be accepted* In the case of trial 
of offences not punishable by death a verdict of the maj­
ority of two-thirds of the jury shall be accepted as the 
verdict of the whole jury in the cause**70 The majority 
verdict is not accepted by the judge as a matter of course, 
or after the first deliberation of the jury* In Ghana, for 
example, If the jury are not unanimous, the judge may 
require them to retire for further consideration. After 
such psriod as the judge considers reasonable, the jury may 
deliver their verdict, or state that they are not unanimous.
”This section/s* 295 of the old Criminal Procedure Code_7 
now. s. 285 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960J7 
empowers the judge upon the statement of lack of unanimity 
to require the jury to retire for further consideration, 
and in this connection, it would not be improper for a judge 
to indicate to the jury the importance from the point of 
vies of general convenience of their reaching a definite 
conclusion upon the matter.” 80
79. Sierra Leone, Cap. 38 s . 27(1)&(2). In Ghana the ratio 
Is 5 to 2. In the Gambia two-thirds. In Nigeria the 
ratio is 7 to 1 or 6 to 2.
80* v. Antor & ors (1958) 3 WALE 430 at p. 433. (Ghana
Court of AppealTJ™
S88.
(c) Trial with Assessors. The third major modification
' * H i l l W W H — M  —Ii.ii iBim Will In i *i ww iMiiihIhIIH ........  V
of jury trial in criminal cases, is the introduction of a 
system of trial by a judge of the superior courts with the 
aid of a s s e s s o r s Generally, a person charged with a non­
capital offence may be tried by a judge with the aid of 
usually not less than three assessors, instead of a judge 
and jury* This practice is believed to have originated in 
India*00 The essential difference between the two modes of 
trial in Ghana was summed up by KORSAH, C.J., thus;
11 We would however point out the essential 
difference between trial by a court with the aid of 
assessors, and trial by a court with a jury; Unlike 
a jury, the assessors are merely required to give 
their opinions to the judge, who must thereafter 
pronounce his verdict whether the accused is guilty 
or not guilty irrespective of whatever opinions the 
assessors may have expressed* Whereas In a trial by 
a court with jury, it is the jury who pronounce the 
verdict of guilty cr not guilty and. the judge is there' 
after required by law merely to record the verdict of 
the jury and proceed either to convict or acquit as 
the case may be In accordance with that verdict*
It follows from the above distinction that with 
regard to trial by a court with a jury, the judge is 
not required to write any judgment stating the reasons 
for the decision of the court provided the summing up 
to the jury Is adequate and does not amount to mis­
direction or non“direct!on of essential elements of
81. In Nigeria - Crim.Proc. Gode Gap. 43 (1958 Rev.) s.441 
et seq; Ghana " 11 ” 1960. E.g. ss. 204, 227,
242f & 260-264; Sierra Leone - Jurors & Assessors Ord. 
Gap. 38 ss. 39-45; Courts Amendment Ord. No. 2 of 1960 
s. 2; Gambia - Supreme Court Ord. Cap. 5 (1955 Rev.) 
ss. 66-71.
82. REDWAR, H.W/. Comments on some Ordinances of the Gold 
Coast Colony, p. 92.
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the charge and on the evidence. On the other hand it 
is clear that in a trial by a court with the aid of 
assessors the judge is required to pronounce the verdic1 
irrespective of what the opinions of the assessors may 
he, the judge should therefore write a judgment stating 
his reasons for whatever conclusion he reaches upon the 
evidence adduced before him.” 8^
The general principle stated by the learned Chief 
Justice is true for the rest of West Africa, except for 
Sierra Leone where, if the opinions of the assessors are 
unanimous, such opinions constitute the decision of the 
court, but If they are not unanimous the decision rests 
exclusively in the judge who must record in writing his 
reasons for the decision.8^
The rules regarding the opinions of assessors in 
criminal cases are spelt out more clearly in the Ghana 
Criminal Procedure Code than elsewhere. Section 287 
stipulates;
w (1) When, in a case tried with assessors, the case on 
both sides is closed, the Judge may sum up the 
evidence for the prosecution and the defence, and 
shall then require each of the assessors to state 
his opinion orally, and shall record their opinions.
(2) The Judge shall then give judgment, and in so 
#oing shall not be bound to conform with the opinions 
of the assessors, but he shall record his judgment in 
writing and in every case the judgment shall contain 
the point or points for determination, the decision 
thereon and the reasons for the decision, and shall 
be dated and signed by the Judge at the time of 
pronouncing It.
A  5)______ _ _I ■ i ii I I) ,■■■*  —-  ..................... - - rr-1—r " il" r ----------------- ------r  r n ir. nr im       ..... ...  ■■ r n.i ntUii     in ■■m inim rti ■ »i 11 i n
8^* Adade v. Reg (1959) Judgments of the Court of Appeal, 
July to December 1959* Cyclostyled p. 79 at 80.
84. Cap. 38, s . 45(1).
(3) If the accused is convi^cted, the Judge shall 
pass sentence on him according to Haw.”
With the exception of Ghana there is no statutory
obligation on the judges In the rest of West Africa to sum
up the evidence for the prosecution and the defence,
although such judges in practice do sum up.00 Whether the
judge sums up to the assessor or not, he should give a
written judgment from which it will appear to all who read
it that he has, in arriving at his own verdict, instructed
himself as fully as his duty would require him to instruct
a jury if he had in fact been sitting with a jury.88 The
judge is the tribunal both of fact and of law, and failufce
to direct the assessors on a point of 3aw would not as a
rule necessitate the quashing of a conviction, as it would
in a jury trial.817 A summing-up, which if addressed to a
jury might be criticised as being dogmatic, cannot be
criticised on that account when addressed to assessors. It
serves rather to indicate the j\idge!s approach to the
     / case
85. MACAULAY, B. op c it ♦ (1960) Crim .L.R. 751; Caulker v* 
The Queen (1959) 16 WACA p. 63.
80 * Bar pong v. Reg. (1959) Judgments of Ghana Court of
Appeal, July-December 1959. Cyclostyled. p. 87 at p.88 
per Granville Sharp.
87. See, e.g. R. v. Bio (Sierra Leone Prot.) 11 WACA. p/^ P; 
R. v. Wuseni LrtW) 5 WACA 73; Caulker v. The Queen 
(19 59) 16 WACA 63; R. v. Dagartl (Ghana! 10 WACA S7».
(Ghana! 13 WACA 134.
* King
i m  I, in,, iHnffirn.il L .. ■***
case and the way he regarded various items of the evidence# 
If his approach and sriew were wrong, the summing-up may he 
criticised on that account as affecting the soundness of
OQ
his decision.
Another departure from jury trial is the fact that, 
after the summing-up, each of the assessors is required to 
state his opinion orally in open court.80 Thus the element 
of secrecy which underlies jury trial is missing. Further, 
unlike jury trials, assessors are required to give their 
opinions individually. The provision which enjoins 
”dissenting” assessors to give their reasons can he 
described as an improvement on the jury system. According 
to Sir Patrick Devlin (as he then was) the jury merely 
says yes or no. Indeed it is not allowed to expand upon 
that and its reasons may not be inquired into. It is the
QQ
oracle deprived of the right of being ambiguous.
The foregoing are some of the main differences between the
two systems.. Trial by a Judge with the aid of assessors
has many advantages which commend themselves to the West
African situation. There is, however, one aspect of the
system of assessors which needs reforming. It is this,
 ___________  / tha t
■m—i— T rT —— ‘Tin i*  Ill i i ii ' ' I   I'nrfcmn— iiin nm-irf-Ti T r i T imnn m .  - f t.i.i.m -i* -in .inwrfimn1 niiip.~i i w n i mi — i— mini i i >M ii i im iiiii. ii i i» ri.'m iiiwii i . . i i i i iw r t r r « T t m i » i ii>i n . i i n i i i iW iw i i i i r r n ^ iw
88* Caulker v. The Queen.
89. Dhalamini v. Rex £1942[J A.G. 583. See also Jearey, op 
cit. (1961) JAL 88.
00* Op cit. p. 14. See a Is o The Times December 14, 1956; 
The Observer., June 21 1956; The Times December 1, 1961 
Trial without Jury” - Observer, February 25, 1962. 
ALLEN, C.K. ”The layman and the law” (1959) J. Inter­
national Commission of Jurists, Vol. 2(1) 57-67.
that judges should pay the greatest respect to the unanimous 
opinions of assessors. The fact that their decision is 
unanimous against conviction should indicate to the judge 
the existence of reasonable doubt. In spite cf the over­
whelming support given to the system by one of the out stand­
ing English judges, It Is submitted that the jury system as 
it exists in England today is suitable neither f cs? England 
nor for West Africa. As Dr. G-lanville Williams put it, 
uTo entrust the defendant* s liberty to a jury on these terns 
is not democracy; it is certainly aristocracy ; it is 
the despotism of small, nameless, untrained, ephemeral 
groups, responsible to no-one and not even giving reasons 
for their opinion1* .91
III PREROGATIVE WRITS92
The legal maxim that prex»ogative writs form part of
the common law of England admits of no doubt.93 in the
/words
91. The Listener. August 24th, 1961, p. 280.
92. For further reading see; CHITTf, J.j A treatise on 
the law of the prerogatives of the Crown, etc• 1820• 
SHORT, F.H. & MELLQR, F.H.s The practice on the Crown 
side of the King*s Bench Division, etc. 2nd ed. 1908. 
HALSBURX*S Laws of England, 3r& ed* Vol. 11.
93* Ee Mwenya(1959J"-3 All E.R. 525 at 533.
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words of Sir William Blacks tones
MBy the word prerogative we usually understand 
that special pre-eminence, which the king hath over 
and above all other persons, and out the ordinary 
course of the common law, in right of his regal 
dignity. It signifies, in its etymology (from prae 
and rogo), something that is required or demanded 
before, "or in preference to, all others. And hence 
it follows, that it must be in itsnature singular 
and eccentrical! that it can only be applied to 
those rights and caxca cities which the king enjoys 
alone, in contradistinction to others, and not to 
those which he enjoys in common with any of his 
subjects: for if once any one prerogative of Hie 
Crown could be held in common with the subject, 
it would cease to be prerogative any longer. And 
therefore Finch lays it down as a maxim, that the 
prerogative Is that law in case of the king, which 
is law in no case of the subject*u 94
Of all the prerogative writs the best known ares-
(a ) Habeas corpus ad subjicienduma commonly known 
as the writ of habeas corpus.
(b) Certiorari.
(c) Prohibit!on.
(d) Maddamus.
By the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act, 1938,^5 which does not apply In 
_ _ ______     /countries
94. 1 Comm. 239. But see a very stimulating article - uThe 
Prerogative writs** (1951) 11 Cam.L.J. 40-56, where the ^ 
author, S.A. de Smith (as he then was) makes the ffffooufiny 
comments:- **Most modern writers have said that prerogative 
writw are writs which originally were issued only at the 
suit of the king but which were later made available to 
the subject. This view cannot be accepted without a number 
of reservations. Prohibition and habeas corpus appear to 
have issued on the application of the subjects from the 
very first; and although writs of certiorari and mandamus 
were initially royal mandates issued for diverse purposes 
of government, their earliest use in judicial proceedings 
seem* to have been to rectify wrongs due to subjects..
p.t.o.
95. 1 & 2 G-eo. 6, Csg$}. 63.
countries in West Africa,96 it was provided that the pre­
rogative writs of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition 
should be abolished and replaced by orders of the same name 
The Act left habeas, corpus inviolate as a writ with the 
old procedure, as it was apparently feared that to meddle 
with habeas corpus m ight be misconstrued as subversive c>pihti
( ' V i  U o f i  q r y
aoMvMfr. As prerogative writs form part of the common
law, they are in force in West Africa by virtue of the
provision which stipulates that the common law, the
doctrines of equity and statutes of general application as
at a particular date in England shall apply in a particular
t e r r i t o r y * 98 The writ of habeas corpus Is of high
constitutional importance and the other three writs are 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ ___     /used
94. (cont.) ...It Is nevertheless true to say that when,
In the 17th and 18th centuries these various writs came to 
be called prerogative, it was because they were conceived 
as being intimately connected with the rights cf the 
Crown." pp. 40-41.
96. However, an error in applying for an Order instead of 
a writ is not fatal and a judge can amend it. See The 
^Resident, Ibadan Province, & an or. v. Laguniu (1954*7 14
mi.n<n iiorfiiH)M'in|.fif JffnMin n ii>~ U tihhim m i n - w w i — in n w ii.i.mwii'.i.w.liii .i.utt ■— —  - Miiii.niimBTMiiiiir»im>iliiifcM i
W.A.C.A. 549.
97. BE SMITH, S*A. op cit. at p. 40.
98. See, e.g. N.Reg. High Court Law, No. 8 pf 1955, s. 28.
But by s . 20(1) of the High Gt. of Lagos Law, Cap. 80, pre­
rogative writs of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari 
should not be issued by the High Court. By s. 20(1) the 
High Court is Invested with all the jurisdiction of the 
English High Court to make orders of mandamus, prohibition 
and certiorari. This section is more in line with the U.K. 
Act of 1938. S. 14B of the G-ambia Law of Engand (Applic­
ation Amendment) Ordinance, No. 11 of 1957, makes 
similar provision.
295
used to control inferior courts and other persons and 
hodies exercising judicial s C c f T s ^  •
(a ) Habeas corpus. The importance of this writ cannot 
be over-emphasised* According to Ha3sburyfs haws of 
E n g l a n d . uThe Writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum,* t*Bw*rwninMw«^rTTfnriin~ nnnwrmmyr 1 .*»i nnn~i"|TTt ■■.iiinnfmnlnn nmninin pi~ mi i nr«i Tito *"T r . ■•••"if “i—i~n—fmr-m .fi-n-Trm— i i r • w
unlike the other writs of habeas corpus, is a prerogative 
writ, that is to say, it is an extraordinary remedy, which 
is issued upon cause shown in cases where the ordinary 
legal remedies are inapplicable or inadequate*9 As Lord 
Birkenhead said of that writ on an appeal to the Privy 
Council; 9It is perhaps the most important writ known 
to the constitutional law of England, affording as it 
does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal 
restraint or confinement ... It has through the ages been 
jealously maintained by Courts of law as a check upon 
illegal usurpation of power by the executive at the cost 
of the liege9 ,3- The right to apply for the writ of habeas
99. Vol. 11, 3rd. ed. p. 26.
1. Secretary of State for Home Affairs v. Ob r i e n  0.9233 
A.C. 603. at 609. Eabrovsky v. Gen. Officer commanding
wfe iiw ip w iw ia iim i I*..n i.in.W ■ im miinif ■ mm on n i»i i »-n  ir.i prr m i i n mn iii im i n    i >f—
Palestine 0-9493 A.C. 246 P . C . " i t  has heen said
that each word of this writ is of more value than 
is a library of books written in praise of liberty. 
Habeas corpus is the key that unlocks the door to 
freedom9 - G003DHART, A.L. The migration of the common 
law, p. 9*
corpus exists at common law independently of any statute, 
although the right has been confirmed and regulated by 
statute.2 It follows, therefore, that it is the common 
law rights to the writ of habeas corpus and the rules 
evolved therein by the English courts, which are in force 
in West Africa.s
The writ is applicable as a remedy in the High Court 
in all cases cf wrongful deprivation of personal liberty 
or in civil and criminal cases, provided there is a dep­
rivation of personal liberty without legal justification.4 
The sole object of a writ of habeas corpus is to secure the 
release of a person who Isunlawfully detained. Where an 
applicant is not detained, It obviously cannot issue, and 
it would be an absurdity to listen to arguments of a 
purely academic nature based on a state of affairs which 
does not in fact exist.5
2. HA IB BURYIS Vol. 11, p. 27. See. e.g. Habeas Corpus law 
of the W. Region of Nigeria, Cap. 42, Laws of W.R* of 
Nigeria, 1959 rev. Nigerla(Constitution) Order in
Council 1960. No. 1652, Chapter III.
3* Eleko v. Govt, of Nigeria (1928} A.C.P.C. 459*
2abrovskyMscase (194tT. In thernat ter of the arrest & 
detention of S.O.K. Dumoga & 12 others. 1961. Cyclo- 
styled judgments, where ADUMUA-BQ3SMAN, J., considers 
this topic at great length. In W©st Africa the writ 
has been invoked for all sorts of purposes. See In re
Native Court of Onitsha (1928) 9 N.L.R. 65.
® • Liversjge v . Anders m  Cl94 2j A.C. 206; Re detention of
Kofi Koree, Dlv. Ct. 1926-9, p. 170 (Ghana). In re
Preventive Detention Act 1958, & In.. re Okine & ors, 
etc7Tl959T G.l.R. p. 2. “
5. Dogah & ors. v. Kwaslnye (1931) 1 WACA 154 at p. 155
r(S ie r"ra ’ Leo ne ) ♦
However, the writ will not be granted where the aim 
behind the application is an indirect method of appealing 
against the decision of an inferior court on a master 
within its jurisdiction.6 In the Western Region of Nigeria 
an application to the High Court for the issue of a writ of 
habeas corpus to secure the custody of a child was refused 
on the ground that questions relating to custody of child­
ren governed by customary law were not justiciable in the 
High Court.?
What is the right of a person whose application for a 
writ has been refused? In the case of Eleko v . Officer 
administering the Government of Nigeria.8 the Judicial Comm­
ittee had decided that a person whose application for a 
writ of habeas corpus has been refused may apply not only 
to every superior court of competent jurisdiction, but also 
to every High Court judge In turn. Lord HAILSHAM, L.C. 
who delivered the advice added; wThe same principle ^ as 
existed in England_/must apply In the case of judges of the 
Supreme Court of Nigeria.9 9
ni>iWrmt~nTBffm~nnigw*rtl1THMii^ |ii iin— ii^ini«*.Bmi*iii.*Hn iiHiihu ■■■ ' wriniilii ■lMlflu hi ihmii.hH i-iii W I  ^lil >iiiiHniliiiM»mn inn HHIM»||I» nrmi.urHiiirifhi w  i «MniMW.tir-ni^wirri,,>ii— twnrnfcM^ r— rmiffrrffr-nimtMmrT1 t t  |. . IMII fcn"ii11 _iii ii <
6. Ibid. p. 155.
^• OmodIon v. Fasoro (I960) W.R.N.L.R. p. 2V. See also
Infants Law (1958) Gap. 49, 1959 Rev. of L§mvs of W.R.
of Nigeria, Part III.
8. £192gJ A.C.J.C. 459.
9. £19283 A.C. 459 at p. 469.
But in an English case, Re Hastings ,10 the Chancery 
Division of the Courts ruled that 9 this supposed right was 
an illusion9 . Eleko* s case was not formally disapproved, 
hut HARMAN, J., confessed, however, to have had his belief 
9in that judgment very much shaken by the Irish Case to wh­
ich Lord Parker, C.J. referred9 .11 The decision of the 
Chancery Division was affirmed by the English Gourt of 
Appeal.12 Tils Is another example of a Privy Council 
decision conflicting with that of an English Court of 
Appeal, lhat should be the authority of Eleko1 s case on 
the West African Courts? In 1959 Professor S.A. De Smith, 
writing a note on Re Hastings,1^ suggested that in the 
light of the dicta expressed in the case, it was unlikely 
that the Eleko case would be followed subsequently. The 
decision In Re Hastings attracted a good deal of attention 
and brought to light again the defect in English l&w with 
particular reference to the right of a petitioner for a 
writ of habeas corpus when It was refused by a Divisional 
Gourt.14 The result of the public outcry was the enact- 
ment in 1960 of the Administration of Justice Act.1^
10. £l959j 1 All E.R. 698,ao. 3.
H *  Ibid at p. 701 The Irish case is The State (Dowling) 
v. Kingston (No. 2) (1937) I.R. 699.
12. Re Hastings Ho. 3 £19593 3 All E.R. 221.
mi, 1^ 1— ll» I' llj|l|l I Mili^ TI T*"
13. 1 1 9 5 9 L.q.R. 421 at p. 423.
14. See, e.g. The Times 12 & 19, 1959. Letters cf 
Prof. O.H. Phillips and Prof. II.W.R. Wade respectivel; 
The Guardian, August 4, 1959.
15. 8 & 9 Eliz 2, Ca#. 65.
In the Act It is provided that where a criminal or civil
application of habeas corpus has been made by or in respect
of any person, no such application shall again be made by
or in respect of that person on the same grounds, whether
to the same court or judge cr to any other court or judge,
unless fresh evidence is adduced in support of the
application^ and no such application shall In any case
be made to the Lord Chancellor. By s. IStOan ajjpeal lies,
in any proceedings upon application for habeas corpus,
whether civil or criminal, against an order for the
release of the person restrained as well as against the
refusal of such an order. The English Act does
9
not apxDly in Yfest Africa• In the Ghana case of In re
17
Ambbnsah & A pa loo (1960), ' hr. Danqu.ah, Counsel for the
applicants, relying on Ob r i e n 1 s c^se^ 8 unsuccessfully
tried to convince the Court of Appeal as it was then
known, that a right of appeal existed under the common law
for an unsuccessful applicant for a writ of habeas corpus.
The Appeal Court rejected the argument* The learned
judges of the Appeal Court cited the decision in Be
Hastings to refute the learned counsel’s argument and
/added
16. S. 14(2).
I*?• In the matter of the P.P.A. 1958, and In the matter of 
the arrest and detention "of Amponsah & Apaloo. ffee Judgments 
of the Court of Appeal delivered during Jan-June 1960.
Civil Appeal Ho. 7 of 1960, p. 100.
18. [192§) A.C. 603 at pp. 609-10.
addedsuIn our view If there had been a right of appeal in 
Habeas Corpus generally under the common law, there would 
have been no necessity for an unsuccessful applicant to go 
from judge to judge or from court to c o u r t .*1 The Administ­
ration of Justice Act, 1960 clearly confirms the views 
expressed by the Ghana Court of Appeal*
There is no doubt that very shortly legislative 
measures will be taken in the Gambia, Sierra Leone and 
Ghana to improve the position of a person whose applic­
ation for a writ of habeas corpus is refused by the High 
Court. As has been argued earlier, the courts of the three 
countries can easily find a way of avoiding the binding 
effect of Eleko’s case. The courts of Higeria will, 
however, find It difficult to ignore the judgment given 
in that case. Fortunately, the difficulty has been removed 
by the passing of the Administration of Justice (Habeas 
Corpus) Act, Ho. 41 of 1961. This Act is expressed to be 
operative throughout the Federation. Section 2(1) stipulates
Subject to the provisions of this Act, where a 
judge of the appropriate High Court has refused an 
application for a writ of habeas corpus ad subjicien­
dum by or on behalf of his liberty made on the grounds 
that the confinement or restraint is unlawful, or has 
ordered the release of a person confined or restrained 
of his liberty, an appeal shall lie to the Federal 
Supreme Court from the refusal to make, or the making 
of the order, as the case may be.u
/(b)
301 *
(t>) Certiorari. In England “ the writ of certiorari is 
the process by which the King’s Bench Division in the 
exercise of its superintending power over inferior juris­
dictions, requires the judges or officers of such juris­
dictions to certify or send proceedings before them into 
the King’s Bench Division, whether for the purpose of exam­
ining into the legality of such proceedings, or for giving 
fuller or more satisfactory effect to them than could be 
done by the Court below*1.**-9
Order 59, s. 3 of the Annual Practice (1962) states 
that the prerogative writ of certiorari lay to remove pro­
ceedings from inferior courts to the High Court for a 
variety of purposes, sometimes- at common law, “sometimes 
by statute, s aneKLmes at common law as restimated by 
statute**.*20 The most important function of the Order
is that by it, in the exercise of the supervisory capacity 
of the High Court over inferior Courts, judgments, orders,
convictions (other than judgments upon Indictments) or 
_____  /other
19. Short & Mellor op cit. p. 14 • See also Hals bury, 3rd ed# 
Vol. 11, p. 54 et seq. S.A. de Smiths Judicial Review of 
Administrative Action. 1959. The oil gin of this controlling 
power was the writ of certiox^ari, by which the king commanded 
the judges of any inferior court of record to certify the 
record of any matter in their court with all things touching 
the same, and to send it to the king’s court to be examined# 
R v. Her'thumb er land Compen sati on Appeal Tribunal# Ex parte 
Ihaw 1 ^ 5 2 ?  H T W  at 347°™er D M I H T T T j T l a s  he m S a  
wasT *
2q # Short & Mellor cite the following examples? certiorari 
fox'* the removals- of indictments, of co ronex^s inquisitions, 
of summary convictions, of orders generally, cf county rates, 
of Orders of Commissioners, of Orders of Commissioners cf 
Sewers, etc., of Orders of Town Councils or County Councils,
of Auditors allowances or disallowances? and certiorari in 
miscellaneous cases#
3 0 2
other proceedings of inferior courts, whether civil or 
criminal, made without or in excess of jurisdiction, may 
"be removed to the High Court to be quashed.11
The power to exercise supervisory jurisdiction over 
inferior courts by Y/ay of prerogative writs was conferred 
upon the Supreme/High Courts in West Africa by the provision 
which stipulates for the application of English common law?^ 
Sometimes, the extent of these powers is recorded in the
O *2
various court laws. The procedure to be followed is the 
same as that which prevailed in England before the passing 
of the Administration of Justice Act, 1938* In Ghana, 
however, full details cf the English procedure modified to 
suit local conditions have been incorporated into the Courts 
Rules.24
The superior courts in West Africa have jealously
guarded their supervisory powers over courts cf Inferior
/ juri sdi c ti on
21. Annual Practice, 1962, p. 1728.
22. E.g. Ghana CourtsAct (C.A.9) s. 154(4) & Interpretation 
Act, 1960, s. 17. The Queen v. The Resident Opeola 
Province; ex parte Ihpa*h Onah of Igogobe (1957j 2 P.8.
rrn T" f f ■ - “r '  7 iriT mri r r  im l  1 ■ m i  i n   u  n ipiim.ni nn i i ^ i i j m rum irninnlimp . f ipwli mi iPimniiii i i '
C.R.. 30 at p. 31 per EOS TER-SIR T Oh, F.XJ.J-
23. E.g. s. 31 of the Ghana Courts Act, 1960. W. Reg. High
Ct. Law, Cap. 44 (1959 Rev.) s. 19® E. Reg. Magistrates1 
Court Amendment Law. E.R. No. 8 of 1958, s. 2. British 
House of Commons Debates, October 23, 1958.
24. Laws of the Gold Coast, 1954, Subsidiary Legislation, 
Vol. 7; Order! 59 $ s. 14(9) of the Gambia Law of Eng­
land (Application) (A.) Ord. No. 11 of 1957 stipulates
that the rules cf court made under s. 99 of the Engl ish 
Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925 
pursuant to the provisions of s. 10 of the Administration 
of Justice (Misc. Provisions) Act 1938, shall apply 
mutatis mutandis in the courts of the Gacbia.
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Queen
jurisdiction, such as customary courts, Native Authorities, State 
or Traditional Councils* Statutes will be construed so as not to 
oust the supervisory jurisdiction of the superior courts* As 
GRANVILLE SHARP, J*A* observed;
”It must, however, be noted that decided cases of long-standing 
have clearly established the principle that enactments which 
expressly provide that proceedings shall not be removed by 
certiorari to the High Court have no application when the 
lower tribunal has overstepped the limits of its jurisdiction 
or is not duly constituted, or where the party who obtained 
the order obtained it by fraud.” 35
The award of the writ of certiorari (as well as mandamus and pro­
hibition) is discretionary and it is not a writ of r i g h t T h e  writ 
may be granted to quash the proceedings of an inferior tribunal which 
has acted without jurisdiction* It will also lie in cases where
inferior courts have exceeded their jurisdiction*37 in Ghana, for
/example
25* Ahenkora v* Ofe (1957) 3 W*A*L*R* 145 at 151* By a majority 
decision of 2 to 1 , the Ghana Court of Appeal (as it then was) went on 
to hold that In re State Council of Waasaw v* Enimil (1934) Div* Ct*, 
1931-37, p* 61, was wrongly decided*
26. Commr* of Police v. Abassi and ors* (1929) 9 N.L.R. 108: The Res- 
ident, Ibadan Province and anor* v. Lagunju (1954) 14 WACA 549*
27* Reg* v* Akiwumi and Bannerman, ex parte Pako (1958) 3 W*A*L*R*
372 (Ghana). In re Urnoulu Village Group Court ex parte Macaulay and 
Ben (l952) 20 N.L.R. 111. For other grounds for granting the writ, 
see Halsbury, Vol. 11. For the meaning of 11 inferior court11, see 
Halsbury, p* 122. There are a number of High Court decisions which, 
wrongly relying on a passage in Halsbury's (Vol. 11, p. 130) to the 
effect that certiorari does not lie to quash the judgments of inferior 
courts of civil jurisdiction, created the impression that the writ 
does not lie to a native court in its civil jurisdiction. See, e.g. 
cases cited in R. v. Govt, of 33. Nigeria, ex parte Okafor (1955) 21 
N.L.R. 675 and In the matter of the State Councils (Colony and S. Togo- 
land) 0rdinaneeTT952. etc. (Ghana) Civil Ann. No. 66/1957. This vie. 
has been rightly held to be erroneous. As FOSTER-SUTTON, C.J. explains 
the meaning of the statement in Halsbury1s is that certiorari will not 
lie where the former writ of error lay. ,!I am not, however, prepared 
to accede to the proposition that in a country where the writ of error 
never lay, [i.e. Nigeria] the Supreme Court (now the High Court) cannot 
exercise the supervisory jurisdiction by certiorari because in the far 
distant past the procedure by way of writ of error lay in England.” - 
v. The Resident. Ogoja Province and anor (1957) 2 F.S.C. 30.ninn .inn iii* i wrrrM.N'iTi i i —■— .----- ----  --------  —T , ------- | [ , . . mni i ni i . mi . — #
example, where an order of certiorari is made in any such
case, the order shall direct that the proceedings shall he
quashed forthwith on their removal into the ccurt.^ This
rule, "based on the Supreme Court Rules in England, is og
general application in West Africa* In the Nigerian case
of In re Umu olu Village Gf r ou p C ou r t . ^  ^ MBANBFQ* J., (as he
then was) quoted with approval a dictum of Lord Goddard
explaining the reason for the rule* Lord Goddard s§ids
rtIf a Court imposes a sentence which is not auth­
orised hy law for the offence for which the defendant 
is convicted the conviction is bad on its face and 
can be brought here to be quashed. That Is because 
this Court has no power, and has never had any power,
on certiorari to amend the conviction. If such a
power existed, it would enable the court to sit as 
Court of Appeal on justices and we have no such 
juri s di c ti on *H30
Now in England, s. 16(1) of the Administration of
lust ice Act, 1960, has provided that where a pe rson who
has been sentenced for an offence by a magistrates* court,
applies to the High Court for an Order of certiorari to
  ___________ ___________/remove
28. Courts Rules of Ghana Order 59, TT. 6.
29. (1953) Si N.L.R. 111. The case referred to is R. v.
Hillesden Justices Ex parte Uttey 0947*3 2 All E.R.
838 at p.
30. Bpt according to DENNING, L.J. (as he then was) there
is power to quash and order trial again. R. v. North - 
umberland Gompensation Appeal Tribunal 0.9523 1 K.B.
.■ > I rn -  a n in.  unm n n f y  i ihm'iihi inra^iw pr—rum .i r n i m  n r^nr i m. n   wnm— Mi.iiniinnfwiiwm*iHOT..dM»Tnw-.iir>uiiiiiiiMffi—r f j i fin iii iiimin w i' ‘if r- t ii i i n r  9
338. Where there is a right of appeal from the 
decision of the Court below a dissatisfied party may 
nevertheless apply for a writ of certiorari Instead of 
appealing, but he cannot do so until the time for app­
ealing has expired 11 - per MBANEPO, J. (as he then was 
In re Umuolu Village Group Court, supra, at p. 113.
  . i n.m i. Hull!. 111111 11 iMiiii.m im ^ nw ii I»iiwi ■.............. in.  H n I|III —.... .. irniri nnmMiiiiHii irt. i . n * i . . n m Im M iiu .n n n  niwi iim» n iii In 19 nrfnMiiij.IW <■ 9 —*
remove the proceedings of the magistrates* court Into the 
High Court, and the High Court determines that the Magi­
strates* Court had no power to pass the sentence, the High 
Court may, instead of quashing the conviction, amend it by 
substituting for the sentence passed any sentence which the 
Magistrates* Court had power to impose. There 3s a strong 
argument for the universal adoption of this new rule in 
West Africa*
It must be remembered that certiorari is a remedy of
a v&ry special character, and it lies only to remove
.judicial acts *31 pn The Queen v. The Governor in Council
Western Region of Nigeria & ors. QUASH IE-IDUN, C.J. cited
with approval a dictum of Lord Goddard which is as
follows;3*2 uXb will be observed tint the persons must
have authority to determine, and they must be persons 
who have a duty to act judicially. Their Orders if 
they act im excess of their authority, can be reviewed 
by this Court under the Order of Certiorari, which 
has now taken the place cf the writ, but it is 
essential to remember... that there must be something 
that can be called a determination which will affect 
the rights of the party and there must be a tribunal 
whose duty it is to act judicially. It isnot easy to 
give a definition of exactly what Is meant by Mact 
_____________________________________________________ Zj.ud.lola llyn.
v * bt.Gov. W.Reg. & anor (1956) 1 F.S.C.R.57 per 
FOSTER-SUTTON, F.C.J. Hetherington v. Security Export 
Co. £19243 A.C. 9 88«
32. Tl961) W.N.L.R. 86 at p. 89. The English case is Reg,
v. Statutory Visitors to St.Lawrence*s Hospital. 
Caterham; ex parte Pritchard (1953) 1 W.L.R. 1158 at 
p. 1162; 09533 2 All E.R. 766.
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judicially11, but in my opinion, for this purpose the 
expression refers to a body which is bound to hear 
evidence from both sides. Although there need not be 
anything strictly called a 11s 5 it must be a body which 
lias to hear submissions and evidence and come to a 
judicial decision in approximately the way that a 
court must do11.
There is a long series of cases in West Africa which go to 
confirm the view that certiorari will not issue to quash 
the order of a body that has acted in a purely ministolal or 
executive capacity, notwithstanding that its ministerial 
order may have been preceded by a determination of a judicial 
character of another body.33
(c) Prohibit! on. Short and Mellor,34 define the writ 
of prohibition as ua judicial writ issuing out of a court of 
superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court 
for the purpose of preventing the inferior court from 
usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally 
vested, or, in other words, to compel courts entrusted with 
judicial duties to keep within the limits of their juris­
diction... It is a preventive rather than a corrective 
 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ ______     /remedy
33. See, e.g. Dadzie VI v. The A11 or n ey -G ene r a 1 (1933) 1 
WACA 2 71 (Chana). "The Resident, Ibadan 8c anor. v.
Lagunju (1954) 14 WACA 549 (IIIgeria ) g Amaka v. It.Coy ♦
Western Region. (1956) 1 F.S.G.R* 57 (Nigeria) Nyako 
Min, of Local Gqrt. (1956) 2 WALR 147 (Ghana).
See also S.A. de Smiths Judicial Review (1959) p. 281.
34. Op cit, p. 252.
remedy and Is used only to prevent die commission of a
future act and not to undo an act already perfornied.*13^
The expression ‘‘inferior courts11 includes bodies which
have authority to act judicially, such as Traditional
Councils, which have jurisdiction in Ghana in matters
relating to the nomination, election and installation of
chiefs* Thus in Ad/oko v * E d a , ^  a writ of prohibition was
granted to prevent a State Council from exercising its
powers otherwise than had been provided by statute.
Mandamus, “The prerogative writ of mandamus may
be defined as a high prerogative writ, issuing from the
Crown side of the King's Bench .Division of the High Court,
whereby the court, in the King1 sname, commands the person
to whom it is addressed to perform some public or quasi-
public legal duty which he has refused to pefform, and the
performance of which cannot be enforced by any other
adequate legal remedy,11 “A mandamus11, says Lord
Mansfield, “is certainly a prerogative writ, flowing from
the king himself, sitting in this court, superintending the
police, and preserving the peace of this Country,** 38
function of a writ of mandamus is to compel a magistrate
to exercise his jurisdiction! it is not issued as a means 
 ______    _ /of
35. But see a dictum of DENNISON, J. in Nyako v. Min. of 
Local Covt. (1956) 2 WAIR 147 at 1547(lhana ) T ~ ~ ~
36. 11958) 3 WALK 441, see the now Chieftaincy Act 1961,
Act 81.
37• Short & Mellor op cit p. 197. See also HALSBURY, 3rd ed
Vol. 11, p. 84 et sequ.
38. R v. Barker 1 W.B1. 352.
of having his decision reviewed, or compelling him to 
state the reasons for his decision.^ Thus where a magi­
strate re-transfers a case to a native court in a manner 
which is ultra vires, mandamus will issue to compel him 
to hear and determine the c8s e . ^  The writ is often 
resorted to in order to compel traditional councils in 
Ghana to hearand determine matters wof a constitutional 
nature**
Mandamus, therefore, differs from certiorari and 
prohibition in that the last two are used only when an 
inferior court has wrongly exercised or exceeded its juris 
diction, wherea© mandamus is only issued when an inferior 
court has declined jurisdiction*^
IV* THE INDEPENDENCE OP THE JUDGES
The fourth essential feature of the common law is the
principle of the independence of the Judiciary. This
       /principle
39* Peg# v. Magistrate Grade I, Jos (1954) 21 N.L.R. 28 
BAIRAMIAN, J.
40. Henshaw v* Effiong (1925) 6 H.L.R. 114.
41. Kpanynli & an or v. W. N^ma State Council & ors (1957)
3 WALR 190 (Ghana).
42. Also it differs from quo warranto, in that it is used 
to compel an election to a vacant public office, 
whereas quo warranto only questions the election - 
Short & Mellor op clt* 199* By the High Court of Lagos 
Ord. Gap. 80, s. 21 abolishes information in the nature 
of quo warranto. That is replaced by Injunction. But 
proceedings in quo warranto are expressly provided for 
by the W. Region High Court Law, Gap. 44 (1959 Rev.), 
s. 23. Such proceedings are deemed civil proceedings.
principle, says Lord Yfalght, is the life-blood of the common
law and justified the description of the common law as the
law of free peoples.4'^  Lord Denning summed up the position
for England thuss ”Ever s ia ce the Act of Settlement in 1701
it has been part of our constitution that a judge of the
High Court cannot be removed except for misconduct, and
even then, there must be a petition from both Houses of
Parliament for his removal” .^4 However, In Tdrell# v. Sec*
retary of State for the Colonies,45 Hard GODDARD held that
section 3 of the Act of Settlementms not p&rt cf the
English law which Englishmen carried with them to the
Straits Settlement or to any colony; for that section,
which stipulated that English judges were to be appointed
during good b<tiav.Iour was a comparatively modern Innovation
applicable only to English judges of the superior courts*
The effect of that judgment was that, whilst English
judges were appointed quamdiu se bene gesserint (i.e. during
their good behaviour), colonial judges, unless otherwise pro
vided by law, held office during the pleasure of the Crown 
- — ____________________________ __________________in. . e * the
43. Legal Essays, p. 334*
44. The changing law, p. 4.
45. 7l953Z^  ^ .B • 482. But Colonial Regulations provided
that any proposal to dismiss a judge had to be
referred by Hie Secretary of State to the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council.
4 6the Executive) as is the Ca^e in the Gambia Colony.
The first reaction to Lord Goddard1 s judgment Is
contained in the resolution of the Commonwealth Empire
Law Conference, 1955, which heads as follows ;”This
Conference Is of the opinion that the Supreme or High
Court Judges of the Colonial Empire should he appointed to
hold office during good behaviour and not during Her
it 47Majesty1 s pleasure*1. The principle of the independence 
of thw judiciary was reiterated at the International 
Conference of Jurists held at New Delhi in 1959.48 
Clause 1 of the Report of Committee IV is as follows;
uAn independent Judiciary isan indispensable 
requisite of a free society under the Rule of Law. 
Slich independence implies fx*eedom from interference 
by the Executive or Legislative with the exercise 
of the judicial function, but does not mean that 
the judge Is entitled to act in an arbitrary manner. 
His duty is to interpret the lawand the fundamental 
principles and assumptionsthat underlie it. It is 
implicit in the concept of independence set out In 
the present paragraph that provision should be made
/for
46. Supreme Court Qrd. Cap. 5 (1955 rev.) s. ”whwnever 
the office of Judge becomes vacant by death or other­
wise, the Governor may appoint another fit and proper 
person to fill such office until Her Majesty’s 
pleasure be known.” See also British colonial judge; 
(1956) by the Inns of Court Conservative and Unionist 
Society.
47. Cited by CHITEPO, H.W. at p. 75 of the Report of the 
African Conference on the Rule of Law, Lagos, 1961. 
Published by the International Commission of Jurists, 
Geneva, 1961.
48. Journal of the International Commission of Jurists 
Vol. 2 (1959) p. 16. Ke-affirmed at Lagos In 1961.
”for the adequate remuneration of the judiciary 
and that a judge1 s right to the remuneration settled 
for his office should not during the tern of office 
he altered to his disadvantage.
Clause 3s ”The principle of irremovability of the Judiciary 
and their security of tenure until death or until a 
retiring age fixed by statute is reached, is an impor­
tant safeguard of the Rule of Law. Although it Is 
not impossible for a judge appointed for a fixed term 
to assert his independence, particularly if he is 
seeking re-appointment, he is subject to greater 
difficulties and pressure than a. judge who enjoys 
security of tenure for his working life.”
Clause 4s uThe reconciliation of the principle of irrem­
ovability of the Judiciary with the possibility of 
removal in exceptional circumstances: necessitates 
that the grounds for removal should be before a body 
of judicial character assuring at least the same 
safeguards to the judge as would be accorded to an 
accused person in a criminal trial.”
These principles have already gained a firm footing
in Africa. Thus In Nigeria,49 and Sierra L e o n e , 50 The
Chief Justice is appointed by the Governor-General, acting
in accordance with the advjfoe of the Prime Minister. In
Ghana the Chief Justice is appointed by the President from
aiong the judges of the Supreme Court. ^  The judges of
the superior courtS in N i g e r i a , 52 and Sierra Leone,^3
appointed by the Governor-General, acting in accordance
with the Judicial Service Commission. In Ghana although 
  / the
49. The Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council 1960.
2nd Schedule art. 105.
@0. Sierra Leone (Constitution) Order in Council 1961. The 
2nd Schedule art. 76/0
51. The Ghana Constitution, Art. 44(1).
52. E.g. 4th Schedule - The Constitution of Western 
Nigeria, art. 49(2).
53. Sierra Leone (Constitution) Order in Council 1961 <wt.
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the judges of the superior courts are appointed by the 
President,*^ in practice it is the Chief Justice who sub­
mits proposed appointments of judges for signature by the 
President
Subject to the compulsory retiring age, judges in 
West Africa can be removed from office only for inability 
to discharge the functions of their office (wwhether 
arising from infirmity of body or mind or any other cause) 
or for misbehaviour** * ^ 6 The procedure for removal in Si err 
Leone and Nigeria differs from that of Ghana. The provision 
for Sierra Leone (which is practically the same as Nigeria] 
is as follows? (Section 77(4);57
11A judge of the Supreme Court shall be removed from 
office by the Governor-General if the question of 
removal of that judge hasat the request of the Gov­
ernor-General ^ made in pursuance of sub-section (5) 
of this section, been referred by Her Majesty to the 
Judicial Committee of Her Majesty1 s Px*ivy Council 
_ _ _ _ _    /under
54. The Ghana Constitution, Art. 45(1).
55. Statement of Sir Arku Korsah, C.J. of Ghana. African 
Conference on the Rule of Law. Lagos (Report), p. 141. 
The learned Chief Justice added? ^In brief, judicial 
organization in Ghana is a very faithful copy of the 
English model and there are very satisfactory guaran­
tees of an independent judiciary.1*
56. Western Nigeria (Constitution) 4th Schedule to the 
Nigerian Constitution, 1960. Art. 5©£2). There are 
similar provisions for Sierra Leone. In Ghana the 
expression is **for stated misbehaviour5* - Ghana Const­
itution, Art. 45(3).
57. Sierra Leone (Const.) 0-in»C, 2nd Schedule. This 
method is common In the constitutions of ex-British 
African territories. Bee also He Smith, S.A.s **Funda- 
mental rights In the new Commonwealth** (1961) 10 
I.C.L.Q. 83*102; 25-237.
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under any enactment enabling Her Majesty in tiiat 
behalf* and the Judicial Committee has advised Her 
Majesty that the judge ought to be removed from office 
for inability as aforesaid or for misbehaviour.
(5) wIf the Prime Minister represents to the Governor- 
General that the question of removing a judge under 
this section ought to be investigated* then
(a) the Governor-General shall appoint a tribunal 
which shall consist of a chairman and not less than 
two other members, selected by the Govexn or-General^ 
acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime 
Minister, from among persons who hold or have held 
ibffice as a judge of a court having unlimited juris­
diction in civil and criminal matters in some part 
of the Commonwealth or a court having jurisdiction 
in appeals from any such court;
(b) the tribunal shall enquire into the matter and 
report on the facts thereof to the Governor-General 
and reccmmend to the Governor-General whether he 
should request that the question of removal of that 
judge from office should be referred by Her Majesty 
to the Judicial Committee; and
(c) if the tribunal so recommends, the Governor- 
General shall request that the question should be 
referred accordingly.
(6) If the question of removing a judge from office 
has been referred to a tribunal unler sub-section (5) 
of this section, the Governor-General, acting in 
accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister, 
may suspend the judge from performing the functions 
of his office, and any such suspension may at any 
time be revoked by the Governor-Genera 1, acting in 
accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister, and 
shall in any case cease to have effect-
(a) if the tribunal recommends to the Governor- 
General that he should not request that the question 
of removal of the judge from office should be referred 
by Hex'1 Majesty to the Judicial Committee; or
(b) if the Judicial Committee advises Her Majesty 
that the judge ought not to be removed from office.
/(?)
(7) The provisions of this section shall he without 
prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (5) of 
section 76 of this Constitution.u §8
The procedure for removal froxn the office of a judge
in Ghana follows the present pattern in the United
Kingdom. A judge can be removed by the President only
uin pursuance of a resolution of the National Assembly
supported by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the
Members of Parliament and passed on the grounds of
stated misbehaviour or infirmity of body or mindH .®®
58. Sub-section 5 of s. 76 deals with appointment for a 
limited period.
59. Ghana Constitution. Art 45(3).
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Chapter Five 
As ASPECTS OF CIVIL (COMMON) LAW IN WEST AFRICA
(1) CONTRACTS
The English law of contract being part of the common 
law is in force in West Africa In so far as local con­
ditions permit. As the late Professor Dicey observed*
11 Nine-tenths, at least* of the law of contract* and the 
whole, ov nearly the whole, of the law of torts are not 
to be discovered in any volume of the s t a t u t e s . 11!
Therefore in order to ascertain the law relating to con­
tracts in West Africa, one has to rely mainly on English 
judge-made law. There are, however, certain asiuects of the 
law of contract, which, since they are peculiar to the 
English should not have been exported to West Africa in the 
first p4ai.ce. One such example is the English doctrine cf 
consideration. Lord Wright has described consideration as 
uperhaps the most characteristic and fundamental doctrine In 
the common law relating to contracts. Save in contracts 
under seal, no contract can be valid in law unless there is 
consideration. But some doubt may be felt as to its value 
when it is realised that it is peculiar to the common law.
No other modern system has any such notion; the Code Civil
does indeed provide for^!,causew as a condition of contract,
... . - .. , , ,   /But
1. DICEY, A.V.s Lectures on the relation between IgTwTand
public opinion in England dulling the nineteenth century. 
(2nd ed), p. 362.
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but it seems tfl> be agreed that the provision is not 
practically significant* The Roman-hutch law and Scottish 
law know nothing of consideration; m o d e m  Codes* the C-erman 
and the Swiss, have disregarded the notion* Consideration 
is thus clearly no necessary pa rt of a civilized law of 
contract*^ Indeed, in 1937, the Law Revision Committee 
set up in Eng Hand under the chairmanship of Lord Wright, 
produced a valuable report on the Statute of Frauds and 
the doctrine of consideration*^ The Committee inter alia 
recommended the repeal in England of sect! on 4 of the 
Statute of Frauds, section 3 of the Mercantile Law Amend­
ment Act, 1856, and section 4 of die Sale of Goods Act, 
1893, paragraph 16* It also made proposals for alteration 
in the law relating to consideration and to .jus quaesiturn
tertio. The main recommendations of the Committee were not
accepted in the spirit with which the report had been 
written* The only action which has been taken Is the pass­
ing of the Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act 1954, 
which amended section 4 of the Statute of Fraudes, 1677, an 
repealed section 4 of the Sale cf Goods Act, 1893* Accord­
ing to Cheshire and FIfoot, there is a slender chance of 
____________ _ ________ _ _ _ _ __________________________________/the
2. Legal Bssaya. p. 375.
3 ‘ Sixth Interim Report. 1937, Cmd. 5449.
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the r©i:>ort being accepted in England.^
Par from being daunted by the temerity shown by the
English Parliament on this issue, the Parliament of the
Ghana Republic has been bold and realistic in adopting the
recommendations of the Law Revision Committee in the
Contracts Act 1960.^ It is not a codification of the
whole law of contract* The long title describes it as an
MAct to amend the law of contract and to replace certain
Imperial enactments** • Part III lays down the law relating
'.n rtspec-{- o f omf~ro.<Jrs
to consideration's follows:-
Section 8(1) UA promise to keep an offer open for 
acceptance for a specified time shall not be invalid 
as a contract by reason only of the absence of any 
consideration therefor*
(2) A promise to waive the payment of a debt or part 
of a debt or the performance of some other contractual 
or legal obligation shall not be invalid a® a contract 
by reason only of the absence of any consideration 
therefor•
Section 9. nThe performance of an Act or the promise 
to perform an act may be sufficient consideration for 
another promise notwithstanding that the performance 
of that act may already be enjoined by some legal 
duty, whether enforceable by the other party or not*
Section 10. wNo promise shall be invalid as a contracl 
by reason only that the consideration therefor is 
supplied by someone other 'than the promisee.1*
The foregoing provisions show a clear departure from 
 ..       /the
4. CHESHIRE, G.C* & FIFOOT, : The law of contract.
5th ed., 1960, p. 92.
5. Act 25 (Ghana). See a note on the Act by READ, J.S. in 
(1961) 5 J.A.Li 48-50.
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the existing common l&w rules in England* Section 5* which
relates to privity of contract appears to he directly
contrary to the English law on the same point The
English law was restated in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd*
v* Self ridge Ltd* by Viscount HALDAHE as follows
u *.,Only a person who is a party to a contract can sue 
on it • Our 3a w knows nothing of a ,ius quaesiturn tertio 
arising by way of contract* Such a light may be con™ 
ferred by way of property, as, for example, under a 
trust, but it cannot be ecuferred on a stranger to a 
conttact as a right to enforce the contract in personam*
Another exception 1ms been added to the list by section 25(3
of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, which provides
that %
^Where goods are sold by a supplier subject to a con­
dition as t o the price at which those goods may be re­
sold, either generally or by or to a specified class 
or person, that condition may, subject to the provisions 
of this section, be enforced by the supplier against an:? 
person not party to the sale who subsequently acquires
I I I II—1... ■ ■ II I II- — .. — — I ■ I f — r 1 '----  ------------r~ • Hu - ir~--   n r • *i « m " r  111 TIT If  ~ .rimnm 11 1 - i-**rr~r ■■---i i ■" T t  ff'i i i—ti rn  !*—■■
the goods with notice of the condition as if he had been
'ff—w w w m  « wh"p b i>—<i**» 'nn i — ■ m  i * iu >m  ■ »*M<-*. lniirT'— im iu w i n w .in u m f .iu ftM   i n  i . n *■ n —m i ip m m i  *>■ it. m  .■ n,
party thereto•”8
On the other hand, section 5(1) of the Ghana Contracts 
Act, following the recommendation of the English Law 
Revision Committee provides that **Any provision in a 
contract made after the commencement cf this Act which pur­
ports to confer a benefit on a person who is not a party to 
_.n . ,....    ,     /the
6* See READ, J.S.: uChange in the law of contract** (1961) 5
J,A*L. p. 49* CHESHIRE & FIFOOT op cit, PP. 67 & 367.
7. G.91$J A*G• 847 at p. 853.
8. Writer* s underlining*
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the contract ... may, subject to the provisions of this
Part,® be enforced or relied upon by that person as though
he were a party to the contract11;^ -® but subsection (1) does
not apply to?-
t!(a) a provision in a contract designed for the 
of resale price maintenance, that is to say, a 
provision whereby a party agrees to pay money or 
otherwise render some valuable consideration to a 
person who is not a party to the ccntract in the event 
of the first-mentioned party selling or otherwise dis­
posing of any goods, the subject matter of the contract 
at prices lower than those determined by or under the 
contract; or
(b) a provision in a contract purporting to exclude or 
restrict any liability of a pez^son who is not a party 
thereto#11 2-1
Part IV*, which relates to Con tracts of Guarantee, is
drafted on the lines suggested by the Minority Report of
the EngTLsh Law Revision Committee of 1937# Section 14(1)
stipulates that contracts of guarantee shall be void
wunless it is in writing and is signed by the guarantor or
his agent, or is entered into in a form recognised by
customary law1*# This section is a good example of the
efforts of the Ghana Government to eradicate the dichotomy
of laws existing in that country#
Part I which deals with frustration of contracts follow
. ___ /aImps t
9. Part II of the Act relates to third party rights.
Ss'ss # 6 & 7 deal with M Assignment'* and to priorities 
based on the English rule in beadle v# Hall (1828) 3 
Rus s . 1#
10. The Ghana case of Amuakwa v. Any on (1936) 3 WAG A 22, 
which is authority for *the statement tint only a party 
to a contract can sue is therefore obsolete.
11. S. 5 (1) & (2).
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almost word fof word the English Law Reform (Frustrated 
Contracts) Act, 1943.-^ Section 11 of the Ghana Contracts 
Act is another provision which gives statutory recogaition 
to customary law. It provides tint "subject to the prov­
isions of any enactment , and to the provisions of this Act, 
no contract ... shall be void or unenforceable by reason 
only that it Is not in writing or that there is no memor­
andum or note thereof in writing** •
Finally, section 32, is welcome in s o far as it 
abolishes the antiquated English rule that contracts by 
corporations have to be made under s eal,^ The reasons for 
the general rule that contracts and other documents to be 
legally binding upon a corporation cr the person contracting 
with it must be executed under its common seal was stated 
by Blaekstone to be that?^
nA corporation, being invisible body, cannot manifest its 
intention by any personal act or oral discourse. It 
acts and speaks only by its common seal."
But what was a sound rule in Blaekstone* s time may be an
anachronism in the nunc 1 ear age.
The English Law Reform Committee, reporting in 1958,
recommended that the law in England should be changed.
12. 6 & V Geo** 6, C. 41.”™
13. But there were many exceptions, e.g. by s * 32 of the
English Companies Act, 1948, companies registered 
under the Companies Acts, and Trading Corporations
acting In the course of their business can contract in
the same way as individuals.
14• 1 Comm. 475.
15. Law Reform Committee. Eighth Report. Cmnd. 622.
321
The Corporate Bodies Contracts Act, I960,16 carried out that 
recommendation by enabling a corporation to contract in the 
same way as an individual of full age and capacity.
Section 12 of the Ghana Contracts Act, which is based on the 
English Act, is therefore up-to-date in that respect.
The Western Region of Higeria Contracts Law, 1958,^  
makes provisions with regard to specific topics. Part II of 
the law reiates to contracts for the sale of land, and con­
tracts of guarantee. By section 2 it is provided that HNo 
action may be brought upon any contract for the sale or 
other disposition of land or any interest in land, unless 
the agreement upon which such action is brought, or some 
memorandum or note thereof, is in writing, and signed by the 
party to be charged or by some other person thereunto by 
him lawfully authorised.*1
Section g stipulates that;
ul\fo action shall be brought whereby to charge the
defendant upon any special promise, whether made before
or after the commencement of this law to answer for the 
debt, default or miscarriage of another person unless 
the agreement upon which such action is brought or 
some memorandum or note thereof is in writing and signed 
by the party to be charged therewith or some person 
thereunto by him lawfully authorised•11
This statutory requirement is based on the amended version
of section 4 of the Statute of Frauds, 1 6 7 7 . Lack of 
  _______   , ___w  /writing
16. 8 & 9 Eliz. 2 G. 46.
17. Laws of the Western Region ho. 22 of 1958 (1959 Rev.)
Cap. 25.
18. See Law Reform Committee (First Report) 1953. Cmd.8809j 
and the Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act, 1954
3 2 2
writing merely makes the contract unenforceable just as it 
is the law in England.-*-9 On the other hand, the framers of 
the Ghana Contracts Act adopted the minority report of the 
Law Revision Committee, 1937, which renders such contracts 
void .
Section 3(2) of the Vi/estern Region Law, which is based
on the English Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856, states?
uNo such special promise being in writing, and so 
signed as aforesaid, shall be deemed invalid to 
support an action, suit, or other proceeding to charge 
the person by whom such promise has been made by 
reason only that the consideration for such promise 
does not appear in writing, or by necessary inference 
from a written document.u
Part III of the Western Region Contracts Law, relates t
^Frustrated Contracts**. Like the Ghana Act, the provisions
made on that topic by the Western Region Law are taken
almost word for word from the English Law Reform (Frustrate
Contracts) Act 1943.
The Law Reform (Contracts) Act, No. 64 of 1961, which
has been enacted for the Federal Territory of Lagos,
contains provisions largely similar to those described for
the Western Region of Nigeria. Thus the provisions relatin
to frustrated contracts originate from the English Act of
1943. Part II of the Law Reform (Contracts) Act, relates
  m   /to
19. A contract of guarantee made orally is not void or 
a nullity but is merely incapable of proof unless and 
until a memorandum complying with the Statute of Frauds 
is prepared/* - U.A.C. v* Jazzar (1939) 15 N.L.R. 67, 
per BUTTLER LLOYD Ag7C.J.
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to contracts for the sale of land* and to contracts of 
guarantee like the provision in the Western Region* 
section 5(2) of the Federal Territory Act stipulates that 
no contract for the sale*etc. of land nshall be enforceable 
by action unless the contract at? some memorandum or note in 
respect therefor is in writing and is signed by the party 
to be charged therewith or by some other person lawfully 
authorised by himn • But section 5(3) goes on further to 
provide that nothing in that section shall5
(a) apply to any contract for the sale or othe r disposition 
of land made under customary law;
(b) apply to the sale of land by order of any court of 
competent juxrisdiction;^ and
(c) affect the operation of the law relating to past 
performance*
Section 5(b) declares that the section is in substit­
ution for section 4 of the Statute of Frauds* 1677* cf the 
Parliament of England and therefore the latter section 
ceases to be in force in the Federal Territory. The 
provision which deals with contracts of guarantee* like 
the Western Region, stipulates that consideration for the
20. **Court11 means in relation to any mattex'* the court or 
arbitrator by or before whom the raa tter falls to be 
determined.
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COMMERCIAL AND RELATED IAWS
The divergence of t he commercial laws in West Africa 
today is due partly to colonialism and partly to the lack 
of interest shown "by colonial attorneys-gene ral, who paid 
scant attention to nth e need for law reform* As as result, 
the commercial and related laws in West Africa are based 
on English statutes passed at different times• There are 
four main ways by which the commercial laws of England were 
received in West Africa* The first type of reception is 
through the common law* Thus, although ihe United Kingdom 
Partnership Act, 1890, has not been re-enacted in Sierra 
Leone, the Gambia or Ghana, it can be regarded as applic­
able there as a codification of the common law.^Oa By the 
second method, statutes which were of ugene pal application1 
in England before the date of the introduction of English 
law, usually applied to the receiving t err it cry. A good 
example is the Sale of G-oods Act, 1893* By the third 
method, statutes of England passed after the reception date
or sections of such statutes are adopted* Thus the
 ____     /G-ambla
20a* The Act of 1890 is an uAct to declare and amend the 
law of partnership” . For case-law on Partnership, see, 
e *&* H* Van Hein v* Kpaku&( 1925) Div* Ct.r2l-25, p*146i 
Reynard v. Allan (19347~T3 W.A.C.A. 52; HadLaby v. Halabs
1111 . #<iii mi* *  * * nm 11in ,Y a *wh"»iiiw^ih i i* ik r t i l f  M
& an or (1951) 13 W.A *G .A • 180* The Partnership Act, 
1890 of the U.K. is in force in Nigeria as a ustatute 
of general application” . The Western Region has its 
own Partnership Law, No. 44 of 1958 (Cap. 86.)
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Gambia Stamp Ordinance No* 14 of 19 3 7 , ^  adopted the
definition of ^conveyance on sale” , 11 equitable mortgage11
and 11 mortgage1* in the English Stamp Act of 1891* Fourthly,
English Acts relating to commercial law may be”codifiedu
locally* A difficulty arises when an English Act relating
to mercantile law Is repealed or altered* Such an action
may leave the receiving country with the old law, which
has been found to be unsuitable in England*
One way out of this dilemma is to be found in the Civil
Law Ordinance of Malaya* Section 5(1) of the Ordinance,
22
reads %
”ln all questions or issuer which arise or which 
have to be decided in the Colony with respect to the 
law of partnership, corporations, banks and banking, 
principals and agents, carriers by land and sea, 
marine insui^ance, average, life and fire insurance, 
and with respect to mercantile law generally, the 
law to be administered shall be the same as would be 
administered in England In the like case, at the 
corresponding period, if such question or issue had 
arisen, or had to be decided in England, unless in 
any case other provision is or shall be made by 
statute*11
As far as it is known, there never was any such
provision in the laws of West Africa.
(a ) Sale of Goods . The English Sale of Goods Act, 1893
has now been re-enacted in all the four West African
/count rii
21* Laws of the Gambia Cap* 167 ^ 9 5 5  Rev*_7S •
22. ”The Civil Law Ordinance, s. 5(1). A re-appraisal” , by 
CHAN SEE KEONG, (1961) 27 Malaya Law Journal Nos* 8 
& 9.
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countries* As the date for the application of English law 
in West Africa (except in Nigeria) was fixed previous to 
1893, the English Act did not apply to Sierra Leone, the 
Gambia or Ghana until it was re-enacted locally, whilst it
CM
applied in Nigeria as a statute of general application* * 
However, as the English Act merely codifies the common law 
rules relating to the sale of goods, the courts in the 
Gambia, Sierra Leone and Ghana, before local enactments were 
passed, were able to apply the provisions of the Act 
without any difficulty.^ Indeed section 61(2) of the Sale 
of Goods Act, 1893, expressly provides that;
wthe rules of the common law, including the law 
merchant, save in so far as they are Inconsistent with 
the express provisions of this Act, and in particular 
the rules relating to the law of principal and agent, 
and the effect of fraud, misrepresentation, duress or 
coercion, mistake or other invalidating cause, shall 
continue to apply to contracts for the sale of goods**1
23. W* Nigeria No. 43 of 1958 Gap. 115 /1959 Rev.J/*
Sierra Leone No. 20 of 1950 Gap. 225 /1960 Rev. J ;
The Gambia, No. 4 of 1955. Ghana - a Sale of Goods 
Bill has been introduced in 1962* For decided cases o: 
sale of goods generally, see, e *g. Khalil v. Mastroni- 
ko&la (1949) 12 W.A.C.A* 462; Akoahile v. Ogidan (1950 
19 N.L.R. 87; Boshall v. Allied Commercial Exporters. 
Manchester Guardian, 1961.
24. At present the English Act is only in force in all the 
Regions of the Federation, except the Western Region.
25. Thus, before the Ghana Sale of Goods Act was passed,th 
courts freely relied on the provisions of the English
Act, except in name only* See, e.g. Anglo-Guinea Produc
*  —r  V .1.111 II Ill Hill IJMIIIIII.I ill I* llll
Co. Ltd* v. George (1923) Div.Ct. 1921-25. Common­
wealth Trust Ltd. v. Akotey /l926_7 A.C. 72 (The judg­
ment isnow regarded as erroneous). Nanka-Bruce v. 
Commonwealth Trust Ltd. /l926_/ A.C. 77.
Backey v. Fattal (1959) G.L.R. 169 at p. 176.
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In Ghana a Sale of Goods Bill just published, is stated
to?
u *.„. represent in many ways a considerable deja.rture 
frcm the English rules which have hitherto, generally, 
been applied in G-hana®^ The English Sale cf Goods Act 
* cannot be regarded as wholly satisfactory* • A buyer 
is given 1 an extraordinarily wide right cf rejecting 
goods which are perfectly satisfactory1® These restrict­
ions have caused * great and entirely unnecessary c cmplic 
at I onsin the law relating to mi srepresentation and 
mistake* • The English rule that the property in specific 
goods sold jssses to 1h e  buyer as soon as the contract is 
made, 1 is in many respects unfortunate* *H
^Another innovation in this Bill is to be found in 
the section which codifies, as briefly and simply as 
possible, normal commercial practice relating to c.i.f* 
and f• o.b® contracts* * It Is one of the weaknesses of 
the English Sale of Goods Act that it does not mention 
these contracts, especially since so many of the prov­
isions of the Act must be read differently - relying 
always on the 1 contrary intent ionn - in c. i • f . and 
f.o.b. sales*
nThe Bill proposes that customary law should apply to 
all contracts for the sale of goods, *a proposal which 
has the merits of simplicity and uniformity* ®tt ^6a
26* W est Africa, 30 June, 1962, p* 723®
26a. The Bill became law too late for serious study in this 
work. Upon a careful reading of the provisions cf the 
Ghana Sale cf Goods Act, 1962, Act 137 (which has just 
been passed) one finds that there is not a 1 considerable 
departure1 from the English rules. The provisions of 
the Act make use of the English judgments given In 
respect of the Sale of Goods Act 1893. One such example 
is s. 27 of the Crhana Act which deals with the transfer 
of risk® Again, s. 80 of the Ghana Act stipulates that 
1 The rules of the common law and of customary law, save 
in so far as they are Inconsistent with the provisions 
of this Act shall continue to apply to the contracts 
for the sale of goods11.
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There are only a few verbal alterations between the 
various Sale of Goods laws in West Africa. One notable 
difference is in respect of tx*ansfer of title. The Western
overt;, according to the usage of the market,, the buyer acq­
uires a good title to the goods, provided ‘that he buys them 
in good faith, and without notice of any defect or want of 
title on the part of the seller* The Sierra Leone and the 
Gambia Ordinances omit the provision relating to sale of 
goods in a market overt* These countries in West Africa 
must be taken to b e content with the general rule stated
wThe general rule of the law is that where a person 
has obtained the property of another from one who is 
dealing with it without the authority of the true 
owner, no title is acquired as against the owner, 
even though full value be given, and the property be 
taken in the belief that an unquestionable title 
thereto is being obtained, unless the person taking 
it can shew that the true owner has so acted as to 
mislead him into the belief that the person dealing 
with the property has authority to do so#1*
It may also be mentioned that this doctrine was rejected in
America long ago as unsuitable to American conditions*
27* For the raison d*etre of this principle, see COKE, 2 
Ints. 713* The relevant section in the W.R.ISf# Law Is s . 23 
which is a word for word copy of the U.K. Act, s. 22; but 
whereas in the U*K. legislation it is stated that the sectic 
shall not affect the law relating to the sale of horses, 
that of the Western Region of Migeria is silent.
27a# The London Joint Stock Bank v . Simmons /l8927 A.C. 
201 — — - —  — —  ^
Region Law adopts the o3.d English doctrine of 1 market 
o v e r t 17 which says iirat where goods are sold In market
by Lord HElfcHELL thus s^7a
/America
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America sticks to the general principle that nemo plus
OO
juris in alium transferre potest quam ipse habet.
The Western Region case of Economic Exports Ltd, v,
O d u t o l a brings to light the danger involved in incor­
porating English commercial teminology into local statutes 
without consideration of the effect. In an action by the 
plaintiffs for general and special damages for breach of a 
contract for the sale of goods ordered* It was proved that 
the defendant had been in breach and the main question was 
the measure of damages recoverable. JIBOWU* C.J. held that 
the measure of damages was not to be assessed according to 
s. 50(3) of the Sale of Goods Act* 1893 (which is Identical 
to s. 50(3) of the Western Region .legislation) since the 
term ,!available market15 in that section did not mean shops 
in which goods were sold* but a place like the Corn Exchange
or the Coal Exchange tiere goods of the type in question
_   __ /were
28. KENT* J* Commentaries % Vol. 2* p. 324 . The doctrine 
has also been rejected in a number of Commonwealth 
doantries* e.g. Alberta* Manitoba* Nova Scotia and 
Barbados. But it las been adopted in British Columbia. 
See ILBERT * I.; Unification cf commercial law*1 ( 1920) 
2 J.Comp.Leg. (3rd series) 77 at p. 78.
29. (1959) W^R.N.L.R. 239. It is difficult to understand 
why the English Sale of Goods Act* 1893* wa s referred 
to in view of the fact that a Sale of Goods Law* No.
43 of 1958 had been passed by the Western Region 
Legis lature.
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were continuously being sold. 11 In that sense we have no 
such market sin Lagos or Ibadan1*. This decision would appear 
to make section 50(3) of the Western Region Sale of Goods 
Law meaningless.
(b) Company Laws® When Professor L.C.33. Gower was
* hi mi. ii iiiiii tnbi|T~ririi itt'tii i ■~n~n—m—
invited to inquire into the working and administration of th 
existing company law of Ghana, v he was alarmed at the lack 
of uniformity of company laws in West Africa:
Nigeria has an Act based on the English Act of 1908, 
with assorted amendments s i n c e . SI Sierra Leone*s Act is 
based on the English Act of 1929*52 while Gambia*s is 
based on that of 1948.35 Hence at present West Africa 
runs the whole gamut of English consolidating Acts from 
that of 1862 (Ghanaf^to that of 1948 (Gambia4* There 
appears to be no logical reason for this diversity5 it 
seems to result solely from the fact that the Attorneys- 
General of the various territories displayed an 
interest in company law at different dates.1
Final Ibpprt of the Commission of Enquiry into the■n.i.ir< it—rfi—— mrtrptm'igv ml mi mm g->i >n i imimB~irirtirnil-i-.ifn>iHTp-mniiiprmiiiw>w.|ii riii nm «i n.m'iri—t» mm m rm* nun win ■mui. m ...........   iwm ‘"tii i niif mm wmm.m i«hiii.hbi i hiiui mu Mir, a
working and administration of the present company law of
. w fin iM. w 'i.iiH i .nnT.n-F'Mt-. ■«— 11 m 'n n w iiiiim fn  1 ■imiiin . . ♦ ‘if.umj . Mnmininiiiii
Ghana, 1961. For a review of the Report, see 0* K>F,
’^ Report of Committee1* (1962) 25 M.L.R. p. 78.
31. The Companies Ordinance No. 8 of 1912 of S. Nigeria was 
an adoption mutatis mutandis of the Companies (Consolid­
ation Act, 1908 of the U.K. The Ordinance of 1917 of Nig 
eria merely reproduced the former Ord. No. 8 of 1912 (S. 
Nigeria) and Incorporated provisions of the U.K. Company 
(Consolidation) Act of 19(LS. The Companies Ord. No. 54 o; 
1922 reproduced that of 1912 and 1917. The Companies Qr< 
No. 20 of 1929 incorporated the mor^e important changes 
of the U.K. Companies Act of 1928*
32. The 1st Companies Ord. of Sierra Leone was No. 3 of 190* 
which adopted en bloc the Y/hole of the English Acts with 
rules and regulations 1 so far as the same are applicable 
to the circumstances of the Colony11. The Companies Ord* 
No. 18 of 1937, which repealed that of 1924, Is based
on the U.K. Act of 1929.
33. The Companies Ordinance No. 9 of 1955.
34. The Companies Ord. No. 14 of 1906 followed the U.K. Act 
of 1862. This Ordinance virtually unamended and a 
century out-of-date in England, remained the statute law 
in Ghana until the Gower Report of 1961.
331
Perhaps another reason for the lack of interest in the 
development of company laws in West Africa is due to the 
fact that almost all the existing companies were of foreign 
origin*35 The picture is changing and with the rapid 
economic development in Africa now, the need for reform in 
commercial law is greatly felt more than ever now* In 
Nigeria a Company Law Revision Commission has heen set 
up*35 The nature of r e f o m  needed in West Africa to 
improve the laws of commerce should follow the lines 
suggested in the Grower Report set up to inquire into the 
working of company law in Ghana which has been acclaimed 
everywhere as a notable achievement. After considering a 
number of possible solutions, Professor Gower rightly 
decided to draft a Companies Gode Bill properly suited to 
Ghana1s needs, or for that matter sufficiently attractive 
to have any chance of forming tfee basis for uniform legis­
lation throughout the African states. Another reason 
which weighted with Professor Gower In suggesting a codi­
fication of the company laws is that thereby greater unif­
ormity of the laws in this field would be of enormous
/economic
35. Indeed, decided cases on company law are negligible. 
Those worth mentioning are - African Commerc1a1 
Corp. Ltd* v. Holm (1926) L i v . C t 1926-29, p. 53;
Obu v* Strauss & Co. Ltd. (1947) 12 W.A.C.A. 277 and 
281 P.O.| Lagos Chamber of Commerce v. Registrar of 
Companies (1952*) 14 W.a 7 c .a 7 197.
36* See West Africa. April 7 1962.
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economic value to the African states. With this aim in 
view, professor G-ower has produced a Code, which not only 
blends many of the provisions of English, and American and 
continental laws, but also takes African conditions into 
account. However, since the West African countries are 
familiar with English law, the draft Code Bill leans 
heaviest on English law. Thus Clause 7 stipulates that,
11 the rules of equity and of common law applicable to 
companies shall continue in force except so far as they are 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Code11 * But 
greater freedom of inter pi's tat ion is provided for by Clause 
2 which reads *-
uThis Code and every provision thereof shall reeeiv 
such liberal construction as will best ensure the 
attainment of the objects thereof according to their 
true intent, meaning, and spirit, and in aid of con-* 
struct ion and to ascertain the objects of this Code 
and its several provisions reference shall be made to 
the Report dated the 6th day of April, 1961, of the 
Commission of Inquiry into the Working and Administratii 
of the Company Law in Ghana and to the (Government 
Statement thereon dated.u
Some of the English provisions have been rejected as 
unsuitable to the needs of Ghana. wThe quite Incompre­
hensible and senseless dichotomy of the company 
constitutions in memorandum and articles is given upu .^
By clause 16, both the memorandum and articles of 
association are merged and the word Regulations** is 
substituted. English concepts, such as n authorised capital
37. O.K-F.: (1962) 25 M.L.R. p. 80.
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^issued capital1*, and ** pa id -up capital** disappear in the 
limbo of legal history and are replaced - partly on the 
pattern of American legislation - by the new concept of 
the Mstated capital** (Clause 66)* Non-voting shares are 
banned (Clauses 31, 49, & 50)* In explaining the reason 
for this action, Professor Gower saysj^B
uThe traditional pattern of English company laws 
is to allow complete freedom so that one class of share 
even equity shares may be completely deprived of votes, 
or the voting may be weighted in favour of one class* 
This enables one group of persons to maintain complete 
control notwithstanding that they may have only a small 
financial stake in the business... Furthermore, the 
objections to non-voting shares are not merely based 
on unfairness| they lead to a number of abuses which 
seem undesirable in the general Interest.**
Clause 25 modifies the ultra vires doctrine as suggested by 
the English Cohen Committee® The Report of that Committee 
pointed out (Cmd.6659, para. 12) that the doctrine of ultra 
vires has become **an illusory protection for the sharehold­
ers and yet may be a pitfall for third parties dealing with 
the company**. Professor Gower, has therefore based Clause 2 
on section 6 of the American Model Business Corporation Act 
uwhich seems to provide an eminently workmanlike solution*1.
Professor Gower also pays attention to the improvement 
of African businesses. To encourage them, he recommends 
that the one-man company should be openly recognised. Thus 
Clause 8 , which stipulates that !,Any one or more persons
38• Final Report on Company law in Ghana, p . 58*
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may for® an incorporated company in Ghana by complying 
with this Code in respect of registration11 is yet another 
departure from the English provision. As a supplement to 
the Companies Code, Professor Gower has drafted an 15 Inc or- 
porated" Private Partnerships Act, which is also designed 
to help African businessmen. uThe principal weakness of 
the present type of partnership as an organisation for 
African business is that the firm has no separate 
existence and that the partnership is automatically 
dissolved on the death or retirement of any partner*
Under this Bill, a distinction is drawn between the 
partnership relationship and the firm. The f o m e r  id 
dissolved on the death or retirement of any partner. But tl 
firm (the business itself) on registration of the partner­
ship becomes a separate l^egal entity capable of permanent 
survival and its life is not destroyed by a change in the 
constitution of the p a r t n e r s h i p ' * T h i s  is a haiopy blend 
of African and English law. It also enhances Ghana1s 
s ys tem of family bus ines s *
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(°) Miscellaneous . In addition to those already 
mentioned, there are in West Africa the usual laws relating 
to commerce. Thus there are enactments relating to pawn­
b r o k e r s , ^  i n s u r a n c e r e g i s t r a t i o n  of trade marks, stamp 
duties, Bills of Exchange, Bills of Lading, exchange control 
Bills of Sale (except in Ghana), based on English law, 
with minor verbal modifications. Further, the Mioney-lender/ 
Acts of 1900 and 1927 in England form the basis of the mone; 
lenders laws.^ But, apart from Sierra Leone, it is worth 
noting that nthe English Acts of 1900 and 1927 which are 
the fountainhead of the local Ordinance on moneylenders, do
not contain any provision similar to the provision In our
/section
40. E.g. The Pawnbrokers in Ghana (Cap. 189,
1951 Rev.) Gambia (Cap. 177 1955 Rev.); Sierra Leone, 
(Cap. 243, 1960 Rev.), and Nigeria (Lagos) Cap. 146, 
(1958 Rev.) are based on the English Pawnbrokers Act, 
1872 (35 & 36 Viet. C. 93). But, whereas the English Ac 
does not apply to a loan by a pwnbroker of above £10, i 
Ghana the amount Is £50, in the Gambia £10, in Sierra 
Leone and Nigeria (Lagos) £&0.
41. E.g. The Nigerian Insurance Companies Act, 1961, No. I 
of 1961, which is of federal application. The NIgex>ian
Marine Insurance Act No. 54 of 1961 - also of federal
application.
42. 63 & 64 Viet.-0. 51: and 17 & 18 Geo.C.5. In fact, the
Moneylenders .. nr fir in Sierra Leone,
No. 15 of 1941, Gambia, No. 25 of 1954, and in Ghana N< 
21 of 19&0 were based on the Nigerian Moneylenders 
Ordinance No. 45 of 1938, which was itself based on 
the English laws.
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section 3 /which creates a presumption that a person is a 
money lend er/Ja Here there is no need to prove a repetitior. 
of acts which can he branded as acts of a moneylender in 
order to show that a person is a moneylender? it is 
sufficient to show that he has given a lo@n at interest 
or in consideration of a larger sum being repaid, and then 
the onus is shifted on to him to prove that he is not a 
money lender 43 But in the Nigerian case of Egbele v.
Amadu»44 from which the above-quoted extract emanates, 
the learned judge held that presumption was rebutted where 
it was proved that money was advanced to a close friend at 
interest* On the other hand^nthe Gambian case of Parage v*
a 5
Davies, the plaintiff was unable to discharge the onus 
cast upon him by section 3 to prove that he was not a 
moneylender#
Notable omissions in the commercial laws of West Africa
at the moment are comprehensive laws relating to banking ar
bankruptcy. One reference to the latter item is made in
Professor Gower1 s interim report on Company Law in Ghana?
bankruptcy law, fairly but vigorously administered 
might enable the feckless and dishonest few to be 
weeded out to the enormous advantage of the responsible 
and honest manyw •
As a result of his recommendations, an Insolvency Commissio:
43# Egbele v* Amadu (1953*T~20 N.L.R# 131 at p. 132 per 
BAIBAMIAN, J* **“
44* Ibid#
4-5# (1957) 2 W.A.L.R# 324#
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was set up in Ghana in 1960 , which produced a Report in 
1961,46 including a draft Insolvency Bill, now awaiting 
Government action.
There can he little doubt that within the next few years 
large-scale reforms relating to commercial laws will be 
undertaken. That will be the opportune moment for ‘the West 
African governments to pay more attention to the uniformity 
of commercial laws. It may be appropriate to establish a 
body such as the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws,47 established in America for that 
purpose. It is reported that through the work of the 
Conference many uniform laws relating to commerce - for 
example the Uniform Instruments Act, modelled on 'die English 
Bills of Exchange Act - have been adopted by the various 
States of America.
TORTS
The English law of torts, which cons ists largely cf the 
decisions of judges, is in force In West Africa as part of 
the common law. So long as the common law relating to torts 
in England is developed through judicial decisions, the 
courts in West Africa are able (where applicable) to avail 
themselves of the current developments in England. There
/is
I *■'■111' »■««*' v i» i ■■ ^ ■l— n— iimu m iii. n l . i — i "Win .a n . i     ^ w iwiw  .th^ hiih*.    . » wbwiw  ■
46• Report of the Commissioners appointed to enquire into 
the Insolvency Law" of" Ghana , 1961.
47. LAWSON, E.H. Uniformity of laws? a suggestion. (194-4) 26 
J.Comp.Leg. 3rd series, 16-27.
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is, however, a limit to the process of development of the 
common law by means cf the m l e  of stare decisis* However 
competent English judges may be, ha ere are certain aspects 
of the common 3a w which can only be changed by legislation 
and indeed a number of rules in torts have been altered by 
statutes in England to suit modern conditions* But owing 
to the fact that in West Africa, by means of various stat­
utory provisions, the date of the reception of English 
statutes has been fixed in the 19th century, statutes 
passed in England in the 20th century to alter the common 
law rules of tort have been regarded as inapplicable unless 
re-enacted locally* This has resulted in the application c 
certain common law rules of torts in West Africa when they 
have long been abandoned in England* Thus, for a long time
the famous, or infamous, doctrine of common employment,
48
first laid down in Priestly v. Fowler, was regarded as
* i*m' <* mumi*i>iHm mu i— ■»->!• inv*^
applicable in West Africa* Of this case, it has been well
said, *?Lord Abinger planted it, Baron Alderson watered it,
and the Devil gave it increase*1 *^9 Broadly stated, at
common law a master was not liable for negligent harm done
/by
48* (18371 3 M* & W. 1.
49* Cited, in KENNYfS Cases on the law of tort 8 4th ed*
p* 90, quoted by A*L* ©OODHART*? Essays in juris­
prudence ^ 1931, p. 2*
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by one of his servants to a fellow servant engaged in
common employment with him. This defence of c o m  on employ
ment was limited in England first by the Employers1 Liabil
ity Act, 1880, which did not apply in Ghana, and secondly
by the Workmens1 Compensation Acts 1925-45. The la tter
Acts did not apply to West Africa, but an Ordinance
modelled on the English Acts by the Golonial Office was
50
accepted and enacted by the West African governments.
For example, Section 5(1) of the Ghana O r d i n a n c e ,
stipulates that HIf in any employment personal injury by
accident arising out of and in the course cf the employmer
is caused to a workman, his employers shall, subject as
hereinafter mentioned, be liable to pay compensation in
accordance with 'the provisions of this Ordinance1*. There
follows a number of exceptions to the section. The defenc
of common employment was abolished in England by the Law
Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948,^2 but it did not app]
in West Africa.
Fortunately, the wave of judici al ref orrn, which is
sweeping across West Africa, is correcting some of
    ________  /thes e
50* E.g. Workmens Compensation Ordinance Gap. 93 (GambiaX 
(as amended by No* 9 of 1956); Workmens Compensation 
Ordinance, Gap. 222 (Nigeria).
51* Workmens Compensation Ordinance©, Cap. 94 (Laws of Golc 
Coast (1951 Rev.).
52. 11 & 12 Geo 6* C. 41.
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these anomalies • Part I of the Nigerian Law Reform (Torts 
Act* 1961* whhh applies only to the Federal Tex>ritory of 
Lagos* abolishes the doctrine.^ By section 3(1) it is 
stipulated:
wIt shall not be a defence to an employer who is 
sued in respect of persora 1 injuries caused by the 
negligence of a person employed by him* that that 
person was* at the time the injuries were caused* 
in common employment with ih e person Injured* and 
accordingly the Employers1 Liability Act* 1880 of 
the Parliament of the United Kingdom* to the extent 
to which it applies shall caase to be in force.n
It is also provided that any provision contained in a
contract of service or apprenticeship* or in any agreement
collateral thereto shall be void insofar as it would have
the effect of excluding or limiting any liability of the
employer in respect of personal injuri es caused to 'the
person e m p l o y e d .  54* The foregoing provisions bind the Crow;
These provisions are almost identical to those of the Engl
Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act, 1948. Similar prov-
55is ions have been made in Sierra Leone, and the Western 
Region of Niger!a*55 and the Gambia.56a
/Where
53. No. 63 of 1961.
54. S . 3(2) and s. 5.
55. Law Reform (Law of Tort) Ordinance of Sierra Leone,
No. 33 of 1961. Part II* s. 7.
56. Torts Law of the Western Region of Nigeria. W.R. No.4
of 1958.
56a. S. 14A(1) Law of England (Application) (Amendment) 
Ordinance, No. II of 1957.
Ml
Where, as in Ghana, there has not as yet been any 
specific legislation abolishing it, it would appear that 
the defenc e of conmon employment will still be available 
to employers just as it was ruled by the Privy Council in
5 ly
the Indian case of Governor-General in Council v. Wells / 
However, vhen the d efere e is raised in Ghana today, it is 
hoped that the reasons given by a High Court in India in 
refusing to apply ihe doctrine wUl be of assistance. In 
rejecting the doctrine in the case of Secretary of State t 
Bukhminibai, STOKER C.J. made the following observations
HI am of opinion however that in considering what is 
today consonant to justice, equity and good conscienc 
one should regard the law as it Is in EngLand today, 
and not the Haw that was part of England yesterday. 
One cannot take the conmon law of England d ivoreed 
from the statute law of England and argue that the 
former Is in accordance with justice, equity and 
good conscience ... the doctrine of conmon employment 
would not apply, not because the ca se would fall 
outside the common 3aw doctrine of common employment, 
but because it would fall inside the Employers’ 
Liability Act.11
On the general question of the reception cf ihe common la1
the learned Jud ge saids5^
MWhat I desire to point out is that when one finds . 
rule has been abrogated by legislation, that rule
/become.
57. (1949-50) 77 I.A.d. Cited In DAS, S.K.: Ihe common 1,
p. 20.
58. A.I.R. /1937J7 Hag. 354 at p. 368; cited in SETALVAX) 
M.C.s Ihe common law in India, p. 111.
59. Ibid, at p # 368.'
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becomes an unsafe guide. Even when, as in this case, 
the rule remains but its practical applicability is by 
statute very greatly reduced, oie is entitled and boun 
to view it more critically than would be the case if i 
remained in full force and effect. When one finds its 
criticised by competent jurists in the country of its 
origin and followed not because cf its infrangible 
logic but because of its authority, an authority 
derived from an earlier age when circumstances were 
different, one is also justified in treating it as 
an unsafe guide.u
(a) Hegligence
The law of negligence in West Africa is basically the
same as that of the English common l a w . ^  Thus the old
common law rule that the contributory negligence of a plai;
tiff was a complete defence to the claim was held to apply
in Ghana, even though by the English Law Erfctan (Gontribut
Negligence) Act, 1945^1 contributory negligence is no
longer a defence to an action for negligence. This ruling
was made in Amoabeng v. Mills,62 where the plaintiff, a
police constable, sustained injuries after being knocked
down in the road by a taxi driven by the defendant. It wai
established that the plaintiff crossed the road without
taking due care for his own safety. On a claim by the
/olaintif;>U*|* 'W i l ' i * n u i— i<»li . i . .HTi»* . l* u i.lLnut i i ' l » i in m uJn uw a i t i i h L W ii. ■. ■■■■■mimiitn^yyiiwi
60. See, e.g. Iqwal & ors. v . Messrs. Youna & Sons & The 
Royal Exchange Assurance Go. Ltd. (1959 ) W.R.H.L.R. 151 
Jacob v. Bandpe (19 5FTT6~W.A.C~.A . 3 (Sierra Leone) \ 
Gilbey Construction Go. Ltd. v. Bangura (1957) 16 W.A.< 
A. 37 (Sierra LeoneTT”™
61. 8 & 9 Geo. 6. C. 28.
62. (1956) 1 I.A.L.R. 210.
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plaintiff for damages for negligence, the defendant 
successfully set up contributory negligence as a defence. 
Having held that the decisive factor in the accident was 
the plaintiff1 s negligent way of crossing the road,
SMITH, Ag. J., observed:
uFollowing the principle in Hadley v. London & 
Northwestern Railway C o m p a n y if one looks at 
the cases in Hibbs collisions on land, 5th ed., pp. 34 
and 35, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff i 
circums tarn es such as these defeat his claim. Neglige 
though the defendant m s ,  the proximate and direct cai 
of ihe accident m s  the plaintiffs act in suddenly 
crossing the road, without looking. I much regret tha 
the Law Reform Act is not in operation in this country 
itWould have obviated hardship to the plaintiff in thi 
case. There will, however, have to be judgment for th 
defendant with costs.u 64
The old common law doctrine which is unsuitable to
rapidly developing countries in West Africa is being
eliminated by statutory provisions similar to the English
Law Reform (Contributory Neglig enc e ) Act, 1915. Thus con-
tributory negligence is no longer a defence to an action
for negligence in Sierra Leone.65 Western Nigeria,6e and
Federal Territory of L0.gos.6V Section 11(1) of the Lagos A
/which
63. (1876) 1 App. Gas. 754.
64. 1 W.A.L.R. 210 at p. 213. The editoria 1 note suggests 
that the remarks In Hadley1 s case can no longer be 
taken as an accurate exposition of the law.
65. Lav/ Reform (Law of Torts) Ord. No. 33 of 1961, Part 3
66. The Torts Law W.R. No. 41 of 1958, part 3; see also 
Olalya v » Ososami (19 59) W.R.N . L.R. 264.
67. Civil Liability (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act,
No. 33 cf 1961.
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which, is identical to section 1(1) of the English Act* 
provides that uwhere any per sen suffers damage as the 
result partly of his own fault and partly of the fault of 
any other person or persons* a claim in respect of that 
damage shall not be defeated by reason of the fault of the 
person suffering the damage* but the damages recoverable ii 
respect thereof shall be reduced to such extent as the Cora 
thinks rjust and equitable laving regard to the share of the 
claimant in the responsibility for the damage” ® For the 
purposes of section 11, "fault” ”includes negligence* breac 
of statutory duty or other act or omission which gl ves ris < 
to a liability in tort* or would* but for this part of the 
Act* give rise to Hie defence of contributory negligence” ® 
This section also applies in cases of fatal accidents where 
the damages recoverable in an action brought for the benef" 
of the dependants of the deceased may be reduced to a
go
proportionate extent.
(b) Occupier1s Liability
Both in Sierra Leone^ and in the Federal Territory of
Lagos'71 legislative provisions similar to the English
72
Occupiers1 Liability Act* 1957* have been made to provide
 _____, _        /new
63. Civil Liability (Ivi.p. ) Act 1961. s“ 11(3). Similar to" 
Si 4 of the English Law Reform (Contributory Negligenc 
Act* 1945.
69. Ibid* s. 35.
70. Law Reform (Law of Tort) Ord. * 1961* Sierra Leone.
71. Law Reform (Torts) Act 1961. Nigeria (Lagos).
72. 5 & 6 Elis 2. 0. 31.
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new rales to replace the rules cf the common Daw under whi
■the duty owed by an occupier of premises differed accordin
73
to whether the visitor was an rtinviteeu or a “licensee” .
Thus section 7(1) of the Nigerian Law Reform (Torts) Act,
provides, uAn occupier of premises owes the same duty, * tb
common duty of care* to all his visitors, excexDt insofar a
he is free to and doss extend, restrict, modify or exclude
his duty to any visitor or visitors by agreement cr
otherwise,” Subsection 2, which is identical to the
English provision, defines the common duty of care as “a
duty to take such care as in all the circumstances of the
case is reasonable to see tint the visitor will be
reasonably safe in using the premises for the purxooses fox
which he is invited, or permitted by the occupier to be
there” , Thus the distino tion between invitees and licens e 
   ____ __          ____ /is
73. Explanatory memorandum to the English Occupiers*
Liability Bill. The Act of 1957 carries out the rec­
ommendations of the Law Reform Committee (3rd Report), 
1954. Cmd. 9305. S. 1(1) of the Act stipulates^ The 
rules enacted ... shall have effect, in place cf the 
rules of the common law, to regulate the duty which 
an occupier of premises owes to his visitors in 
respect of dangers due to the state of the premises 
or to things done or omitted to be done on them” . This 
section is identical to s* 6(1) of the Nigerian (Lagos 
Act.
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is abolished in the Federal Territory of Lagos and in 
Sierra Leone. The old common law rules, will, howevex1, 
apply in Ghana, the Gambia and the other Regions of 
Nigeria until altered by legislation.
(c ) Defamation
The English common law of libel and slander has not bee
adopted in West Africa without some legislative adjustment.
The following local Acts have been eaacted;
Defamation Law, No. 42 of 1958 (W. Region of Nigeria)? 
Defamation Ordinance No. 32 of 1961 (Sierra Leone); 
Defamation Act No. 66 of 1961 (Federal Territory of 
Lagos).74
All these enactments are based on ihe English Defamation Ac
of 1952,^5 which was passed in order to carry out the
recommendations of the Report of the Committee on ihe Law
of Defamation.^ Introducing ihoe Defamation Bill for the
Federal Territory cf Lagos , Dr. Elias, the Federal Minister
of Justice, said that it sought to Improve ihe existing laii
of defamation by making provisions under which any person
who claimed that publication of any defanatory words was
made innocently could, under certain conditions, be
exonerated from liability for damages. Thus he said it
placed the law relating to pleas of qualified privilege on
a new b asis.^ In West Africa, the distinction made by 
. , ____ _____ _ ______/EiirL i sh
74. It is expressly stated in all these local enactments
that nothing in any of the Acts affects the law relatir 
to C2*lminal libel.
75. 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & Eliz. 2. C.66.
76. Cmd. 7536.
77. The Times November 27, 1961*
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English law between libel and slander actionable per se or
the one hand,TO and ordinary slander on the other, Tfihich
requires proof of special damages, has been adopted
Another aspect cf the English law of defamation is that
libel, which tends to provoke a breach of the peace is a
crime as well as a tort* Slander, as such, is never
criminal except that spoken words may be punishable as
being treasonable, seditious or blasphemous.®^ Such a 
     _   /di s tine ti on
78. See, e.g. Quacoe v. Dadspn (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 396. By 
virtue of the date of the English Slander of Women* s 
Act (1891), that enactment has been in force in 
Nigeria as a statute cf general application. Indeed 
the right given to women by this Act to sue for slandc 
without proof of special damage when words spoken 
imputing adultery or unchas tity a re spoken of them, ha 
been re-enacted in the Nigerian and Sierra Leone 
hefamati on Acts. Until legislative provisions are mat 
the Act of 1891 will not apply in the G-ambia or in 
Ghana. See, e.g. Amoah v . D.jabi (1926) Div.Ct. 1926-9j 
p. 43i In Ghana there Is a tendency to distinguish 
between slander according to cuss ternary law and s land el 
according to English law. Bee Chuku v. Nkrumah (1958) 
3 W.A.L.R. 471. Thus if A calls B a "thief"- Ln ttie 
vernacular, it could be sland er a ccording to customary 
law. It will be otherwise If spoken in English. Such a 
distinction is undesirable. A future legislation shou] 
aim at assimilating the two types.
79. It Is Interesting to note that in Scotland no differei 
tiation is made between libel and slander. In the 3 
States of Australia - Queensland, New South Wales, 
and Tasmania, slander is put on the same footing as 
libel. See WILLIAMS, G.L. (1939) 21 J.Comp.Leg. 3rd s, 
p. 161 et seq. Owing to tie cultural background of 
peoples In West Africa perhaps it may be best to pres­
erve the distinction. ult is amat ter of common know­
ledge of Which this Court takes judicial notice that .
p . t. o «
80. WINFIELD on Tort (6th ed. 1954), p. 291.
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distinction is recognised in the Gambia,*^ Sierra Leone, ^  
and OKhana.^5 No such distinction is made between libel and 
slander by section 391 of trie Penal Code Law of Northern 
Nigeria,^ which is stated to be similar to the relevant 
provisions of the Pakistan and the Sudan Penal Codes* The 
rest of Nigeria also does not recognise this distinction. 
Section 373 of the Nigerian Criminal Code, which defines 
udefamatory matter1*, adds that s wsuch matter may be 
expressed in spoken words or in any audible sounds, or in 
words legibly rrarked on any such substance whatever, or by 
any sign or object signifying such matter otherwise than by 
words, and may be expressed either directly or by insinuate 
or irony .**85
79T5ontTJv r:. people commonly abuse each other as a prelud 
to a fight and call each other T01el Elewon (Thief! Ex- 
convict), which abuses no-one takes seriously, as tbe y 
are words cf heat and anger , and are nothing but vulgar 
abuse1* - per JIBOWU, C.J. in Bakare v. Ishola (1959) 
W.R.N.L.R. 106 at p. 107.
81. Laws cf the Gambia. 1955 Rev. Cap. SI, s. 178.
82. Sierra Leone has not codified its criminal laws which 
are virtually the same as the English laws# Thus in 
Patience Richards & crs v • The Q,ue en (195 6) 16 W.A #C .A• 
16, s. 6 of the English Libel Act 1843 (6 & 7 Vict.C96) 
was applied.
83. Criminal Cede 1960. Act 29, s. 113. The Act also charac 
erises two types of libel - ^negligent*1 and wintentions
84*. N.R. No. 18 of 1959.
85. The reason for the departure from the English practice 
here is -that the section is bassed on ss. 366 & 368 of 
the Queensland Criminal Code Act, 1899. 63 Viet. No. 9.
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(d ) Mis cellaneous
In addition to i±Le specific topics discussed, legis­
lative provisions ha ve been made in other ”areas” of tort.1} 
There are now local enactments defining the class of perse 
for whose benefit an action may be brought and providing 
for the compensation cf the families of the persons killed 
These ares- The Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions)
Ordinance,®6 an£ the Fatal Accidents (Damages) Act, 1961,
07
of Sierra Leone; the .Torts Law of the Western Region o:i
Nigeria,6^ the Fatal Accidents Act, 1961, of the Federal
Territory of L a g o s , 89 and the Fatal Accidents Law cf the
Ea stern Region of Nigeria*®^a All these Acts are based on
the English statutes with modifications to suit local
conditions,, Where no local legislation has been passed,
90
the English Fatal Accidents Act 1846 and 1864 would be
in force as statutes of general application.^l in the
Feddral Territory of Nigeria and in Sierra Leone there ar 
_ _  ______ /legislative
86. laws of Sierra Leone (1960 Rev.) Cap. 19.
87. No. 58 of 1961 (Sierra Leone).
88. Laws of the Yvr. Region of Nigeria (1959 Rev.) Gap. 32
89. No. 34 of 1961 (Lagos).
89a. E.R. No* 16 of 1956, as amended by E.R. No. 20 cf 
1958 and E.N. No. 21 of 1960.
90. 9 & 10 Viet. 0. 93. 27 & 28 Viet. 0. 95, and also th 
Carriage by Air Act, 1932, which applies In Nigeria 
by virtue of the Carx^iage by Air (Colonies, Prot­
ectorates and Mandated Territories) Order, 1953.
91. Eguriase v. U.A.C. Ltd. & anor (1959) W.R.N.L.R. 72.
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legislative provisions relating to proceedings against 
joint tort-feasors similar to the English law on that 
point
£4  ^Evidence
The rules of evid enc e,which are almost the creation of 
English judges, form part of the common law Introduced in 
West Africae Thus such English rules relating to judicial 
notice, presumption, admissibility cf facts, estoppel, 
res judicata» hearsay, and the burden of proof, are in 
force in the general courts wl th modification wherever 
possible. In Ghana, for example, it is now common know­
ledge that the type of evid enc e , usually designated as 
wtraditional evidence** is widely admissible in support of 
Cases in courts involving the histibry and traditions of 
families, clans and t r i b e s , on this point was 
stated by REDWAR in his Comments as follows?-^
ttIn cases relating to pedigree, inheritance, 
boundaries of land, hearsay evidence or evidence cf 
common reputation is admigslble, and It was held in 
Bura & Amonoo v. Ampima, that a much greater lati­
tude is permissible in thes& matters than is allowed 
by English law, because of the absence of written 
memorials in a country where everything, the native la 
 ___   _ __ /itself
92, Ho# 33 of 1961 (Lagos) Part 2; Ho. 33 of 1961 (Sierra 
Leone)»
Poh v# KSnamba (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 74 at p, 79 per 
ADUMUAH-BOSSMAN, J.
94. At page 86.
95. (1891) Sar. F.C.L. 214.
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itself included, depends on oral tradition. Besides 
evidence as to declarations of deceased members of a 
family, hearsay statements of linguists and cf other 
persons with presumable knowledge of the matters in 
dispute were admitted/*
In Nigeria, where the rules of evidence are contained 
in the Evidence O r d i n a n c e , ^  section 44 lays it down that 
uwhere the 'title to or interest In family or communal land 
is in issue, oral evidence of family or communal tradition 
concerning such title cr interest is relevant/*
(5) Practice and Procedure
The English Supreme Court Rules appear to be the main
source of the local rule s. 97 There are, however, other
rules which depart from hie English practice. With the
  /except! on
96, Laws of Nigeria (1958 Rev*) Cap* 62*
97* A footnote to the Siipreme Court Rules of Sierra Leone 
rea ds % u F ol low! rg the p m  c ti c e in Engla n d , the Rule s 
are printed without any revision of the serial number 
of the Orders or Riles* Underneath most of the margi­
nal notes are references to the corresponding rule
of the Supreme Court Rules cf England. These ref­
erences are not part of the marginal note and are 
merely to Indicate the English rule, which appears 
to be the local rule (the 'two may or may not be iden­
tical in text)11* ^1960 Rev*_J/Vol* 6. See also Laws of 
the Cold Coast, 1954* Subsidiary Legislation. Vol* 7 - 
Supreme Court (Civil Procedure) Rules - saved by s . 8 
of the Ghana Courts Act, 1960* For Nigeria, see Suprem 
Court .(Civil Procedure) Rules /^Eaws 1948 Rev._7Vol. 10 
which is apparently saved by, e.g. s* 3 of the High 
Court of Lagos Rules - Laws of Nigeria, 1958 Rev.,
Vol. 8. For Western Region see The High Court (Civil 
Procedure) Rules - Laws of Western Region of Nigeria, 
1959 Rev* Subsidiary LegMation, Vol. 2*
352
exception of Sierra Leone, both movables and immovables 
may be attached under a writ of fi whereas under
English law only the personal goods ov chattels can be 
so attached.99
The dissimilarity between the English procedure and 
that in some parts of West Africa was maitioned in the 
Nigerian case of Janmi v. Balogun & ors^  when GRAHAM 
PAUL, J., referring to the old Nigerian rule, saids-
l*The next question I have to decide is whether in 
Nigeria an estate tail is attachable under a writ cf 
fi fa. In England* of course* it could not be attached 
under a writ of fi f a , but in Nigeria the position Is 
quite different. Under Schedule 11 Order 44 Rule 13 of 
the Supreme Ccurt Ordinance,2 1 all property whatsoever 
moveable or immoveable belonging to the party against 
whom a decree is to be enforced1 ... Is liable to attae 
ment and sale In execution of the decree* and Order 45 
Rule 10 of the same schedule specifically prescribes tt 
procedure for attachment 1 where the property shall con­
sist of lands houses or other immoveable property or 
any interest therein Hie procedure is by writ cf fi fa<
98* See* e.g.' Salbu~TT“l g ^ ^(T94l7^T6 ' F ^ T ^ ”25T^ h S ^ ^ m m  
ercial Bank v • Chan diram./lOGOj/A. C • 732 * Commenting on 
the practice in the Gold Coast (now Ghana), KELWAR 
observes that Hie provision in the Gold Coast Rules was 
copied from the Hong Kong Civil Procedure Code of 1837, 
op cit, p. 47.
99. In England, where the debtor las land, ihe judgment ere 
itor may apply under Order 46, s. 2 for a charging Orde 
pursuant to s. 35 of the Administration of Justice Act, 
1956, which a bolished the old writ of elegit.
1. (1936) 13 N.L.R. 53.
2. The Rule is identical to Sch. 11 Ord. 43 Rule 13 of the 
Gambia Supreme Court Rules and Order 42 Rule 45 cf ihe 
Gold Coast Supreme Ccurt Rules. The present Rules for 
Nigeria are now embodied in the Sheriffs & Civil Process 
Ord. Cap. 189, Laws of Nigeria, 1958 Rev., as amended b; 
No. 62 of 1961 (Federal Territory). For the W. Region, 
see Sheriffs & Civil Process Law, Cap. 116, Laws of 
Western Nigeria.
3. 13 N.L.R. at p. 57.
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Moreover, whereas in the English rales, relief by way 
of interpleader summons is granted only where good3 or
a pj A
chattels are involved, in the Gambia,’ and in Ghana, 
relief by way of interpleader m y  be granted where a claim 
is made to any px*operty, moveable or immovable taken or 
intended to b e taken in execution under any process.
The local rules may not cater for every contingency. 
Hence Order 42 Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules cf Sierra 
Leone provides:
uWhere no- other provision is made by these rules, 
the procedure, practice, and forms in force in the 
High Court of Justice in England on the 1st day of 
January, 1957, so far as they can be conveniently 
applied, shall be in force in the Supreme Court,
In Ghana, and in the Rfestern Region of Nigeria,^ the
saving clause provides for the application of English
rules of practice and procedure 11 in force for the time 
_ ___ _ __________________ .   /being
4. Rules of the Supreme Court of England, Ord, 57 r, 1, 
which is followed in Sierra Leone •
5. Supreme Court Rules - Gambia, Sch, 11. Ord, 44, Rule 5
6. Supreme Court (Civil Procedure) Rules. Order 57, r. lb 
See also Mahmudu v, Zenuah & an or (1934) 2 W.A.C.A.172 
Brand ford -N ettley v . The G.C. Independent Press Ltd. & 
ors ( i93§T~3 W . A . C • A . 100; John v. Oluwa (1942) 8 
W.A.C.A. 26 (Nigeria).
7. Court Rules Order 74*
8. The High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules Ord. 35 r. 10. 
See also 0gun 1 eye v. Arewa (1960) W.R.N.L.R. 9*
i m M i t t M ' n n M i a u M  ■— irrr^r-*rr-Tm  —
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being in the High Court cf Justice in England” • The 
effect of such a provision is to bring into operation in 
the country concerned the practice and procedure of the 
High. Court in Engl and. 9 ri'he Supreme Court Rules of 
EngLand should apply only when the local Rule is silent#*^
It has been held in Ghana that the saving clause, Order 74, 
merely regulates procedure and practice to be followed in 
the High Court, but does not purport to cofer Juris diction 
on any other Court#-^
*£6^ The Common Law and the Common Market
’  n  n  u b i  ii - i f B iin iir ' B i n  i h i       ~  i *~t " i  r  ii - i ■ v n  i i i  n  1 • ' i r ■ -  • r r ■ - • • • , i  , i ■ r
Some fears have been expressed by some English lawyers 
that the United Kingdom's entry into the European Common 
Market will ultimately lead to •the disappearance of the 
common law as a distinct legal tradition# It has been 
argued that the rules on restrictive trade practices and 
on the misuse of monopolies, which are contained in the 
Treaty of Rome, will be immediately applicable in the Englis 
courts, and 1hey will abrogate rules of ihe common law with 
which they are at variance#
/“What _______
9* Macfoy v# United Africa Co# Ltd#/I961_Z 3 A11~E#R* 1169 
at 1171 P.C. per Lord DEffiLNG.
10# The Gold Coast & A shanti Electric Power Development Cori: 
Ltd. v. A-Q o F t h e - Gold Coast dl957T~5 W.A.C.A. 215 at i 
217.
Amponsah v. Min, of Defence & anor. 1960# Civil Appeal 
557 7/60. Cyclostyjed Judgments of Court of Appeal, 
January#June 1960 , p. 100 at p. 107.
"What is likely to be a mere serious issue from the 
point of view cf English, law and the English legal pro1 
fession is the need for a new style of legal thinking* 
The Treaty is couched in language which differs 
noticeably from that used in the framing of statutes 
in this country*'1 12
If the English judges, who are responsible for the develop­
ment and growth cf the common law, are going to abdicate 
their duty and adopt a new style of legal thinking suitable 
to members of the European Economic Community, then it 
becomes necessary to ask how much of this legal reorien­
tation is going to affect the common law African countries 
on Britain1 s entry. The obvious choice for such countries 
will be to develop their own common law without leaning 
too heavily on the English common law which seems to be 
on the way out.
12* "Legal consequences of Common Market" by Prof* 0*
KAHN'-FREUND. The Times, May 21, 1962. See also MARSH 
H.S.s "The Common Market and the common law". The 
Listener, March 15, 1962*
B* ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL LAW, EVIDENCE ANT) PROCEDURE 
The Criminal Law
The criminal laws of the West African countries are base
ultimately on English statutes and common la,w, although the
immediate source differs from one territory to another*
The 1960 revision of the Crimina-l Code of Ghana was original
enacted as Ordinance No* 12 of 1892* This Ordinance was basec
on a criminal code drafted in 1877 for Jamaica, by Mr* Justice
13Wright and settled by Sir James Stephen* The Jamaica draft
never became law there9 but it was adopted in St* Lucia, the
Gold Coast (Ghana), British Honduras, St* Vincent and Grenada*
The Code of St* Lucia followed the 1877 model very closely, an
that of the Gold Coast follows St* Lucia* The Nigerian Crimin
Code Ordinance No* 15 of 1916, which applies partly throughout
the Federation and partly in Lagos, was modelled on the Crimin
.) 4Code Act of Queensland*" The Queensland Criminal Code Act of
1899 was itself partly based on the English Criminal Code draf 
] 5
of 1879, and to a large extent on the penal codes of Italy ^
T s s 7 n r f 8 9 6 ^ 7 r r j ^ ^
model criminal code for the colonies” (1899) 1 J*Comp*Leg< 
(n*So) p® 439* READ, J*S* "Ghana: the Criminal Code, !96( 
(1962) I.C.L.fi. 272®
14* See The Public. Acts of Queensland (1828-1936) Vol* 2* It 
was reported in West Africa, December 16* 1961 that the 
Government of Nigeria is to review the Criminal Code of 
the Federation®
15® See the Criminal Code (indictable Offences) Bill, 1879* Pa 
Pap* Session 1878 Vol* 2, p* 5* See also the Report of the 
Royal Commission appointed to consider the law relating to 
indictable offences; with an appendix containing a draft 
code* Par* Pap* Session 1878-79* Vol* 20, p* 169*
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and of the State of New York® The Penal Code Law, 1959, of
Northern Nigeria is based on the Sudan Penal Code, which
itself was adopted from the Indian Penal Code# The Indian
Penal Code itself has been described as "the criminal law of
England freed from all technicalities and superfluities
systematically arranged and modified in some few particulars •
16to suit the circumstances of British India"#
With the exception of Sierra Leone, all the other West
African countries have reduced their criminal laws into a
codified form# The fact that the criminal laws are codified
raises a number of problems# Firstly, it poses the question
in regard to the interpretation and construction of the Code
itself# Thus section 3(l) of the Gambia Code reads;
"This Code shall be interpreted in accordance with the 
principles of legal interpretation obtaining in England, 
and expressions used in it shall be presumed, so far as 
consistent with their context, and except as may be other­
wise expressly provided, to be used with the meaning attac 
ing to them in English criminal law and shall be construed 
in accordance therewith#"
On the other hand, the general rules for the construction 
of the Ghana Criminal Code as laid down by section 4(b) are 
as follows;
"In the construction of this Code, a court whall not be
bound by any judicial decision or opinion on the construct*
ion of any other enactment, or of the common law* as to . the
/definition
16. STEPHEN s
Cited by SETALVAD, MoC# The common law in India, p# 118#
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definition of any offence or any elament of any offence.'
Even in the absence of an express provision relating to
the interpretation of the Nigerian Criminal Code, it would
appear that the reasonable course to adopt (which has in fo,ct
been done on occasion), in construing the provisions of the
Code is to abide by the general principles of construction
peculiar to "codifying statutes"® In the English case of Bank
17of England v. Vagiiano Brothers? which related to the meanin 
of a section in the Bills of Exchange Act , 3 892, Lord HAT.SBURY
Xj»C. indicated the method of approach in the following words:
"It seems to me that, construing the statute by adding 
to it words which are neither found therein nor for which 
authority couSLd be found in the language of the statute 
itself, is to sin against one of the most familiar rules 
of construction, and I am. wholly unable to adopt the view
that where a statute is expressly said to codify the law,
you are at liberty to go outside the code so created,
because before the existence of that code another law
prevailed»"
3The principles enunciated above were applied in R* v* Hare
with respect to the New Sealand Criminal Code. As CHAPMAN, J*,
pointed out, "The Crimes Act is a code in which the preceding
Acts have been put in the crucible, and a code drawn with the
intention of expressing anew the criminal law of the country.
That is the reason why, as was said by Lord Herschell in
Vagiianof s case, we should read it according to its ordinary
/mean ing
17. [1891] A«C° 107 at p. 1205 but see Robinson v® Canadian 
Pacific Railway Co. [1892] A®C® 481 at p. 487.
|IH III* Ij.all 11 TIM ■ II II 1 Hi I m u  w t e a W a fcwi.i.Muj b J A,
18. (.1910) 29 N.Z.L.R. 641 at p. 646.
meaning,and not allow ourselves to be embarrassed by consider 
ations as to what the antecedent legislation meant*11
In West Africa;, the classic statement with respect to th 
interpretation and con traction of a codifying statute was
made in the Ghana case of Wallace-Johnson v* The King: 19
"The present case* however, arose in the Gold Coast 
Colony, and the law applicable is contained in the 
criminal code of the colony* It was contended that the 
intention of the Code was to reproduce the law of seditit 
as expounded in the cases to which their Lordships1 
attention was called* Undoubtedly the language of the 
section under which the appellant was charged lends some 
colour to this suggestion* There is a close correspond­
ence at some points between the terms of the section in 
the code and the statement of the English law of seditior 
by Stephen in the Digest of criminal law * *• The
fact remains, however, that it is in the Criminal Code of 
the Gold Coast Colony, and not in English or Scottish 
cases, that the law of sedition for the Colony^js to be 
found* The elaborate structure of section 330“' suggests 
that it was intended to contain, as far as possible, a fu 
and complete statement of the law of sedition in the 
Colony* It must therefore be construed in its applicatio
to the facts of this case free from any glosses or inter­
pretations derived from any expositions, however author- 
itative, of the law of England or of Scotland*,f
In the Nigerian case of Potts-Johnson v* Commissioner of 
SIPolice,"* the West African Court of Appeal, in deciding what
interpretation should be given to the words "corruptly and und<
colour of his employment", by a majority of two to one foLipwee
/the
19* [1940] A-C* S31 at p. 239*
SO * Laws of the Gold Coast [1936 Rev.] pub* 1937-8.
21. (1947) ].?, W.A.C.A. 198. VERITY, C.J. declined to sign tlu
judgment *
the the Privy Council*s advice given in Wallace-Johnson1s cas 
and declined to resort to English decisions to interpret the
words used in the Nigerian Criminal Code * However, in
22Motayo v * Commissioner of Police,"'' the same Court in 1950, 
consisting of five judges unanimously refused to follow its 
own decision given in the Potts-Johnson case* The appellate 
court in Motavo!s case ruled that "Where, then, the local leg: 
lature uses a phrase found in English enactments its meaning
23
should be considered in the light of English authorities"*
Tt held further, that Potts-Johnson1 s ca.se was wrongly decidec 
and should be regarded as overruled* With the greatest 
respect to the learned judges in Motayo1s case, it is sub­
mitted that the principle enunciated therein must be confined 
within limits* It may be that if the appellate courtfs
attention had been drawn to the statement made by the Privy
2 4Council in Chettiar v* Mahamtee, the method of approach
adopted in deciding Motayo1s case might have been different*
The effect of cofidication on the method of interpretatio:
is further illustrated by the Nigerian case of Ogbuagu v*
25
Police, " where it was held that as the defence provided in
section 7 of the Libel Act, 1843 (popularly known as Lord
Campbell * s Act) has not been inserted in the Nigerian Criminal
  _ /Code
2 2* (i95o) is wTrrcTATTTTr"*"”'*^  “ ”  “
Ibid, at p. 117•
24* A*C* 481 at p* 4911 see ante p«
iv Cns^) 3#  fM.i_.fc, . »2<?
Code in regard to seditious libel* it does not apply in
Nigeria» For the same reason* it has been held that that par
of section 6 of Lord Campbell1s Act which provides that it is
a defence to a charge of publishing a defamatory libel if it
is proved that the publication is for the public benefit* and
that the matter published is true* has ceased to apply in
Nigeria* since that is a matter which has been dealt with by
section 377 of the Criminal Code Ordinance * The plea of just]
fication under section 6 of the Libel Act* 1843* is* however*
operative in Sierra Leone* The reason is that Sierra Leone
26has not as yet codified its criminal law*
The second point to consider is how far the various penal
codes can be regarded as being exhaustive statements of the
criminal laws of the countries concerned• As VAUGHAN V/ILLIAMS
L*J* observed? ,fThe difficulty arises which must always exist
when an attempt is made to enact an exhaustive code of any
branch of our law* However able the codifier may be* when the
code comes to be applied to some innumerable cases that must
arise* there is found every now and then some case which it is
impossible to suppose was in fact intended to be governed by
the Code* At the same time the code purports to be exhaustive.
and therefore it is necessary to try to treat every case as
27
falling within it*" The learned Lord Justice*s dictum , J ,
/relaiec
26* 'Richard a and o i^T^v W u Tl) u e'en (1956“JT6"W * a Tc7aT16 *
3>fe>
related to the interpretation of a provision of the Sale of
Goods Act, hiit it is submitted that it is of equal application
28
to the codification of criminal lav*
There is ample evidence in some of the codes in Y/est 
Africa to support the view that the codification of the 
criminal law is not exhaustive® Thus, although the Criminal 
Code of the Gambia is described as "an Ordinance to establish t 
Code of Criminal law", section 2 of the Code states that 
except where otherwise expressly provided, nothing in the 
Code shall affects
”(l) the liability, trial or punishment of a person for 
an offence against the common law or against any other 
law in force in the Colony other than this code; or
(2 ) the liability of a person to be tried or punished 
for an offence under the provisions of any law in force
in the Colony relating to the jurisdiction of the Colonial 
Courts in respect of acts done beyond the ordinary juris­
diction of such courts; or
(3) the power of any court to punish a person for 
contempt of such court.1’
The Nigerian Code also stipulates that a person may be 
tried or punished for an offence under the provisions of the 
Code ”or some other Ordinance, or some law, or of some Order
in Council made by Her Majesty for Nigeria, or under the expres; 
______    /provision*
28. It is interesting to note the following passage in the
Report of the Commissioners appointed in England in 1878 tc 
report on a draft criminal code which had just then been 
prepareds ”It must be observed that codification merely 
means the reduction 6$ the existing law to an orderly 
written system freed from the needless technicalities, obsc 
urities, and other defects, which the experience of its 
administration has disclosed®” Op cit3 at p. 175® See also 
AUSTIN, J . % Jurisprudence9 op cit, p® 660 et seq®
provisions of some statute of the Imperial Parliament which is
2 9in force in, or forms part of the law of Nigeria®11'* This 
provision must be read as one with section SI subsection 10 of
rtbo
the Nigerian Constitution Order in Council^fwhich states that
nNo person shall be convicted of a criminal offence unless tha
offence is defined and the penalty therefor is prescribed in
30a written Iaw*rl The effect of the two provisions is that 
whilst a person may be tried or punished for an offence under 
some law in force in Nigeria, that law must be a written law®
Thus no-one can be punished for an offence either under native
31law and custom, or under the common law, since both are
32unwritten laws® “* Section 8 of the Ghana Criminal Code
/stipulates
29® Laws of Nigeria £1958 ftev®] Cap® 42, s. 1*
30® The Admiralty Offences (Colonial) Act 1849 and the
Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act, 1878*
31* Indeed section 3(2) of the N® Nigeria Penal Code Law
lays it down that no person shall be liable to punishment 
under any native law or custom®
32® In view of the provision in the Nigerian Constitution it
is doubtful whether the decision given in the Nigerian cas 
of R« Vo Sdgal (4 W*A*C*A* I?3) can be regarded as a corre
statement of the law* In that case it was held that the
omission of a definition or a declaration in the Criminal 
Code of Nigeria merely throws the enquirer back to ascerta 
what is the law of the land in regard to when it is lawful 
and when unlawful to procure a miscarriage* As the law of 
the land was held to be the same as the common law of 
England, the appellate court applied the meaning given to 
the word Munlawfully” by the English court in ft* v* Bourne 
fL939j 1 K*Bo 687.  ^ '
stipulates that "no person shall be liable to punishment by th
33common law for any act".. However, the power of the courts
in Nigeria and Ghana to punish a person for contempt of court
under the common law is expressly saved* Thus the proviso in
section 21 subsection 10 of the Nigerian Constitution Order in
Council^reads "* *® Nothing in this subsection shall prevent a
court of record from punishing any person for contempt of
itself notwithstanding that the act or omission constituting
the contempt is not defined in a written law and the penalty
34therefor is not so prescribed"*
Even though the main object of codification is the reductj 
of the existing English law to an orderly written system freed 
from the needless technicalities, it must not be assumed that 
such a process has been undertaken in West Africa without some 
modification® Thus one feature of the Criminal Code in Ghana 
and the Northern Nigeria Penal Code is the use made of illus­
trations to explain the true ingredients of the crime set out 
in the sections* Again, treason apart, crimes in England are 
divided into two — felonies and misdemeanours* The Nigeria
Criminal Code has three kinds of offences, namely, felonies,
35misdemeanours and simple offences® 1 The Ghana Criminal Code
  _ .... /recognizes
33* Act 29* ' ” “ — — — —  -- --
34* It is also saved by s„ 10 of the Ghana Criminal Code, 1960 
35« Cap o 42, s * 3 *
recognises the distinction of* offences into felonies and
misdemeanours? but a felony is of two kinds, namely, "first
36degree felony” and "second degree felony”*
The English law relating to the defence of insanity prioi
37to the Homicide Act, 1967, was that laid down by the judges
in answer to certain questions propounded to them by the House
38of Lords in the IvfNaghten ease* Among other things, the 
M*Naghten rules did not recognise the defence of "irresistible 
impulse"* A comparison of the answers to the second and third 
questions propounded to the judges in the M'Naghten case with 
section 28 of the Nigerian Criminal Code shows that the 
Nigerian Legislature have not only departed from the phraseo­
logy of the judges, but have also introduced two entirely new
factors, that of "natural mental infirmity” and that of
39incapacity to "control one's actions"* Thus the defence of
uncontrollable impulse is a good defence in Nigeria by virtue
/of
36* Act 29, s® 1® This section is to be construed in accord— 
ance with section 296 of the Criminal Procedure Code Act ; 
37* 5 and 6 Elis 2® C® 11® s. 2® The M!Naghten rules remain
in force but their harshness in England has been to some
extent alleviated by the Act of 1957 which affects the 
defence of diminished responsibility® See Attorney- 
General for the State of Australia v® Brown f 1960*1 A*C • 41
38. (I843T 10 Cl. and Pin. 300; 8 E.R. 718.
39. R. v. Omoni (1949) 12 W.A.C.A. 511.
40of section 28 of the Criminal Code Ordinance»
41In RV, v* Dangttr? * the West African Court of Appeal held    -    . -■ *  ^“>1 nm >'>!>■
that the law in England regarding homicide by a person who is
being unlawfully arrested is incorporated info the law of
Nigeria by section 317 of the Criminal Code which states that
"A person who unlawfully Rills another under such circumstance
as not to constitute murder is guilty of manslaughter•’* The
law relating to the defence of provocation in homicide cases
4.2
is virtually the same as that known to English law* In the
43Ghana case of Mensah v» The King? Lord GODDARD delivering 
the advice of the Judicial Committee said;
"The law relating to murder and manslaughter in the 
Gold Coast is contained in the Criminal Code? but in all 
material respects the Code reproduces the common law of 
England on the subject* Section 2334^ provides that 
intentional homicide shall be manslaughter only? if among 
other matters of extenuation it is proved on the accused's 
behalf that he was deprived of the power of self control 1 
such extreme provocation given by the person Rilled as 
mentioned in section 234*^® Among the matters which may 
amount to extreme provocation is an unlawful assault of
such a kind * * * as to be likely to deprive a person being
  ___ ^____ ______  „ , .  _ __ /of
40 * Echem v. The Oneen~Tl952 7~14 w 7a *C*A* T58 at 160* "Note s* 2 
of the Nigerian Criminal Code Ordinance is identical to 
s* 27 of the Criminal Code Act? 1899? of Queensland*
41* (1944) 10 W.A.C.A. 225*
42* See? 0*g* R* v* Tekyi (1941) 7 1Y*A*C*A» 122^  R* v* Wunuah
(1957) 3 W*A«L*R* 303* —
43* (1945) 11 W*A*C*A* p. 2 at p* 6*
44* Laws of the Gold Coast 1936 Rev* Now substantially the
same as s* 52 of the Ghana Criminal Code? I960* Act 29*
45* Laws of the Gold Coast 1936 Rev* Now s. 53 of the Ghana
Criminal Code, I960* Act 29*
or ordinary character and in the circumstances in which 
he was of the power of self-control* Then section 2354-6 
excludes the benefit of provocation where the accused was 
not in fact deprived of the power of self-control and 
also where after the provocation such a time elapsed 
or such circumstances occurred that a person of ordinary 
character might have recovered his self-control* This 
puts into statutory form what has for long been the law 
in this country»
However, the question whether in the circumstances the 
provication was such as to deprive an ordinary person of 
self-control is a matter to be left to the local jury 
who must apply the tests to the ordinary West African 
villager*'1 4-7
In R. Vo Xgiri,48 BtACKALL, P«s observed;
"In primitive communities,49 where the subjection of 
women is accepted as natural and proper such an insult 
^provocative words coupled with spitting] from a wife 
arouses more passion than in more sophisticated societies
Dnf
In Northern Nigeria, provocation reduces liability notadai
50with respect to homicide, but also grave and sudden prov­
ocation under any other section of the Penal Code modifies the 
nature of an offence or mitigates the penalty which may be 
inflicted*0'^
46* Now s* 54 of the 1960 Act*
47* Mens ah v* The Ming 11 V/*A*C.A* at p* 7*
48* Tl948/ 12 W.A.C.A. 377*
49* The Learned Presidentmust be taken to be referring to a 
society culturally different from that of the English*
50* 8* 222o
51* 38, except (l) provocation sought or voluntarily
provoked by the offender as an excuse for committing an
offence5 (2) provocation given by anything done in obed­
ience to the law or by a public servant in the lawful 
exercise of the powers of such public servantf (3) provo­
cation given by anything done in the lawful exercise of 
the right of private defence* Such cases as VIonalm v* 
Sokoto Native Authority (1956) 1 F.S.C.R. 295 and Nomad v 
Bornu N.A* (1954) 21 N.L.R. 31, must be regarded as no 
longer the law in view of s« 3 of the Northern Nigerian 
Penal Code Law*
52It has been held in the Ghana case of R« v» Mensah, 
that the Ghanaian law as to criminal negligence is very 
different from the English law on that topic* LUCIE-SMITH,
C*J* pointed out the difference in the following words;
"Now as regards the law as to criminal negligence in the 
Colony one must realise that criminal negligence in this 
country is a very different matter from criminal negli­
gence in England and many other parts of the Empire*
This has been laid down by this Court on more than one 
occasion* Under English law, negligence to be criminal 
must be so gross and outrageous as to offend against the 
State as guardian of lives and liberties - so culpable 
as to be for the purpose of vindication outside the 
solace of mere civil damages — so wicked as to call for 
vindication and punishment under the criminal law* 
flection 14 of the Criminal Code [now section 12 of Act 29 
1960] reads as follows;
"A person causes an event negligently if, without 
intending to cause the event, he causes it by voluntary 
act, done without such skill and precaution as are 
reasonably necessary under the circumstances «.*" ^
From this it will be seen that criminal negligence here 
amounts to little more than what is known as civil 
negligence in England and in other places•"
Perhaps the most notable departure from English law is
section 387 of the Northern Nigeria Penal Code Law which
regards adultery as a criminal offence* That section reads;
"Whoever, being a man subject to any native law or 
custom in which extra-marital sexual intercourse is 
recognised as a criminal offence, has sexual intercourse 
with a person who is not and whom he knows or has reason 
to believe is not his wife, such sexual intercourse not 
amounting to the offence of rape, is guilty of the offence 
of adultery and &ha11 be punished with imprisonment for a 
term which may extend to two years or with a fine or with 
both*"
52~. (1948J 12 W.A.C.A. 346 at p. 347.
53. In the 1960 Criminal Code the word "care” is substituted 
for the word "precaution" <.
(2) Evidence
As has been mentioned earlier on, the English rules of 
evidence are in force with modification, where necessary, in 
West Africa* Some of the rules have been incorporated either in 
the Criminal Procedure Codes or enacted separately, such as the 
Criminal Evidence Ordinance of the Gambia* The English Criminal
<!# ifr-Evidence Act, 1898, has not been adopted without modification*
Owing to the fact that English law prohibits polygamy whilst
customary or Mohammedan law in West Africa favours polygamy, one
provision which calls for comment is the law relating to the
evidence of husband and wife* The local laws make a distinction
between the so-called Christian marriage and customary marriage®
Thus section 77 of the Sierra Leone Ordinance (which is similar to
56that of Nigeria and the Gambia laws) stipulates;
"Where a person charged with an offence is married to 
another person by a marriage other than a Christian, such last 
named person shall be a competent and compellable witness on 
behalf either of the prosecution or of the defence; Provided
that no party to a Mohammedan marriage shall be compellable
54* Cap® 26 Laws of Gambia [1955 Rev*]
55® The Gold Coast Criminal Evidence Ordinance No® 13 of 1907 is inc
orporated into the Criminal Procedure Code Act 30 of Ghana
with modifications® See, e«g® s® 123* The Criminal Evidence
Ordinance No® 2 of 1908 of Sierra Leone is incorporated in
the Criminal Procedure Code Cap® 39 [1960 Rev®] ss* 77-82* The 
Evidence Ordinance Cap® 62 of Nigeria consolidates and amends 
the law on the subject of evidence in both civil and 
criminal proceedings®
56* laws of Sierra Leone 1960, Cap* 39®
m o
37 0
to disclose any communication made to him or her during 
the marriage by the other party®" 57
The first part of the passage just cited adopts the old
English fiction that husband and wife are regarded as one person
and denies the application of the principle to potentially and
polygamous marriages® In vieW of the reasoning of the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in the Tanganyika case of Maw ji 
58
T a  Ihe Queen, it is hoped that some of the consequences of the
fiction will be modified® The provision in the Ghana Criminal
59
Procedure Code has made such a move as follows?
"In any enquiry or trial the wife or husband (whether 
married by customary law or otherwise) of the person charged 
she, 11 be-
(a) a competent and compellable witness for the defence and
(b) a competentj and on a charge of felony, a compellable, 
witness for the prosecution without the consent of the 
person charged®
Provided tlmt no party to a marriage shall be compellable t 
disclose any communication made to him or her during the 
marriage by the other party®"
Thus the Ghana version operates regardless of race, religion, or of
the type of marriage®
Another rule of evidence which shows a departure from the
English 3aw is the law relating to dying declarations® Section 870
of the Ghana Criminal Procedure Code (which is identical with the
/provision      law.   i i>■ -■ .... -‘t~—   —i--r-»n-roTniTTViiirfiiiiMriii«inw*t iinwi nw i.n ■ ■■■■«■ nn»i 11 tim m«i mi«in« nini«iiimi/1 iw iwi im— Tiirm—r~ tt  r^ tira
57* For case-lavf on this topic see R* v* Ajiyola and ors (1943) 9
W.A.C.A* 28; R. v. ‘Qopfoe (].947)_12 W.A.c’.A. 184T~(%ie law in
Ghana on this topic is changed® See s» 123 of the Act 30 I960) 
and R® v.flDom and ors (1947) /p, fcj 4 a/?
58® [1957] A*C# 126 at p® 135®
59 o Act 30 1960® S* 133®
60
provision in the old Nigeria Criminal Procedure Ordinance) reads;
"Upon a trial where the cause of death of a person comes 
into question, the declaration of the deceased, whether it he 
made in the presence of the accused or not , may be given in 
evidence if the court is satisfied that the deceased at the 
time of making the declaration believed himself to be in 
danger of approaching death although he m a y  have entertained 
at the time of making it hopes of recovery®"
It is to be noted that these provisions are very materially
different from the law in England, where before a dying declaration
is admissible it has to be shown that it was made in a settled
hopeless expectation of immediate death® Here the requirements 
63
are far less® But in Sierra Leone, a person making a dying
declaration must have "believed himself to be in danger of imminent
death and entertained at the time of masking it no hopes of 
62recovery"®
(3) Cri mina! Procedure
In V/est Africa there are statutory provisions regarding the
manner in which a person charged with a criminal offence can be
63brought to trial and punished® 1 The provisions deal with, for
example, arrests, the granting of bail, trial, examination of
   ....      /witnesses
60® Laws of Nigeria[1923® Eev®]Cap® 20, s® 51®
^ 0 S'* v<* Bebetebe \1938) 4- W#A*C#A* 67 at p® 68®
62® Laws of Sierra I,eone* 1960 Rev® Cap® 39, s* 62®
63® Ghana - Criminal Procedure Code, I960, Act 29$ Sierra Leone,
Cap® 39 (in part on!yf)$ Gambia [1955 Rev®] Cap® 23\ Nigeria - 
Criminal Procedure Code Ordinance Cap® 43 (partly federal and 
partly in operation in Lagos5 Northern Nigeria Criminal 
Procedure Code® N.R* No® 11 of I960®
377-
witnessesj punishment? probation and appeals* In Ghana, Northern 
Nigeria and the Gambia the legislation is described as a code, 
whilst in the rest of Nigeria and Sierra Leone no such claim is 
made* Perhaps the use of the word ’’code’1 in this connection is 
too strong a word* Indeed, in Shorunde v° The King, Lord PORTER 
observed s
,fIn their Lordships’ opinion the contention that the Ordinances 
and Rules in force in Nigeria provide the only method by which 
subpoenas ad . testificandum can be obtained in the colony 
cannot be supported® In their view there exists, side by side 
with them in appropriate cases, the English common law right 
of subpoena."
This view is further strengthened by the fact that section 363 
of the Nigerian Criminal Procedure Ordinance lays it down that?
’’The procedure and practice, for the time being in force of 
Her Majesty1s High Court of Justice in England in criminal 
trials shall apply to trials in the High Court in so far as 
this Ordinance has not specifically made provisions therefor®”
Referring to the old Criminal Procedure Ordinance of Ghana,
the West African Court of Appeal in v« Harlto said that "In*     M W  m nw 1UKI w
effect therefore, the relevant sections in our Procedure Ordinance 
contain similar provisions to the English law and since our Ordinance 
are as silent as the English statutes in regard to the right of the 
Crown to [order a juror] to "stand by", it would seem that the old 
common law right of the Crown in that respect survives here as in
England"
64* 
65 *
[1946]
(1931) 135
The modifications in West Africa of the English Criminal 
Procedural rules are very slight and^need be mentioned only on^e® 
With the exception of Ghana, the expression used to refer to the 
trial on indictment is "trial by information", although the 
relevant provisions rega-rding such trials are identical to the
Q 0
provisions of the English Indictment Act 1915® The 
modification of the jury trial has already been discussed 
elsewhere *
66* See, e*g» R® v® Jones (1939) 7 W»A®C®A° 75* The expression
used in the Northern Nigeria Penal Code Law is "charge"®
It must be noted that with reference to criminal procedure,
no attempt is made to compare the provisions of the Northern 
Nigeria Criminal Procedure Code Law with the others in 
Y/est Africa®
PART IV
THE INFLUENCE OF BQjUITY IN WEST AFRICAN LAW
Chapter Six 
THE INFLUENCE OF EQUITY IN WEST AFRICAN LAW
(A) INTRODUCTION
The term "equity" appears in three contexts in the laws of 
1
West Africa.
Firstly, it appears in the law which provides for the 
application of English law in eabh of the four territories.
Thus in the Gambia, by the Law of England (Application) 
2Ordinance, the Supreme Court of the Colony is empowered to 
administer:
,!The common law, the doctrines of equity, and 
the statutes of general application in force 
in England on the 1st November, 1888." Such 
laws are applicable Mso far only as the limits 
of the local jurisdiction and local circumstances 
permit and subject^to any existing or future 
local Ordinance."
The Gambia, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Nigeria and formerly the Southern 
Cameroons. In view of the changes in the legal structure of Ghana 
on becoming a republic, it is necessary to state that the references 
to the Ghana cases have bearing on the existing law only. "The 
repeal of section 83 of the Courts Ordinance (Cap.4) shall not be 
taken to affect the continued application of such of the statutes 
of general application which were in force in England on 24th July, 
1874, as applied in Ghana immediately before the commencement of 
this Act*
Provided that the said statutes shall be subject to such 
modifications as may be requisite to enable them to be conveniently 
applied in Ghana." (Courts Act (C.A.9) s. 154 (4) ).
Laws of the Gambia (1955 Revision) Cap.3, s.2.
3 Ibid., s.3 (l).
By virtue of section 29 of the Protectorate Ordinance,
the above-mentioned provisions apply to the Protectorate of the 
4Gambia. Similar provisions are enacted for Sierra Leone, where
5 6the date for the application of “English laivr" is January 1, 1880.
Secondly, the term “equity11 occurs in the following phrase: 
“repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience,” and 
thirdly in the phrase, “principles of justice, equity and good 
conscience.” It is submitted that the meaning of “equity” in each 
of these phrases is not the same, and it is intended to expatiate on 
this point at a later stage. Our present task is to show in what 
different contexts the two latter phrases appear.
In the Gambia, section 5 of the Law of England (Application)
Ordinance, Cap.3, states that:
“(i) Nothing in this Ordinance shall deprive the 
courts of the right to observe and enforce the 
observance, or shall deprive any person of the
4 IMS., Cap.47, s.29.
5 “English law” includes the common law, the doctrines of equity and 
the statutes of general application as at the particular date.
6 Lav/s of Sierra Leone (i960) Cap.7, s.37. See also The High Court 
Law, 1955, Eastern Region, No.27 of 1955, s.14. Northern Region
High Court Law, N.R. No. 8 of 1955, ss.28-33, 35. Western Region
High Court Law, Cap.44^  Laws of Western Region (1959 Rev.)
High Court of Lagos Qrd. Cap.80* Laws of the Federation of
Nigeria (1958 Rev.)
f ' j  rj
zj> $
b^enefit, of any native law or custom 
existing in the Gambia, such law or 
custom not being repugnant to natural 
justice, equity and good conscience, nor 
incompatible either directly or by 
necessary implication with any law, for 
the time being in force,
H(ii) Such laws and customs shall be 
deemed applicable in causes and matters 
where the parties thereto are natives, and 
also in causes and matters between natives 
and non-natives where it may appear to the 
court that substantial injustice would be 
done to either party by a strict adherence 
to the rules of English law.
H(iii) No party shall be entitled to 
claim the benefit of any local law or custom, 
if it shall appear either from express 
contract or from the nature of the 
transactions out of which any suit or 
question may have arisen, that such party 
agreed that his obligations in connection 
with such transaction is a transaction 
unknown to native law and custom.
”(iv) In cases where no express rule is 
applicable to any matter in controversy, the 
court shall be governed by the principles of 
justice, equity and good conscience.”
There are, of course, verbal variations from territory 
to territory. For example, section 38 of the Courts Ordinance of 
Sierra Leone provides inter alia that:
MSuch native customary law shall, except where the 
circumstances, nature or justice of the case shall 
otherwise require, be deemed applicable in all causes ^ 
and matters where the parties thereto are natives ..."
7 C.O. (1960 Rev.) Cap.7, s.38.
There is no doubt that this sentence has been put in 
with a particular aim in view* The effect of it appears to be 
this: that even if a customarylaw is not repugnant to natural
justice, equity and good conscience, the courts have a very wide 
discretion in refusing to enforce it. The rule is not so wide 
in the other territories. There is no case in Sierra Leone on 
this point, but the Ghana case of Re Whyte ® decided by a 
Nigerian courts, is in point. In that case the deceased was a 
Fante from Ghana who died in Nigeria, his domicile being Ghana.
He left a widow, to whom he had been married in accordance with 
Fante customary law, and an infant daughter of the marriage, both 
of whom were in Nigeria, and also a sister, who was living in Ghana 
and who was the successor to the estate under Fante customary law 
to the exclusion of the widow.
The Administrator-General, who was administering the estate, 
proposed a distribution of the residue which was not wholly in 
accordance with Fante customary law, in that it made - inter alia 
the widow a beneficiary. This scheme was opposed by the deceased's 
sister, who claimed the whole estate in accordance with Fante custom.
o
(1946) 18 N.L.H. 70; but see Abusatu Balogun and anor. v. 
Arnodu Balogun and ors. (1935) 2 V7.A.C.A. 290, 306.
The sister, in opposing the scheme, also relied on a passage in
Sarbah*s Fanti Customary Laws which said? "That by the Fanti
customary laws, a woman married in accordance with that law has
9
no share in the estate of the deceased husband, etc."
To this BROOICE, Ag. C.J., in delivering judgment, said:
"There can be no doubt that this is a correct statement of 
the strict native law applicable and it has in principle been 
recognised in judgements of the West African Court of Appeal."
But when he was faced with the enactment which directs the court
to enforce customary law when certain conditions were fulfilled, the
learned judge had this to say:
"The general rule is that where there is a native law applicab 
which is not repugnant to natural justice, equity and good 
conscience, the matter in controversy should be determined in 
accordance with such native law and custom. There is however 
an exception that if the decision of the court based on native 
law and custom would, having regard to the position of the 
persons affected, be contrary to natural justice, equity and 
good conscience native law and custom should not apply."
It is submitted that the attitude of the learned judge in regard
to the law of succession of the Alcan as it stood at the time of the
judgment, is questionable. It was his clear duty to apply the law of
succession as was proved to him. Indeed in a recent Nigerian
succession case of Bawodu and ora v. Danmole and ors, Privy
Council has observed that "In their Lordshipsf opinion the principles 
of natural justice, equity and good conscience applicable in a 
country where polygamy was generally accepted should not in a 
matter of this kind be readily equated with those applicable to 
a community governed by the rule of monogamy".
Since Ghana became a republic, the provision enjoining the courts 
to enforce customary law subject to certain reservations similar to 
the Bambian example has been abolished as being
9. J.M. SABBAH, Fanti Customary T a ^ TSnTedAl^orS ip. 100. ' ™
10. (1946) 18 N.L.R., pp. 72-73.
10a. The Times, July 26, 1962.
unsatisfactory. In fact in Ghana today the existence or
content of a rule of customary law is a question of law for the
11court and not a question of fact as it used to be.
The provision for the application of customary law can be
found in the laws of the various Regions of Nigeria, although the
12.original provision has undergone several amendments.
With the exception of Ghana, the phrase also appears in the
laws enacted for the establishment of customary or native courts in
West Africa. For example, in Northern Nigeria a native court shall
in civil causes and matters administer:
" the native law and custom prevailing in the area 
of the jurisdiction of the court or binding between 
the parties, so far as it is not repugnant to 
natural justice, equity and good conscience nor 
incompatible either directly or by necessary 
implication with any written law for the time being 
in force.1 13
.CBl NATURAL JUSTICE. EQUITY AMD GOOD CONSCIENCE
(l) The Repugnancy Clause
This expression in its full context has sometimes been 
described as the "repugnancy clause" or the "repugnancy doctrine."
11
Courts Act, 1960 (C.A.9), s.67.
^  e.g., The High Court Law, E.R. No.2? of 1955,s.22; Northern Region
High Court Law, N.R* No.8 of 1955, s.34; Western Region High Court 
Law, Cap.44, s.12.
13 Native Courts (Amendment)Law, 1960. N.R. No.10 of 1960, s*6 (a).
It will be recalled that the courts were under a duty to enforce
native law or custom ". . . not being repugnant to natural justice,
equity and good conscience." There are may versions of it. As far
back as 1844, when Cape Coast (in Ghana) was made a suitable place
for the trial of offenders (under 6 & 7 Viet. c*94), an Order in 
14Council stipulated that all judges, etc., were to observe "such 
of the local customs .. .  as may be compatible with the principles 
of the law of England.11
Again in 1856, in another British Order in Council, made to
apply to the Gold Coast, the egression "not repugnant to Christianity
15or to natural justice" was used.
In the Gambia the expression is "not repugnant to natural
justice and morality," whilst in the old Native Courts Ordinance of
16Nigeria it is "not repugnant to natural justice or morality" ;
as far as punishment authorised by native law or custom is concerned,
17it must not be "repugnant to natural justice and humanity."
14 Sept.3, 1844, British Order in Council recorded in A.Montagu, 
Ordinances, etc. of the Gold Coast, 1852-70, p.169.
15 April 4, 1856, B.O.I.C. Jurisdiction in the Protectorate Territories, 
(ibid.)p.170.
16
Laws of Nigeria (1948) N.C.O. Cap. 142, s.10 (l) (a).
17 Ibid., s.10 (2).
In section 23 (j) of the Native Authority Ordinance, the term
18is reversed to "not repugnant to morality or justice.1*
In the Act granting a Representative Constitution to New
Zealand (15 &16 Viet. c. 72) it was provided that the laws, customs,
etc., of the aboriginals or natives of New Zealand "so far as they
are not repugnant to the general principles of humanity'1 should be 
19maintained.
The French phrase given by M. Labouret is a much narrower
20one, viz. - "coutumes compatibles avec la civilisation occidentale."
repugnancy clause is distinguishable from the "residual 
clause" which states that the court "shall be governed by the 
principles of justice, equity and good conscience," where no express 
rule is applicable to any matter in controversy. We shall considef 
the residual clause later.
Native Authority Ordinance (of Nigeria), Cap.140 (Laws of Nigeria 
1948 Rev.)
19 C.J. Tarring, Chapters on the Law Relating to the Colonies (2nd ed., 
1893), p.7.
20
Cited by E.J* Arnett, "The French Mandate in the Cameroons" (1938) 37 
J.R.A.S. 191-198 at 194. In Belgium and Portugal,, indigenous laws 
which Vgve prejudicial to the ordre publique are denied recognition. 
See A. Robert, "Legislation and Courts in French, Belgian and 
Portuguese Territories" (1959) J.A.A. 124-131.
(2) Interpretation of the Phrases
The phrase can be looked at in one of two ways. It can 
be considered as one expression consisting of three different and 
distinct phrases, or it can be looked at as a single expression. It 
is not a mere academic exercise, for the problem involved has misled 
a number of people. Assuming that each phrase has a definite meaning, 
our first task is to try to find that meaning.
(a) Equity. STORY tells us that:
"in the most general sense, we are accustomed to call 
that equity, which, in human transactions, is found 
in natural justice, in honesty and right, and which 
properly arises ex aequo et bono. In this sense it 
answers precisely to the definition of justice, or ^  
natural law, as given by Justinian in the Pandects.'*
Snell begins his learned work on Equity thus:
**The term 'equity1 has a broad popular sense and 
a narrow technical sense. In its popular sense 
equity is practically equivalent to natural justice 
or morality."
At this juncture an impression is being formed that the
meaning of equity in the broad sense was equivalent to the meaning
23of natural justice. This view is supported by Allen, who referred 
to the remarkable treatise of St. Germain, Doctor and Student, which
21 The Hon. Mr. Justice Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence 
(3rd English edition by A.E. Randall), p.l.
22 R.E. Megarry and P.V. Baker, Snell’s Principles of Equity(24th ed., 
1954), p.3.
23 C.IC. Allen, Law in the Making (5th ed.,195l), p.332.
appeared early in the sixteenth century* We learn from a reply 
to one of the Doctor*s questions that the technical jurisdiction of 
the Chancery was not as yet known by the general term '‘equity," 
that word being understood in its broad meaning of natural justice*
24(b) Natural justice in its broad sense* In the English
case of Maclean v. The Workers' Union, MAUGHAM J. (as he then was)
observed that:
"The phrase is, of course, used only in a 
popular sense and must not be taken to mean that 
there is any justice natural among men* Among 
most savages there is no such thing as justice 
in the modern sense* In ancient days a person 
wronged executed his own justice. * . The truth
is that justice is a very elaborate conception,
the growth of many centuries of civilisation, and 
even now the conception differs widely in countries 
usually described as civilised." 25
With the greatest respect, the learned judge is in errof to think
that people he describes as "savages" have no idea of justice. Their
sense of justice is as good as if not better than the so-called British
justice; and there are a number of anthropological works which make
this clear. The phrase, it must be remembered, is not synonymous in
For a scholarly account on this topic see H.H. Marshall, Natural 
Justice (1959).
or
(1929) 1 Ch. 602 at 624. "I am not sure that I know what the terms 
'natural justice and good conscience1 mean* They are high-sounding 
phrases and it would of course not be difficult to hold that many of 
the ancient customs of the barbaric times are repugnant thereto, but 
it would not be easy to offer a strict and accurate definition of the 
terras": per SPEED Ag.C.J., Lewis v. Bankole (1908) 1 N.L.R. 82, 84.
meaning with equity in the technical sense. STORY rightly gives 
the warning that it "would he a great mistake to suppose that equity, 
as administered in England, embraced a jurisdiction so wide and
extensive as that which arises from the principles of natural
. . (| 26 justice. . . "
According to Snell:
"when the rules of natural justice enforced by the 
courts are examined, it will be seen that many of them 
are rules of common law, many others statutory, and 
some are derived from ecclesiastical and other sources. 
Only a small fraction of the whole are rules of equity 
in the technical sense." 27
Keeton describes equity in the technical sense as 
"an imperfect realisation of the conception of natural justice," 
and he also admits that "a good deal of the common law is also based 
on natural justice." One learned author put it this way:
"The words 'natural justice* were here clearly not 
used in their restricted modern sense but were 
synonymous with natural law; in the same way as the 
word 'equity* did not refer to technical equity, i.e., 
the equity of the Chancery Court, but to jus naturale.
Commentaries on Equity, p.2.
27 Principles of Equity, p.l.
28 An Introduction to Equity (2nd ed., 1947), p.5.
In other words, *natural justice' and 'equity' 
in this passage meant the same thing, i.e., 
natural law." 29
This conclusion, though helpful, does not answer all
the questions. One must agree with what a learned jurist has said,
that "natural law has been the occasion of much repetitive
generalisation and of great arid tracts of scholasticism on which
30no green thing grows." Further on, the learned author
observes that "Natural law is either a canon of the moral world as 
certain and as cognisable as, say, the law of gravitation in the
31physical world, or it is an imaginative embodiment of an aspiration."
The effect of the foregoing is very interesting. When we 
look for the meaning of equity in the broad sense, we are told that
Marshall, H.H., op.cit.,p.9. The passage referred to was said by 
Lord Mansfield in Moses v. Macferlan (1760) 2 Burr. 1005 (in an 
action to enforce a "quasi-contract"). The Lord Chief Justice 
said: "In one word, the gist of this kind of action is that the
defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the 
ties of natural justice and equity to refund the money."
Calvin's Case (1608) 7 Co.Rep* la, was considered mainly on 
the basis of natural law. Thus an extract from the judgement reads: 
"... the lav/ of nature is immutable. The law of nature is that which 
God at the time of the creation of man infused into his heart, for 
his preservation and direction; and this is lex aeterna. the moral 
law, called also the law of nature. And by this lav/, written with 
the finger of God in the heart of man, were the people of God a 
long time governed, before the law was written by Moses, who was 
the first reporter or writer of law in the world."
C.K. Allen, Aspects of Justice, p.44.
it is equivalent to natural justice. When we try to ascertain the 
meaning of natural justice we are told that it is practically 
equivalent to equity in the popular sense. Then both are said to 
mean natural law. At this juncture we re-enter the realm of 
uncertainties, but one thing is being made clear: it is that the
theory of assigning specific meanings to each of the phrases in the 
context just quoted is untenable.
(c) Good conscience
From what has just been said it would be a waste of time to try to
define the phrase "good conscience” apart from equity. Two short
passages from Allen and Maitland, respectively, will put the
matter in its correct perspective. The former states that:
” If we look for one general principle which more 
than any other influenced equity as it was developed 
by the Chancery, we find it in a philosophical and 
theological conception of conscience. . . .  In the 
common law courts of the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries, we hear a good deal, in many connections, 
about 1 conscience,1 'good faith,1 'reason,' 'conscience 
and law,' 'the lav/ of conscience,' 'right and reason’,
'reason and good faithS; of 'equity* we hear very little.”
That was the state of affairs then. Three hundred years later,
as Maitland shows, the marriage between equity and good conscience
had been consummated:
” In the course of the sixteenth century we begin to 
learn a little about the rules that the Chancellors are
TE2 Law in the Making, pp. 381-382
S88
administering in the field assigned to them.
They are known as 'the rules of equity and 
good conscience'." 33
Even though equity is not synonymous with good conscience, 
as the first passage ha© indicated, yet it can be said that the 
meaning of equity in the broad sense embraces almost all, if not 
all, the "concexrt of good conscience." Therefore in the phrase 
"equity and good conscience," the words "good conscience" can be 
regarded as superfluous.
The repugnancy phrase is usually punctuated, but it has also
been written without any punctuation. Thus in Snell, we come across
34the phrase "natural justice equity and good conscience."
Section 62 of the High Court Law of the Northern Region has this 
style: "natural justice,morality, equity or good conscience."
The fact that the expression is punctuated does not mean that each 
phrase has a separate meaning. Punctuation is regarded as a kind of
35contemporanea expositio, but not as forming part of the Statute itself.
Perhaps the reason for using these three almost similar 
phrases was due to the fact that the expression was coined in the
33 » , A 0 Equity, p.8.
34 Principles of Equity, p.4.
35 Sir Charles E. Odgers, The Construction of Leeds and Statutes 
(4th ed., 1956), pp.220-221.
period of English history when draftsmen believed in employing 
more words to cover a single situation so as not to leave any 
loophole. If this submission is correct, then it follows that 
the expression "natural justice, equity and good conscience," in 
the context under discussion should be treated as though it were 
a single phrase.
(3) Interpretation of Expression as a Whole
On the other hand, if we assume that the three phrases joined
together have only one meaning, certain possibilities arise.
Much ink has been spilt on this topic both by judges and jurists.
When all the views are assembled and sorted out, it appears that when
a custom is said to be repugnant, it could mean repugnancy as to one
or more of these:
(a) natural justice;
(b) equity;
(c) public policy and/or morality. Each of the three heads 
will be discussed in some detail.
36(a) The repugnancy clause with regard to natural justice
As a result of what has been said earlier on, it will be
rather ambitious to attempt a definition here. Fortunately it has
36 The reader is referred to the excellent account on "natural justice" 
by Professor S.A. de Smith in his Judicial Review of Administrative 
Action, p.101 et seq. See also Marshall, Natural Justice, p.3.
gone on record that the expression ’’natural justice” is one ’’sadly
37lacking in precision*” Again, it has been said that in so far
as it "means that a result or process should be just, it is harmless 
though it may be a high-sounding expression; in so far as it 
attempts to reflect the old jus naturale, it is a confused and 
unwarranted transfer into the ethical sphere of a term employed for
other distinctions; and in so far as it is resorted to for other
.. . „ 38purposes, it is vacuous."
It is difficult sometimes to know whether it is the "natural
sense” of justice which is meant or just justice* The following
have been resorted to with the same effect: "substantial justice,”
"the essence of justice,” "fundamental justice,” "universal justice,”
39"rational justice,” ^he principles of British justice,” "rough 
justice," or even "palm tree justice.”
When, however, an African customary law is said to be 
repugnant to "natural justice,” it could mean:
(i) repugnancy relating to the substantive law;
^  R. v. Local Government Board, ex p. Arlidge Cl914j 1 K.B. 165
^  kocal Government Board v. Arlidge A.C.120 at p.138 per
Lord Shaw.
39 de Smith, op.cit. 102.
(ii) repugnancy relating to procedure;
(iii) repugnancy affecting' the degree of punishment.
JEacli of the three items will now be considered.
(i) Repugnancy relating to the substantive law.
Before the British assumed control and jurisdiction over the
West African territories, and well after their arrival, slave-
dealing was tolerated by both black and white until it was
"found" to be repugnant to natural justice. Thus, in 1874, the
41Gold Coast Slave-dealing Abolition Ordinance was enacted.
This Ordinance abolished only the worst form of slavery 
which had acquired international notoriety (or so it seemed), but 
not all the incidents arising out of that status. This state of
affairs was bound to produce some ambiguity.
Therefore in December of that year the Gold Coast
42ISmancipation Ordinance was enacted to resolve certain doubts.
By section 3 '‘persons bora after the 5th of November, 1874" were
40 J. Lewin, "The recognition of native law and custom in British 
Ajfrica" (1938) 20 J.Comp.Leg. (3rd series) 16-23.
41 No. 1 of 1874
A O
No.2 of 1874 (December 17, 1874).
declared ffee. It was also expressly provided that "nothing 
herein contained shall be construed to diminish or derogate from 
the rights and obligations of parents and of children or from other 
rights and obligations, not being repugnant to the law of England, 
arising out of the family and tribal relations customarily used 
and observed in the protected territories."
The effect of this provision is that if a customary rule 
depends solely on slavery for its existence, it would not be 
recognised.
43In the Ghana case of Santeng, per Ohemeng v* Darltwa and anor., 
STUATTER-STEWART J., delivering the judgement of the court, explained 
it in these words:
"The true construction of that section is, 
in my opinion, that slavery, being repugnant to 
the law of England, is abolished by the enactment, 
but any privileges or rights which the slave may 
have had before the passing of the Ordinances are 
saved, provided those privileges or rights are not 
in themselves repugnant to English law."
Consequently, the West African Court of Appeal held that the 
custom that the child of a slave woman is considered, for purposes of
43 (1940) 6 V/.A.C.A. 52, 53-54. See also Donkor v. Dan so (1959) 
G.L.R. 147.
succession and otherwise, to be a member of the fatherfs family, 
was not repugnant.
Another custom which has been abolished by statute as
being repugnant to natural justice is the cult of Osu in Eastern 
43aNigeria. It was strictly taboo for these ’’social outcasts”
to marry or to have sexual relations with free-born Ibo, and they
44-were subjected to a number of other restrictions.
The custom of killing twins will no longer by countenanced 
under any circumstances.
Far from these customs having been regarded with opprobrium, 
they have been regarded as criminal offences.
45Thus section 246 of the Nigerian Criminal Code states that :
”Any person who without the consent of the 
Governor buries or attempts to bury any corpse 
in any house, building, premises . . .  is guilty 
of misdemeanour, and is liable to imprisonment 
for six months.”
Abolition of the Osu Sysiem Law, 1956, E.I*. No. 22 of 1956.
Nwachukwu v. Nnoremele (1957) II E.B.L.B.50.
Originally these Osu or their ancestors were free-born, but were 
brought by a family or individual at the command of a diviner and 
offered as slaves to some deity whose wrath was aroused and whom the 
sacrifice of a mere fowl or goat would not satisfy. See M.M.Greene, 
Ibo Village Affairs, p.24.
Laws of Nigeria (1958), Cap.42, s.246. See also N.W.Thomas, ”Some 
Ibo burial customs” (1917) 47 J.R.A.I., 160-163, 164.
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46(ii) Repugnancy relating; to procedure.
As will be recalled, there are statutory provisions which direct
indigenous courts to administer customary law. This means inter alia
that the procedure adopted in court also must not be repugnant
to natural justice. From the point of view of superior courts, the
customary procedure adopted in the indigenous courts must, as far as
possible, conform to the standard set in the English courts. In the
technical sense, English law recognises but two principles of
47natural justice :
that an adjudicator be disinterested and unbiased (nemo judex
See J. Lewin, MThe recognition of native law and custom in British 
Africa” (1938) 20 J.Comp.Leg. (3rd series), 16-23; ,!Some problems 
involved in the recognition of African native law” (1942) 24 
J.Comp.Leg. (3rd series), 109-113; ”Native courts and British 
justice in Africa” (1944), 14 Africa, 448-452. A*N. Allott,
”The extent of the operation of native customary law.
Applicability and repugnancy” (i960) 2 J.A.A. (No.3) 4-11;
A. Epstein, ”Some aspects of the conflict of law, and urban 
courts in Northern Rhodesia” (l95l) 12 Rhodes-Livin&stone Journal, 
28-40; Administration of justice and the urban African,
Chaps. 6 and 7, and ”The standard of justice.” T*0. Elias, 
”Customary law. The limits of its validity in colonial law”
(1954) 13 Afr.Stud. 97.
S.A. de Smith, op.cit♦, p.101.
in causa sua) and,
that the parties be given adequate notice and opportunity 
to be heard (audi alteram partem).
The origin of these two rules is not English. We are told
by Professor de Smith in his book that the principle that no man is
to be judged unheard was a precept knoivn to the Greeks. In English
law perhaps the earliest celebrated case is that popularly known as
48Dr. Bentley^ case.
Why, it may be asked, should a superior court upset a
decision of a native court on a matter of procedure according to
customary law? The answer is that there are certain rules of
procedure so fundamental in any system of law that their observance
is obligatory on every court of law. These rules are known to lawyers
49as "the principles of natural justice." They apply in all
judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Thus in Thomas and ors. v.
50Oba A. Ademola II and ors., where the plaintiff, a holder of the
48 R.v. Chancellor of the University of Cambridge (1723) 1 Str. 557 
at 567 where Fortescue J. said "....even God himself did not pass 
sentence upon Adam before he was called upon to make his defence. 
•Adam' (says God) 1where art thou? Hast thou not eaten of the tree 
whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat?1 "
4-9 J. Lewin, "Native courts and British justice in Africa," cit.supra, 
note 46, pp. 448,450.
50 (1945) 18 N.L.R. 12.
Iwarefa title-chieftaincy of Base of Iporo siace 1934, wa©
“drummed out“ of the Iwarefa body by his fellow Iwarefa chiefs in a 
way which amounted to taking matters into their own hands, POLLARD 
Ag.J. said this:
“No evidence has been given to this court that 
the first plaintiff had been previously informed 
of the charges held against him, or that he was to 
be tried; no invitation was given to him to appear 
to defend himself, or to answer the charges that 
these two Iwarefa chiefs * . • conceived he had 
committed. In his absence, and without being even 
notified of any inquity into his conduct, far less 
being called upon, he was expelled from their society.
This method of procedure was in direct violation of 
the native law and custom bearing upon the deposition 
and/or suspension of a chief . . . .  I find as a fact 
that in Ogboni societies the sacred principle which is 
enshrined in the legal maxim - audi alteram partem - 
operates with full force.“
He continued, “the chiefs had done so in violation of the
51elementary principles of natural justice.“
An interesting case, which illustrates the responsibility
resting on the shoulders of the indigenous courts, is the High Court
52case of Egba Native Administration y. Adeyanju. The facts are
these:
The Ake court was a native court established by warrant
Ibid. 33, 37.
52 (1936) 13 N.L.R. 77.
under the Native Courts Ordinance. The warrant provided that
the court should consist of the President and twenty-two othefc
members, but without any provision that a quorum of the members
of the court could function. The appellant was charged in the
Ake court with a criminal offence. The President and two members
sat to try the case. Just before the close of the case for the
prosecution these two members of the court were replaced by two
others who heard the rest of the evidence for the prosecution and
that for the defence. These two newcomers dropped out and two
other members, who had heard none of the evidence at all, took
their places, and the court so constituted convicted and sentenced
the appellant. On appeal to the Native Court of Appeal, the
conviction was upheld. On further appeal to the High Cpurt
GRAHAM PAUL J. did not mince his words in l-ejeeting the customary
procedure referred to. The learned judge was of the opinion that
if a custom amounted to a denial of the fundamental right of an
accused person to have his case heard by judges, he conceived that
it would be the
“clear duty of this court on appeal to refuse to give 
effect to such a practice and to quash a conviction 
obtained in such circumstances. I regard the procedure 
disclosed in this case as a travesty and a mockery of 
the administration of justice. A custom of that kind 
is clearly in the terms of section 16 of the Protectorate
Courts Ordinance 'repugnant to natural 
justice, equity and good conscience'* 11 54
The principle that a person ought to be given an opportunity
to be heard applies to his witnesses: "It is a fundamental
principle of the administration of natural justice that a defendant
and his witnesses should be heard before the case against him is
determined, and it islf in my view, a denial of justice to refuse to
55hear a defendant's witnesses."
It has also been held that the duty of audi alteram partem
is not performed by the substituting for the case of one side a
55arecord of the evidence given by it before another magistrate.
It is contrary to natural justice that a person should be 
convicted or punished for an offence in respect of which there is no 
complaint or charge. This was so held tfejbf the High Court of Northern
ft. 5Q
Nigeria in DzakpH v. Tiv Native Authority.
53 Now see Northern Region High Court Law, No.8 of 1955 (amended), 
ss. 28-33, 35.
(1936) 13 N.L.R. at 80.
EC
Maiam SadalLof Kunya v. Abdul Kadir of Fagge (1956) F.S.C.H. 39, 
at 41, per Jibowu F.J*
Ogiogun v. Idukpaye (1959) W.R.N.L.R 81 at p.82 per MORGAN, J. 
(1958) N.R.N.L.B., 135, 137.
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The principle that no man may be judge in his own cause
is well illustrated by the Nigerian case of ModibblS) v. Adamawa Native 
57Authority, which \ms heard by the High Court on appeal. The facts 
were that the appellant if as sentenced by the Latnido of Adamawa to 
twelve months' imprisonment for writing an insulting letter to the 
Adamawa Native Authority Council*
The Larnido is President of the Council, and certain other 
members of the Council were members of the court by which the sentence 
was passed* The appellant argued that as the Native Authority Council 
were the persons to whom the allegedly insulting letter was addressed, 
the alleged offence ought not to have been tried in the Lamido's court, 
but in the Alkali's court. It was, however, contended on behalf of 
the respondents, that even though in Maliki law the same principle 
(that no man shall be a judge in his own cause) applies, yet this case 
was an exception on the gounds - inter alia - (a) that no Alkali
had power to adjudicate upon a religious matter between a ruler and 
a subject, and therefore (b) the case had, of necessity, to be tried 
by the Larnido in his court. It was held upon a consideration of this 
point as a preliminary point, that this case afforded no exception to
57 (1956) N.U.N.L.R.,101. The courts system has been reorganised.
the general principle, and that although the Ruler is the proper 
person to hear and determine religious disputes this does not apply 
where the dispute takes the form of a personal attack upon him; and 
that in such a case the principle that no man can be a judge in his 
own cause must be maintained.
These days all efforts are being made to ensure that persons 
appearing before the courts get a fair hearing. Chapter III of the 
Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council, 1960, deals with fundamental
* i* 58rights.
It would, however, be wrong to presume that any indigenous 
rule of procedure which is not compatible with English law should 
be held to be repugnant to natural justice.
59One can do no better than qhote what Lord Hailey has said :
nIt would be a mistake to assume that primitive 
Africa made no provision for the decision of 
contentious issues; there existed everywhere a 
recognised means of securing decisions on them, 
beginning with the arbitrament of family heads or 
or heads of kin groups and ending with the more 
formal adjudication by a Chief, or a Chief and his
58
S.l. 1960/1652,s.2l(l) states that: f,In the determination of his 
civil rights and obligations a person shall be entitled to a fair 
hearing within a reasonable time by a court or other tribunal 
established by law and constituted in such manner as to secure its 
independence and impartiality.1
59 An African Survey (revised 1956) pp.628-629.
council, or some form of clan or tribal moot* 
"If these tribunals had their limitations, 
they nevertheless seem to have been accepted as 
dispensing justice to the general satisfaction 
of those who sought their decisions. But the 
procedure of trial differed widely from that 
practised in the present Colonial courts, 
Africans do not seem to have had any clear 
concept of relevancy, and no limits were set 
to the relevancy of the evidence given; . • • 
where writing was unknown, documentary evidence 
was necessarily excluded and hearsay evidence 
was entirely unrestricted."
But real evidence was usually available. Moreover, 
the judge or judges might be well acquainted with the litigants 
and might know all the circumstances of their lives* The facts of 
the case might be well known to the judges. It is submitted that 
the judgement should not be impugned merely because of "bias" or 
some such technical ground in English law.
The High Court in Northern Nigeria when hearing appeals 
from the native courts is warned about this danger. Section 62 of the 
High Court Law provides that^:
"Where the jurisdiction conferred on any native 
court is as regards practice, or procedure, regulated 
in any particular by native law and custom, no 
objection to any proceeding in such court shall be taken 
or allowed on the hearing of an appeal from a decision of
60 N.H. No.8. of 1955. See also feago.ii v. Kano N.A. (1957) 
N.R.N.L.R. 57; Tsamiya v. Bauchi N.A. (1957) N.R.N.L.R.73.
such court on the ground only that, in any 
such particular, there has been a failure 
to observe any principle of English law or 
any English rule of evidence or procedure, 
if such proceeding or decision is not in 
fact contrary to natural justice, morality, 
equity or good conscience nor incompatible 
with the provisions of any written law.'1
m . 61These provisions emanate from the Tsofo Gubba case, 
which impelled the legislature, whilst maintaining the application 
of the Criminal Code to all cases, to allow native courts to try 
cases in accordance with their customary law on the one hand, and 
on the other hand to have their decisions corrected in the light
of the Criminal Code, where necessary, in courts familiar with
. . 62its provisions.
The Northern Nigeria case of Kano Native Authority v,
62aObiora decided by the Federal Supreme Court is also relevant
to this topic even though Criminal trial under Maliki law has been
superseded by the Northern Nigeria Penal Code. The importance of
the case lies in the emphasis which the Federal Supreme Court gives 
to the requirements of the principles of natural justice. Delivering
^  Tsofo Gubba v. Gwandu N.A. (1947) 12 W.A.C.A. 141.
62
Fago.ii v. Kano N.A. (1957) N.R.N.L.R. 57, at p.71, per Bairamian S.P.J. 
62a (1960) N.R.N.L.R. 42 at p.47
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the judgement of the Appellate Court, ADEMQLA, F.C.J., remarked:
MA procedure is not contrary to natural justice 
merely because it is foreign to English law,, so 
long as it is clear that substantial justice is 
done. This was laid down in the case of Scarpetta 
v* Lowenfeld (62b)
uWe agree that natural justice requires that 
an accused person must be given the opportunity to 
put forward his defence fully and freely, and to 
ask the court to hear any witnesses whose evidence 
might help him, but we do not regard the decision 
*n Auzinawa v. Kano N.A. (62c) requiring the Appellate 
Courts to hold, as a matter of course, that there has 
been a denial of natural justice merely because a 
Native Court has not adopted any particular method of 
achieving this end.1
The interpretation given by the Federal Supreme Court 
to the decision in Auzinawa1s case shows that the pdwer of Appellate 
Courts to disturb the decisions of Customary Courts on technical 
procedural grounds should be exercised with great caution.
Section 15(d) of the Sharia Court of AppealL states, inter alia, 
that "The Court, in the exercise of the jurisdiction vested in it 
by this law as regards both substantial law and practice and procedure, 
shall administer, observe and enforce the observance of the 
principles and provisions of ... . natural justice, equity and good 
conscience."
62b (1911) 27 T.L.R. 509
^ Qrt
(1956) F.S.C. 27. See also Dei v. Pong (1959) G.L.R. 135. 
62d N.R. N*. 16 of 1960.
The best way of approaching this practice is to be found in the 
language used in an Eastern Nigerian Case by DE LESTANG, F.J.:
MI venture to say that so long as those (Native) 
Courts act in good faith, listen fairly to both 
sides and give fair opportunity to the parties 
adequately to present their case and to correct and 
contradict any relevant statement prejudicial to 
their view, they cannot be accused of offending 
against the rules of natural justice."
(iii) Repugnancy relating to the degree of punishment
The degree of punishment inflicted by the native courts must 
be reasonable* Thus section 2 of the old Native Courts Ordinance 
of Nigeria (Cap. 142) says that:
"For offences against any native law or custom 
a native court may, subject to the provisions of this 
Ordinance, impose a fine or imprisonment or both, or 
may inflict any punishment authorised by native law 
or custom, provided it does not involve mutilation, or 
torture, and is not repugnant to natural justice and 
humanity.11
Even stronger language is used by the Nigeria (Constitution) 
Order in Council, 1960, s. 187 : "No person shall be subjected
to torture or to inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment.11
62e The Queen v. The Lieutenant-Governor, Eastern Region (1957) 
2 F.S.C. 46 at p.47.
See S.I. 1960/1652.
(b) The repugnancy clause with regard to equity
64It will be recalled that Snell described equity as 
having a broad popular sense and a narrow technical sense. In its 
popular sense, equity is practically equivalent to natural justice 
or morality. Snell goes on to say that sometimes both are to be 
found in the same instrument, as in the Courts Ordinance, 1935, of 
the Gold Coast (now Ghana). This enacted that the courts of the 
Colony were to apply "the common law the doctrines of equity and 
the statutes of general application which were in force in England" 
on a certain date, and also empowered them to give effect to any 
native law or custom, "such law or custom not being repugnant to 
natural justice, equity and good conscientel" Here the first phrase 
refers to equity in the narrow sense and the second to equity in 
the wider sense.
As has been said before, equity in the popular sensd actually 
meant natural justice or morality. Looking at a number of cases 
that have been decided by the High Couft, one finds that the judges 
have taken the view that under the repugnancy clause they can 
incorporate equitable principles to tame some of the harsh customary 
laws.
Snell, Principles of Equity, pp. 3 and 4.
It is submitted with the greatest respect that the view
is erroneous* Judges are directed to observe and enfonce the
observance of customary law not repugnant to natural justice,
equity and good conscience. There is nothing in it which gives
the power to incorporate equitable principles. On this ground, the
interpretation of M'CAHTHY Ag* C.J* in the Ghana case of Fiscian v.
05Nelson is, with respect, untenable* The learned judge interpreted 
it thus:
"The equitable jurisdiction exercised by him 
(the trial judge) in refusing to grant relief to the 
plaintiff-appellant is based on section 74 of the 
Courts Ordinance (66) which provides in effect that 
native customary law will not be recognised by the 
courts where to do so would be contrary to equity and 
good conscience*"
It must be noted that the repugnancy clause has only a 
negative function and no more. A similar misinterpretation has 
recently been put forward by a writer in the Journal of African 
Administration* In writing about Ghana, he stated that 1 if the 
courts decide that a custom is repugnant they have to fall back on 
the principles of justice, equity and good conscience in deciding the 
case before them*" ^
f j e T  "  L,r " irllr ' 1 L-n... [ I .r- ■ „■ r- r  - ■ -  ' 1 n—."1 ,   , r " , — - '
(1946) 12 W.A.E.A. 21.
Later s*87 (l) of the Courts Ordinance, Laws of the Gold Coast (1951) 
Cap.4.
67 A. St* J.J* Hannigan, ’’The present system of succession amongst 
the Akan people of the Gold Coast11 (1954) 6 J.A.A* 166-171.
Upon careful reading of the relevant provision in the
68 "te c^ rr* j?/o 4
Ordinance, it will be seen that the courts are the
positive principles of justice, equity and good conscience, only 
where no express rule is applicable to any matter in controversy*
Thus this expression, usually called the residual clause, has only a 
positive function. By the absence of express rule is meant absence 
of customary law rule on that point.
As Lord Atkin pointed out in his speech to the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Eshugbayi Bleko v.
69Government of Nigeria :
"It it (the customary lat£] still stands in its 
barbarous character it must be rejected as repugnant 
to natural justice, equity and good conscience.
In other words, the court cannot itself transform 
a barbarous custom into a milder one.11 (70 )
It is respectfully submitted that it is unnecessary for the
courts to resort to the repugnancy clause in order to introduce
equitable principles, for the doctrine of technical equity is already
conferred on the court.
8ee supra.
69 fl93i> A.C.662 at 673.
70 Writer*s italics.
(c) The repugnancy clause with regard to public policy and/or morality
This is our third and last major division* Under this head 
may be included principles which have to be regarded as offending 
against the principles of Christianity.
As will be recalled, all the three "terms" have been used
in enactments governing the recognition of customary law. Thus in
the Gold Coast the phrase "not repugnant to Christianity or natural
justice  ^was used in 1856. In the Gambia it is "not repugnant to
71natural justice and morality." Section 11 of Act No.38 of 1927
of the Union of South Africa provides for the application of native law
in suits between natives involving questions of customs "provided that
such native law shall not be opposed to the principles of public
72policy or natural justice."
73As Dr. Allott has rightly pointed out, when the term 
public policy is used in relation to African law, the meaning is 
probably wider than its meaning in English law; for, as was
74recognised by the English court in Fender v. St. John Milchuay,
71 “
See ante, p.34
72 A.S. Welsh, "Native customary law in the Union of South Africa" 
(1958) 10 J.A.A., 83-94 at 83.
73 "The extent of the operation of native customary law" (1950)
2 J.A.A. 4-11.
74 fl93Sj A.C. 1 at 23
35
it is no longer legitimate for the courts to invent a new head
A j\A«^pcL
of public policy. Bfe must expound, not expand, this particular 
branch of the law.
There is no yardstick by which the exact line of demarcation 
75between public order and morality ctpi be determined. In fact 
morality is no more than an aspect of public policy. Decided cases 
have revealed that when a customary law is held to be repugnant to 
public policy, what is probably meant is that it offends against 
the sense of morality of the Western world.
It is on this ground that some injustices have been done.
Thus in Sou$h Africa the courts have been erroneously led to regard
the transfer of cattle as marriage consideration as nothing other than
an offer for "the immoral purpose of cohabitation with a woman," and
have therefore declined to enforce such contracts or rights that arose 
76out of it.
Until recently, the English courts relied upon the principles
77established in Hyde v. Hyde, following the case of Warrender v.
D. Lloyd, Public Policy (1953), p.27. "Public order" is the French 
version of public policy.
76 J. Lewin, Studies in African Native Law, p#108
77
Hyde v. Hyde (1866) L.R. 1 P. & D.130.
78Warrender, where Lord Brougham expressed himself as follows:
”It is important to observe that we regard 
it (marriage) as a wholly differing thing, a 
different status, from Turkish or other marriages 
among infidel nations, because we clearly never 
should recognise the plurality of wives*”
With the passage of time, this notion has been proved to
be without virtue. In the words of one learned writer, it could
scarcely foe the law ’’that our courts in England should absolutely
ignore all family relations among the great majority of the human
race, treating all wives among them as mere concubines, all children
as bastards and all property left by an intestate among them as
79escheating or becoming ownerless.”
(4) By what Criteria is it Decided, and who Decides that a
Customary Law is Repugnant?
The quick answer to the second question is that the power to
observe and enforce the observance of native law and custom not
repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience, or morality,
is vested in the breast of the superior court. This means that it
is exercised by the individual judges.
70
(1835) 2 Cl. & F. 433, 532.
79 Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, "Non-Christian Marriage" (1900)
J.S J.Comp.Leg. (n.s.) 359-387 at 379.
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The thorniest problem is by what criteria the judge is 
to assess thecustom.
There seems to be a welter of examples all pointing in the
direction that the standard to be used is that of English or British
moiaLity. The late Right Honourable Sir Sidney Abrahams, delivering
80a lecture at the London School of Economics in 1948, expressed 
himself thus:
"Morality and justice must of course mean British 
and not African conceptions of these. Were that not so 
British justice would be looking in two different 
directions at once.11
81Later on in the course of the lecture, he expounded this theory :
"I have sometimes been asked . . . 'How do you 
justify the application of English principles of 
justice to so mapy different peoples whose outl&ok 
and mentality vary so much from our own, especially 
when English ideas pass their understanding1?..* We 
believe that these ideas are the best that can 
regulate our administration of justice, and an 
Englishman because he is an Englishman and not someone 
quite different, cannot adopt other persons' conception 
of justice."
Ten years ago, another English judge, delivering a judgement
80 '    1 " 1  ” ~   .
Sir Sidney Abrahams "The Colonial legal service and the administration
of justice in the Colonial dependencies" (1948) 30 J. Comp.Leg. and
I.L. (3rd series, parts 3 and 4) pp. 1-11 at p.8.
81 T, . , ..Ibid, p.11.
82in Tanganyika, asked himself a similar question:
"To what standard then does the Order in 
Council refer - the African standard of justice and 
morality or the British standard? • . . • I have 
no doubt whatever that the only standard of justice 
and morality which a British court in Africa can 
apply is its own British standard/'
One may ask why an African indigenous law should be looked 
at through the monocle of an Englishman? With the greatest rogpect, 
this view is rather narrow and insular.
Sir Sidney himself had remarked, in his address, that "the 
court has to be wary not to condemn a custom merely because it does 
not accord with a European mode of life."
As far as the last statement is concerned, Sir Sidney had 
many followers* To take a few examples:
In 1887 Sir James Marshall, an experienced judge in the
83Gold Coast, recounted his impression thus :
"My own experience of the West Coast of Africa 
is that Government has for the time succeeded best 
with natives which has treated them (sic) with 
consideration for their native laws, habits and 
customs, instead of ordering all these to be
Gwao bin ICilimo v. Kisunda bin Ifuti: (1938) 1 T.L.R*(R.) 403* 
(1887) 16 J.A.I. 180-182 at 181.
suppressed as nonsense, and insisting on the 
wondering negro at once submitting to the 
British Constitution and adopting our ideas 
of life and civilisation . . . • What X 
wish to say is that the natives of the Gold 
Coast and the West Coast of Africa, have a 
system of laws and customs which it would be 
better to guide, modify, and amend, rather 
than to destroy by Ordinance and force.'1
The same warning was given by an administrative officer
84who had done distinguished service in Nigeria. He observed s
"The attitude of the English lawyer towards 
African law and custom is not that of adaptation 
but contempt for a worthless thing, which should 
be abandoned and replaced by European law whole 
and undefiled.
"The problems of Africans today of how to 
adapt themselves to the sudden inrush of strange 
European ideas get no help from English lawyers, 
but perhaps we may hope that some day the lawyers, 
like the missionaries, will discover that there is 
something in African ideas of justice and right 
worthy to be built into the new structures that 
Africa demands."
85(a) What should the role of the .judge be?
From the foregoing passages, certain observations emerge 
which throw some light on the duty of a judge in such cases.
It is admitted that the use of the repugnancy clause is
84 (1939) 38 J.A.S. 161
85 In formulating these rules the writer has had great assistance from 
the work of Professor D. Lloyd on Public Policy, 121 et seq., and 
he is highly indebted to him.
beneficial in many cases in pruning down and abolishing some 
unpleasant instances of customary law, but it must also be 
mentioned that the repugnancy clause, like its English counterpart 
of public policy, may be an "unruly horse" which may carry its rider 
he knows not where.
The following are a few suggestions for such a situation:
(b) Negative aspects of the .judge's role, (i) The judge must not 
condemn a custom merely because it does not accord with a European 
mode of life, or offends against the stringent domestic policy of 
England. The standard by which it is judged must depend also on 
the conception of justice held by the people concerned.
(ii) The judge must not rely too heavily on previous decisions, 
for that prevents the evolution of customary law, and it may prevent 
him from dbaling with a novel situation. He should use reported 
decisions as a guide.
(iii) The question whether a customary law is repugnant or not 
must notdepend solely on the conscience of a judge, for (and if we 
may adapt a passage from Selden's Table Talk on the Chancellorfs 
Conscience ) one judge has a long foot, another a short foot, and a 
third an indifferent foot - it is the same thing with the judge's
conscience# In other words, the judge must not indulge in
87the subjective test.
(iv) But he must not be bound to observe a custom of the 
community if he is satisfied that the custom or opinion is abhorrent 
to right-thinking people. Otherwise, to give an example from the 
Southern States of America, a judge might have to favour lynch-law.
Put it another way, the judg'e must not follow mass opinion 
on a particular custom when it is clearly in error.
(v) Finally, the judge must not make a sort of extra-judicial
inquiry as to the prevailing moral concept.
(c) Positive aspects of the judge’s role
(i) In arriving at a decision as to whether a customary law is
repugnant or not, the judge should consider the social consequences
of the custom propounded as to its probable results.
86 jSel4en’s Table Talk, title "Equity,*1 cited in Story’s Commentaries 
on Equity Jurisprudence, p.13
87 Lecturing on "The enforcement of morals: a consideration of the
jurisprudence in the Wolfenden Report," Mr. Justice Devlin (as
he then was) is reported as saying that morals were not always a
matter for private judgment, for the structure of every society 
was made both of politics and morals; the fact that no grave 
offence against morals was punishable without the verdict of a 
jury was of great importance: The Times, March 19, 1959.
<//?- 41 '5
(ii) Although the judge must not hold a public inquihy into 
the alleged customary rule, he must try to get the best evidence 
possible from reliable and expert witnesses*
(iii) Lastly, the judge is expected to maintain a high degree of 
impartiality and to seek, as best as he can, to apply not his individual 
moral or ethical conception, but that which his training, background 
and knowledge lead him to believe to be in accordance with customary 
morality and the general conscience of the community*
££-) Q  THE RESIDUAL CLAUSE
This is the second limb of the repugnancy clause, but each operates 
in a different field. Whereas the repugnancy clause operates in 
the negative field, the residual clause functions positively to 
introduce j>rinciples of justice, equity and good conscience# At this 
juncture, it is necessary to give the full quotation in which the 
expression occurs.
In Sierra Leone, for example, there is a proviso to section 38 
of the Courts Ordinance which states that no party will be allowed to 
claim the benefit of any local law or custom if it appears either from 
the express contract, or from the nature of the transaction, that such 
party agreed that his obligations in accordance with such transactions
lk 1 i
88should be governed exclusively by English law.
89There follows this quotation :
"and in such cases where no express rule is 
applicable to any matter in controversy, the court 
shall be governed by the principles of justice, 
equity and good conscience♦"
Until recently, these provisions could be found in the statute
books of all the four territories of West Africa. Why were they
enacted? One answer was given by BRANBFORD GRIFFITH J. (as he then
90was) in the Nigerian case of Cole v. Cole. The learned judge
explained that:
"These words show that the legislature was well 
aware that it could not lay down specific rules as to 
where native law and custom was to apply and where it 
was not to apply. It was aware that cases must arise 
for which it could not possibly provide, accordingly 
it framed the s£bction in very general terms, 
expressly specifying one particular class of transaction 
in which matives should not take advantage of native lav/ 
and custom, and finally giving the court large 
discretionary powers."
(l) Origin of the expression
As far as West Africa is concerned, there is strong reason
to believe that the quotation was modelled on an enactment from
91 92India. We are told by STORY, however, that perhaps it
Q Q  .............  '■■ ■ ' ■"  ' ■ L i: i -  . i i " " n . r - . r u r
Courts Ordinance (i960) Cap.7.
89 T1 . ,Ibid.
90 (1898) 1 N.L.R. at 21, 22.
91 See H.W.H.Redwar: Commeris on Some Ordinances of the Gold Coast Colony, 
etc., p.63 et seq. Sir Frederick Pollock,Essays in the Law,pp.74*79.
02 Op.cit. pp.3-4
originated from Roman jurisprudence. Thus in his chapter on the 
nature of equity he said this:
"In the Roman jurisprudence we may see many traces 
of this doctrine, applied to the purpose of supplying 
the defects of the customary law, as well as to correct 
the measure of interpretation of the written and 
positive code.
"Domat accordingly lays it down as a general 
principle of the Civil law that if any case should 
happen which is not regulated by some express or 
written law, it should have for a law the natural 
principles of equity, which is the universal law, 
extending to everything.*1
These words are not identical with the quotation given 
earlier, but there seems to be a possibility of the draftsman having 
availed himself of some such similar early provision.
(2) Meaning and application of the residual clause
Since the expression was probably imported into West Africa 
from India, it will be helpful to consider its meaning and how it has
been applied in one or two different countries.
93(a) The Indian example Section 93 of the Regulations made for
the Sudder Dewanny Court by Sir Jillijah Impey on July 5, 1781, 
provided that:
"in all cases, for which no specific directions
See Tagore Law Lectures 1912, "Codification in British India," 
pp.90 and 270, by B.K. Acharyya, for a brilliant account. See also 
Tagore Law Lectures 1894, "The law of Fraud in British India," by 
Sir Frederick Pollock, in which the author points out on p.6 ihat 
"equity and good conscience had already appeared in the Charter 
of 1683," but that this was confined to the Company^ own people.
"are hereby given the judges of the Sudder Dewanny 
Adawlut do act according to justice, equity and 
good conscience.11
This provision was later copied at various intervals in
94the other presidencies and provinces of British India and Burma.
How was this maxim or expression applied, and with what
results, in India? At this juncture we can do no better than cite
four Indian cases to illustrate the answer. It has been said that
the maxim was used to introduce the technical rules of English law.
This might have been largely true but, as the cases will show, it
95must not be over-emphasised.
See Tagore haw Lectures 1912, p.95 et seq.
A similar provision was introduced in the Japanese Civil Code. 
Acharyya op cit.96. As Sir Frederick Pollock stated (Tagore Law 
Lectures 1894): "The really natural justice for Englishmen 
governing in India was t> follow the rules they were best 
acquainted with. The only 'justice, equity and good 
conscience' English judges could and did administer, in 
default of any other rule, was so much of Er^ish law and 
usage as seemed reasonably applicable in this country” (at p.7). 
"But I have already endeavoured to show that the 'justice, 
equity and good conscience1 of the Old Regulations could not 
in practice, if there was to be any settled system of justice, 
mean anything else than the analogies of English law"
(at p.10). It is significant that the learned author 
uses the phrase "analogies of English law" rather than 
simply "English law."
96In the case of Saroop v. Troyla-Khonath
Sir Barnes Peacock asked himself this questions
"Now, having to administer justice, equity 
and good conscience, where are we to look for the 
principles which are to glide us? We must go 
to other countries, where equity and justice are 
administered upon principles which have been the growth 
of ages, and see how the courts act under similar 
circumstances, and ifwe find that the rules which 
they have laid down are in accordance with the true 
principles of equity, we cannot do wrong in 
following them.'1
Sir James Stephens later explained that:
"Though justice, equity and good conscience 
are the law that Indian judges are bound to 
administer, they do in point of fact resort to 
English law books for their guidance,..." 97
98In an 1862 case Lord Ligsdown expressed himself to be 
in favour of total importation of English law under the guise of the 
maxim for "to adopt it (English law) and yet reject its 
qualifications and restrictions would be scarcely consistent with 
justice."
QQ
In the Calcutta case of Sinha v. Ghose O’KENEALY J. said
96 (1868) 9 V/.H. 230,232.
97 Supplement to the Gazette of India, May 4, 1872, 535. 
^  Varden Seth Sam v. L.H. Lallah (1862) 9 M.I.A* 307 
"  (1897) 24 C.ft. f908
that it has long been the practice that
"where the code does not provide for a matter 
arising in a suit the court must adopt the 
procedure of courts of equity, and that in 
the present case means that they must follow 
the procedure of the High Court of Chancery 
in England.1
The foregoing interpretation was judicially approved by 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council when their lordships 
ruled in 1887 that equity and good conscience are "generally 
interpreted to mean the rules of English law if found applicable 
to Indian society and circumstances."
The italicised sentence, it is submitted, makes a world of 
difference. In effect, it subjects the application of Egglish law 
in such circumstances to a severe test.
Following this ruling, judges began to interpret the maxim 
even more liberally.
2In 1898 the Privy Council treated the words as equivalent 
to "abstract justice." Lord Shaw, in another case thought that 
the maxim meant "natural justice." Sir Frederick Pollock, however,
 ^ Wagheda v* Masludin (1887) 14 I.A. 89.
2 Moidin v. Nepean (1898) I.L.R. 26.
3 Skinner v. Singh (1913) 40 I.A. 105, 114-115.
was of the opinion that these words ”could only be read . • • .
4as being synonymous with the law of Nature.”
(b) The Sudan example. In the Sudan, section 9 of the Civil
Justice Ordinance, 1929, enacts that:
!,In cases not provided for by this or any other 
enactment for the time being in force, the courts
shall act according to justice, equity and good
conscience.”
It would appear that the section was also modelled on the 
Indian provision, but the judges in their interpretation of the maxim 
did not rely solely on the Indian example.
To the Sudan judges, the maxim of Mjustice, equity and good
conscience11 did not completely exclude the application of Egyptian,
5French or any other law. For, as was stated by OWEN J.: ”We are
guided but not governed by English Common and Statute law.” If 
English law was applied, it was applied ”so far as it is appropriate * 
to conditions in the Sudan.”
However, the courts have been very reluctant to follow the 
Statute law of other countries. Thus BENNETT J., in the course of a
4.
Essays in the Law, p.75
g
E* Guttmann, ”The reception of the Common Law in the Sudan” (1957) 
6 I.C.L.Q. 401-417, 410.
6 Heirs of Ibrahim Khalil v. Moneim B and Bros. A.C./App./42/l926.
7
very extensive judgment, said s
"Whatever may be the scope and meaning of section 9 
of the it does not enable this court to set
itself up as a legislative body free to adapt or 
adopt, and so in effect to enact any foreign statute 
or any statutory enactment of its own imagination 
that may recommend itself.”
Thus Statute law would only be applied in so far as it dealt 
with matters of principle and not when it contained mere artificial 
qualifications. ®
(c) The West African example. How far have the instances
cited for Indian and the Sudan influenced the development of the law 
in West Africa?
Surprising as it may seem, there have been very few occasions 
on which the residual clause has been invoked. Where the matter in 
issue was unknown to "customary” law, the judges were prone to conclude 
that it could only be governed by English law.
It has been argued by a learned author that in countries such as 
Ghana, where there is no legislation expressly authorising the 
application of Islamic law as such, it might be applied not as native law
Manios v. Boxall and Co. A.C./App./l4/l936.
8 Guttman, op. cit., p.411
but as required by ** just ice, equity and good conscience.*1 ^
This means that in Ghana the residual clause can be invoked 
to introduce both English and Islamic law wherever necessary.
It must be remembered that Islamic law is administered as 
native law and custom in the areas where it is the customary law 
prevailing among a section of the people.
A case in which the residual clause was actually invoked is the
10Nigerian one of J.S. Andre v. Johnson. This was an administration
suit. The first question to be decided was who were the next-of-kin 
to the deceased Samuel; then to whom the letters of administration 
would be given.
The Divisional Court judge found that the only evidence of
native law and custom as to succession was that of one chief, who stated
that if a child left property the family on his father*s side would
inherit. The case that the learned judge had to decide was, in his
opinion, different, as it was a case of an illegitimate child dying
intestate, and leaving property. On the death of the deceased there
9 ........
Dr. A.N. Allott, Header in African Law, School of Oriental and African
Studies, University of London.
10 (1931) 10 N.L.H. 79.
survived a uterine brother and a half-sister born of his father by
the latterfs lawful marriage. The judge was inclined to the opinion
that the trend of decisions was in favour of the uterine brother
succeeding to some share of the inheritance. But this view conflicted
with the evidence of the chief. Thus, in order to resolve the conflict,
11the learned judge said :
"The court realises the futility now of obtaining 
any reliable evidence of native law and custom on the 
special point. Not one of the several counsel engaged 
could produce any evidence beyond that of Amodu Tijani 
(the chief). The court therefore falls back on that 
jmrt of the law, namely section 20 of the Supreme Court 
Ordinance, which lays it down that in cases where no 
express rule is applicable the court shall be governed by 
principles of justice, equity and good conscience."
The learned judge then proceeded to administer justice as 
seemed fit to him.
12In the Ghana Case of Abosso Gold Mines Co. Ltd. v. Koomah (1883) 
when he had to decide an action for specific performance which in turn 
depended on the construction of a vague and unsatisfactory wording of 
,fConcession documents" between a Foreign Company and an African illiterate 
in the English language, MACLEOD, J., invoked the doctrine in order to
Ibid. p.81, per Webber J.
1 ?
Reported in The Gold Coast Assize Vol.l, No.2, 1883.
do what was fair and just. As he put it:
"I desire first of all to remark 
that this point eminently calls for a decision 
according to those principles of justice, equity 
and good conscience which have been so 
thoughtfully inculcated in section 19 as the 
guiding-stars of the Court - by the eminent 
and learned gentlemen who framed our Supheme 
Court Ordinance."
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Chapter Seven 
THE DOCTRINES OP EQUITY1
A. INTRODUCTION
It m s  pointed out in the previous chapter that equity
as administered in England,, which has been described as
’’technical equity", was introduced into West Africa in the
instrument which provides for the application of English law*
It is usually found in the courts legislation* Thus in Sierra
2Leone section 37 of the Courts Ordinance lays it down that:
"Subject to the provisions of this and any other
Ordinance, the common law? the doctrines of equity and
the statutes of general application in force in England 
on the 1st day of January 1880s shall be in force in 
Sierra Leone*"
In Ghana the provisions of the sections which enable the
courts to apply the doctrines of equity have been repealed by the
3 * »
new Courts Act, 1960, but by section 17(1) of the Interpretation
Act, I960!4
"The common law, as comprised in the laws of Ghana, consists, 
in addition to the rules generally known as the common law, of
1* This Chapter is based on my thesis submitted for the TJL*M*
degree in 1960 under the title "The Place of Equity in West 
African law"*
2s Laws of Sierra Leone [I960 Rev]] Cap* 7* For T/estern Region see 
The Law of England (Application) Law* Cap* 60*
3* But s* 154(4) provides that the repeal of s* 83 of the Courts
Ordinance, Cap* 4 [1951 Rev*j should not affect the continued
application of the statutes of general application which were 
in force in England on July 24, 1874, as applied in Ghana 
immediately before the commencement of this Act*
/ the
4* (C.A.4.)
the rules generally known as the doctrines of equity and of 
rules of customary law included in the common law under any 
enactment providing for the assimilation of such rules of 
customary law as are suitable for general application#1
Thus the application of the doctrines of equity has not been
impaired*
In the English system the term "equity1 under this head has 
(acquired a technical connotation* It may loosely be described 
as a distinct source of law* though the distinction between the 
common law and equity has been modified by the Judicature Act, 1873* 
As Allen puts it/ in spite of the fusion, there is still a frontier 
between the common law and Chancery* If we regard equity as a dist­
inct source of law, then its application in West Africa should be 
subject to the same conditions as the other sources of English law* 
It follows from this that those rules of equity which have been
described as "anachronisms" should be regarded as unsuitable to the
6conditions of West Africa* Apart from this reservation, it may be
5* Law in the making, 5th ed* p. 388*
6* E*g» the doctrines of conversion, secret trusts and half-secret
sssHKitisa: trusts * Bee KIRALFYs "The penal consequences of the 
equitable doctrine of conversion"* (1949) 13 The Conveyancer and 
Property Law pp* 362-3785 and MARSHALL, O.R. "Anachronisms in 
equity" (1950/ 3 30—45* Although in the Ghana case of
Sani v* U»T*C» Ltd* Div* Ct. 1926-9, p* 189, it was held that 
the rule in Clayton*s case did not apply, that must not be
wm int ’tn fcu w j*  *  »  %f ir
taken as conclusive that the rule does not apply under any 
other circumstances*
said
said that the reasonable doctrines of equity have played an 
important role in the development of the law in West Africa*
The impact of the English Judicature Act, 1873, on West African 
Jaw is too well known to be repeated here* The influence of the 
doctrines of equity on customary laws is no less pronounced*
Indeed, where principles of customary law, though not repugnant 
to natural justice, etc• 9 conflict with the rules of technical
7
equity, it has been held that the rules of equity should prevail*
8Thus in the Nigerian case of Awo v# Gam, which was a case concerning
the ownership of land after a long period of acquiescence, Y/EBKEU, J* 
9said s
"We do not decide this point in accordance with any 
provision of English law [because the transaction was 
governed by native law which knew no prescription].** 
but simply on the grounds of equity, on the ground that 
the Court will not allow a party to call in aid principles 
of native law merely for the purpose of bolstering up a 
stale claim*'1
10Again, in the Ghana case of Ado v« Wusu the West African Court of
11
Appeal expressed the same principle in the following words:-'"
"We accept the finding and entirely agree that in accordance 
with strict native law and custom the plaintiff remains the 
owner# slut there is a long series of decisions in which it 
has been laid down that the Courts will not allow the strict 
native law and cuts tom to be invoked in such cases as this when 
the effect is, in equity unjust#"
a
4 3 0
7L MAXIMS OF EOFITY
Almost all the so-called maxims of equity have played their part
in the evolution of the law in Y/est Africa* A few examples may
, , . , 11 a,be mentioned®
(l) Qui prior est tempore potior eat jure* As the Latin tag 
says* "He who is earlier in time is stronger in law". This maxim 
governs the question of priorities where the equities are equal, 
and in Y/est Africa it has functioned mainly in the field of regi­
stration of instruments to land. In the Gambia, for example,
3 2section 7 of the Land (Registration of Deeds) Ordinance, provides?'
"Every instrument executed after the date when this 
Ordinance shall come into operation so far as regards any 
land to be affected thereby shall take effect as against 
other instruments affecting the same land from the date of 
its registration."
11a. For the application of other maxims, see? fiuagrqlne v« Bronte 
■Dcyy'iS F.C. 1920-21, p. Qkunubi v. Assaf (1951) 13 Y/.A.C.A* 226.
Tetteyf io v. Awultu fl955T 14 W.ATfTtXT 723 $ Akenzna v. Benin 
Divisional Council (1959) W.R.N.L.R. p. 1| ICome v. Yemoah 
Ghana Civil Appeal Mo. 20 of 1961.
12. Laws of the Gambia [1955 Rev.] Cap. 126. For Sierra Leone see 
Registration of Instruments Ordinance, Cap. 256, s. 4 [Laws of 
Sierra Leone 1960 Rev«]j and the Sierra Leone case of Isaac v. 
Isaac (1937) 3 3. For the Federal Territory of Lagos,
see Land Registration Ordinance, Laws of the Fed. of Nigeria, 
[1958 Rev.] Cap. 99, s. 16. In Ghana the provision relating to 
the registration of instruments in regard to land is now con- 
tuined in s. 26(l) of the Land Registry Act 1962 (Act 122). This 
Act repeals the Land Registry Ordinance, Laws of the Gold Coast 
[1951] Cap. 133, s. 21. The statement of the law as far as 
"priority" is concerned is virtually unchanged, so the old 
case-law will still be useful. See, e.g. Anyidoho v. Markham 
(1905) Ren . 3185 Crayem v. Consolidated African Selection Trust 
Ltd. (1949) 3 2 W.A.C.A. 443. “  “ ““ "
It then goes on to stipulate that if registered within a certain
period after execution, any such instrument takes effect from the
date of execution*
Bound up with the question of priority is that of "notice11*
] 3
The statement of the law on that point by SNELL that a purchaser
is affected by notice of an equity where it has come either within
his knowledge or to the knowledge of his agent, was cited with
approval by the West African Court of Appeal in the Nigerian case
14of Ollivant Ltd* v« Alakija* In the course of the judgment,
I K
BLACKALL, P., gave the facts of the case as follows:
"In the present case the former landlord, having received 
rent in advance from Messrs* G.B. Ollivant (the appellants), 
was in equity bound to treat that advance as a fulfillment of 
the latter*s obligation to pay the rent and the respondent 
who purchased the right, title and interest of the former 
landlord, is bound by the tenant's equity against him.. Now, 
in the appeal before us the respondent had not only constructive 
but actual notice of the appellant's equity, for Hallinan, J*, 
found as a fact that the bailiff announced at the sale that it 
was understood that rent had been paid in advance up to 31st 
December, 1963 * * * In these circumstances it would be clearly 
inequitable, in the popular as well as the legal sense, to 
permit the respondent to exact from the appellants a rent 
which they have already paid."
13. Principles of Equity, 32nd ed* p. 40*
14. (1950) 13 W.A.C.A. 63*
15. Ibid at p. 67. See also Johnson v* Onisiwo and ors, (1943) 9 
V I *A.C.A. 189. Fraser v* Young 7T944) 10 W*A*C*A* 135 - Sierra 
Leone. Croyem v* Consolidated African Selection Trust Ltd. (1949) 
12 IV.A.C.A*”- Ghana.
(2) One cannot approbate and reprobate« In its African context
this rather dramatic maxim is illustrated by the Ghana case of
16McLaren Bros (Manchester) Ltd. v. Nartey.' The facts are set out
in the head-note as follows? The defendant m s  a storekeeper for
the plaintiff, under an agreement not to give credit. In spite of
this, he allowed one XCorkor to run up an account, and the plaintiffs
having thus found a deficiency in his books, sued him for the amount.
In the course of the hearing, Korleor was added as a defendant.
She admitted the debt, judgment was given against her, and the
plaintiff withdrew against the defendant. The judgment debt
remaining unpaid, the plaintiffs brought the action under discussion,
one of tort, against the defendant for damages for breach of his
agreement. The Divisional Court held that, as the plaintiffs had
discontinued against the defendant in the first suit, and had not
obtained leave to bring a fresh action, they were estopped from
bringing the new suit, even though it purported to be for tort.
17SM’YLY, C.J., in the course of his judgment observed:
"Scrutton, L*J. in the case of Verschnres Creameries Ltd. v.
II ul 1 and Nether I and s S t earns hip Company Ltd somewhat
similar case to the present one, refers to the following lines;-
1 Thoughts much too deep for tears pervade the Court,
When I assumpsit bring and, godlike, waive the tort.1
He puts it thus? fA $>erson cannot say at one time that a trans­
action is valid, and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he 
 ________________ _ _ /could■■ iiih m h i ' h i m  ■ m i i w .i^ irr. ■ I —  ■ <■ I ■■ I.—  — - - - - - -  ■ ■ —  T—  ■-- - - - rr tTI ~ 1— ■nfi ti - - -  rp .> n . i.     m m —  n< a  in w n w n  . ■ . n .1 i n      n m  .. __  _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _
16. B.Ct. 1926-29, p. 30.
17. Ibid. at p. 32*
t M M i v f l i i w t m  *
18. [1921] 2 K.'f). 608 at p. 611
could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid? and 
then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing 
some other advantage* That is? to approbate and reprobate 
the transaction* ."19
The phrase is apparently borrowed from the Scotch law? where it
is used to express the principle embodied in the English law of
election — namely? that no party can accept and reject the same
instrument* The doctrine of election was discussed in the
30Nigerian case of Taylor v. Williams and llnor. In that case a
testatrix in her will devised her undivided share in a family
property.. The plaintiff claimed that such devise was null and
void* The defendants? the executors under the will pleaded
in bar of the claim that the plaintiff? who had accepted a
benefit under the will? had thereby elected and therefore could
not challenge the devise* GBAEAA4 PAUL? Jo? rejected the argument
21and mo.de the following observations s
"The law as to election under a will is clear enough in 
its main principles, jfhere a testator under his will 
disposes or professes to dispose of property not his to 
dispose of? the disposition is of course of itself void 
and of no effect * But if the person to whom the property 
wrongly disposed, of in fact belongs and who has the power 
to dispose of it? is a beneficiary under the will he is put 
to his election? that is to say he must refuse the benefit 
he gets under the will or allow his property to go under the 
testator*s devise of it? or compensate the devisee thereof 
for the failure of the devise# What the testatrix here in the 
devise in question sought to dispose of was her undivided 
share in certain family property. That undivided .share of the 
family property did not belong to the plaintiff though it is 
,  /probable
19. [1921] &  K.B. at p. 612.
20 • (1935) 12 N •L •R • 67.
21. Ibid at p. 6 8.
probable that the plaintiff*s share of the same family 
property would be increased to some extent by the failure of 
the devise to the second defendant* The plaintiff had not? 
any more than her mother? the power to dispose of the subject 
of the bad devise» In such circumstances X consider on the 
authorities that the plaintiff by.taking a benefit under anothej 
part of the will was not put to her election*"
(3) Equity looks on that as done which ought to be done*
The doctrine of conversion in equity? which stipulates that
where A directs that property shall be converted from one form
into another? then in the eyes of equity the property is regarded
as converted? rests on it* It also applies to agreements which
are specifically enforceable® Thus in equity a written lease not
made under seal was treated as an agreement for a sealed lease?
of which specific performance might be granted* This was the stand
equity took both before the passing of the Judicature Act? 1873?
and after? when the variance between the common law and equity
33was resolved in the leading case of Walsh v* Lonsdale* The West
African equivalent of the Walsh v® Lonsdale situation is the Nigerian
2 4case of Savage v* Sarrough*-' In that case the plaintiff and his
Hi.* ti-mnfw ifT»OTn¥li" «m n»ffc I—'1 •»
brother and sister were the owners of certain land and buildings
The plaintiff usually managed the property* In 1933? he let the
_________   /property
22* In I-Ioare v® Ho are (1936) 13 N ®L*R* 28? the plea of election 
succeeded®
23* (1882) 21 Ch«D* 9* On this subject see any edition of KEETON?
Equity; see also Saclcey v* AshOng (1956) 1 W*A*L*R. 108 at p® 115 
— Ghana *
24* (1937) 13 N *L *R • 141.
property for two years at a. rent of £3 a month to the defendant*
On the expiration of the two years the defendant stayed on as a
monthly tenant at the same rent until the end of August, when the
plaintiff and the defendant entered into a new agreement for a term
of five years at the same: Tent* About a year later, the plaintiff
received an offer of a higher rent for the premises, and told his
brother, P, to press the defendant also to make a higher offer* On
the defendant refusing to do so, the plaintiff brought the action*
The plaintiff contended, inter alia, that since the agreement
was not under seal .it was void* "But the simple answer to this",
said TCINGDON, C*J*? "is that in equity the lease is deemed to have
been effectively granted, and for practical purposes the parties
25are in the same position as if the lease were valid at law"*
(4) Bel ay defeats equities c ( T S S S & t i m m l m i B a m d m * , Vigilantibus non
26
dormientibus .jura subveniunt* ) It is no exaggeration to state
that of all the equitable rules that have been invoked to mould the
application of the indigenous ?/est African laws, the maxim "equity
aids the vigilant", has been the most active* Thus the doctriney^
25* Ibid at p» 142* The learned Chief Justice in this case adopted
the statement of the law given in Halsbury's Laws of England, 
2nd ed, Vol* 20, p* 59* See also Chidiak v* Ccdcer (T9 45; 14 
W * A ° C * A ® 506 at p« 508«
26* "The maxim does not apply in such circumstances as these to
infants" ~ p_qr KING™FARL0W, Jo in the Ghana case of Vanderpuye 
and other infants v* Cud joe (1915) K~F 87 at p* 89* ™“ “™ “
—^ *>r«T'iirnTTrTrint-iTiJrmrrini>i(im  luTmrni nm  ittm i n  ,« - t u m  - fttw-' -tt '  * *8*
of laches, which is a feature of the maxim, has been frequently
applied to customary transactions in order to produce just and
equitable results. In this sphere., the superior courts have
been guided by the essentials of the doctrine of laches laid down
in 1874 by the Judicial Committee in the leading case of Lindsay Pet
27roleum and Coc v * Hurd to be as follows s— *
"Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an 
arbitrary or a technical doctrine® Where it would be 
practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party 
has 9 by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded 
as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and 
neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet 
put the other party in a situation in which it would not be 
reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be 
asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay 
are not material* But in every case, if an argument against 
relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mer,e 
delay, of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of 
limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon 
principles substantially equitable® Two circumstances, 
always important in such cases, are the length of the 
delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval 
which might affect either party and cause a  balance of 
justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, 
so far as relates to the remedy®"
Thus if by the conduct and neglect of the plaintiff a new 
situation has arisen, the court will not aid the plaintiff to 
recover his rights on the grounds that it would be unjust to give
a remedy® In the Ghana case of Taylor^ Laugh I and and C o ® v«
28 , ~
Barnor and Saekey, the defendant, Hammond, was engaged bv the
appellants as their storekeeper and clerk by an agreement in writing
/dated
dated October 1, 1880, and signed by Hammond* Under the agreement 
Hammond's duty was to sell the appellants' goods entrusted to him 
fpr that purpose, and to account for theprocoeds of sale * In 81au.se 
4 it was provided that "in case of any deficiency in any goods or 
moneys” for which Hammond was responsible he "shall forthwith make 
good the value of amount”* By an endorsement on the agreement 
the respondents9 Harnor and Sackey guaranteed to the appellants 
"the due performance" by Hammond of this agreement* The evidence 
taken in the 'Divisional Court disclosed that Hammond first received 
goods from the appellants for sale in October, 18S9* The books 
were made up sn December 31, 1889, and Hammond had made a deficit 
of £4* 6s• 8do which he paid* In April 1890 there appeared a 
deficit of £18ol9s*G&* which Hammond paid* A deficiency m s  again 
discovered in June of that year, and this was stopped from Hammond's 
salary* From June 1890, notwithstanding the repeated deficits, 
the books were not made up until January 1892, and all this time the 
sureties were not informed of any of Hammond's defaults until 
February 1892*
The question which the Divisional Court had to determine was
whether on these facts Burnor and Sackey were liable as sureties*
The Court held that they were not liable* On appeal to the Full
Court the appeal Court affirmed the judgment of the Divisional Court
pq
REOTAR, J*, applying Phillips v* Foxal 1, '“pointed out that "this
r— Jj4«i*rant]<n*» ti—TTniti-mfT-m i ■*
    ,    /c o induct
29* (1878) L•Tie 7 £#3. 666
f ' L
3 (
conduct, in my opinion, amounts to such ’laches’ as, in equity,
entitles the sureties to relief from their obligations'* o
Laches consists of standing by while an infringement of one’s
rights is in progress* Thus, where the defendants posted caution
notices on both occasions when an infringement of their rights by
the sale of their property was attempted, the Court refused to give
30relief to the purchaser* If a plaintiff holds an equitable title
and believes that he has the legal title as well, he should not
content himself with mere verbal objection or protests to the
persons attempting to deal with the property, for such conduct
31might amount to laches*
From the conduct of the plaintiff, it can be inferred that he
has waived his rights or does not wish to proceed further with the
3 2matter in question* In Ephraim v* Asuquo, "  where the plaintiff 
sought to revoke a grant of Letters of Administration after a lapse 
of two years or so, the Court found him guilty of laches* v/EBBER, 
delivering the {judgment of the Divisional Court at Calabar, 
observed;™
"It is now nearly two years since this grant was made *
The plaintiff and his people have had every opportunity of 
opposing the grant, of which opportunity they have not availed 
themselves* If they were anxiously desirous of administering
/their
t li*wn win Munir* .»iu»•Sif-
30 * Ertkitola v* Alii and ors (1941) 16 N •L •R * 56*
frtwwewwuwiflinrniki —r~r ~r— h - t  r -iT --r«"— f  n.T, T»-r" i  . *
31 * Laryea v * U*A*C* Ltd* (1939) 5 V/*AoC*A* 166 at p 0 170 ™ Gha,na
32 • 1T923) 4 N.L.R. 96*
33* Ibid, at p»
this estate, why did they wait a whole ^eor to make this first 
move, and why did they wo.it another felie months before getting 
the case on the hearing list? 11
The l&ps&of time here is presumptive of the fact that the
plaintiff did not believe in his cause of action*
As a general rule? the sale of family land, in some parts of
West Africa., without the consent of a member of the family whose
34-consent is necessary is voidable by that member,, but unexplained 
delay by him in asserting his right may be deemed to amount to an 
expression of intention or promise on his part not to exercise 
that right
The length of the delay, the inadequacy of the explanation for
the delay, and the consequences of setting aside the sale of land, as
against a bona fide purchaser for xssdura value, who had been in
occupation of a piece of land during the whole period of nine years,
and had apparently altered the structure of the buildings thereon,
were held by the Judicial Committee in the Nigerian case of
36Agbeyeftbe v* Ikoinl, to have created a "balance of justice" in
favour of the respondent within the ambit of the dictum of Lord
/Blackburn
Bayaitlie v* Mens ah (1878) Sar F*C»L« 171 at p* 172*
35 * Aganran (Oku substituted) v* Olushi (1907) 1 N®L*R* 67« See also 
the Gambian case of Jallow v* Jallow (1956) 2 64*
36. (1953) 12 V/*A«C*A* 383* See also the Ghana case of Odonkor v*
Akoshift FoCo 1926-29, 322 at p 0 330* ~
°7
■Blackburn in Erianger v« New Sombrero Phosphate Company9 U  and that
38in Lindsay Petroleum Company v* Hurd•
The doctrine of acquiescence is also a feature of the 
equitable maxim under discussion* In the Nigerian case of Aganran 
To Olushi, PENNINGTON, J., defined it as followss-
”Acqu,iescence may be defined as acquiescence under such 
circumstances as that assent may be reasonably inferred from 
it, and is no more than an instance of the lav of estoppel 
by words or conduct* But when once the act is completed 
without any knowledge or without any assent on the part of 
the person whose right is infringed, the matter is to be 
determined on very different legal consideration*’1
Although one would have wished for a clearer definition, it
must be observed that some of the essentials which constitute
acquiescence are mentioned, namely, that there can only be
acquiescence where there is knowledge, and that a per,son can be
estopped from asserting his rights where he has led the other
party to alter his position* In the leading English case of
Willmott v* Barber, : which has been followed in West Africa
without reservation, FRY, J*? laid down the conditions which will
4?deprive a man of his rights as follows?—
”It has been said that the acquiescence which will deprive 
a man of his legal rights must amount to fraud, and in my 
view this is an abbreviated statement of a very true 
proposition* A man is not to be deprived of his legal rights
 __       /unless
3 7 ~ (1078) L.R. 3 A.c. 1218. ------- -
38, (18T4J L.R. 5 J?.C. 321 at p. 339.
39* ( n o y )  1 NoIjoR* 67*
40* Ibid9 at p* 69*
41 • “(1880) 15 Ch.D. 96*
P* 105*
unless he has acted in such a m y  as would make it fraudulent 
for him to set up those rights* What, then, are the elements 
or reauisites necessarv to constitute fraud of that 
description? In the first place the plaintiff must have 
made a mistake as to his legal rights* Secondly, the 
plaintiff must have expended some money, or must have done 
some act (not necessarily upon the defendant's land) on the 
faith of his mistaken belief* Thirdly, the defendant, the 
possessor of the legal right, must know of the existence of 
his own right which is inconsistent with the right claimed 
by the plaintiff* If he does not know of it, he is in the 
same position as the plaintiff, and the doctrine of acquiescenc 
is founded upon conduct with a knowledge of your legal rights* 
Fourthly, the defendant, the possessor of the legal right, must 
know of the plaintiff's mistaken belief of his rights* If he 
does not, there is nothing which calls upon him to assert his 
own rights* Lastly, the defendant, the possessor of the 
legal right, must have encouraged the plaintiff in his 
expenditure of money or in other acts which he has done, 
either directly or by abstaining from asserting his legal right 
When all these elements exist, there is fraud of such a nature 
as will entitle the Court to restrain the possessor of the legal 
right from exercising it, but, in my judgment, nothing short 
o f thi s will do *"
The superior courts in West Africa recognise two degrees of 
acquiescence: (i) the first degree is acquiescence in occupation 
over a  period, which would bar the original overlord from bringing 
an action for ejectment, and (ii) the second is such acquiescence 
as would serve to pass the original rights of the overlord to 
the occupier* Very much more is required * to establish the second 
than the first.^
The elements of acquiescence laid down by FRY, J.. calls for a
/few
43 * Oshodi v. Tmoru (1936) 3 W»A«C*A« 93 at p. 95 per RINGDON* C. J° 
The first degree is characterised by the case of Awo v. Gam 
(1913) 3 N.L.Ro 100^ and the second degree is illustrated by 
Suleraan v. Johnson (1951) 13 W°A*C.A* 213 at p. 215* See also 
Oshodi V* Balogun and ors (3 936) 4W°A«C*A« 1. P.C*
few coinments* One point to be emphasised is that the plaintiff, 
in order to succeed with his plea of acquiescence, must have occup­
ied the land in the mistaken belief that the land was his own.
It is evident therefore that mere occupation of land for a long
time or lapse of time is not by itself conclusive. Thus, in
44the Ghana case of Ifuma v »  Kuma, where evidence was given that the 
defendant and his ancestors had been in occupation of the land in 
suit for six generations without let or hindrance by the plaintiff 
or his ancestors, and without paying any tribute, the Judicial 
Committee, in advising that the appeal should be set aside, 
observed as followss—^
"Their Lordships are not prepared to accept without 
qualification the evidence as to the length or continuance 
of the occupation by the defendant and his predecessors, but 
even assuming that the defendant and his predecessors have 
been to some extent in occupation of parts of the land in 
question for some considerable time without paying tribute 
to the plaintiff or his predecessors, such possession ... is 
not conclusive evidence of the defendant's title.11
But by virtue of the long period of occupation the Courts as a rule
can infer acquiescence« ^  There is no Imrd and fast rule about the
 _^ exact.
44. (1936) 5 W*A»C*A» (P*C.) 4° See also Thomas v. Bolder (1946)
12 W .A .C .A . 78 r. Qloto v . Administrator—Genera 1 7194^7 - 2
y f.A«C «> A« 765 Erempongg II v. Brempong IIX ) 14 T/.A.C.A. 13-
45. Ibid at p . 7. ~
46. 11I say and affirm that such prolonged possession does not destroy
the title of the original owner" - per .BRABDFOB'O-GRIFFITH, Ag*• J. 
(as he then was) in Sccoban^ v. Hagan (1885) Gar F.C«L. 159-60.
4-7. Miller v » Kwayisi (19307""T7*?7oA.C«A. 7; Fiscian v. Tetteh (1956)
2 T/.AoL.II. 192.
exact length of time* Whilst the coxirts sometimes apply the 
Statutes of Limitations by analogy? they are not bound to do so. 
It appears that the time factor depends on the circumstances 
surrounding each case® In one cases eight years after sale 
•was deemed sufficient to establish evidence of acquiescence;
49in another case it was a hundred years, plus two generations* 
Although there is no prescriptive title known to native law 
and custom? the courts in West Africa, on the grounds of
equity5 will not allow a party to call in aid strict principles
50of native law for the purpose of bolstering up a stale claim/
48. Assraidu v* Dadzie (1890) Car F.C*L* 174 at p. 176 fGhana]•
49* Yam ike v« Adako(*1853) Sar F»C*I • 2 [[Ghana]; T1 or I v« Oloto 
(1941) 7 W*A*C*A* 154 — 80 years [[Nigeria]*
^  • Iklhawi and ors « v » Aromas ho dun (195 2  ) 14 W * A * C • A • 204 at p«206 
[[Nigeria] • Macauley Chief Bungav 2 . *D, 0° "5ierrn
Leone]; Concession No* 38(Bokitgi No* I*) (190-3) Hen* 239 
at p. 243*
Mote that the Western Nigeria Prescription Law, Cap-■ 95 (laws of 
Western Nigeria, 1959) states by s* 1(2) that nothing in that 
law affects the acquisition of easements or rights over or in 
respect of any kind,1 the tenure of which is subject to customary 
law* However, in Ghana, the Farm Lands (protection) Act 1962 
(Act 107), seeks to protect farmers whose title to land are 
found to be defective* But the Act applies to prescribed 
areas only; section 2(1 ) reads: ’’Where a farmer has, in good 
faith, at any time after the thirty-first day of December, 1940, 
and before the commencement of this Act, acquired any land by 
customary law or otherwise, in a prescribed area for purposes of 
farming and has begun farming on that land within eight years 
from the date of such acquisition, this section shall, 
notwithstanding any defect in the title to the contrary, 
operate to confer valid title on such farmer*”
5 1In the recent Ghana case of Co fie v* Ashon^ YAN LABE , J*,
5?
(as he then was) stated the lair on this point as follows:
’’Although it is true that there is no such thing in 
native customary law as a prescriptive title3 and this has 
been accepted bv the courts to mean that mere use and
A  *■
occupation for any length of time cannot oust an original 
owner, it is nevertheless good law that a grant by an 
original owner followed by a continuous occupation and 
effective possession without payment of rent or dues5 
coupled with ownership for several years without let or 
hindrance3 gives a valid title*”
The defence of estoppel plays an important part in the
doctrine of acquiescence* The basis of all estoppel is the
principle that where one man has led another to believe something,
and the other has altered his position on the strength of that
belief, it would be unjust for the man inducing the belief to
53profit by asserting that the belief was mistaken• In applying
this doctrine, the Courts in West Africa have extended the
•principles laid down in the English case of Hams den v* Hyson,
55in determining cases governed by customary law*
til. (3 956) 1 W.A.L.U. 82.
52. Ibid at p. 8 6.
53* BKXJNYATB* J»s Limitation of actions in equitv (1933) p* 1851 ' n — T~ -  I ! I T I  TT'T"y> If ITT Tl " H Wfifl-1 Itmtl' H I M  « n  nWffl— E'HIWn-*—1"T - 'V w  *■ *  i
et sje^ c
54* Xl866) L.H. 1* H.L. 129 at p* 14-0*
55* For case law in Ghana see, e.g* Abbey v« Ollenu (1954-) 14 
W*A*C*A* 5675 Allotey v° Essien (1958J™3 T/*A*L*Eu 527j 
Thompson v* Mens ah (1957) 3 ?f.A.L*R* 840j Sarfo v* Bonsu (.1957) 
3 WoA*L*E* 195* For Nigeria, see B&fat v* Ellis (l954) "
14 W.A.C.A. 430*
C. E Q U I T A B L E  B E L I E F  A N D  R E M E D I E S
A great portion of the jurisdiction of equity lies in
providing relief against the harshness of contractual bargains,
which operate according to their strict terms as "penalties11 or 
56"forfeitures"/ The notable examples are the decree of
57specific performance/ injunction, rescission, and rectification,
all of which are dealt with adequately in the standard English
58
textbooks on the subject of equity* In T.7est Africa, the
Q»
principles relating to the grant of equitable relif o.nd remed3.es 
haV&also been extended to transactions governed by eiisiomary law*
The relief against forfeitures is one good example* and the 
redemption of customary mortgage another*
Questions of forfeiture frequently arise as a result ofs 
(a) alienation or attempted alienation of the lineage or family 
property without consent; (b) denial of an ovex"lord!s titles and 
(c ) misconduct*
56 * EVERSHED, S  ir Raymond (as he then ms): Aspects of Engl ish 
equity, p. 29.
<BirattWi«nnc#t44rVhvu
57* "The doctrine of specific performance is an equitable relief 
and will never be granted where it will cause hardship to 
third parties unless it can be shown that such third parties 
were aware of the existence of the contract of which the 
plaintiff is claiming specific performance" - per HARRIGAN, C®J®, 
in Taylor v* Arthur (194-7) 1 2  V/.A.C.A. 179, at p. 180*
58o E.g. the current edition of SNELL'S, KEETON'S, HANBURY'S and 
NATHAN'S.
59* On forfeiture in Nigeria, see BROOKE, N.T. "Some legal aspests of 
land tenure in Nigeria" (1947) 5 Afr. Stud* 211, 218 et seq. 
ELIAS, T.O. Nigerian land law and, customs COKER, CLB«A« Family 
property among the Yorubas, p° 83 et seqj MEEK, 0*11® land tenure 
and land administration in Nigeria ancMbhe Cameroons ,~~rw I1C9T~~““
r  f
Although alienation, of attempted alienation, of lineage or
family land without consent is considered a serious breach in 
60customary law, the superior courts do not readily allow
forfeiture to take its course* As 0LLI5NNU, Jo has pointed out
61in the Ghana case of Thompson v. Mensah. "forfeiture according
to native custom is not an automatic consequence which must of
necessity attend a breach of a condition of grant"* Again,
according to customary law, the denial of an overlord1s title
used to be considered as a grove breach, but in modern times,
liability to forfeiture in such cases has been modified by
the courts in the exercise of their equitable jurisdiction*
The attitude of the superior courts is illustra,ted by the Nigerian
case of Ogbakuinamvu of PBfollo Oye and ors v* Chiabo 1 q cb?_ Agbogbo 
6S
Awha and, ors * In this case, the plaintiffs sued the defendants 
for damages for trespass, and the defendants alleged that the 
land originally belonged to the Awha people, and that it was 
jointly farmed by themselves and the plaintiffs * To this the 
plaintiffs replied that the defendants, having /the plaintiffs1 
title, forfeited their rights as customary tenants and were 
therefore trespassers * Such a claim was rejected by HALLMAN, J.,
—ri—— i-iT-t— n-n-i-rififi iiirnrmnTmrn«*tt-n«»«nfTmiini rwnmiP>anrini*rnrnn» onwuquimm in
60* Onisiwo and ors* v* Gbambone (1941) 7 TT.A*C*A* 69 
61* 7*1957) 3 WoAoL.R. ? A 0  at p. 347*
62. (1949) 19 N.LoR. 107*
who distinguished between a mere denial of a landlord*s title
from cases where the misconduct was serious.. The learned judge
conceded that there had been a breach which under native law
might amount to forfeiture, but he added:—
"I doubt whether upon a denial of the landowner* s title 
the Native Court would ipso facto order a forfeiture, and 
in any case X must consider whether the native law and 
custom is consonant with natural justice, equity and 
good conscience*11
64
In another case, BN C0MA3KM0ND, &VP, J. , stated that in his opinion
the right of forfeiture under customary law was an "irksome or
outmoded law" and that it was high time legislative action was 
65
taken* One can well sympathise with that dictum, for the
consequences of forfeiture under customary law are drastic*
It is submitted that the judgment in the case of Inasa and ors v*
66
Chief Oshodi, that a breach of tenure under native law and custom 
committed by the head of the tenant family involves the whole 
family in the forfeiture of the property, would not be followed in 
modern times*
63* Ibid at p. 108*
64* Onisiwo v* Pagbenro and ors (I954-) 21 N°T.,R, 3*
65* But note that s» 14 of the English Conveyancing and Law of
Property Act, 1881, which deals with relief against forfeiture
of leases governed by English low applies in Nigeria*
66 * (1930) 10 N«L°jR.o 4* On appeal to the Privy Council* (1933)
11 N 10$ (1934) A * C * 991 the comments of the Judicial
Committee are instructive* In the former Sierra leone 
Protectorate, the liability for the misconduct used to be 
one of banishment from the Chiefdom — see Bongay v. T.Iacaulev 
(1939) 1 "J.A.C.A. 895. ~ ~  " --------- -
Q-
The right of redemption of customary mortgage is another
topic which is being gradually 01odi.fieel through the jurisdiction
of equity. In English law? the right to redeem* whether legal
or equitable* is barred if the mortgagee remains in possession
of the mortgaged land for twelve years without giving an
acknowledgment of the title of the mortgagor or his equity of
67redemption* This is 0. statutory provision* There is no such
provision affecting the right of redemption in the customary
laws of ’Test Africa* As long ago as 1888* in the 6old Coast
6B
( Ghana) case of Txicrotm v* Tdarmon* 1 GATIT1Y, C• J♦ after listening
to the views of his assessors* stated the principle in these words
"No right of posp,ession by a mortgagee could vest ownershiy 
of mortgaged lands In such a mortgagee * >To length of even 
adverse possession would entitle the mortgagee to oust the 
claim of the mortgagor to the 'mortgaged, debt»"
69Daily recently* LANGTEV, J., reiterated the rule thus;'’
"Tt is estahl ishecl law that a pledgor can redeem his land 
after any lapse of time* However much one may feel that * 
with changing conditions* there ought to be some limitation 
of this doctrine* it is a well established principle and it 
is not open to this Court to depart from that principle*"
67 , TtEGATOY, Hog* and 'HAITC* lit The lbmr of ^ oal property (1st e. Id HR *
p. 902*
6 8. (lf!83) 2ar V.
2 E.n.
69 * II’-ma Vo Kofi
It is the practice these clays for a fixed time* within which 
the pledge or customary mortgage should be redeemed* to be agreed 
upon* Moreover* there is a tendency shown by the courts to 
insure that native law and custom is not used as an instrument
Ti­
to do injustice* Indeed * in the Ghana case of Adobea v. hassey*
a High Court -judge (formerly Supreme Court) ruled that where an
order of the court is sought and obtained* for the enforcement of
a customary right to redeem a pledge* a customary right becomes
merged in the court order* so that if the pledge is not redeemed
within the period allowed for redemption by the order* the right
to redeem it is lost*
B * THUS'Tg7"
"Of all the exploits of equity* the largest and the most 
Important is the invention and development of the trust."
7 9.
These are the words of Maitland. In the course of his 
lecture the learned professor ascribed the invention of the Law 
of Trusts to the work of English lawyers* It should be pointed 
out that the institution of trusts is not peculiar to English law
(1956) 1 ToA.1 .R. 181.
71* This section is discussed more fully in ray LI. * I U thesis*
72* MAITLAND; Equity; a course of lectures, p* 93.
-i—nirriiiiijn . w i^nr»w > n . io i i iiniiiii*nT .iin»n 'i » . n n m w» i . i»iiih iw ii ii i . mi ■ m > rr. .mir.—rnn +
Thus ? writing about the Eatab of Northern Nigeria, one learned
7 3
author records?
"If the sons are too young to inherit the various kinds of 
property enumerated above, the property is held in trust for 
them by their father*s brother or paternal cousin, who 
restores it when they reach the age of discretion, or gives 
them the equivalent either in kind or by meeting the marriage 
expenscs of their wards*"
It is evident that the word "trust" is being used in this
context in the customary law sense* In West Africa, therefore,
thetfe exist two types of trusts5 one operating under customary
law and the other under the general or English law* There are
differences between the two types* For example, nm~!JLw).iw,
section 53(l)(b) of the English Law of Property Act, 1925,
(which is the so,me as the Western Region legislation^ ‘stipulates
that "a declaration of trust respecting any land or any interest
therein must be manifested and proved by some writing, signed by
some person who is able to declare such trust or by his will*"
According to customary law, however, writing is not essential*
Thus among the Mende of Sierra Leones
"the individual inheriting land automatically becomes head 
of the family concerned and trustee of its property, and in 
acknowledging his position the other members look to him/,
73* MBEE, C.K* "The ICatab and their neighbours" (1928) J»A*S.
205-273 at p* 266*
7 4* Western Nigeria* property and Conveyancing Law* Cap* 100.
Section 78(1 )(b).
to fulfil the double responsibility*11
The mere fact that writing was absent in the creation of a 
trustee according to customary law does not necessarily make the 
position of a trustee less responsible* In England* under the 
common law* a trust could be created without deed* without writing* 
without formality of any kind* by mere word of mouth* According
76the the preamble of the Statute of Uses it could be created by signs.
In recent times there is a tendency either through legislative
fiction or by judicial decisions to merge the two types of trusts*
77
The Communal Land Rights (Vesting in Trustees) Law* is one 
such example. Under this law* the Governor in Council may declare 
those chiefs whose chieftaincy titles are associated with a
78particular community to be the traditional authorities there*
7/here any chiefs have been declared under this law to be the
traditional authority in respect of that community, the Regional
Minister responsible shall appoint them as the trustees of communal
79rights in respect of that community. The communal rights recorded
80in the trust instrument are vested in the trustees* and all the
/revenue
75* "Land, and labour among the Mende" (194-7) 47 African affairs* 
p* 23 et seq at p. 25*
76* MAITLAND* Equity, Lecture 5* KEETON* G.7/, The law of trusts* 
5th ed. (I9497“p. 50* —
77. g/0 Nigeria Laws (1959) Cap. 24.
78. Ibid, s. 3(b).
fbid9 s. 7(l). Here, the Chiefs will be actiang as trustees in 
the strict legal sense.
80. Ibid, s. 5(l).
revenue received in consequence of the exercise of communal rights
must be applied or disposed of by the trustees in accordance with
the provisions of the trust instrument by which they are appointed,
81and not otherwise® Other provisions deal with the powers of the 
trustees, breach of trust, and removal of the trustees® It can 
be seen from the foregoing that the aim of the legislation is to 
regularise the role of the traditional authorities to suit modern 
conditions *
Although according to the customary laws in some parts of
V i est Africa, a head of a family was not liable to render a strict
account to the members of the family, recent judicial decisions
show that an unscrupulous and callous head, who exploits this
custom to the detriment of the individual members of the family,
82will not escape liability. On the question of the duties of the
oq
head of a family in Nigeria, ROBINSON, J. observes:* ^
"Tie cannot treat house money as his own. If it is his own, 
he can throw it away or misuse it* He cannot do that with 
house money, although T think he can spend it without 
consulting any member, if he thinks reasonably it is in a 
good cause and for the good of the house* He shou1d certainiy 
keep accounts and work on some rules, either laid down by 
himself or, preferably, after consulting with the heads of 
his house.11
As far as the general lairs of trusts are coneerned» it need 
only he said that the various local statutory laws are based on the
R/3.
English legislation,* These laws are in addition to the Acts of 
the British Parliament which are in force locally*
84* E*g* public Trustee Law} Cap* 108? and Trustee LawP Cap* 125 of 
V/o a t eru Nigeria*
85* Ss* 7 and 8 of the Statute of Frauds ? 1677* See also AJcvrei v* 
Alnrei (1943) 9 Vf.A.C.A. Ill at p. 116.
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Chapter Eight
STATUTES a7 GENERAL APPLICATION
A • THE MEANING AND SCOPE
In West Africa* the Common Law of England has generally
been received together with such statutes of the United
Kingdom Parliament as were enActed before local legis-
m
latrures were established* Thus in the Gambia * the Supreme 
Court is empowered to administer* l*the Common law* the 
doctrines cf equity* andthe statutes of general application 
in force in England on the 1st November* 1888w .l As has 
been mentioned elsewhere* the operative date in Ghana is 
1874; in Sierra Leone* the date Is 1880 and in the Feder­
ation of Nigeria (except the Western Region) the date is 
1900«
An Act of the British Parliament enacted after the estab 
lishment of a local legislature does not apply to a West 
African country unless%
(a) it Is expressly extended to tint country;
(b) that country is expressly mentioned; or
(c) it Is adopted by an Act of the local legislature; or
(d) It is re-enacted locally*
The expression n Statutes of general application1* refers*
therefore* to statutes in force in England antecedent to the 
establishment of a local legislature in any part of West
Africa » _____ ______________________ ___ ____________ _____ __
1, laws of the Gambia (19 55 Rev.) Cap* 3* s*
If the expression simply meant all statutes In force 
in England* there would have been no difficulty in 
ascertaining what laws ought to apply in West Africa and 
what laws ought not to apply* The various legislative 
provisions refer to so much of the statutes of England as 
are of general application*
The task of ascertaining what are statutes of general 
application is further complicated by the fact that it is 
the courts and not the legislature which usually exercise 
the authority in determining what statutes are of general 
application and what are n ot> The approach of the courts 
to this problem has not been systematic* Therefore it is 
not always possible to know the tests used by the courts in 
determining the issue* As will be shown later* one 
court may regard an English statute to SSwSS
a statute of general application* whilst another 
judge may decide differently* A few examples may be 
selected to illustrate the way in which the courts set about
p
their work* In the Ghana case of Des Bordes v Des Bordes*- 
which turned on the jurisdiction of the court to grant a 
decree of divorce* MACLEOD Jo* had to consider whether 
the Marriage Acts of England before 187A were statutes of 
general apjplication,, The following is the reasoning of 
the learned judges
(2) (188U) g_aPo EoCoLc p. 26?
"Now what is meant "by 1 statutes of general application1?
That expression cannot mean statutes which apply to the 
whole United Kingdom for this court constantly enforces 
the provisions of statutes which do not apply to Scotland; 
neither can that expression mean those statutes which are 
printed under the designation ’Public General Statutes1, for 
statutes which apply to Scotland alone, are among the 
’Public General Statutes", neither does that expression 
indicate those statutes which apply to the whole of 
England, for the Full Court (sitting at Lagos) has decided 
ttnat the Bankruptcy Acts of England are not operative 
here •
"The Marriage Acts of England are of general 
application when compared with some statutes,-? and of 
particular application when compared with other statutes, and 
I am afraid I must designate those words ’statutes of general 
application’ as a slovenly expression, made use of by the 
Legislature of this Colony to save itself the trouble of 
explicitly declaring what the actual law of the Colony shall 
b e •
"I am not aware of anything in the Marriage Acts of 
England which makes them of more general application than 
the Bankruptcy Acts; it is my duty therefore to follow the 
Full Court (though I do not by any means say that I 
concur with the Full Court), and declare that the Marriage 
Acts of England are not operative within this Colony . . .
The same Ordinance to which I have already alluded,
[The Supreme Court Ordinance, I876], makes operative within 
this Colony the COmmon law of England • . • That Common 
law which was in force in England until July 2k, 18jk*
But at that date there was, on the subject of marriage, no 
Common law operative in England, for it had been swept away 
by statutes* This Colony is deprived (l) of the presently 
existing Marriage Acts of England, and (2) of the old 
Common law."^
The exhaustive dictum of the learned judge calls for 
a few comments* Firstly, it may be remarked that the 
meaning ascribed to the expression "statutes of general 
application" is on the whole commendable* However, it can 
hardly be described as a definition of that expression.
The learned judge tried to define the expression hy ifelMtosEg^
(3) Namely, The Marriage Act of 1823 (it- Geo. 2+ C.76), and The 
Marriage Act of I836 (6 & 7 Will. 2+ C.85)
(2+) Nor another exposition on the topic see Dede v African 
Association L t d . (1910) 1 N.L.R. 131 ~ ~
O  ff
t e  what statutes of general application are not*, but 
he was silent on what "statutes of general application" 
actually are* Secondly, it will be remembered that, 
having examined the provisions of the relevant Marriage 
Acts of England, the learned judge concluded that when 
compared with some other English statutes they could be 
classified as statutes of general application within the 
provisions of the Supreme Court Ordinance of I876, yet 
when he had to decide t o w  those Acts could be applied in 
the Gold Coast Colony as statutes of general application, 
the learned judge was swayed not by the provisions of the 
English Marriage Acts themselves, but by a decision of the 
Full Court which ruled that the English Bankruptcy Act was 
not a statute of general application in Lagos* It is 
submitted that the learned judge could have distinguished the 
two cases without much difficulty* He admitted that the 
Supreme Court Ordinance, I876 extended to the Gold Coast 
only the Common law of England which existed in England 
until July 2b, 187<U* But as at that date, in the words of 
the learned judge himself, the Common law operative in 
England on the subject of marriage, had been swept away by 
statutes, he should have realised that to hold that the 
relevant Engli^hil Marriage Acts were not applicable in the 
Colony, would have left the Colony, as it did, without any
8law with regard to marriages governed by English law. The 
fact that a Common law rule has been abrogated by statute 
clearly shov/s that the legislation takes the place of the 
Common law rule.
Secondly, as it has already been pointed out, the 
learned judge’s main reason for declaring that the English 
Marriage Acts were not statutes of general application, 
was due to the fact that the Full Court had decided that the 
English Bankruptcy Act of 1869 was not a statute of 
general application. We now know that this was not the 
way the Privy Council considered the question in
6Callender. Sykes & Co . v Colonial Secreta r y o f  Lagos & ora 
on appeal from the Supreme Court of Lagos. All that the 
Judicial Committee decided was that$ the Supreme Court of the 
Cold Coast Colony had no bankruptcy jurisdiction in 1877* 
and therefore could not act as an auxiliary to the English 
Court under Section 7i+ of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869• The 
Judicial Committee held further, that the English 
Bankruptcy Act of 1869 applies to all Her Majesty’s 
dominions. It can therefore .be surmised that if 
MACLEOD J., had had the benefit of the ruling of the Privy 
Council on the ’’bankruptcy question”, his decision on the 
application of the English Marriage Acts in the Cold Coast
(5) Indeed the first Marriage Ordinancefbr the Gold Coast 
Colony was passed in 1881+ No.fl+ of 1881+•
(6) [1891] A.C. 1+60
before the enactment of a local legislation in 1881+, might
have been different.
Apart from these comments, it is submitted that the
tests suggested by MACLEOD J., for the ascertainment of
statutes of general application are very instructive. For
example as it can now be inferred in the learned judge’s
dictum, the expression refers to statutes of general application
in force in England; therefore the fact that a statute in
force in England does not apply to Scotland or Ireland does
not deny it the status of a statute of general application.
It Is submitted that the method of approach adopted by the
West African Court of Appeal in Okpaku v. OkpalcuT to the
effect that a statute of general application is one that
applies to Scotland and Ireland is questionable. It is
unfortunate that the attention of the Appellate Court
was not drawn to an earlier decision of its own in
8
Young v Abina. In this case the West African Court of
Appeal held that the decision given in a Nigerian case 
9In re Sholu to the effect that the English Land Transfer
Act of 1897 did not apply in Nigeria was erroneous. As
the court; in Young’s case put it;10
11 It would.appear that the basis of this reasoning was 
that the Land Transfer Act applied to England only and not 
to Scotland or Ireland. We are unable to agree with this 
view. It seems to us that the words of ’general 
application* are used with reference to the matter of the 
statutes and not only geographically. Also it seems 
to us that under section li+, England is the test of
gil+Yy-' 6 *^ wTaTcTaV 180
geographical generality."
The other case v/hich illustrates the method of
ascertaining whether a statute is one of general application
11
is the Grenada case of Attorney-General v Stewart . The
question involved in that case was whether the statute of 
12mortmain' applied in Grenada; and on this point Sir WILLIAM 
GRANT, the Master of the Ro&ls, made the following 
observations:
"Whether the statute of mortmain be in force in the 
island of Grenada, will, as it seems to rtoe, depend on this 
consideration - whether it be a law of local policy 
adapted solely to the country in wfeich it was made, or a 
general regulation of property equally applicable to any 
country in which it is by the rules of English law that 
property is governed* I conceive that the object of 
the statute of mortmain was wholly political - that it grew 
out of local circumstances, and was meant to Jiave atmerely 
taeal operation. It was passed to prevent what was 
deemed a public mischief, and not to regulate, as between 
ancestor and heir, the power of devising, or to prescribe, 
as between grantor and grantee, the forms of alienation*
It is incidnetally only, and with reference to a 
particular object, that the exercise of the owner’s 
dominion over his property is - abridged.
,!. . . . What the legislature had to consider was, whether, 
as there was so much of the land of England already in 
mortmain, it was not expedient to lessen"the facility, 
of putting more of it into that situation. That was a 
consideration purely local. It related to land in England 
and to land In England only. The statute contains some 
exceptions. These exceptions are also local, and still 
further show the local nature of the law, and how little it 
can be considered as a general regulation of property • • • 
But, framed as the Mortmain Act is, 1 think it is quite 
inapplicable to Grenada, or to any other Colony. In its 
causes, its objects, its provisions, its qualifications and 
its exceptions, it is a law wholly English, calculated for
fcss** -aoMi it^ ma^ ikjansKa ut.tvin'jMi  ------  mtfy- r^rrrriT~n»tn nw-rn«~i»r.r.irii mr--| It.n |>| I m I mum in ■ -"i-i. i -i iTTririrminr*^ w t»“ tfwi mu nnui n 'l* ■.
(11) (1816) 2 Her. l2+i+ at 160 ^
(12) (l735) 9 Geo. 2 C.36. It is described in the statutes
at large as "An Act to Restrain the disposition of lands, 
whereby the same become inalienable".
purposes of local policy, complicated with local 
establishments, and incapable, without great incongruity in 
the effect, of being transferred as it stands into the code 
of any other country. I am of opinion, therefore, that it 
constitutes no part of the lav; of the island of Grenada, and 
that the exceptions must consequently be allowed."
Ihe illuminating opinion given by the learned Master
of the Rolls shows that not only must a statute of England
be examined to see whether it is one of general application,
15but also the object of the legislation must be considered.
As to whether the test suggested by Sir William Grant is
comprehensive is another matter. On this point it is
interesting to note that as early as 18U5 Upper Canada,
1
the Court of Queen*s Bench in Doe. Anderson v Todd held
that the English Statute of Mortmain applied in Upper
Canada as a statute of general application in spite of the
decision in The Attorney-General v Stewart. Robinson C.J.,
15expressed himself as follows: ^
"I think the reasoning of the Master of the Rolls,
[in Stewarts 1 easel is obvious and irresistible, and that 
it sEauTdTTTead us to say, that the legislature if they 
had given no evidence of their intention than is to be found 
in Statute 32 Geo. 3 Ch. 1, [a local statute] did not intend 
by that Act to introduce the Statutes of Mortmain, among 
which the 9th Geo. 2 is usually though not very accurately 
classed. But my opinion is, that we cannot properly hold
(13) In Whicker v Hume (I858) 7 H.L.C. 12^, the House of Lords 
held that the Mortmain Act did not extend to Hew South Wales. 
"Now I think, upon general principles, if the question were 
without reference to any act of the legislature, whether
the Mortmain Act was applicable to the situation of New 
South Wales, I slaould most decidedly, without any hesitation, 
come to the conclusion that it was not;" - per Lord 
CHELMSFORD, L.C., at p.151.
(14) 2 U.C.Q.B. 82. It was also held to be applicable by 
the Court of Chancery of Ontario in Corporation of Whitby v
Liscombe (I875) Grants Ch. R. (0. Can.) p.l.
\15) ibid at p. 88
that opinion now, after the legislative exposition, which 
has been afforded, and especially in recent times, of the 
assumed effect of that statute. The legislature it is 
admitted, are the best interpreters of their own laws; and to 
say nothing of other evidences they have given of their 
understanding upon this point, by the Church Temporalities 
Act, passed in 3 & k Viet., Ch. 78, they have provided that 
lands may be conveyed to such uses, for the benefit of the 
United Church of England and Ireland in this province, as 
would clearly have been prohibited by the British Statcufr*.
9 Geo. 2, and they have shown it to be their understanding, that 
without such express legislative authority the English 
Statutes of Mortmain would have restrained parties from making 
such a disposition, for they have added the words fthe Acts 
of Parliament commonly called the Statutes of Mortmain or 
other acts, laws or ixsages to the contrary thereof notwith­
standing; 1"
The crux of the learned Chief Justice’s point is that 
since the local legislation, the Church Temporalities Act, 
was passed on the assumption of the Statutes of Mortmain 
being in force there, it was not permissible for the Court 
to hold otherwise. The Canadian case therefore does not 
conflict with the dictum of the Master of the Rolls in 
Stewart1s case.
The meaning and method of ascertainment of a statute 
of general application was discussed in yet a third case 
decided in Nigeria. The case is unreported but the
16language used was cited in Attorne.y-Genera 1 v Holt & ors 
by the Full Court and it is as follows:
"No definition has been attempted of what is a statute 
of general application within the meaning of section 11].,
[of the S.C.O. which introduces English law] and each case
(16) (1910) 2 N.L.R. 1 at p. 21. The judgment of the Full 
Court on the substantive point v/as set aside by the Privy 
Council in A.G. of SouthernNigeria v HOLT [1915] A.C. 599.
The unreported case referred to above is Re Public Lands 
Ordinance. Lawani Bale. Claimant- E x p a r t e U U U T T q T o T —
has to he decided on the merits of the particular statute 
sought to he enforced. Two preliminary questions can, 
however, he put by way of a rough, but not infallible test, 
vis.: (l) by what courts is the statute applied in 
England? and (2) to what classes of the community in 
England does it apply? If, on the 1st January, 1900, 
an Act of Parliament were applied by all Civil or 
Criminal courts, as the case may be, to all classes of the 
community, there is a strong likelihood that it is in 
force within the jurisdiction. If, on the other hand, it 
were applied only by certain courts (e.g., a statute regulating 
procedure) ' or by certain classes of the community 
(e.g., an Act regulating a particular trade), the probability 
is that It would not be held to be locally applicable."
The view that you can determine whether a statute is or 
is not one of general application in England according to 
whether it is to be applied by a special court is questionable. 
This argument was put forward in the British Columbia Case 
of S v S (1877) without success.^ The main question 
at issue was whether the British Columbia Proclamation 
declaring that "the Civil and Criminal laws of England, 
as the same existed on the 19th day of November, 1858, and 
so far as the same are not from local circumstances 
inapplicable, are and shall be In force in all parts of the 
Colony of British Columbia," gave jurisdiction to the 
Supreme Court of British Columbia to suit?in divorce. In 
other words by virtue of that Proclamation, did the English 
Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857 become operative 
in British Columbia, and did the Supreme Court have
iriMT—iifl>|Wi 1 iBnmw 1 'i .miirwuri wm ■■wihwihhwi iiiiiiMin*iiinNfn n ii.n ii>'i w. 'niii i m ' i.w n i nnnur twmr»vii— nr i mnr Mrti fwni<m (iti . irnrTr*— ■■r f  *■— — i m 1 1    tv -.** tifcm * nw >
(17) But the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852 iifich regulated the 
procedure and practice in the Superior Courts of Common Law
at Westminster, has been held to be a Statute of general 
application, see Ribeiro v Chahfen(1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 476
(18) (1877)‘1.B.C. (pt .1725" followed in Sheppard v. Sheppard (1908) 
13B.C. 486. Lord BLACKBURN has also said of Colonialists "that 
"they cannot be expected to take out with them all the machinery 
of the law; they cannot take out with them the judges, and just­
ices of the Peace, & quarter sessions and everything of that kind 
that is established in England." - The Lauderdale Peerage (I885) 
L.R. 10 App. Cas. 692 at p. 746
jurisdiction to grant divorces4? It had heen argued that since
the type of special court set up in England had not "been
established in British Columbia, the Act did not apply.
This argument did not impress the learned judges. The
19observations of Gray <T., are instructive^
uThe principle of the English Divorce Act not being in­
applicable, have we the machinery to carry it out, in the case 
of a local marriage, or is all this legislation to be 
nugatory because we have not? A Lord Chancellor, a Lord 
Chief Justice of the Court of Queen1s Bench, a Lord Chief 
Justice of the Common Pleas, a Lord Chief Baron of the 
Exchequer or a Judge of the Court of Probate Constituted 
by Chap. 77, passed by the Imperial Parliament in the 
same session, to be called the Judge Ordinary), being the 
special tribunal, of whom any three, the Judge Ordinary 
being one, is to constitute the Court in England under this 
Act. Or, in such a case, must the injured party necessarily 
go to England, before this specific tribunal, to get his 
remedy? . • . Does not the Supreme Court of this Province 
exercise the powers of the Chancery and the Exchequer, 
without a Chancellor or a Baron? In no instance has it 
been deemed necessary to have the English machinery; we 
adopt the principles and the rules of practice, but not 
the officers of a court . . . The action of Local 
Legislatures, in adopting laws and c W ating tribunals for local 
purposes, when constitutionally taken, must be received as a 
legislative declaration that for all local purposes those 
tribunals are competent to carry out these laws. If this 
principle be sound, When the Legislature of British Columbia 
after the Union in I867, adopted for the whole of the 
Province the English la?\r as it existed on the 19th November, 
I858? which permitted pleas of divorce and matrimonial 
causes, and at the same time merged the two pre-existing 
courts into one, with the combined powers of both, with 
power to have '*complete cognizance of all pleas xvhatsoever,11 
it was a clear legislative declaration that in all local 
matters of this nature, that court as then constituted, had 
jurisdiction and was empowered to act. It would be 
Inconsistent to hold that we adopt an English remedial 
law for local purposes, but when you want to use the 
remedy you must go to England to get it. When adopted 
it becomes local law*11
(19) (1877) S.B.C. (Pt. I) at p. 31
Since the decision in S, v S, jurisdiction in divorce
cases has been uniformly exercised by single judges of the
Supreme Court in British Columbia. Martin J., in 
20
Watts v Watts refused to follow it but on appeal to the 
Privy Council, their Lordships allowed the appeal and placed 
the question beyond discussion that the Supreme Court in 
British Columbia had jurisdiction in divorce cases for
the reasons already given by GRAY and CREASE <J.®. in
r , -,21 
v S.
Other tests may be suggested. It is evidenct that
if a statute of England merely declares the Common law, there
is a strong reason for believing that such a statute is
one of general application. Mr. West’s opinion on this
tojpic given to the Lands Commissioners of Trade and
9 9
Plantations in 1720 is as follows:
"The Common Law of England, is the Common Law of the 
Plantations, and all statutes in affirmance of t h e common 
law passed in England, antecedent to ’the“"settlement” of a 
Colony, are in force in that Colony, unless there is 
some private Act to the contrary; though no statutes made 
since those settlements, are there in force, unless the 
colonies are particularly mentioned.1’
This test does not present any difficult problems. If 
such a declaratory statute was passed in England before 
the founding of the settlement of before a local
legislature was set up, it is submitted that it ought to be
(20) (1907) 13 B.C.R. p.281, On appeal see [ 1908JU.C. 578
(21) .tote p.
(22) See CHALMERS, G., Oninions of Eminent Lawyers on various 
points of English jurisorudence chiefLconcerning the Colonies. 
Fisheries and Commerce of Great Britain. Burlington (1858)
p. 206
regarded as one of general application. Indeed if even 
it was enacted after the setting up of a local legislature 
such sb the Sale of Goods Act, 1S93 with regard, to its 
application in Ghana, it will not make much difference. On 
such occasions, it becomes the tendency of the courts of the 
receiving country to refer to the provisions of the 
declaratory statute, not because they regard such an 
Act as being in force there, but aiMpfep because, it merely 
records what is the common law on a given topic.
The next proposition is that statutes which alter the 
common law (termed remedial statutes) or are in derogation 
of it, and statutes which abrogate the common law 
antecedent to the establishment of a local legislature, 
generally fall within the category of statutes of general 
application. The danger involved in not regarding such 
statutes as those of general application, is that in the 
absence of a local legislation, the receiving country may be 
left without either the common law or the statute law on a 
particular topic. It can hardly be the intention of the 
"gtadUQjr" country which in this case is England, and the 
receiving country, that there should be a lacuna in the law. 
Statutes of this nature passed in England after the 
establishment of &he local legislature in West Africa, as 
have been already pointed out, do not apply to the countries 
concerned, even though they fall within the category of
statutes of general application. The disadvantages
Inherent in the latter statement just made have been 
discussed elsewhere*
B. THE DECLARING AUTHORITY
It has already been stated that the duty of deciding
whether a statute of England is one of general application
or not has generally been exercised by the judges of the
receiving countries, namely West Africa. We have also
seen^that the courts are not consistent in their method of
approach* Hence it may be postulated that the
QctiViy
”declarations” made by judges£alone could open the door to
much controversy and render the law uncertain. Further,
as one 11 wrong declaration” even by a court of first Instance,
may perpetuate a b&k&l law, it is evident that the part to be
played by the legislature* should be great. Indeed as one
Canadian Chief Justice put It ”We can hardly suppose a
point more especially within the province of the
legislature to decide, than whether a particular part of the
statute law of England is or is not so far in its nature
2&applicable to the state of things in this province.”
However, if one looks back into the Colonial days,
one finds that the local legislatures have functioned 
mainly in the negative sense. Thus Igr section 2 of the
Gold Coast Statute Law Revision Ordinance No* 1 of 1893>
stipulated that notwithstanding section 1U of the Supreme Court
Ordinance, I876, (which extended English statutes of general
application to the Colony) twenty-one statutes which fell
within the category of of general application in
force in England, were declared "not to he in force within
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court” . One such statute
PR
was "An Act for the more effective prevention of crime". J 
Perhaps the first full-scale attempt hy a Colonial 
legislature to determine how much of English statnfces ought 
to he regarded as applicable locally, is the one illustrated
26
hy the "Declaratory Act of the Bahama Islands". Its
full title is,"An Act to declare how much of the laws of England
are practicable within the Bahama Islands, and ought to he
in force within the same." It gave a full and clear
account of which part of English law should he deemed in
force and binding in the Bahamas, instead of leaving it to
the varying discretion of the judges from time to time as
has been the normal practice elsewhere.^ The preamble
to the Act declared that "the Common law of England in all
cases, where the same hath not been altered by any of
the Acts or Statutes hereinafter enumerated,or by any Act
or Acts of the Assembly of these islands, (except so much
thereof as hath relation to the ancient feudal tenures, to
   — — — — —
(26) (1799; 40.Geo.3,0.2(Bahamas Legislation). LEWIS G.C., Op.cit. 
p. 191. See also MALCOLM O.D.: "Modes of Legislation in the Baha­
mas" (1899) I.J.Comp.LegfN.S.) No.2 p. 296
(27) CLARK C.s A Summary of Colonial Law (l83^)p°368. The full 
text of the Act is contained in HOWARD ’ S The Laws of the British 
Polonies in the West Indies (1827), Vol. 1, p. 3hl
outlawries in civil suits, to the wager of law or of batail, 
appeals of felony, writs of attaint, and ecclesiastical matters) 
is and of right otight to he, in full force within these 
islands, as the same now is in that part of Great Britain 
called England.1 Section 2 provided that "the several 
statutes and Acts of Parliament hereinafter particularly 
enumerated and mentioned, are, and of right ought to he, 
in full force and virtue within and throughout this Colony, 
as the same would he if the Bahama Islands were therein 
expressly named, or as if the afrosesaid Acts and Statutes 
had heen made and enacted hy the General Assembly of these 
I s l a n d s T h e  titles of a large number of English statutes 
enumerated, began with 9 Hen. 3* C. 3* a^d ended with 
27 Geo. 2. C.3.
By section 3> it was stipulated, that:
tfAll and every of the Acts, Statutes, and parts of 
Acts and Statutes of the Parliament of England or Great Britain, 
which relate to the prerogative of the Crown, or to the 
allegiance of the people, also such as require certain oaths 
(commonly called the state oaths) and tests to be taken 
or subscribed by the people of Great Britain, also such as 
declare the rights, liberties, and privileges of the 
subject are, and of right ought to be, of full force and 
virtue within this Colony, as the same would be if the 
Bahama Islands were therein expressly named, or as if the 
aforesaid Acts and Statutes had been made and enacted by 
the General Assembly of these Islands.1'
By section 6, it was declared, "That the several 
Acts and Statutes hereby declared to be in force shall be 
taken, construed and executed liberally and according 
to the siibstant ial effect and meaning of the same and
"(2‘8Ui.eV~FronTl225 - I787 ' ‘
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provided also, that nothing herein contained shall extend 02 
he construed to extend, a? abridge, alter or repeal any Act 
or Acts of the General Assembly of these Islands, or any 
article, clause, natter or t hing herein contained«u
The Western Region of Nigeria is the first African 
country t o have embarked upon a similar venture to prescribe 
the exact number of English statutes which are in force in 
that Region. A law Revision Committee set up for that 
purpose went through all the English legislation passed 
from the thirteenth century to the twentieth century (1899 
to be esactjo All the statutes selected foi* that period 
and a number of post-1900 statutes, Including the law of 
Property Act 1925, have been re »macted locally with slight 
modifications. By section 4 of the Law of EngL and (Applic­
ation) Law, 1959,^9 pt is provided that "Subject to the 
provisions of this Lgw no Imperial Act hitherto In force 
within the Region shall have any force or effect therein; 
provided that, subject to express provisions of any written 
law, this section shall not-
(a) revive anything not in force a? existing at the commence
ment of this Law; or _____   _____ _____ __ _ ___
29* Laws of W.R. 1959. Cap. 6 0. But note: s. 6 provides 
that "Nothing in this Law shall affect or apply to any Imper 
ial Act which by express i/iords or by necessary intendment 
applies to ’Her Majesty1sdominions or other possessions’".
By s. 7 it Is provided that nothing in this Law shall affect 
or apply to or be construed as affecting or applying to the 
provisions of any Imperial Act relating to any matter in 
respect of which the exclusive power to enact laws Is con­
ferred on the Federal Legislature.
(b) affect the previous operation, of any Imperial Act 
to which this section applies or anything duly done or 
suffered under any such Act; or
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability 
accrued or incurred under any such Act; or
(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred
in respect of any offence committed against any such Act; or
(&) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy 
in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, 
liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; 
and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may 
be instituted, continued or enforced and any such penalty, 
forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if this Law had 
not been pabsed."
By section 3? the "Common law of England and the 
doctrines of equity observed by Her Majesty’s High Court of 
Justice in England shall be in force throughout the Region.^
C. CONDITIONS OF APPLICABILITY
By way of Introduction, it may be apt to reproduce
the language of GRAY X  ? & British Columbian Judge,
^0which is as follows:^
"The application or non-application of a statute, or 
any particular part of it, does not rest upon the view
(3D) (1877) 1 B.C.R. 1 at p. 36
or opinion of! any one person, however conscientious he may 
he, hut upon the wants and necessities of the community; 
nor does it depend upon the frequency or common nature of the 
subject legislated upon. It is sufficient if the evil 
ever occurs. The moment it does, the statute applies.
The mere fact that there has been no call for its application 
in the particular direction since the introduction of the 
statute is no answer. Its powers may be dormant for years; 
lapse of time will not destroy them. The occasion which 
requires the remedy, and the demand for it, at once give the 
needed vitality, "unaffected by the previous non-user•tf
The first condition that must be satisfied
before an English statute can be applied in West Africa is
&  l~ -ftjl fQj.
that such statute must be in force in England/before the
ft . i f T i w  i f  i n » ^ n  i i m n ^ i w i r o i  '— ^  I _ _ _ _ _
establishment of a local legislature. In Ghana the date of
the f irst establishment of a local legislature is July 24,
1874• It has been held, therefore, that the Judicature
Act of the Imperial Parliament, which was enacted in 1873 Hut
did not come into force until November 1, 1875 does not 
31apply there.
The second condition is that such Acts of the British
Parliament which are declared to extend or apply in the West
African Countries, are considered to be in force "so far only
as the limits of the local jurisdiction and local circumstances
permit and subject to any existing or future local 
32
Ordinance.^ Even where it is not expressly stated in the
31) See The Colonial Bank v Bellon F.C. 1923-5. 173 at p. 177. 
Lomas v P g ^ 7 ~F^T~f92^-"Q. ZZoTt p. 225. But local 
legislation has re-enacted all the essential provisions of 
the Judicature Acts 1873“1925*
(32) Gambia. Law of England (Application) Ordinance.
Cap.3«S. 3(l)“ In the Republic of Ghana, it is enacted that 
such statutes apply provided that they are "subject to such 
modifications as may be requisite to enable them to be 
conveniently applied In Ghana - Courts Act.(CA$)3.154(4)• £ee also 
Neo v Neo (1875; L.R.6. P.C.38I3 applied in Penhas v Engf19531 
A.C.304 and in Leong v Chye [1955] A.C.648 —  — *
legislation that such statutes should apply subject to 
local conditions, it must he implied, "because it would he
absurd to suppose that the common law is to prevail in the
Colony only if suitable, and that laws [statutes] 
abrogating it are to prevail whether suitable or n o t . " ^
Thirdly, as these statutes are applicable "subject to any 
existing or future local Ordinance, it follows that when a local 
has been enacted on a siibject of English lav/, it 
is not permissible to pray in aid the provisions of any 
English statute of general application covering the same point. 
In the Ghana case of Inspector-General of Police v Kamara, 
the question to be decided by the West African Court of Appeal 
was as follows:
"(1) Is the Summary Jurisdiction Act of l81j-8 in force in 
the Colony, and
(2) if so, does section 11 thereof apply to summary trials
before a Police Magistrate?"
The Appellate Court were agreed that that Act was a
statute of general application, but it also observed that the
S'o
Act was to be in force only/as local circumstances permitted.
In holding that the statute in the circumstances could not
|A/ $ 9 U i ot t d
be applied in Ghana, the Court by
(33) Jex v McKinney (I889) L.J.P.C. 67 at p. 69* The
sole question in this case was whether the Mortmain Act was in
force in British Honduras as a statute of general application.
(31+) (193U) 2 W.A.C.A. 185
the following reasoning
"First of all it is very doubtful if a statute like the 
Act of 1848 could be held to apply to the Police 
Magistrates* Gourt of this Colony, which are branches of the 
Supreme Court invested with far larger powers and wider 
jurisdictions than a Petty Sessional Court in England*
A time limit of six months to prevent state prosecutions for 
petty offence in a country like England is by no means a 
statutory provision which obviously fits in with local 
circumstances and the status of our Courts of Summary 
Jurisdiction®
"In the second place a cursory study of the Supreme 
Court Ordinance, the Criminal Procedure Ordinance and the 
Commissioners Ordinance, all of which are to be read 
together, suffices to show that the Cojonial legislature 
has adopted and embodied in its own Ordinances practically 
every provision of the 1848 Act except the six months 
time limit provided by section 11 thereof. From these 
legislative activities it seems reasonably clear (a) that 
the Colonial legislature intended to replace the 1848 
Act by its local Ordinances, and (b) that it had decided 
that the six months limit was not suitable to the 
circumstances and conditions of this Colony.
* "Lastly, we have section 15 of the Supreme Court 
Ordinance, which explicitly enacts that the jurisdiction 
vested by that Ordinance in the Supreme Court shall be 
exercised (so far as regards procedure and practice) in 
the manner provided by itself, and the criminal Procedure 
Ordinance, or by rules and orders of the Court made 
pursuant to its own provisions."
The fourth point relating to the condition of 
aplicability is that the words "shall be in force" or 
"shall apply" must be construed to mean "can reasonably 
be a p p l i e d . F i f t h l y ,  It follows from the last 
mentioned point, that the application of such statutes 
abroad must yield to the special local circumstances and
-  ■■■"  1  -----------------------------------------------•■■■ 1 — , - -  -  II- I -  i r -11  I r n m - n i  n ~ » r  n  .  . . .  ■  — n ~ i
(35) ibid at p. 187
(36) Jex v McKinney (I889) at p. 69. See also Qkeke & anor 
v Comm, of Police, (i960) N.R.N.L.K. 1
must give way to matters of local public policy.
37Neo v Neo shows that even the English statutes of
Distribution, exported to the Straits Settlements,
apply there only sub modo to alio?/ for a .-.plurality of Chinese
w i d o w s . I n d e e d ,  as has been mentioned in the chapter
on precedents, the Privy Council held in the Ghana case of
39Coleman v Shang, that in construing Statute 21 of Henry 8,
C«5 and the Statute of Distribution (I670), the Appellate
Court in Ghana was entitled to apply the words "wife" and
"widow" to all persons regarded as wives and widows
according to the laws of Ghana. These decisions point to
the conclusion that local courts are not to consider
themselves as bound by the decisions of English courts in
the interpretation of such statutes of general application
as the ones just mentioned. itmay be mentioned that
section 85 of the Gold Coast Courts Ordinance (now repealed)
provided that 2^
"All Imperial laws declared to extend or apply to 
the jurisdiction of the courts shall be in force so far as 
only as the limits of local jurisdiction and local
(37) (1875) L«R. 6 P 0C.38I. "In applying this general 
principle, it has been held that statutes relating to 
matters and exigencies peculiar to the local condition
England* and which are not adapted to the circumstances 
of a particular Colony, do not become of its lav/, although 
the general law of England may be introduced into it."
Per Sir Montague SMITH "("at p. 39k) who delivered the 
judgments of the Privy Council.
(38) Counsels argument in Leong v Chye [1955] A.C.6U8
(39) [1961] 2 All E.R. k06' ----
(ho) Laws of the Gold Coast [1951 Rev.] Cap. h®
circumstances permit . . • and for the purpose of facilitating 
the application of the said Imperial laws, it shall be 
lawful for the said courts to construe the same with 
such verbal alterations, not affecting the substance as may be 
necessary to render the same applicable to the matter before 
the court; « « ."
Although this section has been repealed, it is 
submitted that this condition must still be implied in 
construing statutes of general application applicable to 
West Africa.
A contrary view to principles just enunciated in the 
fifth condition was put by COMBE C.J., in the Nigerian
1 *1
case of Lab in ,i oh v Abake. The facts were these: The 
defendant, an unmarried girl under 21 years of age living 
with her parents, was sued in the Police' Magistrate? s Court, 
Lagos, for the price of goods sold and delivered to her.
The Police Magistrate held that the Infants Relief Act,
I87U* was in force in Nigeria, and he dismissed the action 
on that ground. The plaintiff appealed to the Divisional 
Court, which allowed the appeal on the ground that the Act, 
as applied to Nigeria, should read with modifications, and 
that a native should be considered to come of age when he 
or she arrives at the age of puberty. The defendant 
appealed to the Pull Court. The questions which the Pull 
Coiirt had to determine were:
111 • Is the Infants1 Relief Act, 187U, a statute of 
general application in force in this Colony by virtue of 
section llj- of the Supreme Court Ordinance, 19Hj-?
2. If the Act is in force in this Colony, is the 
Court entitled to read that Act, in its application to this
^ . n w iwr-Mwiw 0 wmmn . m i w i a tvi—h ii.wh w mi* * * m inm .w ..■aw n««» 1 n t rT  Lrg-TCf.ru i t  u u j
{kl) (1921+) 5 N.L.R. 32 at p. 3k
Colony, with the modification suggested by the learned 
Judge [at the Divisional Court], or with any modification?
3* 3* Was the learned Magistrate right in holding that,
if the Infants* Relief Act, 187U, is in force in the Colony, 
the contract on which the plaintiff sued is void?1*
With regard to the first question, COMBE C.J., who 
delivered the judgment of the Pull Court of three judges, 
had "no doubt whatever but that the Infants1 Relief Act,
1874* is a statute of general application." His answer to 
the second question is as follows:
"With regard to the second question I am of opinion 
that the learned Judge was wrong in holding that, in applying 
the Act the Court is entitled to alter the Act to suit 
local conditions. The legislature in using the term "infant" 
must be assJFed to have been aware of the legal definition 
of that term and to have intended that the term should be 
read in accordance with that definition.
"When any matter before the Court is governed by the 
English law, whether the common law or a statute of general 
application, the question in issue must be decided in 
accordance with English law, and not, as has been done by 
the Divisional Court in this case, in accordance with what 
the court considered would be proper modification of the 
English la?/ in its application to this Colony."
With the greatest respect, the learned judges of the 
Pull Court were wrong in assuming that when any matter 
before the court is governed by the English lav/, it is the 
English law that is in force in England which should be 
applied. It was expressly stated in the Supreme Court 
Ordinance of 191U* of Nigeria, that the English la?/ 
applicable was subject to local jurisdiction and local 
circumstances. The English law applicable must be 
understood to mean so much of the English la?/ as is
applicable to the situation of the people in Nigeria. When 
such English la?/ is adopted for local purposes, it becomes 
local law. It is submitted that the answer given to the 
second question was right but for the wrong reasons. The 
better view is that the definition of an infant in Nigeria 
for the purposes of the Infants1 Relief Act, is not 
necessarily synonymous with the definition of capacity to 
marry. Further, as it is the general law of the land that 
an infant or child means a pel's on under the age of twenty-one 
years, the Divisional Court were wrong in construing an 
infant to mean a person who has not reached the age of 
puberty.
The sixth condition that must be noted is that if a
statute is held to be one of general application, then it
means that i:£ is the substantial part of the Act which must
be held to be applicable. To lfcake one or two sections of
such an Act, divorced from their context, is to apply a
new law, which Is not the law of England, and so construed
U2might never have been introduced in England at all.
Seventhly^it must be noted^that with particular
reference to civil law, statutes of general application can
be invoked only when by express or Implied terra in any
particular transaction, English law is deemed to be the
TU2Tl3hirik^^  "l3ajerai~V"^hiTtTa7nT'953 I A .C .5U2
P.O. at p. 3k7• The question at issue here was whether 
the English Money Lenders Acts applied to the Straits 
Settlements.
governing law thereon. Statutes of general application 
are not intended to override the application of customary 
law where the latter is the proper law which governs any 
particular transaction.
In the Nigerian case of Malomo v Qlushola, it was 
argued that section 17(l) of the Old Supreme Court 
Ordinance (Cap. 2 1 1 ) , ^  which deals with the application of 
native law and custom where the parties are natives effected 
an alteration of the law precluding the Court from giving 
effect to native law and custom if such la?/ or custom is 
"incompatible either directly or by necessary implication with 
any law for the time being in force," the relevant words being
"any law"; whereas before the enactment of section 17(1) the
equivalent provision read "nor imcompatible either directly 
or by necessary implication with any local enactment • • *"
It was further argued by counsel that the change of ?/ording 
brought in the statutes of general application which were 
in force in England on the 1st January, 1900, of which the 
Statute of Frauds is one, and as the gift of land
made under native law and custom was made orally, and it was
not evidenced by any meorandum or note in writing, it could 
not be proved, since section k of the Statute of Frauds 
preceded its being proved by oral evidence.
nniim*u<i.*—n»BiiMri l . w j urmmnni .  t . n un r im  in i« f  . m u n n .u . hi  m m  mi hhihh ■■■■ ■ iw ii iirm  t hibiiiiimi i i ■ - w m i  ■ ■«—* ni! i .  i ir n imitfinrn m ■ ii.»htttii i iwnmi.»> i< in i i ii'f i n u i<nm i humim imhwii^  tmhimh nnmnwirrr.ii—in  i i|a,trrrwrnrmiMw ,iMnin I
(1+3 ) (1955)15 W.A.C.A. 12
(J+2+) Laws of Nigeria 19U8 Revision
In its judgment the West African Court of Appeal 
rejected Counsels ingenious argument purely on the 
technical ground that the statute had not "been specially 
pleaded in his statement of defence. In these circumstances, 
the court found it unnecessary to decide whether section 
17(l) of the Supreme Court Ordinance did effect the change 
in the law contended.
It is regretted that the court felt it "unnecessary" 
to decide the point involved. The court should have 
stated categorically* that in a civil case where a 
transaction is governed hy customary lav/, English lav/ or 
statutes of general application are expressly excluded.
It is admitted that the phraseology used in the early 
legislation in West Africa ot prescribe the circumstances 
under which customary law was precluded from apply to certain 
transactions was ambiguous, but with judicial courage the 
judges could have settled that matter in a more reasonable 
manner. The Gold Coast legislation on this point was amended 
in 1935 when according to the Attorney-General, a 
Divisional Court held that the Statute of Limitation^ applied 
in a particular case governed by customary law. Moving 
for the second reading of a Bill entitled "An Ordinance 
to restore native customary law to its previous effectiveness", 
SoS. Abrahams, the Hon. Attorney-General made the 
following observations:
Tffb) GoTd Coas’t Colony» Leg. ^
uIt may or may not "be a good thing that there should 
he a law of limitation in the application of native law: 
that is a matter we must consider sooner or later. When 
we want to bring it [statute& of limitation!] in we shall not 
bring it in this way, we shall pass it here in this Gouneil*
We shall do that with every English enactment which 
we desire to bring in affecting native customary law. But 
it is essential that before any other statutes of general 
application are held by the Court to affect native 
customary law, we should put this matter beyond all doubt1'.
The last point in connection with the application 
of statutes of general application is this, that if a 
statute is declared to apply to a particular territory, a 
subsequent amendment or a repeal of the Act^ does not 
affect its continued application in the receiving country.
This proposition is valid only when the repealing Act domes 
into force after the date of reception in a given country.
Thus in the Nigerian case of G - a z a l C o .  Ltd. v Soufan & S o n s ^  
BATE <J •: who ruled that the Fraudulent Conveyances Act,
1571, is in force in the Northern Region of Nigeria, also 
pointed out that the fact that the statute was repealed in 
England by the Law of Property Act 1925? is immaterial 
since the repeal took place after January 1, 1900 - which 
is the reception date.
D. SOME PARTICULAR EXAMPLES
i* Statutes of Limitation^. Owing to the absence at the 
moment of Comprehensive local laws governing the limitation! 
of actions,especially in the law of contract, a number of 
English statutes apply to West Africa with the exception
(46) (1961) N 0R 0N.L0R. p. 39
of Western Nigeria which has her own Limitation L a w . ^
The relevant statutes are
(a) "An Act for the limitation of actions and for avoiding 
suits in law,f? 1 6 2 3 * ^
(h) "An Act for the limitation of actions and suits
relating to real property, and for simplifying the
remedies for trying the rights thereto” - commonly known
hq
as the .Real Property Limitation Act-, 1833o
(c) The ^ eal property [Limitation Act, 1837^°
(d) The Real property limitation Act, 1874* which amends the 
1833 Act.51
Of these, the first Act relates to actions arising out 
of simple contracts or torts, and this Act, often referred
<r
to as^ Statute of James has "been declared to he a statute of
52general application In the Nigeria case of Pearse v Aderoku 
LLOYD J., emphasised it that, ”lt has been repeatedly 
held in these courts that theStatutes of Limitation^ are 
statutes of general application and are therefore in force 
in Nigeria hy virtue of Section 14 of the [1876] Supreme
(47) In the field of Torts there are local 3?g|pwgfaiifciiLLiGttr>^ crr>ico6-^  
governing limitation of Actions. For example, S.4(l) of the 
Lagos Fatal Accidents Act, No. 34 of 1961, provides that 
"Every Action under this Act shall he commenced within
three years after the death of the deceased person • ." The 
Western Region of Nigeria Limitation Law, 1959* is hased on the
English Act of 1939* Laws of W. Nigeria [1959 Rev.] Gap. 64•
(48) 21. JacCt.l. C.16
(49) 3 & 4 W m . 4 C .27
(50) 7 Wm. 4 & 1 Viet. 0. 28
(51) 37 & 38 Viet. c. 57
(52) (1936) 13 N.L.R. 9
Court Ordinance/' Similarly, in the Gold Coast Case of
gischer & Co. v S w a n i k i e r HUTCHINSON G.J., observed that,
"In my opinion, the Statutes of Limitation!^ are in force in
this Colonyo" The circumstances in which the Statute of
James can be held as applicable were related by Redwar in his
5Ucomments as follows:
"The question as to the application of the Statutes of 
Limitation^ has more than once engaged the attention of the 
Gold Coast Courts, but the local case law on this subject is 
not in a very satisfactory condition* The better opinion 
is that, except in cases coming within a provision in 
Siction 19 of the O r d i n a n c e ,55 these statutes have no 
application as between natives, and that a defence of the 
Statute of Limitations in a suit between natives, or between 
a native and a European, must rest entirely, and can only 
succeed upon the evidence of a contract to be bound 
exclusively by English law, such contract being either 
express, or implied from the course of dealing or the nature 
of the transactions between the parties. In this view of 
the matter, the right to claim the benefit of the statutes is 
not, in strictness, a matter of law, but is purely 
conventional or contractual, within the provision of section 
19 of the Ordinance. In order that the court may be 
indueced to hold that English law shall, apply under Section 
19? it must be satisfied that the parties agreed that their 
obligations should be regulated exclusively by English law,
53) (1899) Red. 1
5U) A ct. pp. 10 & 11. See also Koney 
193U) 2 WoAcCoAo'^at p. 190.
.55) S. 19 of the S.Ct.Ord. I876. Later S. 87of the Gold 
Coast Cts. Ord. [1951 Nev.] now abolished by the Courts 
Act i960. There are similar versions of the provisions of 
that section In the laws of other West African countries. 
See g.g. the Sierra Leone Courts Ord. Cap. 7 [i960 Rev.]
S. 38| and the Western Region High Court Law Cap. I4I1 
[1959 Rev.] S. 12(3)o
56and nor partly "by English law and partly hy native law »
The effect of section 3 of the Statute of James (1623)
was that all actions on the case (except slander),actions of
account, trespass, debt, contract, etc* had to be brought
within six years* Actions of assault, battery, wounding
and imprisonment had to be commenced within four years after
the cause of action has arisen; and actions of slander within
157
two years next after the words were spoken* f
With the exception of a judgment in one case, there 
would have been no difficulty in stating that the English 
Real Property Limitation Act, 1833? amended by the Act of 
1874 is a statute of general application in cases where 
English law is the proper law* It is the Nigerian case 
v African Association Ltdo~^ It related to 
ownership of land in which the defendants pleaded possession 
and the statutes of limitation* WEBBER J., who tried the 
case was of opinion that the statutes of limitation 
concerning actions involving land did not apply in Nigeria,
The reasoning of the learned judge is evident in the
Case law on tjiTs^subJect^^Bee^eTSTleno jITTT^ v " 
Sail ah, D.Ct. 1931-7, P.158; (Ghana). Q.uartey y Akuah 
(1895) Bed. 138 (Ghana). Adoo v Bannerinan (1893) Red. 139, 
Aradzle v Yandor F»Co 1922 p„ 91? Tandoh v Williams P*Cerote»Mw»tfrTTO*wvriKres*y6*rt » a ,at«OTr«!iwwanaftB*w*» * *  w q p a B a W Mtb T M  *
1923-5. p.18 (Ghana). Bakare v Coker (1935) 12 N.L.R.31
/  V  ’  '  .  UJ9»M «qba|trcu«> 'M Pa '
(Nigeria). Alike v De_goaga (19381 lh N.L.R. 103 
(57) DARBY J.G.N. & BOSANQUET : A practical treatise on 
the Statute of Limitations in England and Ireland. 2nd. 
ed. revised and enlarged hy BOSANQUET, P.A. & MARCHANT, J.R.V.
(1893) p. U.
(58 ) (1910) 1 N.L.R. 131
following passages
"The Acts of Limitation^ apply to land in England and 
the principle of the limitation of actions relating to it 
could not be applied here unless this principle was recognised 
by native law or there was a special local enactment 
inculcating it and when statutes of general application in 
England were made applicable here it would never have been 
intended that the statutes affecting land in England and 
relating to their acquisition and extinguishment of title in 
it were to be so applied in a Colony or in a Protectorate 
as to affect the land in that Colony ox* Protectorate where the 
tenure and acquisition of land was according to native lav/ 
modified as far as was considered necessary by local
enactment o * P*59
If the learned judge’s main contention is that the
statutes in question do not apply to actions for the
recovery of land governed by customary law, no one will
disagree with that statement„ On the other hand, if if is
to be inferred that the statutes do not apply in Nigeria on the 
ground that the Real Property Limitation Act was passed in 
England to affect land in England, and therefore it could not 
aPPly there, then with the greatest respect, the learned 
judge’s view is questionable. It appears that in arriving 
at this conclusion, he was influenced greatly by the 
language used by the Master of the Rolls in Attorney-General v
>ttt~ h^ t i r>* mu h mF ii* mmwi  n i it» i ii nil >mi m m n  in u
60
Stewart 0 The two cases are distinguishable from each
othero As will be shown later a number of English statutes
relating to land have been held to apply in West Africa•
Indeed the case law on this subject clearly shows that the
(59) ibid at p 0 135
(60) See ante page It&l.
Real Property Limitation Acts are statutes of general
61application,, In the Nigerian case of Green v Owo
GRAHAM PAUL Jo, observes:
"To my mind it is clear - and it is well-settled by 
authority - that the English statutes of limitation^ are 
statutes 'of general application', and therefore they 
apply to Nigeria under „ » * the Supreme ^ourt Ordinance 01
It needs to said that the Acts apply to the other
62countries of West Africa0 The joint effect of the Real
Property Limitation Acts 1833 and 1874 is that actions to 
recover money charged on land are required to be brought 
within twelve years from the time when the right to receive 
the money accrued to some person capable of giving a 
discharge for the release of same® This in effect is a 
summary of the provisions of section 8 of the 1874 Act which 
reduced the twenty year period prescribed by the I833 Act 
to twelve. Finally, it must be remembered that the statutes 
do not apply in cases concerning land governed by customary 
lawe Thus possession of land - under customary law even for 
30 years would not of itself defeat a plaintiff's caseB^
2„ The Statuteiof Frauds„ In England today only part of 
section 4 of the Statute of Frauds, 1677* remains in force *
The fact that the Statute of Frauds, 1677, and the Statute
ri«fri<.urai»,iijp».rg»a*j*}aigirrewitfri» m   nn.i.Tf irrm i ■ a —    ------------------------r--  ,   , , ,, ,, 1 it—     -TilTit r*mi~n rrm i ITU! .m ti 1 mm. wm ■iif im inifi 11 u 1     it m.i.th > nni.rmi
(61) (1936) 13 N.L.R. 43 at p .45
(62) See Naiah v U.T.C. Ltd.(1959) G.L.R. 79. Ghana. For
Sierra Leone Case Law see Macaulay v Bungay (1934) 2.S.L.L.R.28
t _  »« i i aai wa^wi Wr i n^ i ui  > * /
v N2£ii 3 S.l.L.R. 60; Bright v Brights Executors (1958)
16 W.A.C.A.50. For the Gambia case law. see N ’J'ie v Hall
1931) 1 W.A.C.A. 100; 2 S.L.L.R. 31; and Joof'TTFbogi"
1959) 16 W.A.C.A. 105.
63) iMnah v.. Kennedy F.C .1920-21. p.21 at 22. Guraba v
.Public Trustee (1947) 18 N.L.R. 132 at p.135
(645 29 Car,2 C.3
6^ 3of Frauds Amendment Act, 1828s are statutes of general 
application in West Africa has not been doubted« By 
section k of the statute, '‘no action shall he brought 
whereby to charge any executor or administrator upon any 
special promise, to answer damages out of his own estate; or 
whereby to charge the defendant upon any special promise to 
answer to the debt, default or miscarriages of another person; 
or to charge any person Lip on any agreement made upon 
consideration of marriage; or upon any contract or sale of 
lands., tenements or hereditaments, or any interest in or 
concerning them; or upon any agreement that is not to be 
performed within the space of one year from the making 
•thereof; unless the agreement upon which such action shall be 
brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in 
writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or 
some other person thereunto by him lawfully authorised®’1 The 
question which has often come up for decision in the Courts is 
whether and when the statute does apply to transactions 
entered into by the indigenous people either inter se or 
between them and non-natives® In the Nigerian case of 
Okoleji, v Okupe® which related to the sale of land by an 
illiterate woman to a literate registered moneylender, 
GRAHAM-PAUL Jo, had this to say on the subject?
“It has been held that the question whether the Statute 
of Framds.. Is applicable in Nigeria depends on the particular
(66) (1939) 15 N.L.Ro 28 at p.29
67facts of each case in which it is pleaded. In these suits
which are between a literate registered money lender seeking to 
set up a sale as against an illiterate woman, I of opinion 
that the Statute of Frauds does not apply® In fact I consider 
that its application is even more just and equitable to 
protect an illiterate person against a literate person1s 
claim in Nigeria than it is between parties, both literate, in 
England. In my view the Court should be more willing to 
hold that the Statute of Frauds is applicable in Nigeria in a 
case where it is pleaded by an illiterate against a literate 
party® Where a literate party (particularly where that party 
is a professional money lender in a large way of business) 
enters into a contract of sale of land, he ought to have the 
Contract recorded in writing, executed by the illiterate party 
in such circumstances as to make it absolutely beyond', quest ion 
that the Illiterate party understood thoroughly what he or 
she was executing o'1
It must, however, be borne in mind that the statute
does not apply to transactions governed by customary law. Thus
parole evidence is receivable to prove a gift of land made
orally under native law and custom between the indigenous 
68parties .
The Statute of Frauds, 1677 and the Statute of Frauds
Amendment Act, 1828, have been virtually replaced by local
legislation in West Africa® In Ghana, section k of the Act has
ceased to apply there, except in so far as it relates to any
contract for the sale of lands® Section 17 which relates
to contracts for the sale of goods to the value of £G10 and
69
upwards has also ceased to apply. Section 7 of the 1828
Act no longer applies® Again with the passing of the Ghana
Administration of Estates Act, 1961, sections 10, 11, 23 and
X & 7 referred 'to die re id' perhaps that” of Alake" &"anoF v 
Awawu. 11 NoLoR®39
"("68*J Malomo & ors» v Olushola & ors® (195^ 4-) 21 N.L.R.1, (1955)
15 W.A.C.A.12. But it applies to contracts between non-natives: 
Kuri v Kuri (1923) k N.L.R.76 at p. 81 
Jjo9) Ghana Contracts Act, i960 Act. 25
24 of the Statute of Frauds, 1677? do no apply In Ghana any 
more0 In the Federal Territory of Nigeria, the Law Reform 
(Contrftfife) Act, No* 64 of 1961, has substituted a new 
provision in place of section 4 of the statuteQ The new 
provision is very similar to the provision in section 4 of the 
statute with respect to contracts for the sale of land, but it 
makes it very clear that nothing in the new provision applies 
to any contract $ade under customary law* By virtue of the
Western Region Law of England (Application) Law, 1959? the
d (t 70
provisions of [.statutes have ceased to apply there;
but the legislative adjustment made in the Western Region
Contracts Law, 1958, is similar to that in the Fe&eral 
71Territory*
3* Statutes Relating to Fraudulent Deeds and Conveyances 
There are two relevant English statutes0 One is the 
Statute, 13 Elisabeth, Csgu 5 (1571)? enacted to declare void 
fraudulent deeds made to avoid debt and conveyances of lands» 
The other is the Statute, 27 Elizabeth C^p° 4 (1585) which by 
its provisions render void fraudulent conveyances made to 
deceive purchased. It has been held in the Nigerian Case 
of v Polar in,72 that the Statute 13
Elizabech C^gfo 5 applies there» As the learned judges of 
the West African Court of Appeal put it,
J O T Laws of ~ ^ e a t e r n ~ W ± g e r i a 'T 1959r'CapT'Vo”'
Jl) Laws of Western Nigeria (1959) Cap. 25 x
U'p (I9 3S) U W.A.C.A. 76 at p. 77« See also Gazal & Co. Ltd v 
Soufgn (1961) N.H.N.L.R. 3 9 . — ------------
"The Statute in question is in our view a statute of 
general application, applying as it does quite generally to 
ordinajrljf affairs and dealings of men without any qualification 
or speciality restricting its application* The statute was 
simply declaratory of the common law at the time* And the 
statute was in force in England on 1st January, 1900• The repea 
in 1925 does not affect Nigeria as the repealing act was 
subsequent to 1st January, 1900 4'
The statutes do not apply in the Western Region of Nigeria
now. The reason is that the Western Nigeria Property and
Conveyancing Lav/, 1959 which is based on the English Law of
Property Act, 1925? contains adequate provisions designed
72 ato check such mischiefs<4 Both statutes - 13 Elizabeth C .
5 (1571) and 27 Elizabeth, C 0 4 (1585) have been declared
77?
to apply in Ghana*
4° Other St a iju t e s Declared 1 0^ be of Genera 1 A;pp_l ic at ion^^'
etc, 151^
An Act concerning probate of testaments, fees to be taken 
75
(7 2a) W 0N 0 Gap* 100 ss*1 8 1 -1 8 3
(73) As ant (3 v Compagnie Frangaise De I/Afrique Occident ale 
(1 9 5 6 ^ ^ 0  oL oRTITT” ar-— _
(74) Some of these may be of historical interest only as 
local legislation may have been enacted to cover them*
(75) 21 Hen.8 G«5<» In Ghana.in Coleman v Shang [1961] 2 AlloE.R 
406 '
Statutes of Distribution, 1670.*^
Sunday Observance Act, 1677°"^
_  Q
Administration of Intestates Estate Act, 1685° 
Middlesex Registry Act, 1708."^
Landlord and Tenant Act, 1730°^°
O-i
Distress for Rent Act, 1737*
2
83
8Common Carriers Act, 1830c
Administration of Estates Act, 1833°
8k
Statutory declarations Act, 1835®
{7§7 22 & 23 Chao*2 Co 10-For Ghana see Gorle.hu v Gorleku Fl93k)
2 WoAoC.Ao 82, and Coleman v Shang (1959) G»L.R* 390HTl96o] 
k JcAcLc p d 6 0 c  On SppSSIS to~5Fi$y Council [1961] 2 All.EoRo 
k06, P.Co Eor Nigeria see Barnet)ose v Daniel (1952) lk W.A.C.A 
111, (195k) lk W.A.C.A. 116, p.C.", [1955T“AoC. 107° For Sierra 
Leone, see Godwin v Crowther (193k) 2 W.A.C.A.109* ^or 
Gambia see Bah v. Taylor (1959) 16 W.A.C.A. 101.mntJMr.tt.-ix. nwnrznsfviw. wurut.'ca^.a » *
(77) 29 Cha.2 C.7° In Ghana*in Testa & Co. v Duncan Div. et„ 
1926-9 p. 191. 7
(78) In Ghana in Coleman v Shang. In Nigeria, Bamgbose v
'  '  •wtus.tnrnwitMqtw* wyi Br»»KianaM ' —* '  triTnrrrm nn rii ~n. rmt if.m
Daniel. In the Gambia Bah v Taylor.
(79) 7 Ann. Go20o In the Ghana case of Crayem v Consolidated
African Select ion Trusjb (I9k9) 12 W.A.C.A. kk3 .
(80) In Ghana in Kalenderian Bros, v Nahun (1955) 1 WoA.LcR.l8
'  * r-r-Tr^Tf nnajtwarvtvtU iAA '  •
(81) 11 Geoo2. C.19o In Ghana, Kalenderian Bros v Nahun,
1 WoA.LoR. 18
(82) 11 Geo. k & 1 Will.k C.68. In Ghana, Orlelegehv Zogbi
Civ. Cto 1921-25 P° 107° _ _
(S3) 3 & k Will, k ColOko In Sierra Leone in Thompson & anorv,
Jones (1939) 5 W.A.C.Ac 85° “ ~
(8k) 5 & 6 Will®k C.62 in the Ghana case of R v Borson (I9kl) 
7 W.A.C.A. 158 “  — — —
Wills Act, I837.
86Real Property Amendment Act *
Gaming Act, 181+5 ^
88
Inclosure Acts, 181+5*1878.
Common Law Procedure Act, 1852*89 
Court of Probate Act, 1857°9<^
Partition Act, 1868.^
Forfeiture Act, 1870*92
The Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881*9^
X 85) 7 Will* k & 1 Victo C.25. In the Ghana case of In 
Abaka (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 2360 
T S 6 ) 3 &  9 Viet* C«IO60 In the Ghana case of Kugbe v U #T.C. Ltd* 
DiVo ct. 1926“29* p 0 202*
(87) 8 & 9 Viet* C* 109° In Nigeria, Chemor v Sahyoun (191+6)
r **—' *  rgniwwiwwwpmwwuniin ■— \  1 /
18 N.L.R. 113.
(88) 8 & 9 Viet. G. 118, + 1+1 + 1+2 Viet. 0.56. In Nigeria in 
BMnXaffl v Avigo (19U1) 16 N.L.R. 30
(89J 15 & lo Viet. C. 7°. In the Ghana case of Riheiro v
Chanin (1951+) 11+ W.A.C.A. 1+76 — —
(90) 20 and 21 Viet. C.77 in G.B. Ollivant & Co. Ltd. v Ilaroun 
Bros. & ors (193U) 2 W.A.C.A. 159 (Ghana)
(9dJ" 31 & 32 Victo Col+Oo In Williams v Williams (191+6)
18 N.L.R.66; Michel v Frederick (19I+U) 10 W.A.C.A 286* (Nigeria)
(92) 33 & 3k Viet* C.23» In Qwarey v Macaulay (19I+I)
16 N.L.R. 61 (Nigeria)* ~ -
(93) l+ll- & 1+5 Viet* C.i+lo Indeed in Nigeria, the Law of 
Property Act 1881 - 1892 applies. See Onwuta v Niger Co*
(1926) 7 N.L.R.79* Shorunmu v Dophon (T9I+0) 15 NoL7rT§7;’  MMagffll LtW+»Jl!lHWy.HlHnB  p a  \  CJWIVUtf ^ .HKaMW HV * i  f 1 +
Bnkitola v Alii & ors. (191+1) 16 N.L.R.56: Raji v WilliamsTO...aaoi.M«^ . r r y agta , '  f  , iw m I'Wm i m u m n s » :a ra iu lC 3 >
& ors. (191+1) 16 N.L.R. 11+, on appeal, (195-1)7 WVA.C.A.ll+7; 
Awele v Habib (1951+) 21 N.L.R*8.naw*.qpirrm* n riii.Trm-tn-T . m in  ^ 1 /
In Sierra Leone, both the Acts of 1881 and the Conveyancing
Act, 1911 apply* See Lisle v Barllatt (l938) 1+ W.A.C.A* 56;
Basma v Noureldine (1952J* 11+’ wTa.c7a. 231 * For the Gambia,trm^ KtcaaRmifMM  ^ g ■kvtra itb ta: *maa *  ^ <
see N'dow v Sasnfii & ors* (1956) 1 W.A.L.R. 183*«-*■< umnrAW i^trlri otrmog /*naj a nri to  a»j. Bi wen' fc m-iva * * *
Note that the Act of 1881 does not apply in Ghana* See 
Colonial Bank v Bellon B.C. 1923-25, 167 at p. 180; f/.^c 
Sel-Jue v Ologo 1927 Div. Ct. 1926-9, p. 193.
Settled Land Acts, 1882-90 *
OR
Partnership Act, 1890.
Land Transfer Act, 1897
5» Statutes not of General Application
Very few mamm have heen declared to he not of general
application. As a rule, those statutes which have heen
declared to he inapplicable have heen so held because they
were passed in England after the date of the reception of
English law* A good example is the Administration of
97Estates Act 1925* One illustration of a statute held to
he inapplicable to West Africa is the Sierra Leone case of
98
Johnson v Regem which was decided by the Privy Council*
In that case, Counsel had relied on the provision that
declares that statutes of general application which were in
force in England on January 1, 1880, should he in force in
Sierra Leone from the date of the Ordinance coming into effect*
He contended that that provision imported into Sierra Leone
90
the Crown Suits Act, 1855* The argument vms rejected* Their 
Lordships were of opinion "that that Act is not a statute of
k5 & k6 Viet. C .38 - 53 & 5k Viet. C.69. Thomas & anor
(19U7) 12 W.A.C.A. 229.
5k Viet. C.39. In Nigeria in Farhoud v Chama (1953)
_ ^      >■» >-* ’  nR»«Ka»nMr>wud * /
2 N.L.R.166
(96) 60 & 61 Viet. C.65. In Nigeria - Young v Ahina (19U0) 6
_ w  nt»T»fmacCT whJhmj BfaA»mijrfTifii|irt»ia V
W 0A.C.A.I8O 0 This decision overruled In re Sholuji952) 11 
NoL«Ro 37 which held that the statute was not of general 
application* Note this statute does not apply in Ghana« See 
Stance .,qrs v _Qaartey & anor Div.ct. 1921-25 P.19J+, and also 
Gorleku v Gorlekm (193U) 2 WoA.CoA*82.
(97)13 & l o G e  o * 5 C«23° See e 0g« Taylor v Taylor & anor (1935)
2 W 0A . C0A 0 3^8; Johnson v UoA*C *LtdT(T936)*T3N7LTRTi3TTNigerIa) * 
Similarly the voluntary Conveyances Act 1893 56 & 57 Viet* C*21 has 
heen held to he inapplicable in Ghana - Muff at v Trading A ssociation
* _ nwniriiTMimiii nni m inrniiiiiini.ii niiimimiin n iin.wianriiimiiirr
of Nigeria Div.ct. 1926-9 p.59.
(9d) From 
v Nahhan
4 9 E
general application within the meaning of section 19 of 
the Ordinance in question* It only deals with proceedings 
in the United Kingdom*
6 0 Gonel\isionm.* ■■Wf.innnm
Prom our hrief analysis of the so-called statutes of 
general application vre have seen that in four of the former 
British dependencies different portions of statutes of 
England are in force in different territories* Might it not 
have heen more logical and more conducive to uniformity 
hoth of practice and construction, to have had one fixed 
period for all the territories of West Africa* It would not 
have heen difficult to fix such a date in the Colonial period., 
because the four territories had heen governed together as a 
political unit once* As it happened some territories 
benefited from the alterations of statute law since 187U,whilst 
Ghana was deprived of such benefits* However, it is now too 
late for a uniform date to he fixed from outside* On$e 
encouraging sign is that full-scale legislative reform is 
well under way to bring the laws in West Africa more up to 
date with modern needs* As a result of this wave of 
legislation, it can he said that the days of statutes of 
general application are numbered* In the old days, when 
there were no official legal draftsmen employed in the local 
legal service, the necessity of resorting to English statutes
of general application was justified* It cannot he justified 
in modern times* Local legal draftsmen no douht still 
have recourse to English statutes, brut they also mould them 
to suit local conditions before they are adopted*
THE COMMON LAW IN TOST AFRICA
In the foregoing Chapters we have examined in some detail 
the application of English law in the former British territories 
of West Africa* English law in West Africa has been stated 
broadly to include the common law, the doctrines of equity and 
statutes of general application. It is an amalgam of these 
three elements and rules of customary lav applying to a whole 
territory which constitute the common law of a particular country 
in West Africa* The conditions of the applicability of the 
separate branches of the lavs have already been discussed* It 
only needs to be noted that, as the common law in West Africa is
nothing but the practice and determination of the courts drawn
into precedents, where the circumstances of a country and its 
people differ from the English pattern, the common lav of these 
countries must in its natural course, become different, and 
sometimes contrary, or at least incompatible, with the common 
law of England*
The definition and scope of the common lav of each country in
West Africa can therefore be taken to mean the provision which extend.1
the application of English law to that particular country and rules
of customary law* Examples of such provisions have already been 
2
given * The most recent declaration of the common law in Ghana is
CJ
contained in the Interpretation Act, I960,1* section 17 of which reads;
"(l) The common lav, as comprised in the lavs of Ghana, consists 
in addition to the rules of lav generally known as the common 
lav, of the rules generally known as the doctrines of equity 
0,11x1 of rules of customary lav included in the common lav under 
any enactment providing for the assimilation of such rules of 
customary lav o,s are suitable for general application®
(2) In the case of inconsistency, an assimilated rule shall 
prevail over any other rule and a rule of equity shall prevail 
over any rule other than an assimilated rule®
(3) While any of the statutes of general application continue t 
apply by virtue of the Courts Act, 1960, (C®A°9), they shall be 
treated as if they formed part of the common lav, as defined
in subsection (l), prevailing over any rule thereof other than 
an assimilated rule*
(4 ) In deciding upon the existence or content of a rule of the 
common lav, as so defined, the court may have regard to any 
exposition of that rule by a court exercising jurisdiction in 
any country®
(5) A reference in an enactment to the common law shall be 
construed as a reference to it as affected by any enactment 
for the time being in force.*'
Whether the other countries in West Africa will make such a 
formal declaration as has been done in the case of Ghana remains 
to be seen® It is possible that the declaration of each country 
may differ from that of another country. Indeed, in the United 
States of America ~ also a common law country — the declaration
/of
A
of the common law differs from State to State*
There can be no doubt, however, that in any future declaration 
to be made by the other West African countries English law will 
still be the foundation*
In Me Derm id. v » Me Derm id , X„*Sl. WXLFLEY, Judge of the United 
States Court for China, observed that 1!The term common law as 
used in the Statute has been interpreted by this Court in the 
case of the United States v« Diddle [decided on March, 6 1907] 
to mean 1 Those principles of the common law of England and 
those statutes passed in aid thereof, including the law admin­
istered in the Equity, Admiralty and Ecclesiastical Tribunals, 
which were adapted to the situation and circumstances of the 
American Colonies at the date of transfer of sovereignty, as 
modified, applied and developed generally by the decisions of tl 
State Courts and decisions of the United States Courts, and inc- 
orporated generally in the Statutes and constitutions of the 
States1,1 * See The American Journal of International Law (3 908) 
Vol« 2,1, p. 288. In TayloTv. FeT7l956~) 233 F. 2d/~p* 251 it
^ M m U liuw idM B g U  1 m f ~l Ml it i  —
has been declared that "The law of California is the common law 
of England, so far as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent 
with the constitution of the United States or the constitution 
or laws of California"* The 1956 Wisconsin declaration is as 
followss— "The common law in effect at the time of the adoption 
of the State Constitution is not confined to English Statutes 
and the decisions of the English Courts and is perhaps broad 
enough to embra.ee customs and usages and legal maxims and 
principles in vogue at the time*11 - Menne v° City of Fond du lac 
77 N.W* 2do 7egf The Washington declaration in 1958 is as 
follows;— "The * common law1 is comprised of that body of court 
decisions in the non statutory field to which the doctrine of 
stare decisis ar-nl ies J'-d'/indhurst v° Department of Labor and 
Industries, j, 893°*. The Federal, common law has been defined by 
the Court of Appeal in '*assachus setts to be "a. body of decisions 
law developed bv the federal, courts untrammeled by state courf 
dec is ion s *" - Lyons v« Howard {lf5°; 25''' 771»2d . 91.2° 1?or more 
examp 3 es, see, e*g. 2,233 T12 0 e n e r a I El g e s t, 3 r d s e v i es 3 a nd 
Corpus Jnr is secundum 15 C«J. 3. C oran o n I aw *
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